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COMPENSATION OF INFORMERS.
[The following opinion was inadvertently omitted from Volume XX:]

The Secretary of the Navy is, impliedly, authorized to contract for their
compensation with persons furnishing information of frauds practiced upon the Government in the supplying of equipment which was
not according to contract. (Rev. Stat., sec. 3732, considered in connection with 15 Opin.; 235, 240.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 27, 1893.
Sm: Your communication of November 17 asks my advice
as to whether you have authority to contract for their compensation with the persons offering you information of frauds
upon your Department.
The facts are, in short, that you have outstanding contracts
for a large amount of equipment; that large deliveries have
been made under these contracts, but that the deliveries
have not been completed, so that the contracts are still alive;
that you have received certain information from employes Of
the contractor indicating frauds upon your inspectors by
which articles have been accepted that are not completed
according to the contract; that the information s~ far received
has been proved correct and bas been the cause of precau.
tions by which the Department will be protected in the
future; that it has been given under the understanding
that proper compensation should be made and that further
information is promised, through which it is believed that
the Government can be made .whole for an the losses it has
suffered up to this time; but that to obtain this information
it will be necessary to give the informants fair compensation,
both for services done and services proposed. · The informants will be contented with a percentage upon the moneys to
2638-V0L 21, PT. 1--1
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be realized by the Government as a result of the information
furnished.
By section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, you are debarred
from making any contract in the premises, "un]ess the same
is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate
to its fulfillment." The latest authoritative interpretation of
this statute is contained in the opinion of .Attorney-General
Devens on the "Fifteen per cent contracts," as follows: "In
order that a contract should be authorized by law, it must
appear either that express authority was given to make such
contract, or that it was necessarily to be inferred from some
duty imposed upon, or from some authority given to, the person assuming the contract on behalf of the United States."
(15 Opin., 235, 240.)
If, therefore, you have authority to inake the proposed contract, it must be by implication from the statutes authorizing
you to make the aforesaid contracts for equipment. The
question is a difficult one, but it is my opinion that you have
the authority desired. The statutes contemplated necessarily large expenditures on your part for inspection of articles
offered before their acceptance. The proposed informants
have seen things which the force you provided was inadequate to discover. It appe'trs that, owing to overconfidence
in the honesty of the contractor, the outlay for inspection
force has been inadequate, and these informants propose, on
being compensated for the necessary loss involved to themselves, to put you in the same position as if they had been
all the while under your employ as watchmen. The contracts
being still uncompleted, and the matter, therefore, still
within your jurisdiction, I think that you can make such
arrangements in the premises as you may deem best for the
interest of the United States, whether we regard the proposed moneys to be paid in the nature of inspection for
inspectors' wages, or for detective work.
The contract should be made with some responsible person
who will represent all the rest. i inclose a draft which may
give sugge tions as to the form of contract desired.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE N.AVY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Import Duties-"Personsl Effects."

IMPORT DUTIES-"PERSONAL EFFECTS."
Whether persons crossing into Canada, buying clothes there, and immediately returning with the clothes, can introduce them free- of duty as
"personal effects" involves a question of fact.
Persons crossing the line with no other purpose than to buy the clothes,
and immediately returning, are not entitled to introduce them free of
duty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 2, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of February 21 calls my attention to the practice of a certain Canadian tailor who comes
across the line to North Troy, Vt., and other border villages
with samples of cloth, soliciting orders for clothing; and you
inform me that when the garments are ready they are delivered at a point just over the line in Canada, the purchasers
crossing the line to get their clothes and returning wearing
the clothes or carrying them in bundles. You ask substantially a single question, namely, whether these clothes are
entitled to free entry under paragraph 752 of the tariff act
of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, as answering the following
description:
"Wearing apparel and other personal effects (not merchandise) of persons arriving in the United States, but this
exemption shall not be held to include articles not actually
in use and necessary and appropriate for the use of such persons for the purposes of their journey and present comfort or
convenience, or which are intended for any other person or
persons, or for sale."
In my opinion, the nature of the transaction may be such
that the buyers are not entitled to be classed as "persons
arriving in the United States" within the meaning of this
paragraph. That phrase can not be construed to include all
persons crossing the Canadian line in a southerly direction,
whether or not they may have crossed it in a northerly direction a few minutes previous with no purpose but that of
bringing themselves within the letter of the paragraph
quoted. Whether in any given case the clothes are or
are not within the protection of this paragraph would be a
question of fact.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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UNMAILABLE MATTER-LOTTERY.
The business of a certain company considered and determined to be in
the nature of a lottery within the meaning of sections 389'1 and 4041
of the Revised Statutes, as amended.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 4, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 19th
ultimo, requesting my opinion upon the question of the right
of the Tontine Savings .Association of Minneapolis, Minn.,
to use the United States mails in the carrying on of its
business.
I concur in the conclusion reached by the .Assistant .Attorney-General for the Post-Office Department that the com•
pany's business is in the nature of a lottery within the meaning of sections 3894 and 4041 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
N oTE.-The association above referred to issued bonds,
in numerical order, to their patrons, by whfoh it agreed to
pay to the holder of each bond, forty years after date,
the sum of $1,500, unless the .bond was redeemed at an
earlier date, according to the conditions on the back of the
bond. .An initiation -fee of $15 ·was charged, all of which
went to the expense fund. Monthly dues were $3, 12½ per
cent of which was set apart to the expense fund, 50 per
cent as a maturity fund, and 37¼ per cent as a reserve fund .
.Attached to each bond were three coupons for $500 each,
redeemable out of the maturity fund. The coupons on all
the bonds were numbered from 1 up, in numerical order.
Tbe coupons were redeemable out of the maturity fund in
the order of 1, 3; 2, 6; 9; 4, 12; 5, 15; 18; 7, 21, etc .
.Assistant .Attorney-General (of the Post-Office Department) Thomas was of opinion that the plan of business of
the Tontine Company was, in all essential particulars, similar to tliat of the Provident Bond and Investment Company,
in ref r n e to which company an opinion will be found in
20 Opinion , 74 .-W. II. P.
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CHINESE MERCHANT-RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.
Section 2 of act of November 3, 1893, chapter 14, amending the act
approved May 5, 1892; chapter 60, construed; and held, that amember
of a Chinese copartnership within the United States, whose name is
not a part of the firm name, is not a "merchant" within the meaning of the section.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
April 6, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 3d
instant, in which my opinion is requested upon the question
whether a member of a· Chinese copartnership, whose name
does not form a part of the firm. name under which the
copartnership business is carried on, can leave the United
States and return thereto as a merchant, under section 2
of the act approved November 3, 1893, amending the act
approved May 5, 1892, entitled "An act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States."
Section 2 of the act referred to defines a merchant in the
following language: '' A merchant is- a person engaged in
buying and selling merchandise, at a fixed place of business,
which business is conducted in bis name, and who during
the time he claims to be engaged as · a merchant, does not
engage in the performance of any manual labor, except
such as is necessary in the conduct of his business as such
merchant."
This requirement that a merchant must conduct the business in his own name can have but one purpose, to wit,
that he who is a merchant in fact shall also be known to be
such by the parties with whom he deals and by the . public
generally. That purpose could readily be defeated if it were
permissible to conceal his identity by trading under an
assumed name, or under the disguise of a" Co."
I am therefore of the opinion that a Ohinese person does
not bring him.self within the statutory definition of merchant
unless he conducts his business either in his own name or in
a firm name of which his own is a part.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF 1'HE TREASURY.
OF
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CHINESE.
The requirements of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, should be strictly
complied with uy Chinese applicants for admission to the country.
DEP AR'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

.April 10, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of April 6 incloses certain
papers presented by Lee Gong and Mark Yune, claiming to
be merchants resident at Toronto, Canada, and naturalized
British subjects, but Chinese by birth. These papers are
presented *in support of applications for admission to this
country. You ask my opinion whether they comply with the
act of July 5, 1884 (chap. 220, sec. 6). The requirements of
that act, in my opinion, should be strictly complied with by
applicants for admission. The papers submitted to me do not
comply with all the requirements of the act of 1884. ]for
instance, the passports offered as certificates do not, in either
case, state either the nature, character, or estimated value of
the business carried on by the applicant. The consular vise
. supplies the nature aud character of the business, but not
its estimated value. It is not sufficient, however, that necessary information should be supplied by the vise alone.
The statute requires the guaranty of the certificate as well
as the vise upon each point.
· Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Certain steamship companies disputed the validity of the Treasury
Department's regulations, holding them liable under the immigration
act of March 3, 1891, cbapter 551, for the maintenance and transportation to the seaboard of certain alien immigrants who had reached
the interior of the country. IIeld, that as there was no way of
enforcing tlle statute against the steamship companies except through
th~ court , the question is one arising in the Department of Justice,
and tho official opinion of the Attorney-General can not be required
th •r on.
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DEP .A.RTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,

April 12, 1894.
Sm: I :µave the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of April 9, asking my opinion as to the lawfulness of one of your recently promulgated rules relatil).g to
the maintenance and deportation of alien immigrants.
The immigration act of March 3, 1891 (chap. 551, sec. 11),
provides for the return to his own country, within one year
from his immigration, of any alien who shall have come into
the United States in violation of law, or who shall have
beeome a public charge from causes existing prior to his
landing in the country; and further provides that such
return shall be at the expense of the person or persons, vessel, transportation company, or corporation bringing such
alien into tbe United States. Section 10 of the same act provides for the immediate return of all aliens who may unlawfully come to the United States. It provides, further, that
the cost of their maintenance while on land, as well as
expense of the return of such aliens, shall be borne by the
owner or owners of the vessel on which such aliens came,
and that refusal to return them or to pay the cost of their
maintenance shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine.
On November 29, 1893, a circular was issued by the 8uperintendent of Immigration, approved by yourself, providing
certain rules with relation to alien immigrants; these rules
being promulgated under your general power to establisll
regulations and rules and issue instructions not inconsistent
with law for carrying out the provisions of the immigration
laws of the United States. (Act of Aug. 3, 1882, chap. 376,
sec. 3.) Rule 7 of this circular provides that the expense of
the return of any alien under the provisions of section 11 of
the act of 1891 shall be at the expense of the person or persons; vessel, transportation company, or corporation bringing
such alien; and it provides, further, that this expense shal1
include all expenses incurred for maintenance and transportation on land after such cases are brought to the attentiou
of the Bureau of Immigration.
In other words, your Department construes the provision
with regard to maintenance of aliens unlawfully landed as
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applicable to the persons referred to in section 11 as well as
those referred to fo section 10 of the act of 1891. You also
construe the expense of the return of such aliens as including the expense of their transportation to the seaboard from
any interior point at whi.cli they may be apprehended.
The question is now raised by the steamship companies,
who refuse to pay the expenses of maintenance and transportation to the seaboard in the case of aliens returned under
the provisions of section 11. There are no means of enforcing the statutory provisions against the steamship companies
except through the courts. In other words, the companies
not being under control of the Executive Departments of the
Government, your rule is ineffective except as a declaration
of the law as construed by your Department, and its enforcement, if your construction is correct, is the duty of the
Department of Justice.
Your question is substantially whether if a civil suit or
criminal prosecution is instituted under the provisions of
section 10 for the purpose of compelling payment of the maintenance and inland transportation of the aliens described in
section 11 success would result. For the reasons stated by
me in the opinions of January 29 and February 10, 1894, upon
the questions submitted by you relating to a proposed attachment of goods at suit of the United States under the laws of
the State of Maine, I think that your present question is not
one arising in the administration of your Department within
the meaning of section 356 of the Revised Statutes, and I
therefore think that it would be improper for me to give an
official opinion thereon.
· Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,

MAILS-OBSTRUCTI•NG CARRIAGE-CONSPIRACY.
Any interference with the carriage of the mail upon railroads in the
usual and ordinary way i a criminal offense, and a combination of

offenders may be prosecuted under I evise<l. Statutes, section 5440.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 21, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of to-day relating to the stoppage of passenger trains carrying the mails on the Great Northern
Railroad.
The statutes of the United States provide that "every
railroad company carrying the mail shall carry on any train
which may run over its route all mailable matter directed to
be carried thereon, with the person in charge of the same."
The statutes also make it an offense for any person to
"kn_owingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of
the mail."
It has been decided by the courts, and, in my opinion, is
clearly the law, that under these provisions of the statutes
it is an offense for any person knowingly and willfully to
obstruct or retard the passage of a train carrying the mail,
and that it is no excuse that such person is willing that the
mail car may be detached and run separately. He is bound
to permit the mail to be carried in the usual and ordinary
way, such as is contemplated by the act of Congress and
directed by the Postmaster-General.
It would seem from your statement that the persons who
have entere~ into the combination to which you refer have
brought themselves within the further provisions of the
statutes of the United States which declare that "if two
or more persons conspire to commit an offense against the
United States, * * * and one or more of such parties
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the
parties to the conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not
less than one thousand dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars, and to imprisonment not more than two years."
Respectfully,
·
L.A.WRENCE MAXWELL, JR.,
Acting Attorney-General.
Tile SECRET.A.RY OF THE TRE.A.SUI{Y.
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HYDRAULIC MINING-CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION.
Section 19 of the act of March 1, 1893, chapter 183, creating the Commission, construed, with reference to a case stated, and held, that the
Commission bad power to take necessary steps to prevent injury, by
hydraulic mining, to a navigable river within its jurisdiction, and
that it might resort to the remedy of injunction, to be obtained on a
bill in equity filed in the name of the United States, etc.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 24, 1894.

SIR: Your letter of the 18th instant states that the California Debris Commission, created by act of Congress (27
Stat., 507) reports that the Volcano Gold Gravel Mining
Company (a corporation) is mining by the hydraulic process
in California, within the territory of the jurisdiction of the
Commission, as defined by the act; that a portion of the
"detritus" from this mining must reach the Sacramento
River and do more or less injury to the navigability of this
stream. That the company have not made application to
mine, nor has it made the surrender referred to in section l _O
of the act.
On this state of fact you submit for my opinion the following inquiries:
"1. As to the application to this case of the last sentence
of section 19 of the act creating the Commission."
The sentence indicated is as follows:
" Said Commission shall take necessary steps to enforce its
orders in case of the failure, neglect, or refusal of such owner
or owners, company, or corporation, or agents thereof, to
comply therewith, or in the event of any person or persons,
company, or corporation working by said process in said territory contrary to law."
Section 19 applies to those mine owners who have filed the
petition provided for in section 9 and have surrendered to
the United -States the right to regulate the working of the
mine, as provided for in section 10. But it also extends to
all who have not complied with sections 9 and 10, but who are
"working by aid process in said territory contrary to law."
Section 3 provides that"Hydraulic mining, as defined in section eight hereof,
dir ·tly or indirectly injuring the navigability of said river

TO THE SECRE'rARY OF WAR.

11

Hydraulic Mining-California Debris Commission.

systems, carried on in said territory other than is permitted
under the provisions of this act is hereby prohibited and
declared itnlawful."
So the Commission has the power to take such "necessary
steps" as may be required to prevent or restrain those persons who by the operations of hydraulic mining are injuring
the navigability of the river in the defined territory.
"2. Whether or not it is the duty of the Commission to
give the company orders to cease hydraulic mining."
While it may not be strictly the legal d~ty of the Commission to give such orders, it would seem to be, on all accounts,
preferable that before resorting to the harsh and drastic
remedies of the law the attention of the offending company
should be called to the provisions of the statute and to the
acts and conduct of the company which appear to be in violation of those provisions, to the end that the evil complained
of may be voluntarily removed and the company admonished
of the consequence of continued recusancy.
"3 and 4. If the second question be answered in the
affirmative, what course the Commission shall pursue to
enforce such order. And what steps should be taken to
enforce the provisions of the act."
The obvious remedy would seem to be by injunction, to be
obtained from one of the judges of the Federal courts in
California, on a bill in equity, brought in the name of the
United States by the district attorney.
This appears to have proven efficient in the cases of The
People of the State of California v. The Gold Ditch and M. Company (66 Cal., 138), on a state of facts nearly resembling that
above stated; and in Willamette Iron Bridge Company v.
Hatch (125 U. S., 1 ), where like principles were involved.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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CONTRACT-PAYMENT OJ<, INSTALLMENTS-MODIFICATION.
Contract for construction of battle ship Indiana, construed, and held,
that it was not competent for the Secretary of the Navy, under the
existing contract, to pay to the contractors any part of the last three
installments of the price of the vessel or of reservations from previous
payments, prior to the preliminary or conditional acceptance of the
vessel; but that a supplemental contract might be entered into, modifying the terms and provisions of the existing contract.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.April 27, 1894.
Sm: I have your letter of the 26th instant inclosing a copy
of the contract for the construction of a seagoing coast-line
battle ship No. 1, made the 19th November, 1890, between
"The Wi1liam Cramp & Sous Ship and Engine Building
Oo~pauy, a corporation," etc., party of the first part, and
the United States, party of the second part.
You state that the contractors notified the Navy Department that the ship (Indiana) would be ready for her preliminary trial required by the tenth clause of the contract, on or
about the 30th instant, "but in view of the report of a board
of officers appointed to inspect the vessel, I am convinced
that she is not in such condition as ·will permit of her trial
at that time with due regard to t he interests of the Government, and the trial will accordingly be postponed until a
later date"; and you request an expression of my opinion
as to whether "it is competent for me [you] under the provisions of the contract for the constritetion of the Indiana to pay
the contractors any part of the last three installments of the
price of the vessel or of the reservations from the previous
payments prior to her preliminary or conditional acceptance,
provided," etc.
The tenth clause of the contract provides "that when the
vessel is completed and ready for delivery to the United
States, as required by the drawings, plans, and specifications, she shall be imbjected to a trial trip, in the open sea,
under conditions prescribed or approved by the Secretary
of the Navy, to test the bull and fittings," etc.
The eleventh clau e of the contract provides: '' If at and
upon the trial trip before mentioned, the foregoing require-
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ments and conditions * * * shall be fulfilled * * *
then and in such case the ·vessel shall be preliminarily
accepted."
The :fifth ·section of the nineteenth clause provides: "The
payment of the last three installments shall not be made
except as provided for jn the eleventll clause hereof."
I am constrained to conclude, then, that it is not competent for you" under the provisions of the contract" to pay·
to the contractors . any part of the last three installments
of the price of the vessel or of the reservations from the
previous payments prior to her preliminary or conditional
acceptance.
The contracting parties may, however, so modify such of
the terms and provisions of their contract-as in their
opinion operate injuriously to their interests-taking care
in so doing that the rights of each as already secured are
not impaired by such alteration. Draft of such supplemental contract is inclosed.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.
LAND P.A.TENT-SUIT TO REFORM-LACHES.
Patents to Mexican land grants in California under the act of March 3,
1851, chapter 41, were conclusive only as between the United States
and the patentees. They did not affect the interests of third persons.
The surveys confirmed by such patents do not preclude a legal investigation and decision by the proper tribunals between conflicting
claimants.
Third persons claiming title to the land thus patented may bring a suit
to declare a trust in said land. Such a suit may be brought without
the aid of the Attorney-General, and in the State courts. The decision of a State court upon such a suit, unappealed from, binds the
parties thereto, whether righteous or erroneous.
When such third persons fail to sue until the period of the statute of
limitations of the State has expired, they are barred by their laches
from suing thereafter. That they had meanwhile been applying to
Congress for reli._ef is immaterial.
The Attorney-General should not institute for the benefit of private
parties a suit to vacate or reform a United States land patent unless
there is reasonable ground to believe that it will be sustained by the
court; or, except for a wrong "which private litigation could not
remedy."
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DEP,A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 28, 1894.
Sm: Your petition and argument on behalf of the Coppinger claimants have received specially careful attention,
both on account of the value of the property in question
and because the decision upon your application will be a
precedent upon many others.
You represent persons now interested in the- California
ranch called Canada de Raymundo~ which ranch was granted
in Mexican times to one Coppinger. Your clients, or their
predecessors in title, actually occupied the tePritory in dispute, or some part thereof, from Mexican times down to their
eviction under process of court about 1861. The disputed
territory, while occupied and claimed by Coppinger and his
family or grantees, was included in tlle patent for the neighboring ranch known as Las Pulgas. You now apply to· me
for a direction that the U. S. attorney for the northern district of California file a bill in equity to reform the patent of
the Las Pulgas ranch, so that it shall not cover this disputed
territory. On the original merits the questions are the same
discussed in the cases of Arguello v. United States (18 How.,
539, 543-544), Greer v. Mezes (24 How., 268, 275), and De
Arguello v. Greer (26 Cal., 615). While the Las Pulgas
patent was issued in 1857, no application seems to have been
made on behalf of your clients or their predecessors in title
to this Department or to the Department of the Interior
until 1885.
Both Las Pulgas and Uaiiada de Raymundo were wellknown Mexican ranches, both were submitted to the Board
of Land Commissioners established under the act of March
3, 1851, chapter 41, and the titles of both were confirmed by
this Board and by the courts on appeal, the final confirmation
of each having occurred in 1856. You claim that, by the
orders and decrees of confirmation in each case, properly
construed, the territory in que tion belonged to the Canada
de Raymundo ranch; that its inclu ion in tbe patent for the
Las Pulga ranch in 1857 was induced by fraud or gross mistake in the urvey, and amounted to an overruling of the
de i ions of the Land Com mi ioners and of the courts; that
the action of the Interior Department in confirming the sur-
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vey and issuing the patent did not bind the Coppingers, but
that they were entitled to equitable relief in the premises.
From examination of all the papers on file these c]aims
appear to be well founded; and it would follow that, upon
proper proceedings, promptly instituted, the Las Pulgas
patent ought to have been reformed. The questions, however, remain to be decided, whether it ever has been the duty
of the Attorney-General, or would have been proper for him~
to bring such a suit in the name of the United States; and,
further, whether the lapse of time and subsequent litigations
among the parties have affected your clients' rights.
In Greer v. · JJfezes, above cited, the Supreme Court held
that your clients were not entitled to set up their rights in
an action at common law. That action was ejectment brought
against them by the owners of tbe Las Pulgas patent. After
the decision, and in accordance therewith, the Coppingers
were ejected from the premises in or about 1861. All were
then of age except Manuela Coppinger, who canie of age
about 1868. The statute of limitations in California, is five
years. ( Gurtner v. United States, 149 U. S., 662, 676.)
In January, 1862, immediately after your clients were
ejected, they were joined as defendants in a biJI of peace in
the State courts of California. The suit thus instituted was
decided by the court of first instance in favor of the complainants, the Las Pulgas people, and this decision, on
appeal, was affirmed by the supreme court of the State.
(De Arguello v. Greer, supra.) The decree in this suit
quieted the title and enjoined your clients from ever setting
up further claim to the land. You insist that the State
court had no jurisdiction, and that Federal questions were
involved and treaty rights affected. Assuming this to be
true, and assuming the decree and affirmance thereof to
have been erroneous, nevertheless the appeal taken to the
U. S. Supreme Court was allowed to be dismissed for
informality about 1871, and no further attempt was made by
your clients to maintain their rights in court. The State
court, however, had, in my opinion, full jurisdiction of the
controversy and power to settle every question involved.
( California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S., 389.) By the
express terms of the act of 1851, and of the Louisiana act
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of 1831 therein referred to, the Las Pulgas patent was con.
elusive between the United States and the Las Pulgas claimants only, and did not affect the interest of third persons,
and the survey thereunder was not in anywise to be considered as precluding a legal in_v estigation and decision by the
proper tribunals between conflicting claimants, but only to
operate as a relinquishment on the part of the United States
of all title to the land in question. The remedy of third
parties is by the familiar suit to declare a trust in the lands
obtained by the patentee. Such a suit may be brought
without the aid of the Attorney-General, and in the State
courts, under a long line of authorities. (Johnson v. Towsley,
13 Wall., 72; Gibson v. Chouteau, id., 99, 102; O'Brien v.
Perry, 1 Black, 139; Widdicombe v. Childers, 124 U. S., 400;
Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S., 456; California Powder Works
v. Davis, supra.) The State courts having jurisdiction all
parties were bound by their decisions, whether righteous or
erroneous.
But had there-been no litigation at all in the premises,
your clients would have been barred by their laches in not
instituting proper legal proceedings. ( Gurtner v. United
States, 149 U.S., 662.) The fact that they knocked at the
wrong door by vain applications to Congressional favor does
not relieve them. Nor are they entitled to special consideration in ~his regard, for their true remedy was pointed out
by Judge Hoffman in 1857 and by Land Commissioner
Edmunds in 1863.
In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, the duty
of the Attorney-General is not, I think, doubtful. The suit
I am asked to initiate ought not to be brought unless there
is reasonable ground to believe that it will be sustained by
the court. But, after careful deliberation, and with the
strongest desire that the applicants shall have every opportup.ity to secure justice, I am unable to see that such reasonable ground does exist. Without taking into account other
formidable difficulties, the applicants must, in my judgment,
be defeated on either of three distinct grounds: First, that
the tt rn y-General ha no proper right to sue except for a wrong "which private litigation could not remedy" ( Gurtner
v. United States, 149 U.S., 662,672); second, that, with clear
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and ample remedies in their hands, your clients have been
guilty of gross laches in resorting to them, and are barred.by
the statute of limitations; third, that they have had their
day in court and have tried their claim in a suit directly
betw.een themselves and those in possession of the lands
before a court having full jurisdiction of the controversy.
Under such circumstances it would be highly improper, I
think, for the Attorney-General to lend the name and sanction of the United States to the proposed litigation. The
consequences would be far-reaching, and would not merely
affect the parties to this proposed suit. A precedent would
be established to the. effect that the Attorney-General must
sue and call in question long-established land titles, and
involve those interested in all the expense and hardship of
years of controversy, whenever applied to in good faith, and
even though, in his own judgment, the claim to be prosecuted was wholly destitute of legal foundation. My conception of the duty of the Attorney-General in such a case is
different. When he sues for and in the name of the United
States, he in effect represents that in bis judgment the suit
has legal merits deserving to be brought before the courts
for their adjudication. It is true that in refusing to accede
to an application to bring suit the Attorney-General may
settle the rights of the claimants adversely and absolutely.
In that view he of course assumes a grave responsibility.
But just that responsibility is legally and rightfully devolved
upon him. And the true result is not that he is to shirk it
by bringing suit as matter of course every time be is asked
to do so, but that each case is to receive careful and deliberate investigation, and suit be authorized only if a reasonable
probability of its success is disclosed.
Your application for an order directing the U. S. attorney
for the district of California to bring suit to reform the
patent of the Las Pulgas ranch is therefore denied.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
ROBERT W. HUNTER, Esq.,
Attorney at Law, City.
2638-Y0L 21,
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CHINESE-DETENTION PENDING DEPORTATION.
Under act of May 5, 1892 ( chap. 60, see. 7), the Secretary of the Treasury
may authorize the landing at a port in this country of Chinese
sentenced to deportation and their detention at said port until the
vessel returns and is ready to proceed on her return voyage.
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

May 4, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 2d
instant, accompanied by certain inclosures which, as requested, I herewith return.
The question put to me is, as I understand, whether Chinese sentenced to deportation may be landed at Port Townsend on the voyage to Victoria and there be temporarily
detained in the custody of the collector of customs until the
return of the vessel from Victoria to Port Townsend, when
they will be put on board the vessel and taken thence
directly to Yokohama. Such an arrangement seems to me
entirely competent under that provision of the act of May
5, 1892, by which the Secretary of the Treasury is directed
to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
the efficient execution of the act.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

LIEN LAWS-PROPERTY OF UNI'fED STATES-CONTRACTORS.
Assuming that the title to the land on which a dry dock is bnilt, and the
exclusive jurisdiction over it, are in the United States, the mechanic's
lien laws of South Carolina do not operate thereon, and claims under
such laws may be ignored in settlements with contractors.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

May ll, 1894.

Sm: I have your letter of the 8th instant in closing a copy
of the contract between J ustiu McCarthy and the Chief of the
Bureau of Yards and Docks for the construction of a timber
dry do ·k at the coaling Rtation, Port Royal, S. C., together
with a certificate l>y the clerk of the court of Beaufort
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County, S. C., that two liens have been filed in bis office for
labor and supplies furnished in the construction of the dry
dock. On the case stated in your letter you ask my opinion
as to·
.
"Whether, by the insertion in the contract of said stipulatjon, that payment shall not be made if there be any lien
upon the dock other than that of the United States, the
exemption of Government property from the operation of the
mechanics' lien laws was waived so as to give legal effect to
the lieus of the kind described in the accompanying papers."
Generally, on grounds of public policy, the mechanic's lien
laws do not, in the absence of express provisions, apply to
public buildings erected by States for public uses.
And, further, the United States does not suffe'r itself to be
sued without its consent; and a proceeding against it, or its
property, for the enforcement of a mechanic's lien would be
a suit against it such as it does not allow.
Again, public property can be subjected to claims against
it only when it is in the possession of the courts by the act
of the Government seeking to have its rights established.
(The Siren, 7 Wall., 152; Garr v. United States, 98 U. S.,
432.)
But assuming that the title to the land on which the dock
is built, and the exclusive jurisdiction over it, are in the
United States, then the mechanic's lien laws of South Carolina have no application to it. These laws are wholly the
creature of statute, deriving their existence from positive
enactment, by which alone is the lien· created and imposed
on the ]and. Congress is the only legislature by which such
a lien can be created and imposed upon land under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Because this
land lies within the limits of South Carolina it is not subject
to her laws, except there be in the act of her legislature,
under which jurisdiction was ceded to the United States, a
reservation of concurrent jurisdiction to the State. (Fort
Leavenworth R. R. Go. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 532; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72; Foley v Shriver, 81 Va., 568;
Crook, Horner & Go. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Go., 54 Fed.
Rep., 604.)
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The fifth paragraph of the twelfth section of the contract
forbids any payment, under the contract, "without satisfactory evidence, such as a county clerk's certificate, that there
are no existing liens other t han t hat of the United States
upon such work or material."
From what has been already said, it follows that there are
not and can not be any "mechanic's liens " on the dock for
labor and supplies used in its construction, unless such liens
attached before the property was acquired by the United
States and built into or upon its land. In that case the
principles stated and applied in Briggs v. A Light Boat (7
Allen, 292), will control. Paragraph 5, section 12, applies to
any hens that exist upon the work and mat erials, without
regard to when such liens were created. I wish to say that
as to mechanic's liens created since the construction of the
dock under this contract was begun, there ar e none existing;
and no bar is raised by anything that appears in your letter
to the payment of the money to the contractor as the contract provides.
In reply to your further question, I beg t o say that I think
it is competent for the Department to make payment to the
cont ractor of the amounts to which he is or may become
entitled under the contract.
While it is eminently desirable and proper that the Government should not aid or countenance it s general contractors in withholding payment from those who have furnished
labor and material for the construction of Government works,
but should, where it may be practicable, require that they
should be paid, yet the Government should not, in the
absence of any legal liability upon it or up.on its property
for the debts of its contractors, make voluntary payment of
such debts, because such payments might not avail as credits
in the :final settlement of accounts with the cont ractor.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
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CHINESE MERCHANTS-RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.
The third paragraph of section 2 of act of November 3, 1893, chapter 14,
construed, and held, that its provisions are to be regarded as merely
prospective in their operation and as applying exclusively to Chinese
merchants who both come into the United States for the first time
since November 3, 1893, and having carried on business here, afterwards leave the country and seek to return.
Merchants already here when the statute took effect may leave the
country and return as if the act of November 3, 1893, had not been
passed.
DEP.ARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

May 14, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 8th
instant, asking my opinion upon the question whether Chinese merchants, lawfully in the United States when the
statute of November 3, 1893, took effect, are within the provisions of the third paragraph of section 2 of that statute,
which provides as follows:
" Where an application is made by a Chinaman for
entrance into the United States on the ground that he was
formerly engaged in this country as a merchant, he shall
establish by the ~estimony of two credible witnesses other
than Chinese the fact that he conducted such business as
hereinbefore defined for at least one year before his departure from the United States, and that during such year he
was not engaged in the performance of any manual labor,
except such as was necessary in the conduct of bis business
as such merchant and in default of such proof shall be refused
landing."
This paragraph undoubtedly presents serious difficulties
of construction. To interpret its language literally would
be to make Congress declare a new class of Chinese persons
admissible to the United States, to wit, persons who might
not be merchants at the time of their application and might
even be laborers, but who had been merchants in the United
States at some former period. For obvious reasons it is not
possible to impute any such purpose to Congress, or to
believe it did not intend that all persons, when applying
under said third paragraph, should be merchants then, and
not merely at some previous time. That view being inevita-
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ble, the persons covered by the third paragraph are clearly
persons who, having previously come into the United States
and carried on business here as merchants and still being
merchants, have temporarily left the county and are seeking
to return.
The question, however, still remains, whether this paragraph applies to merchants who had come into the country
and were doing business here before the passage of the act
of November 3, 1893. The consequences of that construction
are obvious. A Chinese merchant lawfully here and lawfully doing business here before November 3, 1893, under
some other name than his own, could not depart from the
country for at least a year from that time, except under the
penalty of not being able to return. Neither could he leave
at any later period with the right of return, unless he had
first carried on his business in this country for a year in his
own name. But nothing in the law requires a Chinese merchant who was here prior to November 3, 1893, to make any
change in his mode of doing business-to conduct it, for
instance, in his own name rather than in an assumed name.
Nothing in the law in any way countenances the idea that
such a Chinese merchant is meant to be hindered from temporarily leaving the country by the necessity of changing his
established business methods. Yet so serious alterations of
the status of persons rightfully in the United States when the
act of November 3, 1893, took efl1ect are not to be brought
about by mere implication, unless such implication be
unavoidable, and certainly are not to be so brought about
if they will be avoided by treating the statute as wholly prospective in its operation. The ordinary presumption applica
ble to every statute is to prevail in the case of the act of
November 3, 1893, namely, that it lays down a rule of conduct for the future, but makes no change in rights already
acquired or conditions already established.
Such a presumption yields, of course, to any language
indicative of an intent to change the existing status of any
per on or clas of per ons, or to take away or impair any
right or privileg already enjoyed. But nothing can be
found in th law in que tion ugge:tive of any such purpose
as r gard Chine e merchants already commercially domi-
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ciled in the United States, while the statute must be construed, as emphatically declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States in an analogous case (Lau Ow Bew, 144
U.S., 47), not only so as not to produce absurd or incongruous or unjust results, but so as to produce the least conflict
with existing treaties providing for the free ingress and
egress of Chinese merchants into and from the United States.
I am constrained to the conclusion, therefore; that this
third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893,
is to be regarded as wholly prospective in its operation and
as applying exclusively to Chinese merchants who both come
into the United States for the first time since November 3,
1893, and having carried on business here, afterwards leave
the country and seek to return. Merchants already here
when the statute took effect may leave the country and
return as if the act of November 3, 1893, had _not been
passed.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

IMPORT DUTIES-WAREHOUSED GOODS.
Goods imported and warehoused for nearly three years, then withdrawn
and exported, and finally reshipped to the United States by a different merchant, there being no evidence that the transaction was a colorable one to evade the tariff laws, may be entered for warehousing·
as an "original importation" within Revised Statutes, section 2971.
If the transaction were merely colorable t Qucere.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 19, 1894.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of April 6
asking my official opinion as to whether certain wool imported at Philadelphia is lawfully entitled to the privileges
of an original warehouse entry under the customs laws. It
appears that this wool was imported into the United States
early in 1891 and remained in war~house nearly three years,
when it was withdrawn for exportation to Canada. Very
shortly thereafter it was reshipped to the United States by
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a different merchant, who has applied to have it entered for
warehousing as if a new "original importation." You ask
whether 1t is entitled to be considered an original importation under the terms of section 2971 of the Revised Statutes.
Attorney-General Williams, in 1875, answered the question
in the affirmative (14 Opin., 574). He held that warehoused
goods could be withdrawn, sent across the border, and then
reimported and reentered for warehousing for a new three
years' term as if they never before had been in the country,
and this even if the transaction were for the purpose of
evading a duty to which they would otherwise be liable.
A question once definitely answered by one of my predecessors and left at rest for a long term of years should be
reconsidered by me only in a very exceptional case; but so
far as the opinion above mentioned applies to goods exported for the mere purpose of reimporting them so as to
extend the warehousing period, the subsequent opinions of
Attorneys-General Brewster and Garland upon analogous
questions arising under the internal-revenue laws (17 Opin.,
579; 18 Opin., 381) might be regarded as justifying reconsideration in this instance.
Neither your letter nor the inclosed letter from the Philadelphia collector, however, states as a fact that there was
any intention on the part of the importer whose case is now
before you to evade any statutory provision. It may be that
the goods were bona fide sold in the open market after
export, and that the intent to reimport them was :first formed
by the vendee after the sale had been perfected. Except
where the transaction is shown to be a mere colorable one,
so that there is no real exportation and importation of the
goods at all within the later rulings of this Department, the
definition established by Attorney-General Williams so loug
ago should stand unquestioned by me; and I therefore advise
you that these Philadelphia goods are to be regarded as an
original importation upon the facts stated.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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TAX ON RETAIL LIQUOR DEALERS.
The opinion of Attorney-General Miller, of May 15, 1889 (19 Opin., 306),
does no" conflict with the collection of the special tax on retail
liquor dealers in the Indian country and Alaska under Revised Statutes, section 3244.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 24, 1894.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of May 22, inclosing a letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and an opinion of the Solicitor
of Internal Revenue relating to the collection of a special
tax from retail liquor dealers in the Indian country and in
Alaska under section 3244 of the Revised Statutes. The
Commissioner and Solicitor state that according to their
understanding of the law such tax is collectible, but that
they :find an obstacle to its collection in an opinion of
Attorney-General Miller, rendered May 15, 1889. (19
Opin., 306.) You accordingly ask me to advise you whether
I concur in that opinion.
I :find, on examining the opinion you refer to, .that no
question was asked of the Attorney-General relating to the
Indian country or Alaska. Bis references to the position
of liquor dealers in the Indian country were obiter merely,
and hence do not have the force and effect of an official
opinion of this Department. Those whose cases were then
under consideration he held to be taxable, and his ruling
constitutes no obstacle to any action now desired to be taken
by your Department. I therefore return the inclosures
without further comment.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

SHIPWRECKED SEAMEN-ASSISTING-WITHHOLDING FROM
PAY.
·Where a U. S. consul-general bas provided shipwrecked, destitute seamen with food, clothing, and passage to a port in this country, the
amount so expended should not be deducted from the wages of such
seamen.
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF .JUSTICE,

May 24, 1894.
SIR: I have your letter of the 22d, inclosing letters from
the U. S. consul-general at Honolulu and the shipping commissioner at San Francisco, from which it appears that the
American bark Hilo was wrecked in the region of the
Hawaiian Islands; that the seamen were "utterly destitute"
when they reached Honolulu; that the U. S. consul-general
there provided them with food and clothing and procured
for them passage to San Francisco; and wrote to the U. S.
shipping commissioner at San Francisco, advising him of
the facts, and inclosed to him an itemized statement of the
amount in value of the supplies furnished to each of the
seamen. The owners of the vessel paid the amounts due to
the men for wages, but as each man was paid off the U.S.
shipping commissioner withheld from his wages the amount
expended by the consul-general at Honolulu for his relief.
The men protested and demanded their full pay.
The amount so withheld by the U. S. shipping commissioner is still retained, and you ask my opinion "whether the
amount so reserved should be retained by the Government,
or be paid to the seamen by the shipping commissioner."
Congress appears to have intended and provided different measures and kinds of relief for two distinct classes of
seamen.
In the class of cases provided for by sections 4580, 4581,
4582, 4583, 4600, 4561, Revised Statutes, as amended June
26, 1884 (23 Stat. L., 53), the consular officers of the United
States are required to see that the discharged seamen receive
from the master of the vessel the extra pay therein prescribed. And by section 4584, Revised Statutes, they are
further required to retain one-third of the amount of the
wages so paid "for the purpose of creating a fund for the
payment of the passages of seamen * * * and for the
maintenance of .American seamen who may be destitute and
may be in such foreign port."
By section 4583 it is expressly provided that" no payment of
extra wages hall be required upon the discharge of any seamen in cases where vessels are wrecked or stranded." * * *
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By sections 4577 and 4579, Revised Statutes, provision is
made for seamen who are destitute by reason of wrecking,
stranding, etc. It is made the duty of the consular officers
of the United States "to provide for the seamen of the United
States who may be found destitute ·within their districts,
respectively, sufficient subsistence and passages to some
point in the United States in the most reasonable manner,
at the expense of the United States, subject to such instructions as the Secretary of State shall give. The seamen shall,
if able, be bound to do duty on board the vessels in which
they may be transported·, according to their several abilities."
And by section 4579 provision is made for the payment of
reasonable compensation by the United States to the owner
of the vessel in which the seamen are transported.
From which it would seem that while those seamen who
were discharged under the conditions described in the sections amended by the act of June 26, 1884, and who received
extra pay, were required to contribute from their extra pay
to the relief of the destitute seamen, that the seamen who
were discharged by reason of wrecking or stranding of their
>
vessels received no extra pay and were to be maintained and
brought home at the expense of the Government out of the
fund created for that purpose and from appropriations made
by Congress in the regular general appropriation bills.
I am of opinion, then, that the amount reserved by the
shipping commissioner at San Francisco from the wages of
these destitute seamen should not be retained by the Government, but should be refunded to the seamen.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNIJY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACT-:--DELAY IN COMPLETING-REMITTING PENALTIES.
Where penalties are imposed under the terms of a contract between the
War Department and a contractor for delay in completing the work,
but the contract has been performed in all other respects and no
actual damage has resulted from the delay, the Secretary of War may
remit the forfeiture.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 28, 1894,
SIR: I have your letter of the 14th instant, inclosing copy
of a contract between the post quartermaster at West Point
and John Moore, of Syracuse, N. Y, for completing the gymnasium at West Point.
In the printed "advertisement and specifi cations" for the
erection of the gymnasium it is provided that:
"The contractor will be required to commence building
oi,erations within ten days after the approval of the contract and to push the work regularly and vigorously, so as
to have it completed and ready for occupancy by January
1, 1892, For every day, including Sundays, after January
1, 1892, that the building is not entirely completed according· to this contract the contractor shall forfeit to the United
States $25 per day, to be deducted from the final payment
to be made to him."
It appears that the building was not completed by ,January 1, 1892, but that the time for completion was extended
from time to time to August 31, 1892. The building was not
fully completed until October 19, 1893; and there has been
withheld of the contract price the sum of $10,350, being the
amount of the forfeiture of $25 per day from August 31, 1892,
to October 19, 1893.
It appears that on October 31, 1892, the architect, by direction of the Superintendent of the Military Academy, made
a "complete and careful inspection of the structure" and
reported that the amount to be done to complete it according to the contract was "comparatively trifling."
You request that I will advise your Department ' 6 whether
the Secretary of War has authority to remit the forfeiture
provided in the contract and to order the payment of the
entire sum withheld from the contractor."
Inasmuch as the forfeiture or penalty incurred here was
one imposed by the contract between the parties and not
by any act of Congress, and the work contracted for bas
all been :finished according to tlie contract, and no actual
damage has resulted to the United States, and the penalty
was one from which, in like cases, a court of equity would
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grant relief, I am of opinion that the Secretary of War has
authority to remit the forfeiture provided for in the contract
and to order payment of the entire sum withheld from the
contractor.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER-SOUTH PASS CHANNEL-EADS CONTRACT.
The contract between the United States and James B. Eads and his
associates for the construction of a ship canal between the South
Pass of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, coos trued; and
opinions of Attorney-General Devens (16 Opm., 335) and Actmg
Attorney-General Phillips (17 Opin., 137) as to the width and characteristics of channel required to be mamtained concurred in.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 29, 1894.
Sm: I have your communication of the 23d of May, in closing a letter from Maj.James B. Quinn, of the Engineer Corps,
referring to the contract between the United States and
James B. Eads and his associates for the construction of a
ship canal between the South Pass of the Mississippi River,
and you ask me to "inform this [Warj Department as to
what width and characteristics of channel are required to
be maintained through the bar at the head of South Pass
and throughout the pass itself by the terms of this contract."
The contract to which you refer can be ascertained only
from the various acts of Congress relating to the subject,
and to these recourse must be had for the reply to your
inquiry. These statutes will be found in 18 Stat. L., 463-466;
20 Stat. L., 168 and 376; and 25 Stat. L., 1334.
By act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 463), James B. Eads
and his associates undertook" To construct such permanent and sufficient jetties and
such auxiliary works as are necessary to create and permanently maintain, as hereinafter set forth, a wide and deep
channel between the South Pass of the Mississippi River
and the Gulf of Mexico * * *.
"Upon full compliance with the conditions prescribed, the
United States promised and agreed to pay to Eads
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"$5,250,000 for const~ucting said work and obtaining a
depth of 30 feet i.n said channel."
This act further provides for the payment of the money in
installments as certain results were reached in the course of
construction of the work.
When a channel 30 feet in depth and 350 in width, shall
have been obtained, the remaining $1,000,000 shall be deemed
to have been earned by Eads and his associates, but the
amount shall remain in the possession of the United States
for the purposes set forth in the act, interest thereon to be
paid to Eads, etc., as long as the money is held.
"That after said channel of thirty feet in depth and of not
less than three hundred and fifty feet in width shall have
been secured, one hundred thousand dollars per annum shall
be paid in equal quarterly payments during each and every
year that said channel of thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty feet in width shall have been maintained by
said Eads and his associates by the effect of said jetties
and auxiliary works aforesaid in said pass, for a period of
twenty years, dating from the date on which said channel
of thirty feet in depth a,nd three hundred and fifty feet in
width shall be first secured: Provided, however, That no part
of such annual compensation shall be paid for a11y period of
time during which the channel of said pass sball be less than
thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty feet in width,
as hereinbefore specified.
"That the said channel of thirty feet in depth and three
hundred and fifty feet in width having been maintained for
ten years, one-half of the one mi1lion dollars hereinbefore
mentioned shall be released and paid to said Eads, his
as ign , or legal representatives; and said depth and width
having been maintained for ten additional years, the remaining half of the aid oue million dollars shall be released and
paid a afore aid."
By act approved June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. L., 168), the former
act wa am ~nded in certain particulars as to the payment of
50 ,000 in advance for labor, material, etc. But this act
further provides:
11 ther payments to said Eads * * * are to be
mad und r and in pur uance of the provi ions of the herein-

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

31

lllississippi River-South Pai;s Channel-Eads Contract.

before-recited act; the whole of said act, except ab the same is
hereby expressly modified or amended, to have the same force
and effect as if this act bad not been passed."
By joint resolution of February 14, 1889 (25 Stat. L., 1335),
$500,000 of this $1,000,000 was appropriated and ordered to
be paid to the legal representatives of James B.. Eads.
• It appears now, from the letter of Major Quinn and the
blue-print maps inclosed therewith, that a channel of 26 feet
in depth and 250 feet in width has not been maintained.
I have carefully examined the history of the execution of
this contract as the same appears in the Senate documents
of the l!..,orty-fifth, Forty-sixth, and Forty-seventh Congresses,
in the records of the War Department, and in the opinions
of the Attorneys-General; and I find that in the opinion of
May 17, 1879, of the Hon. Charles Devens, Attorney-General
(16 Opin., 335) 1 the following construction is given of the
words "navigable depth," referred to in the letter of Major
Quinn:
·
"What is the meaning of tbe words 'navigable depth' is
a question partly of law and partly of fact. It is a depth
sufficiently wide to admit of safe navigation. In considering
what was intended to be provided for tlie whole character of
the structure contemplated is to be examined. This shows
that a channel of considerable width, in which necessarily
vessels could pass each other as they ascended and descended
the river, was contemplated. And this navigation is not
limited to any particular class of vessels-as, for instance,
those propelled only by steam. .rhe legal meaning of the
term 'navigable depth' is a depth sufficiently wide, therefore,
to be navigated by vessels either moved by sails or steam,
and to permit them to pass each other in the channel formed
through the pass and the shoal at its head.", etc.
In the opinion of the Hon. S. F. Phillips, Acting Attorney-General, of June 27, 1881 (17 Opin., 137), the question
propounded to me in your letter appears to have been substantially answered. In that opinion it was held:
"1. That a navigable depth of 26 feet is thereby required
to be maintained through the shoal at the head of the Pass.
'' 2. That a navigable depth of 26 feet is required to be
maintained through the Pass itself."
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I concur in the reasoning and conclusions expressed in
these opinions, and respectfully refer to the opinions themselves for a reply to your inquiry-" as to what width and
characteristics of channel are required to be maintained at
the bar at the head of South Pass and throughout the pass
itself by the terms of the contract."
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
Certain foremen at the Fort Leavenworth Military Prison are not
"laborers or mechanics" within the eight-hour law of August 1, 1892
chapter 352.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 7, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of May 26, asking my official opinion as to whether certain
employes at the military prison, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.,
are entitled to the benefits of the eight-hour law of August
I, 1892, chapter 352, as "laborers or mechanics."
It appears that four of these men are employed at the
prison as "foremen of mechanics," and are each paid under
the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat.,
602), a stated salary of $1,200 per annum. Their duties
appear to be directing mechanical labor of the prisoners.
By section 1345 of the Revised Statutes a board organized
by you is empowered to "frame regulations for the government of prisons." You inform me that the regulations so
framed require more th an eight hours' work of the prisoners,
and. therefore necessarily require more than eight hours' work
of the men who are set to watch and direct them. Under
these circum tance it is my opinion that the eight-hour law
i not applicable to these employe . The facts as to the
other emp1oyes mentioned are not so clearly tated, but their
·a app ar. to be governed by the same principles.
ry r pectfully,
RICilARD OLNEY.
Th

ECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
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CIVIL SERVICE-BONA l!.,IDE RESIDENCE.
Th~ facts bearing upon the question of the residence of EdwaJ.'.d D.
Morrill on August 4, 1890, considered; and~ held, that Morrill WM
not an actual and bona fide resident either of the county of Wilcox
or of the State of Alabama on the date named, nor had he been for
auy of the six months next preceding that date.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 8, 1894.
SIR: My opinion is asked with reference to the question
whether or not Edward D. Morrill was a resident of Alabama
at the time of his appointment under the civil-Rervice rules
in the Interior Department, to wit, on August 4, 1890. The
evidence in this case, upon which opinion is asked, consists
of, first, the affidavit of three men who are stated to have
knowledge on the subject, that Morrill has never resided in
the State of Alabama or been a citizen of said State since
the 9th day of November, 1886; and, secondly, the statell!ent
of Morrill himself, that, having a home in Camden, Wilcox
County, A.la., in 1886, he engaged in v'lrious kinds of temporary business in other States until December of that year,
when he returned to Camden, put his property in a condition
to leave by repairing, painting, and renting it, and in March,
1887, sent part of his personal effects to Chattanooga, Tenn.;
was engaged through the summer of 1887 in temporary
employment in Dalton, Ga., and on its completion went to
Chattanooga, where he engaged in business apparently permanent in its character.
In December, 1887, he returned to Camden long enough to
arrange with tenants and collect rents, occupying meanwhile
certain reserved rooms in his house, returned to Chattanooga
in February, 1888, and apparently remained there until
December following, voting at the general election in November, 1888, at Chattanooga. On December 1, 1888, he went to
Camden to look after his property, and returned to Chattanooga the 23d of the same month. Ou April 4, 1889, he gave
up his rented house in Chattanooga, stored his furniture in
that neighborhood, spent the summer traveling, and late in
the fall went to Camden for a period not stated, but certainly
2638- VOL 21, PT 1--3
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not longer than four months, as he was in Washington in
March, 1890, since which time he ha.s actually lived in that
city.
Upon this state of facts it seems to me that the fact of
Morrill's residence at Chattanooga on and for a year prior to
November, 1888, is established by his own act in voting at
that place, and that there is nothing as to his subsequent
movements sufficient to show an abandonment of that residence and the acquisition of a new one at Camden, Ala. I
therefore am of opinion, upon the facts before me, that
Edward D. Morrill, on August 4, 1890, was not an actual and
bona fide resident either of the county of Wilcox or of the
State of Alabama, nor had he been for any of the six months
next preceding tnat date.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The PRESIDENT.
SHIPWRECKED SEAMEN-DEDUCTION FROM PAY.
Opinion of May 24, 1894 (supra, p. 25), reaffirmed.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 14, 1894.
SIR: By letter dated 22d May, 1894, inclosing letters from
the U.S. consul-general at Honolulu and the U.S. shipping
commissioner at San Francisco, you presented to me the case
of certain seamen of the American bark Hilo, which was
wrecked near the Hawaiian Islands. These seamen were
"utterly destitute" when they reached Honolulu. The consul-general supplied their necessary wants and shipped them
to Sau Francisco. He wrote to the shipping commissioner
at San l_i.,rancisco, inclosing a statement of the amount in
value of the necessaries furnished the seamen, and requested
him to withhold the amount furnished to each seaman from
the wage due him when the same were paid to him in San
Franci co. The shipping commissioner did so, and you asked
my opinion whether the amount so reserved should be retained by th Government or be paid to the seamen by the
hi I ing commi ioner. I replied by letter dated May 24,

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

35

Shipwrecked Seamen-Deduction from Pay.

and stated, as the conclusion which I had reached, "That the
amount reserved by the shipping commissioner at San Francisco from the wages of these destitute seamen should not
be retained by the Government, but should be refunded to
the seamen."
Recent consideration of the matter has confirmed that
conclusion. The only provision of the existing statutes
requiring the retention of seamen's wages to meet their expenses appears in section 4581, Revised Statutes, as amended
(23 Stat., 55, and 25 Stat., 80), which provides that"If any seaman, after his discharge, ~hall have incurred
any expense for board, or other necessaries * * * ."
In this case the expenses were all incurred at Honolulu
before the seamen were discharged and paid off in San Francisco. Until a seaman is regularly discharged in one of the
ways provided by statute, he remains under his shipping
articles, and is to be maintained by the master of the ship, as
stipulated in the articles.
When an American seaman is found destitute within the
district of a U. S. consular officer, he is to be provided for
as prescribed in sections 4577 and 4579, Revised Statutes.
But that no unwarranted inferences may be drawn from
my letter of May 24, I think it proper to say now that the
extracts quoted therein from certain sections of the Revised
Statutes, which are referred to as amended, were inserted
there only to illustrate what seemed to be the policy of the
Government as to two classes of seamen who were discharged for different causes, and not as existing and operative provisions of statute on which the conclusion I expressed
at all depended.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

36

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Attorney-General-World's Fair.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-WORLD'S FAIR.
The Attorney-General ca,n not give official opinions except upon questions of law, nor without a definite statement of the facts upon which
the question is submitted.
The question of drawbacks upon the exhibits of foreign Governments
at the World's Fair of 1893 is governed by the act of April 25, 1890
(chap. 156, sec. 11), and not by the Revised Statutes.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 14, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of June 9 in closes the correspondence with the Swiss charge d'affaires at Washington
and the Swiss consul at Chicago relating to the refund of
duties paid on certain Swiss exhibits at the World's Columbian Exposition, and asks my opinion "as to whether the
Department, under the circumstances,. and considering the
special character of the. enterprise and the status of the
importers, should grant the request of the consul." This is
not a question of law, and I am therefore not warranted by
section 356 of the Revised Statutes in answering it, nor
can I properly make a ~tatement of facts for my own use
out of this correspondence. The facts upon which the ques·
tion is submitted should "be agreed and stated as facts
established." (19 Opin., 396, 696.)
It appears by the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury,
which was transmitted with the papers, that the real question that arises is whether section 3025 of the Revised Statutes is applicable to this case. Were this question directly
submitted, I would answer that in my opinion it does not
apply to the exhibits of foreign Governments at the recent
Exposition, which are governed by section 11 of the act of
April 25, 1890, and by your regulations thereunder, which
regulations it is rather your province than mine to construe.
Very re pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

37

Chinese Naturalization-Attorney-General.

CHINESE NATURALIZATION-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. ·
Since the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126, no court, State or Federal, has
had jurisdiction to admit.Chinese to citizenship.
·
The question as to how far a certain judgment was void for want of
jurisdiction· should not be determined nntil actually presented for
decision in a case in which a party to such judgment shall be a party.
DEP ARTMEN'r OF JUSTICE,

J u1•,e 15, 1894.
SiR: I have your letter of 13th of June, in closing a letter
from the collector of customs at Astoria, Oreg., and a copy of
a letter from the Solicitor of the Treasury, expressing the
opinion that the naturalization papers issued in the year
1878 in New Orleans, La., to somp, 50 Chinamen, were issued
without authority of law and are void, and you request au
opinion from me on the question submitted in the letter from
the collector of customs at Astoria, Oreg.
Without entering upon the ethnological questions, so
learnedly discussed in the opinion of the Solicitor of the
Treasury, but referring, on that aspect of the question, to
Webster's dictionary-Race-and the opinion of Sawyer,
J. , in Ah Yup (5 Saw., 157), it is sufficient for the present
purpose to say that under section 2169, Revised Statutes, the
privilege of naturalization is limited "to aliens being free
white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."
In Fong Yue Ting v. The Uniterl States (149 U. S., 698),
Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, says, '
page 716:
"Chinese persons not born in this country have never been
recognized as citizens of the United States nor authorized
to become such under the naturalization laws." (Rev. Stat.,
2d ed., secs. 2165, 2169; acts of April 14, 1802, chap. 28, 2
Stat., 153; l\fay 26, 1824, chap. 186, 4 Stat., 69; July 14,
1870, chap. 254, sec. 7, 16 Stat., 256; February 18, 1875,
chap. 80, 18 Stat., 318; In re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155; act of
May 6, 1882, chap. 126, sec. 14, 22 Stat., 61.)
Section 14 of tlle act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126 (22 Stat., 61), referred to by Mr. Justice Gray, is as follows:
''That hereafter no State court or court of the United
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States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in
conflict with this act are hereby repealed."
It is certainly very clear that since May 6, 1882, no court,
State or Federal, has had jurisdiction to admit Chinese to
citizenship.
It was held by the circuit court of the district of California, in April, 1878 (In re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155), that a native
of China is not entitled to become a citizen of the United
States under the Revised Statutes as amended in 1875; and
this view has been adopted in subsequent cases. .
How far the judgment of the court in Louisiana in admitting to citizenship the 50 Chinese referred to here was void
for want of jurisdiction is a question the determination of
which may better be deferred until actually presented for
decision in a case in which one or more of the 50 Chinamen
referred to shall be parties.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

-LIEN ON MERCHANDISE IMPORTED FOR EXPORTATION.
Article 309, Customs Regulations, 1892, providing " " " " Nor can
liens be recognized for freight on merchandise intended for export,"
is inconsistent with Revised Statutes, section 281, as amended.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 16, 1894.
SIR: I have your letter of June 1, 1894, inclosing a letter of
20th of January from H. Maitland Kersey, on behalf of certain steamship companies, requesting a modification of the
Trea ury regulations relating to liens for freight; a letter
from George 0. Glavi , of May 5; and an opinion of the Solicitor of the Trea 'ury of May 28, on the same subject, and
you a k £ r an '' xpre ion of opir\ion" from me "in the
matt r.
I i,' by no means clear from these letters just what the
matt r' i n whi h my opinion i de ired. I will assume
that i i
inquir wh th r, in my opinion, ection 2981,
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Revised Statutes, as amended, affords to the . owner or consignee of a vessel arriving from a foreign port a lien for
freight on the merchandise imported on such vessel when
such merchandise is imported for exportation. Section 2981
is as follows:
"Whenever the collector or other chief officer of the customs of any port shall be notified in writ.ing by the owner or
consignee of any vessel or vehicle, arriving from any foreign
port, of a lien for freight on any merchandise imported in
such vessel or vehicle, and remaining· in his custody, such
officer may refuse the delivery of such merchandise from any
public or bonded warehouse, or other place in which the
same shall be deposited, until proof to his satisfaction shall
be produced that the freight due thereon has been paid or
secured." * * *
·
It seems that the Treasury Department has given to
this section a construction which denies to the owner or
consignee a lien for freight on merchandise imported for
exportation.
Article 309, Customs Regulations. 1892. provides:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Nor can liens be recognized for freight on merchandise
intended for export."
A construction given in such solemn form by the Treasury
Department, and continuously acted upon for a long time, is
entitled to great respect and consideration.
Section 2989, Revised Statutes, provides:
"The Secretary of · the Treasury may from time to time
establish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for the due execution of the provisions of this chapter,
and to secure a just accountability . under the same, as he
may deem to be expedient and necessary."
The chapter referred to is that on The Bond and Warehouse System, within which are embraced all the provisions
which apply to the matter in band.
The question for consideration is, Is the regulation referred to "inconsistent with law"~
The chapter appears to intend and provide for three classes
of imported merchandise, viz, that imported for consump-
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tion, that imported for exportation, .and that imported for
transportation.
With that class imported for consumption we have here
nothing to do. As to the other two classes, it is provided by
section 2971, Revised Statutes, t4at"All merchandise which may be deposited in public store
or bonded warehouse may be withdrawn by the owner for
exportation to foreign countries, or ma.y be transshipped to
any port of the Pacific or western coast of the United States
at any time before the expiration of three years from the date
of original importation, such goods on arrival at a Pacific or
western port to be subject to the same rules and regulations as
if originally imported there."
And the distinction between the two classes is also recognized by the statute (secs. 2900, 2994, aud 3005), by the
Treasury Department (Customs Regulations, arts. 568-590),
and by this Department (16 Opin., 74).
All merchandise imported into the United States and
unloaded at any port passes into the custody of the officer
of customs at such port, whether it be unloaded for consumption, transportation, or exportation.
Section 2981, Revised Statutes, provides that the owner or
consignee of any vessel or vehicle arriving from any foreign
port may notify the officer of customs of any port of a lien
for freight on any merchandise imported in such vessel and
remaining in his custody, and that such officer may refuse
the delivery of such merchandise until the freight due thereon
has been paid.
This may perhaps be limited as to certain classes of goods
for transportation under seetion 2971, Revised Statutes, but
I have been unable to discover any provision of statute
which re train its application from merchandise imported
for exportation, nor do I perceive any rea on why it should
b or strain d. It i difficult to ee bow the owner of the
I in wbich th merchandi e i imported can be ecured
a to the freight due thereon except by such a lien as
app ar, · t m to b provided by . ection 2981.
I , 111 f pinion that . o much of artic]e 302 Cu tom Reg'
u } a 1. n ,a.·pr id : ' orcanlie11 berecognizedforfreight
n m r ·b n Ii. intend cl for xr ort' i in con i tent with
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section 2981, Revised Statutes, as amended; and that the
owuer or consignee of such vessel is entitled to a lien for
freight.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the United
States, and the Secretary of War bad authority to authorize their
obstruction by dams, but can not revoke his permit when large
expenditures have been made on the faith thereof. (20 Opin., 713,
reaffirmed.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

June 25, 1894.
Sm: I have yours of the 12th instant, with accompanying
papers.
A permit having been granted to the Altamonte Water
Company to construct dams across the St. Louis and Cloquet
rivers, in accordance with the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral of February 9, 1894, a reconsideration of the matter
is now suggested, and the following questions are submitted:
1. Are the St. Louis and Cloquet rivers; or either of them,
navigable waters of the United States 1
2. Has _the Secretary of War jurisdiction . to grant permission to obstruct such rivers, or either of them,
3. The permission to so obstruct said rivers having beeri
granted, can such permission be revoked by the Secretary
of War under the existing circumstances of this ca~e ~
The first two questions may be advantageously considered
together.
It does not seem to be open to reasonable doubt that upon
the evidence disclosed by the papers the St. Louis and
Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the United States
within ~he definition of such navigable waters repeatedly
given by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nor,
being navigable waters of the United States, can I see room
for question respecting the complete and exclusive authority
of the Secretary of War to permi1; their obstruction by dams.
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Such authority is expressly given by the :first clause of section 7 of the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 54), as
amended by section 3 of the act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat., 110).
If this clause stood by itself its meaning and effect, as
above stated, would be deemed too plain for discussion. If
its meaning and effect are now doubtful, the doubt is occasioned by certain subsequent clauses of the same section, and
especially by the concluding proviso, which declares that the
section shall "not be so construed as to authorize the construction of any bridge, drawbridge, bridge piers and abutments, or other works under an act of the legislature of any
State over or in any stream, port, roadstead, haven, or harbor, or other navigable water not wholly within the limits of
such State." It may be admitted tliat the Bntire act is
infelicitously, not to say clumsily, drawn, and that the proviso just cited is the most obscure and unfortunate portion of
it. Nevertheless, when the general scope and tenor of the
whole statute are considered in connection with its main purpose, and in view of the facts to which Congress must have
meant it to apply, the difficulties attending its interpretation
largely disappear and leave a tolerably intelligible and consistent piece of legislation.
The main object of Congress in the statute is clear. It
intended that the navigable waters of the United States
should thereafter be under the exclusive control of the United
States; that for the future their navigability should be interfered with by bridges, dams, or other obstructions only by
express permission of the United States, granted through
its agent, the Secretary of War. That is the plain meaning
and operation of the :first clause of the amended section 7,
already referred - to. The same unmistakable purpose is
manife ted by that clau e of section 7 which immediately
pre ede. the provi o, and which declares that it shall not be
lawful hereafter to '' excavate or :fill, or in any manner to alter
or rno<lify the cour e, location, condition or capacity of any
p rt, r ad tead, haven, harbor of refuge, or in closure within
th limit of any breakwater, or of the channel of any naviganited tate , unle approved and authorbl w ter f th
th
er tary of War." Thi, clau e and the :fir t
f h
tion cov r the wh I ubj ct, the one apply-
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ing to structures in navigable waters of the United States,
the other to excavating, filling, or other disturbance of such
waters. As structures are not to be erected without the
permission of the Secretary of War, so any excavation, filling, etc., must be approved and authorized by him. Thus
the determination of Congress that, as a general proposition,
the United States shall take and hold jurisdiction over its
navigable waters, which should be complete and exclusive of
all interference with them from any other quarter, is too
plainly and industriously declared to admit of any real
question.
But while the main intent and object of this statute (sec. 7)
must be deemed to be as above stated, it is equally plain that
Congress realized that it was not dealing with a new and
untouched subject-matter. It recognized the fact that for
many years almost every State of the Union had been exercising control over the navigable waters of the United States
within its limits; that it had been doing so with the tacit
assent of Congress, and that in reliance upon the validity of
such State action individuals and corporations had invested
vast sums of money in bridges and other permanent structures which could not be dealt with as nuisances without
the most injurious consequences to both public and private
interests. It recognized the additional fact that when the
statute should become a law many State grants or licenses
for structures in navigable waters of the United States would
be found to be outstanding under which work had not as yet
been begun by the grantees or licensees. Under these circumstances, with the desire of avoiding unnecessary injury
to any public interests and of doing no injustice to private
interests concerned, and aiming to treat bona fide State legislation and action with becoming courtesy, Congress qualified the general assumption by the statute of complete and
exclusive jurisdiction by the United States over its navigable waters in two important particulars. In the first place,
to protect public and private interests in bridges, piers, etc.,
which were already accomplished facts, the statute is made
to declare that it shall not apply to them at all. In the second place, to treat State grants and licenses for structures
already conferred but not acted upon with respect, and at
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the same time not lose all control over the subject, the ·statute
is made to declare that construction is not to begin uuder
such grants or licenses until the location and plan of each
structure is approved by the Secretary of War.
If the foregoing views are correct the statute in question,
first, puts all navigable waters of the United States within
the full and exclusive control of the United States; second,
excepts from the statute certain existing structures, like
bridges, piers, etc., and third, excepts from · the statute
bridges, piers, etc., already authorizeci by State authority,
but not constructed, so far as to provide that construction
shall not begin until the location and plan of work have been
approved by tbe Secretary of War. There remains for consideration only the concluding proviso of section 7, already
quoted, the meaning and effect of which, if the foregoingexposition of the statute can be relied upon, would seem to
be tolerably clear. It will be observed that the subject of
tliis proviso is to exclude a possible construction of the section. It is not to "be so construed as to authorize," etc.
Now, what possible constructiou of the statute was Congress
guardmg against, It is not difficult to see. In the previous
portions of tue statute Congress had recognized the validity
of State action respecting tile navigable waters of the United
States in two classes of cases, one class being that of existing
structures, the other that of certain structures not existing,
l>ut authorized by the State.
Having thus recognized State authority iu these two
classes of cases, Congress inserted this proviso, by way of
exces ive precaution, perhapt-i, but to make sure that such
recognition could not l>e u ed to cover any other than the
two . pecifically defined and excepted cla,·ses of cases. It
meant in particular to dispose of the contention that, after
the statute and notwjth tanding the statute, it w:1s still
·ompeteut for a State to license a brj<lge, pier, or other like
. tru tur rn navigable waters of the United States, subject
only t the apr roval of the location and plan of the work
b the ecr tary of · ar. It meant to make that contention
impo ibl , t make it c rtain that, except in the two cla. ses
f c· :
<l th juri. dict1011 of he 11ited States should
b · ru 1 t 11d wh 11 · xclud any tate jnri, diction. To
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1m ke this purpose the more manifest tbe proviso is so
phrased as to indicate just what waters would or might
be under the jurisdiction of a State after the passage of
the statute. Throughout all the preceding portions of the
statute the waters dealt with are "navigable waters of the
United States." In this proviso the waters dealt with are
waters "wholly within the limits of" a State. The distinction is not accidental or insignificant. It was meant to
draw the line between the waters over which, with certain
exceptions, the statute meant to assert exclusive jurisdiction
in the United States, and other waters over which the statute meant to leave the jurisdiction of the State unquestioned,
if not :final1y and forever, at least for the time being.
I see no occasion, therefore, for modifying the opinion
already given by me under date of the 9th of February last.
The remaining, question, whether the permit granted.February 13, 1894, can, under the existing circumstances of this
case, be revoked, is more easily answered. It does not
involve the issue whether the power to rescind a permit is
a necessarily implied element of the power to grant it, or
whether, all the circumstances remaining the same, the
Secretary of War, after granting a permit, might cancel itbeca"Q.se of a change of mind as to the wisdom or propriety of
his original action. Upon the facts appearing in the papers
submitted the circumstances are not unchanged, but on the
faith of the permit the Altamonte Water Company has gone
forward and made contracts, spent large sums of money, and
otherwise materially altered its situation. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Secretary of War
is not now at liberty to revoke the permit.
I return herewith the papers accompanying your letter,
and am,
Respectfully, yours,
RIOBARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
1
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NAVY DEPARTMENT-PRECEDENCE OF OFFICERS.
Article 21 of the Navy Regulations is within the authority conferred
upon the Secretary of the Navy by Revise<l. Statutes, section 1547.
There is no inconsistency between sections 1483 and 1484, Revised
Statutes, in their operation upon the question of the precedence of
Engineer officers of the Navy.
A rule for as<.,ertaining the date of precedence of officers on the active
list of the Navy held to be in conflict with the act approved August
5, 1882. (22 Stat., 284.)
Status of members of the staff corps is governed by Revised Statutes,
sections 1485, 1486, and 1487.
DEP ARTMEN'I.1 OF JUSTICE,

June 28, 1894.
SIR: Your letter of the 22d instant, with that of C. W.
Rae, Chief Engineer, U. S. Navy, head of Department of
Steam Engineering~ presents for my consideration and
opinion three questions arising out of the state of facts disclosed in these letters.
'' 1. Whether or not the present practice of the Department in assigning to graduates of the Naval Academy dates
of precedence according to the rules fixed by the 'Febiger
Board,' as herein set forth, is warranted by law.
"2. Whether the provisions of article 21 of the Navy
Regulations are within the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of the Navy by section 1547 of the Revised
Statutes.
"3. To what extent, if at all, are the provisions of section
1483 of the Revised Statutes (act of 23d of May, 1872) that
graduates of the Naval Academy shall take rank according
to their proficiency as shown by their order of merit at the
date of graduation, modified by section 1484 of the Revised
Statutes (act of 3d of March, 1873), providing that engineer
officers graduated at the aval Academy shall take precedence with all other officers with whom they have relative
rank according to the actual length of service in the Navy."
The provisions of the statute relating to the subjectma t r of the e inquirie are as follows:
'
EC. 1467. Line officer shall take rank m each grade
ace rdin to he date of their commis ion .
" E C. 1
raduate of the aval Academy shall take
rank a· ording to their profi.ci n y a hown by their order
f m rit t th dat f raduation.
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"SEC. 1484. Engineer officers graduated at the Na val
Academy shall take precedence with all oth_e r officers with
whom they have relative rank, according to the actual
length of service in the Navy.
'' SEC. 1485. The officers of the staff corps of the Navy
shall take precedence in their several corps, and in their
several grades, and with officers of the line with whom they
hold relative rank, according to length of service in the Navy.
"SEC. 1486. In estimating the length of service for such
purpose, the several officers of the staff corps shall, respectively, take precedence in their several grades and with
those officers of the line of the Navy with whom they hold
relative rank who have been in the naval service six years
longer than such officers of said staff corps have been in said
service; and -officers who have been advanced or lost numbers on the Naval Register shall be considered as having
gained or lost length of service accordingly.
"SEC. 1487. No staff officer shall, in virtue of his relative
rank or precedence, have any additional right to quarters."
The orders, . regulations, and instructions issued by the
Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President,
for the government of the Navy, have the force of the ·s tatute law when not inconsistent therewith. (6 Opin., 10; 13
Opin., 9; United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S., 46.)
The commissioned officers of the Navy are either of the
line or of the staff. The rank, grade, and order of precedence of the officers of the Navy are prescribed by the statute
law and the Naval Regulations.
Article 21 of the Naval Regulations, 1893, provides:
" The precedence of officers of the staff in their several
corps and in their several grades and with officers of the line
with whom they hold relative rank * * * shall be regulated by the precedence list published in the Navy Register.
* * * In all cases where commissioned officers of different
corps have the same date of precedence, they shall take rank
as follows:
"1. Line officers.
" 2. Medical officers.
"3. Pay officers.
"4. Engineer officers."
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Graduates of the Naval Academy are appointed and
commissioned" To fill vacancies in the lower grades of the line and
Engineer Corps of the Navy and of the Marine Corps: Provided, That no greater number of appointments into these
grades shall be made each year than shall equal the number
of vacancies which has occurred in the same grades during
the preceding year; such appointments to be made from the
graduates of the year * * * in the order of merit." (22
Stat., 285.)
· It must happen, then, that graduates of the same class
receive their commissions as officers in the Navy at widely
different dates; aud section 1467 provides as to line officers
that they take rank in each grade according to the date of
tlleir commissions.
The rule proposed by the" Febiger Board" for ascertaining
the date of precedence of officers on the active list of the
Navy and adopted by the Department is stated by you to l;le
as follows:
"That the date of entry of the member of a class longest
in the service shall apply to him and to all who passed above
him at graduation; that the date of entry of the member of
the remainder of the class longest in the service shall apply
to him and all above him, and to all above him not placed
by the first date, and so on through the class."
As thus formula,ted the rule is obscure and barely intelligible. If it iutends that in each class of graduates from the
Naval Academy the "date of precedence" of the members
of uch class shall be determined by ascertaining the member having the earliest date of admission to the Academy
aud imputiug that date of admission to every other member
who tands above him in the class, aud then taking the
m mb r below him who has the next earliest date of admissi n and i111putiug tllat date to all who stand above him but
b low tli fi.r,'t <lat and o on down in that order, but pre; rvi11g to th m mber of each elate tl1eir relative class
tandiug in th ord r of merit I do not perceive that the
rnl i11v l : any i11 011. i ·te11cy with the requir ments of the
,·t tn •: ba , "l' iu op rati ll at th• date of it: adoption,
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but it is in conflict with the act approved August 5, 1882.
(22 Stat., 284).
As to the members of the staff corps of the Navy, their
status appears to be quite clearly defined by sections 1485,
1486, and 1487 of the Revised Statutes, and particularly as
to Engineer officers whose precedence is prescribed by section
1484, which operates as an exception to 1486. (15 Opin., 336.)
I do not perceive any inconsistency between sections 1483
and 1484 in their operation upon the question of the precedence of Engineer officers of the Navy.
Just what is meant by the term "graduates of the Naval ·
Academy" was considered by Solicitor-General Phillips in
an instructive opinion (15 Opin., 637), to which I beg leave
to refer.
Section 1483 relates to graduates generally from the Naval
Academy, and prescribes the "order of merit" as the scale
of precedence .
.Section 1484 relates to a restricted and peculiar body of
"graduates," who are eligible to only one corps of the Naval
service, to wit, the staff, and to the engineer department
only of that corps.
By act approved March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 878), the academic board of the Naval Academy was required" To separate the first class of naval cadets then commencing their fourth year into two divisions, as they may have
shown special aptitude for the duties of the respective corps,
in the proportion which the aggregate number of vacancies
occurring in the prem•ding fiscal year; ending on the :10th
day of June, in the le, west grades of commissioned officers
of the line of the Nal y and the Marine Corps of the Navy
sha11 bear to the number of vacancies to be supplie4 from
the Academy occurring during the same period.in the lowest
grade of commissioned officers of the :r,;ngineer Corps of the
Navy; and the cadets so assigned to the line and Marine
Corps division of the first class shall thereafter pursuff a
course of study arranged to fit them for service in the line
of the Navy, and the cadets so assigned to the Engineer
Corps division of the first class shall thereafter pursue a
course of study arranged to fit them for service in tlrn Engineer Uorps of the Navy, * * * ; and from the final
2638-V0L 21, PT, 1--4
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graduates from the line and Marine Corps division, appointments shall be made hereafter as it shall be necessary to
fill vacancies in the lowest grades of commissioned officers
of the line of the Navy and Marine Corps; and the vacancies
in the lowest grades of the commissioned officers of the
Engineer Corps of the Navy shall be filled in like manner
by appointments from the final graduates of the Engineer
Division." * * *
Article 21 of the U. S~ Naval Regulations is within the
authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy. by sec·tion 1547, Revised Statutes, inasmuch as it does not appear
to be in conflict with any provision of the stat.u te law relating to the relative rank of line and staff officers in the Navy.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF THE NA.VY.

COMPROMISE 01? JUDGMENT INDEBTEDNESS.
Revised Statutes, section 3469, does not confer power to remit or r elease
any portion of a judgment indebtedness on considerations of hardship
to particular indi viduals. The authority to "compromise" relates to
claims of doubtful recovery or enforcement. (13 Opin., 479, and 18
Opin ., 72, distinguished.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 11, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant to the Attorney-General presents a case in which the Supreme Court of
the Uuited States, in a proceeding under Revised Statutes,
section 3207, bas adjudged ( United States v. Snyder, 149 U.
S., 210) that for certain internal-revenue taxes assessed
against one nyder, the United States have a lien upon real
e tate in tbe city of New Orleans now owned by the International otton Pre Company, which that company bought
from nyder after be lien had attached. The amount of
th ta
i 3,463.29, with considerable interest. The Intern tional otton Pre
ompany ubrnit an offer to pay $50,
t g her with all co t and expen e , in con ideration of a
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release of the lien, and the U. S. district attorney and the
Solicitor of the Treasury recommended the acceptance of
the proposition. You ask whether you can legally approve
the proposed compromise "Rnder Revised Statutes, section
3469.
The petition for settlement and the recommendations in
support thereof are not based upon doubts as to the possibility of realizing the amount of the tax out of the property,
but upon the ground of the hardship to the company supposed to be involved in enforcing against it the laws of the
United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a
proceeding to which the company was a party.
I am of the opinion that section 3469 has no application to
such a case. It provides that" Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent having charge of any claim "in favor of the
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim,
and the terms upon which the same may be ..compromised,
and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms
so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of
the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of
this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the
postal laws."
The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and·
clearly recoverable, but to "compromise," which implies a
claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement.
In the case which you submit there is nothing to "compromise," for the right of recovery and the amount have been
finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property
is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt.
These views are not in conflict with the opinion to which
I have been referred, given to the Secretary of the Treasury
on November 13, 1884, by Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips (18
Opin., 72), for that was the case of a claim with respect to
which, although it had been reduced to judgment, there was,
to use the language of the opinion, "doubt whether anything
more could be made;" nor with the opinion of Mr. Attorney-
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General Akerman (13 Opin., 479), which seems to relate to a
judgment open to be reviewed, and not to the final judgment
of a court of last resort.
Respectfully,
LAWRENCE MAXWELL, JR.,
Solicitor-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:

RICHARD OLNEY.

INSPECTION OF STEAMSHIPS-EXPIRED CERTIFICATES.
The regulations provided by title 52 of the Revised Statutes do not
apply to American steam vessels whilst engaged in commerce beyond
the jurisdictio~ of the United States.
Expired inspection certificates can not be extended by consular officers
of the United States; and there is no authority of law for sending
local inspectors out of the country to make inspection.
DEP.A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 17, 1894.
SIR: I have your letter of July 14, 1894, submitting for my
"consideration and opinion the following questions regarding the application of the U.S. steamboat laws (title 52, Rev.
Stat.) to American steam vessels, originally inspected under
those laws in a port of the United States, whose inspection
certificates have expired by limitation whilst the steamers
are engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, and which steamers are
likely to remain beyond such jurisdiction for an indefinite
period."
The question to be considered being, "Whether such steamers run11ing on expired certificates of inspection outside the
territory of the United States are liable to the penalties pro
vided in titl 52 for violation of the provi ions of that title.'7
nd " hetber under the diplomatic or con ular laws of
nit d tat there i any authority for such officers to
t nd in pe tion
rtificates granted by United States
iu p t r · of team ve el to merican teamers," etc.
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And, "As to the legality of sending local inspectors to
Panama to inspect the vessels referred to," etc.
Section 4400 of title 52, Revised Statutes, provides:
"All steam vessels navigating any waters of the United
States which are common highways of commerce, or open to
general or competitive navigation, excepting public vessels
of the United States, vessels of other countries, and boats,
propelled in whole or in part by steam for navigating canals,
shall be subject to the provisions of this title."
As all of your questions relate to "steamers engaged in
commerce between foreign ports outside the jurisdict-ion of the
United States, and which are likely to remain beyond such
jurisdiction for an indefinite period," it is obvious that they
do not fall within the class to which title 52, Revised Statutes, applies; and it is difficult to see how, whilst they
"remain beyond the jurisdiction of the United States and
engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside such
jurisdiction," the laws of the United States for the regulation
of steam vessels can be made to apply to or be enforced
against them.
I am of opinion that such steam vessels, whilst so engaged
in commerce beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, are
not subject to the regulations provided by title 52 of the
Revised Statutes, and that there is no authority of law for
consular officers of the.United States " to extend inspection
certificates granted by the United States inspectors of steam
vessels to American steamers;" and that there is no authority
of law for '' sending local inspectors to Panama to inspect
the steam vessels referred to."
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF TREASURY.
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MILITARY EQUIPMENTS-RIGHT 01? CONTROL.
The opinion expressed that certain arms furnished the Washington
Light Infantry, of Charleston, S. C., are held by the State of South
Carolina for the use of the whole body of the militia of that State
in such manner and in accordance with such rules and regulations as
the proper authorities of the State may prescribe.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 25, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 23d
instant, in which my opinion is requested upon two questions
presented in a letter of the attorney-general of the State of
South Carolina of the 22d instant.
The facts as there stated are that under a joint resolution
of April 27, 1876 (Stat. L., vol. 19, p. 212), certain arms and
accouterments were loaned by the United States to the
Washington Light Infantry, of Charleston, S. O., and that
under joint resolution of March 9, 1878 (20 Stat. L., p. 248),
120 of these rifles and other accouterments were charged to
the State of South Carolina on its quota, upon the written
approval of the government of the said State, for the use of
said Washington Light Infantry.
The inquiries made are:
'' (1) Are these arms the property of the Washington Light
Infantry or have they any right deriv.ed from the laws of the
United States to said arms over and above any other particular militia of the State of South Carolina f
"(2) Are these arms not to be considered as devoted to the
general purposes of the militia of the State of South Carolina, and as between the said Washington Light Infantry
and the State of South Carolina are they not subject to such
disposition as the rules, regulations, and commands of the
general militia may require '! "
It i exceedingly doubtful whether I can rightfully give
any opinion a requested, the arms referred to having been
ab olutely and finally delivered by the United States, so that
the inquirie above tated relate to the effect of an act already
d n b the ar Department, rather tlrnn raise any que tion
of pre ent administration. Without pa sing upon that point,
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however, which I mention only that it may not seem to have
escaped notice, I answer the inquiries propo'unded by saying that, in my judgment, the arms in question are held by
the State of South Carolina for the use of the whole body of
the militia of that State in such manner ·and in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the proper authorities of
the State may prescribe.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY. ·
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

SEEDS-PURCHASE-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.
'fhe act· making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for
the fiscal year 1895 does not authorize the purchase of any other than
seeds described in Revised Statutes, section 527.
Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

.August 15, 1894.
Sm: , I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 14th
instant, in which you ask my opinion upon the question
whether the act making appropriations for the Department
of Agriculture for the fiscal year 1895 enables the Secretary
of that Department to purchase any other than seeds
described in section 527 of the Revised Statutes, to wit,
seeds " rare and uncommon to the country or such as can
be made more profitable by frequent changes from one part
of our country to another."
I have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative. Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored,
and are held to have taken place only when the provisions
of the former and latter statutes are irreconcilable and can
uot have been intended to be operative at the same time.
In the present instance not only is there nothing in the
appropriation act for 1895 nece8sarily inconsistent with the
terms of section 527 of the Revjsed Statutes, but the language of the former is "For the purchase, propagation, and

56

HON. EDWARD B. WHITNEY.
Nava l S up p li es - Contracts-Withdrawing Bid.

distribution, as reqitired by law," etc. Here is an express
reference to prior legislation on the subject, which makes it
part of the appropriat ion act as clearly and certainly as if
bodily incorporated.
Respectfully, your's,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF AGRICULTURE.

NAVAL SUPPLIES-CONTRACTS-WITHDRAWING BID.
The Secretary of t he Navy is obliged to give contracts for supplies
to the lowest b idder uho fills the r equirements as to security, etc.,
although the Secretary is the person charged with the duty of ascertaining the facts in this regard, and h is decision ie not reviewable in
any court.
In the absence of any special statutor y p r ovision to the contrary, a bidder for a Government contract may withdra w his bid at any time until
notice of acceptance.
Whether t-here is any such special statutory p r ovision relating to the
Navy Departmentf Qmure.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Augus1, 31, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of A ugust 28 states the following facts : You advertised for sealed proposals for supplying
certain chain cables for the use of t he Navy, which proposals
were opened, by the terms of the advertisement, on August 21
last. The lowest bidder was one Neville. Before receiving·
notice of acceptance, however, he withdrew his proposal on
August 25. You ask an official opinion as t o whether you
have the right to release him, or may and must hold him to
his offer.
You are required by statute, when time will permit, to
procure supplies only by the method adopted in this case,
namely, by advertising a certain length of time for sealed
propo al , and opening the proposals at a specified time in
he pre ence of all bidders desiring to attend . You are
required to award the contract for . uch supplies to the lowest bidder who gives ati fa tory security and whose p ro-
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posal shall be accompanied by the guaranty prescribed by
the statute. (Rev. Stat., secs. 3709, 3710, 3718, 3719, 3722.)
You may also refuse to accept bids for other reasons, as for
the bad record of the bidder or his guarantor, or excessive
price demanded. (Rev. Stat., secs. 3722, 3724.)
You have, therefore, no arbitrary right of selection, like a
private person to whom an offer is made. The lowest bidder
who fills the other requirements is entitled to an award of
the contract, although you are the person charged to ascertain the facts in this regard, and your decision is not reviewable by any court. Under these circumstances the suggestion
is made that the law really accepts the lowest competent
bid at the moment the sealed proposals are opened, so that
on correct analysis it is the advertisement which corresponds to the common-law offer, and the bid which corresponds to the common-law acceptance; and therefore that
the bidder can not thereafter assert the common-law right to
withdraw an unaccepted offer. Such a ruling would avoid
gross abuses. ( Twiss v. City of Port Huron, 63 Mich., 528,
531.) The rulings of this Department, however, in the
absence of any special statutory provision, are that the bidder may withdraw at any moment until notice of acceptance
of his bid. (9 Opin., 174; rn Opin., 648, 651.)
A special statute relating to bids in your Department
requfres that "each proposal shall be accompanied by a
written guaranty * * * that the bidder, if his bid is
accepted, will * * * give bond with good and sufficient
sureties to furnish the supplies proposed." (Rev. Stat., sec.
3719.) Strictly construed, this does not prevent a withdrawal before acceptance. Liberally construed, in conformity with the manifest intent of the provision, I think it may
fairly be held that it binds the bidder to stand by his bid, at
least after- the hour of opening. The case being doubtful, I
am inclined to give a liberal construction to the statute,
since in this way only can its authoritative construction be
obtained from the courts. I would therefore advise that Mr.
Neville be held to his proposal, and that no· right of withdrawal O!l his part be recognized, but that he and his guarantors be held responsible.
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You further ask whether it is your duty to award the contract to the next lowest bidder. I would answer that it is
not necessarily so. The next lowest bidder may, for instance,
have bid too high. (Rev. Stat., sec. 3724; see sec. 3719.)
Very respectfully,
EDWARD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRET.ARY OF 'l'HE N.AVY •
.ATTORNEY-GENER.AL-CIVIL SERVICE-RESIDENCE.
Opinion of June 8, 1894 (supra, p. 33), will not be reconsidered for the
purpose of passing upon new and .conflicting evidence. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are not questions to
be considered in rendering an opinion.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 12, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt, by reference
from you, of communication of July 20, 1894, from John R.
Procter and Charles Lyman, requesting further consideration and opinion as to residence of Edward D. Morrill, to be
based upon new and additional evidence accompanying such
request.
I am not at liberty to comply with such request, as it
would involve consideration and decision upon conflicting
evidence. The former opinion was based upon Morrill's own
declarations as a statement of fact. He now seeks to change
the conclusion reached by stating in his own affidavit, in
some measure supported by others, a new fact, namely, a
mental purpose.
·
Morrill having established Chattanooga, Tenn., as his
legal residence in November, 1888, by voting there, now
state (affidavit of July 16, 1894) that in November, 1889,
be xeturned to Camden, Ala.," with the full intention of making that hi future home, or rather of resuming his former
domicile," while in hi affidavit of July 31, 1894, purporting
to tate all facts relevant to his acts and intentions on question of re idence, he declare that on ovember 21, 1889, he
amd n, Ala., an<l. " tayed in my own home and
r urned
made preparations to come to Wa. hington."
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This brings up for consideration the weight to be given to
the affidavit of the person to be benefited in proving a purpose to adopt a new residence, when such affiant appears
jn the same record to have sworn differently on the same
question, and to have sworn in his application in 1890 to
continuous legal residence in Camden, Ala., since 1866, notwithstanding the fact, now admitted by him, that Chattanooga, Tenn., had been his legal residence for at least a year
prior to November, 1888.
Weight of evidence and credibility of such witnesses are
not questions to be considered by me on. application for an
opinion.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
.Acting .Attorney- ~eneral.
The PRESIDENT.
HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE-PURCHASE OF SUPPLIES.
All purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments of
the Government must be made by advertisement unless immediate
delivery is necessary.
The first two sentences of section 3709, Revised Statutes, as amended
by the acts of January 27, chapter 22, and April 21, 1894, chapter 61,
apply to purchases anywhere in the United States. The remaining
three sentences apply only to purchases in the city of Washington.
The word" miscellaneous," in the urgent deficiency act of April 21, 1894,
section 2, must be restricted to that class of commodities which must
be purchased on a considerable scale and used alike by many or all of
the various Departments and Government establishments in the city
of Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 22, 1894.
Srn: Your communication of September 11 asks my opinion
as to the method which you should pursue in procuring certain drawing, engraving, and chart printing supplies required
for the use of the Hydrographic Office in your Department.
The schedule which you inclose, enumerating the articles to
be purchased, shows them to be very varied in character,
including paper, pencils, pens, water colors of different
descriptions, with curves, dividers, gauges, and triangles,
together with brushes, sponges, cloths, tacks, acids, and
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other chemicals, etc. You ask me whether these supplies
fall within the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised
Statutes or the acts amendatory thereof.
Section 3709 requires that "all purchases and contracts
for supplies * * * in any of the Departments of the
Government" shall be made by advertisement ''when the
public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of
the articles." Hence it is necessary for you to obtain these
supplies, like all others, by advertisement unless immediate
delivery is necessary.
It remains to be considered whether these supplies must
be advertised fo:r and the proposals therefor considered
under the provisions of the amendatory act of January 27,
1894. That act added to section 3709 three sentences by
way of ~mendment, providing that the advertisements for
supplies should be made by all the Departments on the same
days, that proposals should be opened on the same days,
and that they should be submitted for examination to a
special board consisting of one .Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, one .Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and one
.Assistant Postmaster-General.
Section 3709 being applicable to all purchases of supplies,
whether made in Washington or elsewhere, this amendatory
act had at first the same wide application. That was ~wt,
however, its intention. Hence the oversight was corrected
by section 2 of the urgent deficiency act of .April 21, 1894.
That section restricts the application of the act of January
27 to advertisements for proposals for "fuel, ice, stationery,
and other miscellaneous supplies, to be purchased at Washington for the use of the Executive Departments and other
Government establishments therein named." No such restriction, however, was imposed upon the original provisions of
section 3709. Hence that section in its present form must
receive an anomalous construction. Its first two sentences
apply to purchases anywhere in the United States, while the
remaining three sentences apply only to purchases in this
city.
Thi geographical restriction, a I have said, was the main
obj ct of the tatut of pril. That tatute, however,
impos d a ·till further restriction upon the operation of the
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three sentences added in January. The origmal portion of
section 3709 relates to all "supplies." The last three sentences, however, now apply only to "fuel, ice, stationery,
and other miscellaneous supplies."
Whether you are obliged to advertise in the present instance
under the .act of January depends on whether the supplies
you now desire are covered by this phraseology. I could not
undertake to decide that question as a pure matter of law in
the case of each of the oue hundred and twenty-two items in
your schedule, even were I acquainted with all the relevant
facts bearing upon each article. Congress has spoken in very
general language, which necessarily and wisely, and perhaps
intentionally, leaves much to the Executive Departments
themselves in the interpretation of the act. I can only indicate the general principles governing the application of the
statute of April, leaving its application in matters of detail
to the heads of the various Departments in consultation with
the members of the examining board, who, through special
knowledge and experience, are much better qualified than .
myself in this regard.
The definitions of " fuel" and " ice" are unnecessary here
to consider. The word "stationery" has no special legal
definition. It is defined in the Century Dictionary as follows:
"The articles usually sold by stationers; the various materials employed in writing, such as paper, pens, pencils, and
ink." Webster defines it as follows: "The articles usually
sold by stationers, as paper, pens, ink, quills, blank books
etc." Whether the a"rticles required by them are usually'
sold by stationers is a matter concerning which your employes
in the Hydrographic Office can doubtless afford full information. I am uot sufficiently informed to be able to advise as
matter of law whether or not there may be varieties of paper,
pens, pencils, etc., which are not classifiable as "stationery."
The word "miscellaneous" in this statute is still more difficult to construe. It evidently does not include all supplies,
for this would make the whole provision entirely unnecessary. Congress must be presumed to have inserted it for
some reason. A. practical definition of the word can only be
obtained by applying the rule noscitur a, sociis. Fuel, ice,
and stationery are staples required by every Department
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and every branch of the service. The word ''miscellaneousi'
must be restricted to other supplies of the same general
nature; in other words, to that class of commodities which
must be purchased on a considerable scale and used alike by
many or all of the various Departments and Government
establishments in this city. This conclusion is s~rengthenecl
by the fact that proposals are submitted to a board containing one representative from each of the three Departments
that require these staple commodities in the largest amount.
It is natural to provide that high officers of the Treasury,
Interior, and Post-Office Departments should superintend
the purchase of these staples, not only for their own Departments,. but for the other Departments and establishments as
well. It is less natural that they should be designated to
negotiate the purchase of articles required for scientific or
technical work of your Department, of the Department of
Agriculture, of the U. S. Fish Commission, or the Smithsonian Institution. It is well known, moreover, that the main
object of the statute of January was to equalize, at the lowest possible price, the prices paid by the different Departments for the supplies common to all; it having been cause
for remark that the. rates obtained by the various Departments had greatly varied in the past.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLN.E Y.
The SECRETARY Olf THE NAVY.

HYDRAULIC MINING.
The North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company, of California, is within
the jurisdiction of the California Debris Commission. (53 Fed. Rep.,
625, considered.)
Resort may be had to a court of equity to compel allowance of inspection of premises where hydraulic mining is being, or is supposed to
be, unlawfully conducted.
DEP AR'.l1MEN'l1 OF JUSTICE,
IR:

September 24, 1S94.
I ha e the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
f th
ting e retary of War, inquiring whether or
r h Bloomfi Id Gravel Mining Company, of Cali-
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fornia, falls within the jurisdiction of the California Debris
Commission, under the act of Congress approved March 1,
1893, and entitled "An act to create the California Debris
Commission and regulate hydraulic mining in the State of
California;" and inqµiring also whether, in view of the fact
that the said mining company has never made application to
the said Commission for license to operate, as required by the
tei:·ms of said act, the Commission has "authority to enter
upon the premises for the purpose of inspecting or supervising the operation of the mine, or performing any of the
duties devolved by the said act upon the Commission in
respect thereto; and, if it has that authority and is forbidden by the said company to enter upon its premises for that
purpose, by what means can the Commission enforce its said
authority¥"
In reply I beg to state that in my opinion there is no reason whatever why the company mentioned should not come
equally with any other company or individual engaged in
hydraulic mining within the jurisdiction and under the
authority of the Commission. The claim of the company
that, under the decision of the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of California, iu the case of
The United States v. The Same Company (53 Fed. Rep., 625),
dated October 5, 1892, the defendant was removed beyond
the provision and operation of the law creating the Commission I deem utterly untenable. At the time of the trial
and decision of the case mentioned that law was not in
existence; consequently it could not have been construed or
the extent of its operation defined by the court. Moreover,
the decision referred to was only to the effect that an injunction to restrain hydraulic mining by the defendant should
be denied, for the reason_that there was not sufficient show ing of damage to the navigability of public waters. But,
whatever might have been the status of' this company
prior to the enactment of the debris law, that law has
become operative upon it as well as upon all others conducting the business of hydraulic mining; and this company, if
engaged in such mining and without license, is doing so iu
violation of law; for it is provided by section 9 of said act
(27 Stat., 508): " That the individual proprietor or proprie-
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tors, or in case of a corporation its manager or agent
appointed for that purpose, owning mining . ground in the
territory in the State of California mentioned in section
three hereof, which it is desired to work by the hydraulic
process, must file with said Commission a verified petition
setting forth such facts as will comply with law and the rules
prescribed by said Commission."
The right of the Commission to enter upon the lands of
the company where such mining is being, or is supposed
to be, unlawfully conducted seems entirely clear under the
provisions . of section 5 of said act. This section, after
directing that· the Commission shall make examinations
and surveys to determine the practicability, utility, etc.,
of storage sites for debris, reservoirs, etc., to aid in the
improvement and protection of the rivers within its jurisdiction, and to that end, preventing, amongst other matters, the deposit of debris resulting from mining operations,
declares that the Commission shall " * * * investigate such hydraulic and other mines as now are or may
have been worked by . methods intended to restrain the
debris and material moved in operating such mines by
impounding dams, settling reservoirs, or otherwise, and in general to make such study of and researches in the hydraulic
mining industry as science, experience, and engineering skill
may suggest as practicable and useful in devising a method
or methods whereby such mining may be carried on as
•aforesaid."
By section 20 of said act it is provided: "That said Commission, or a committee therefrom, or officer of said corps
assigned to duty under its orders, shall, whenever deemed
necessary, visit said territory and all mines operating under
the provisions of this act * * * ." By section 22 of this
act hydraulic mining contrary to the provisions of the act
to the injury, direct or indirect, of navigable waters is made
a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, while
by ection 5 the power to investigate mines is given iu relation to tho e that "are now or may have been" worked. I
think that the law intended th us to give to the Commission
ample means for a certaining the method of conduct of the
mining indu try, with a view to the protection of the navi-
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gable waters concerned and the punishment of violators of
the law, and that such means necessarily include the right
to enter upon and inspect premises even at the present time.
I am unable to find in the act in question any provision
for the enforcement of the right of the Commission to enter
upon lands for the examination of mines, and in the absence
of such expres·s provision am of the opinion that the preferable course would be the filing of a bill in equity, alleging
(amongst other and usual matters) that the company is conducting hydraulic mining without license and without application for license, and, as believed, to the injury of navigation
of the streams; that the Commission desire to investigate
the method of mining, construction of reservoirs, etc., and to
that end have attempted to enter upon the land, but have
been denied · admittance, the prayer of the bill to be for an
injunction to prevent the defendants from preventing the
entry of the Commission and for injunction restraining the
defendants from mining during the time the Commission is
excluded by it and pending the investigation.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W.A.R.

LIFE-SAVING MEDALS.
Section 12 of act of June 18, 1878, chapter 265, does not confer authority
upon the Secretary of the Treasury to bestow life-saving medals for
signal exertions made in saving persons from drowning in small
inland streams, ponds, and pools.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 26, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of September 21, from which I understand you to desire my opinion
upon the question "whether section 12 of the act of June
18, 1878, entitled 'An act to organize the Life-Saving Service,' authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to bestow lifesaving medals for signal exertions made in saving persons
from drowning in small inland streams, ponds, pools;" the
tern! "inland " being used, I take it, to indicate that the
2638-VOL 21, PT. 1--5
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waters referred to are wholly within a State and no part of
the navigable waters of the United States.
I am of the opinion that the section referred to does not
confer such authority. Its terms are vague and general, but
must be construed in connection with other sections of the
same act and with other acts relating to the same subjectmatter. So construed, the waters contemplated by the section are, in my judgment, either the high seas or what may
be described as .waters of the United States; that is, waters
belonging to the United States as owner, or over which it
has jurisdiction by virtue of its authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
CUSTOMS DUTIES-MANUFACTURES OF WOOL.
The phrase "manufactures of wool" in paragraph 297 of the tariff act
of Aug-ust 27, 1894, does not include manufactures of the hair of any
animals other than the sheep.
All doubts arising under said act are presumptively to be resolved in
favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act mentions or describes the same article in two different places, under two different
rates, when the higher rate governs.
The phrase in question having been given a restrictive meaning in
prior tariff acts, there is a presumption, in the absence of anything
to the contrary, that Congress intended it still to have the same
meaning.
The titles of the schedules in the tariff act have little significance.
The phrase aforesaid 'does not include articles partly of wool of which
wool is not the component material of chief value.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 9, 1894.
Sm: The new rates of import duties prescribed by section
1 of the tariff act of .August 27, 1894, went into effect immediately, "unless otherwise specially provided for." Paragraph 297 of that act provided that "the reduction of the
rates of duty herein provided for manufactures of wool shall
take effect January 1, 1895." That paragraph closes Schedul
of th act, who e heading is "Wool, and manufactures
of wool.' The schedule doe not, however, deal with wool
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and manufactures of wool alone. It distinguishes repeatedly between '' wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat,
alpaca, or other animals." It includes also certain manufactures of flax and cotton.
You ask my opinion whether paragraph 297 refers solely
to merchandise of which wool, the product of the sheep, forms
the material, or whether the product of the camel, goat,
alpaca, or other animals is equally included.
The general intent of the act was to effect an immediate
as well as extensive reduction of duties. To postpone the
reduction in the case of any specific article, the article must
be brought clearly within some exception to this general
intent. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively
to be resolved in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where
the act mentions or describes the same article in two different places, under two different rates, wh~n the higher rate
governs.
"Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of
the alpaca and of the Angora goat; it never is used to
include all goat's hair, nor yet camel's hair, cow hair, or
horsehair. Throughout Schedule K, except in the heading,
it is undoubtedly used so as to exclude even hair of the kinds
first mentioned. Moreover, the phrase, "manufactures of
wool" has been given a very restrictive meaning in prior
tariff -acts (Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137; Seeberger v.
Gahn, 137 U. S., 95), and there is a presumption, in the
absence of anything to the contrary, that Congress intended
it still to have the same signification. (J.11.addock v. Magone,
152 u. s., 368, 371, 372.)
If the heading· of Schedule K were intended as an accurate and comprehensive deseription of its contents, the
question would arise whether the heading or the contents
should control; and it might be argued that hair, flax, and
/ cotton were all wool. But the heading has little significance.
It is intended only for a general suggestion as to the character of the articles within the schedule. (Hollender v.
Magone, 149 U. S., 586, 591; Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152
U. S., 581, 583.) If the rule of construction were otherwise,
then sponges would be either "chemicals, oils, or paints,"
and cork would be either "flax, hemp, or jute."
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Moreover, it is proper to consider, as an aid to construction, the original form of the bill and the changes made by
amendment. The bill as it first passed the House of Representatives, in the same paragraph, with the exception above
quoted concerning" manufactures of wool," had further provisions as to "all rates of duty in the woolen schedule."
The latter was stricken out in the Senate, but serves to
show that the distinction was brought to the attention of
Congress.
I am therefore very clearly of the opinion that the word
'' wool," as used in paragraph 297, refers to hair of the sheep
only, and that the new duties upon articles made of the
hair of other animals went immediately into effect upon the
passage of the act.
You ask also my opinion whether the phrase ''manufactures of wool" in that paragraph is applicable to articles of
which -wool, as so defined, although a component material, is
not the material of chief value. I would answer this question in the negative. (Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S., 70,
75; Herrman v. Robertson, 152 U. S., 521, 524.)
Very respectfully,
LA.WRENOE MAXWELL, JR.,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CHINESE IMMIGRATION.
The convention of March 17, 1894, between the United States and
China did not repeal any prior l egislation except the act approved
October 1, 1888. . (25 Stat., 504.)
The Secretary of the Treasury bas power to require the production of a
certificate, in such form as he may prescribe, evidencing the right of
certain subjects of China to enter tho United States, ancl has authority to require that Chinese laborers leaving the United States temporarily shall r et urn to this country only at the ports from which they
depart.

J STICE,
October 16, 1894.
Sm: I hav the honor to a knowledge the receipt of your
tt r f the d in taut, in ·Io iu(Y copy of the convent10n of
arch 1 la t e we u h
uited tat and Chiua for the
DEP.A.R'.J..'MEN'.I.' OF
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regulation of immigration between the two countries; and I
have considered the questions propounded by you.
"1. Whether or not the treaty repeals in whole or in part
any legislation except the act approved October 1, 1888.
(25 Stat. L., 504.)"
From the examination I have been able to give to t,he
legislation on the subject of Chinese immigrat10n, I am of
opinion that the treaty does not repeal any other legislation
than that iudicated.
"2. Will it be permissible for this Department to require
the production of such certificate as at condition precedent
to entry; and if so, may the certificate be in the form provided for by section 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884 ! (23
Stat., 115.)"
The power was given to you, in the act referred to, to pre_
scribe the form of the certificate required in that act, while
article 3 of the treaty is more general in its terms than were
the requirements of the act referred to.
I am of opinion that it is still competent for you to require
the production of a certificate, in such form as you may prescribe, by such '' Chinese subjects being officials, teachers,
students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity o.r; pleasure,
but not laborers, as evidence of their right to enter the United
States.
"3. As to your 'authority to issue a regulation providing
that Chinese laborers residing in the United States, and who
may depart therefrom for temporary sojourn abroad, shall
return to this country only at the ports from which they
depart.'"
I am of opinion that you clearly have such authority under
your general powers as well as under the legislation on this
subject, which remains unaffected by the treaty.
I herewith return the copy of the convention, inclosed in
your letter, as you request.
·
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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ACCEPTANCE OF VESSEL-LIENS.
The Treasury Department can legally accept the revenue cutter Calumet,
subject to a creditor's lien, and, after satisfying the lien, proceed
against the contractor's bondsmen to recover a payment in excess of
the requirements of the contract.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 16, 1894.
Sm: I have to acknowledge yours of this date, in which
you ask my opinion upon the question whether the Treasury
Department ca:n legally accept the revenue cutter Oalurnet,
subject to a creditor"s lien for $2,000, and, after discharging
the lien by payment of the $2,000, then proceed against the
contractor's bondsmen to recover a balance of $1,000 paid
by the Department in excess of the requirements of the
contract.
In my judgment, the Treasury Department can legally
take the course above outlined. In giving this opinion,
however, I assume that the contract and the bond, neither
of which instruments I have seen, are in the ordinary form
and contain no special provisions preventing any such action
by the Treasury Department as is above indicated.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY.
OF

BONDS OF FLOYD COUNTY, GA.
A proposed issue of interest-bearing bonds by the county comm issioners
of Floyd County, Ga., will not conflict with the banking laws of the
United States.

DEPARTMENT

JUS'l'ICE,
October 19, 1894.
SIR : I have your of the 17th instant, in which you request
my opinion upon the que tion whether the proposed issue of
inter t-bearing boud by the county commissioners of F loyd
ounty, Ga., will be in conflict with the banking laws of the
nit d tate ·.
u inclo e the opimou of the Solicitor of
the Trea ury to the effect that uch i u if made wiU not
OF

'

'
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conflict with the banking laws of the United States, and,
for the reasons given- by the Solicitor, I concur in that
conclusion.
As the question whether such bonds, if issued, will be subject to taxation, under sections 19 and 20 of the act of February 18, 1875, does not arise upon any facts now existing
and is one upon which my opinion is not asked, I express no
opinion respecting it.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD . OLNEY.
The SECRE'.L'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

N OTE.-The portion of the opinion of the Solicitor of the
Treasury referred to in the foregoing, as concurred in, is as
follows:
"WASHINGTON, D. c., September 28, 1894.
"Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your reference of
a letter addressed to the Comptroller of the Currency by
Mr. R. G. Clark, of Rome, Ga.
'' Mr. CJ ark states that the county commissioners of Floyd
County, Ga., propose to issue a certain amount in county
bonds, 4 pe,· cent interest, in denominations of $5 1 $10, and
$20, with a view of using the same as local currency; and
he inquires "hether such action would conflict in any way
with United States banking laws.
"In response to your request for an expression of my
opinion, I have to advise you that no statute of the United
States prohibits the issue of county bonds in any denomination. A county has a right to issue bonds, when not in contravention to the constitution of the State.

*

*

"Very respectfully,

*

*

*

"F. A. REEVE,
'' Solicitor of the Treasury.
"The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY."
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CUSTOMS-SALE OF SMUGGLED PATENTED ARTICLE.
Smuggled goods may be seized and sold by a coliector of customs
although protected by patents.
DEPAR'l'MENT .OF JUS'l'ICE,

October 22, 1894.
Sm: Certain phenacetine, smuggled into the United States
from Canada, bas been seized by the collector of customs at
Cape Vincent. It appears that the article is patented in
this country. You do not inform me as to its status in Canada. I will assume, however, that a sale of the article in
this country by the importer would be an infringement upon
the rights of the patentee.
You ask my opinion whether this phenacetine can be lawfully sold by the collector.
Section 3077 of the Revised Statutes requires the collectors to sell goods seized for violation of the revenue laws.
Section 4884, indeed, if literally applied to this case, would
operate as an agreement on the part of the United States
not to make such a sale. In my opinion,however, this section
is not to be applied to the case of smuggled goods, but that
the section first cited requfres the collector to sell them
whether patented or unpatented. I do not undertake to
state :what rights the purchaser would obtain upon such a
sale. He could at least reexport the goods or resell them
to the patentee.
Very respect.fully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

I DIAN TERRITORY-USE OF MILITARY.
The troops of the United States can not be employed in the Indian Territory to aid in the preservation of peace and the arrest of alleged
"outlaws" ancl "bandits," unless such persons are trespassing or are
ab, conding offenders within the provisions of Revisecl Statutes, secti n 2152.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, .

October 27, 1894.
_I have your of the 25th instant, informing me that
the Indian agent at Mu cogee, in the Indian Territory, through
he
mmi ioner of Indian :ffair , reports frequent robJR:
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beries of individuals and corporations by "bandits," causing
express companies to refuse to carry money and other valuables on the Missouri Pacific Railroad and producing general
alarm and interruption of business in the Indian Territory.
The Commissioner recommends that United States troops
be sent to the agency to aid in the preservation of peace and
the arrest of the '' outlaws," and you inquire whether the
United States troops can be used as requested by the Commissioner, and add that, as the Secretary of the Interior Jias
requested special action, you desire an immediate reply.
Without undertaking to discuss the matter at length, therefore, I hasten to say that my conclusions agree with those of
the Major-General of the Army and of the Acting JudgeAd vocate-General, and that unless the persons variously
described by the Commissioner as "bandits" and "outlaws"
are illegally intruding or attempting to intrude upon the
Indian country, or are absconding offenders within the provisions of section 2152 of the Revised Statutes, the United
States troops can not be employed in the manner and for the
purposes suggested.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.ARY OF W .AR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-SOUTH CAROLINA DISPENSARY LAW.
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give an official opinion as to
"the course which should be taken" by another Department, as that
involves questions of fact and considerations of expediency.
Distilled liquors in a United States bonded warehouse can not be seized
under State process.
The Sot1th Carolina dispensary law of December, 1893, does not authorize any officer of that State to tender the taxes due to the United
States on such liquors.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

October 29, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
18th instant, inclosing copies of letter of Governor Tillman,
of South Carolina, to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
and of letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
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yourself, and concluding as follows: "I have, therefore, the
honor to request that you furnish this Department with an
opinion as to the course which should be taken by the Office
of Internal Revenue in the event that the State officers of
South Carolina seize spirits in the bonded warehouses iu
that State."
If the request thus framed is to be literally construed, it
is out of my power to comply with it. The course to be pursued by your Department, in the event specified, may involve
matters of fact of which I have no knowledge and considerations of expediency upon which it is not for me to pass
judgment. I assume, however, that what is meant to be
inquired about is a question of law arising or sure to arise
in the administration of your Department, and which may be
thus stated: If the officers of the State of South Carolina
undertake to enter a United States bonded warehouse in
South Carolina and to seize distilled liquors therein under
the dispensary law of December, 1893, simultaneously tendering to the collector of internal revenue any tax lawfully
dne on such Uquors, is such action to be acquiesced in as not
in conflict with any laws or rights of the United States Y
1. The legal status of distilled liquors in a bonded warehouse of the United States, and under the control of the collector of internal revenue, is definitely stated and settled
by section 934 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which declares that "All property taken or detained by any
officer or other person under authority of any revenue law of
the United States, shall be irrepleviable, and shall be deemed
to be in the custody of the law, and subject only to the orders
and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof."
2. It need not be held, as has been suggested, and perhaps
might well be, that since the tariff act of August 27, 1894,
the tax due on distilled liquors in a United States bonded
war bou
an be paid only by the di tiller. Whether that
o or not, a tender of uch taxe by a sheriff or other like
tat fficer i ne · arily ineffectual a again t the tatute
b e <JU ted, inc 't i b yond the pow r of an internal
oll tort a c pt it and thu nullify the provisions
he Ioli y f a ta ut whi h , im. to ab. olutely
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exempt shch liquors from the operation of the process of a
State court. Such tender, which, for the reason stated, the
collector is incompetent to accept, must be also ineffectual,
because no officer of South Carolina has been given the right
or power to make it; the legislation of South Carolina not
authorizing any such tender, nor providing any fund which
can be used for that purpose.
The result is that the provisions of the South Carolina
dispensary law of 1893 must be regarded as ineffective and
inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a United
States bonded warehouse under the control of the collector
of internal revenue.
I send herewith for your information a copy of a courteous
letter from Governor Tillman, written me in answer to my
inquiry-made through the Uommissioner of Internal Revenue-respecting the authority of any officer of South Carolina to make payment or tender of the United States taxes
due on such distilled liquors.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
~he SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES.
An assignment of an indebtedness admittedly due by the United States
is not inhibited by Revised Statutes, section 3477. (17 Opin., 545,
approved.)
A disbursing officer who holds a Treasury draft payable to the order of
the original contractors should not deliver it to a receiver appointed
in an action between contesting claimants.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 2, 1894.
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a communication
of October 29, from Hon. Joseph B. Doe, Acting Secretary
of War, transmitting certain papers relating to the claim of
J. J. Leonard and others against Whaley & Taylor, late
Government contractors.
From this letter and accompanying papers it appears that
the United States is indebted to Whaley & Taylor in the
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sum of $17,350, that being the b·alance due upon the contract
for work performed by them as . Government contractors,
That a Treasury draft for $17,350, payable to the order of
Whaley & Taylor, dated August 30, 1894, has been and is
now in the hands of Lieut. Edgar Jadwin, post quartermaster
at Willets Point, N. Y. That it is alleged tliat by an agreement entered into between the firm of Whaley & Taylor of
one part and Hammond and Leonard and Schofield, of the
other part, all of the money coming to Whaley & Taylor
from the United States under their ·contract was assigned by
them to Hammond, Leonard, and Schofield. And it further
provided therein that all drafts and checks, payable to
Whaley & Taylor on said contract should be by them
assigned by proper indorsement.
That in a suit now pending in the supreme court of Kings
County, N. Y., of John J. Leonard and George Schofield
against Whaley, Taylor, and Hammond, an injunction was
awarded restraining the said Whaley & Taylor from collecting or receiving, in whole or in part, the proceeds of the
Treasury draft above mentioped.
And on the 19th of March, 1894, by an order made in said
cause, the People's Trust Company was appointed receiver
"of any check, draft, order, or warrant which the defendants,
Whaley & Taylor, or either of them, may receive from the
United States, etc. * * * And the said defendants,
Whaley & Taylor, are hereby directed to surrender and
deliver any such check, draft, order, or warrant upon receipt
thereof to said receiver."
Upon the foregoing state of facts the Acting Secretary of
War asks my opinion as to whether he "would be authorized
tJ direct the said disbur ing officer to pay over or deliver to
tlle aid receiver the said Treasury draft."
I am of the opinion that the disbursing officer, who, as an
offic r of the U. S. Government, holds the draft payable to
tbe order of
haley
Taylor, can not, with propriety or
afi ty, b dire ted to turn that draft over to the receiver of
th tat court in the proceeding referred to.
he nit d St te i not a party to that proceeding and
.
'
1t
n ent an n t be made a party.
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Lieutenant Jadwin, the quartermaster and present custodian of the Treasury draft, is not a party and can not in his
official character be proceeded against in that cause.
The State court appears to have obtained jurisdiction over
all the contending parties, and has restrained the payees of
the draft from receiving or collecting the proceeds of it.
On the 8th of October, 1894, Whaley & Taylor filed their
petition against the United 8tates in the Court of Claims for
the recovery of the amount of this Treasury draft.
· It appears that there is no dispute as between the United
States and the contractors, Whaley & Taylor, as to the
amount due to them on their contract; that the United States
has no other interest in this matter than to pay over this
ascertained amount to whoever may be legally and properly
entitled thereto. And if it be true that Whaley & Taylor
have actually assigned this debt to Leonard and others, then,
upon that state of facts, I concur in the views expressed in
the opinion of a former Solicitor-General, which are approved
and adopted by the Hon. Benjamin Harris Brewster, my
predecessor in office, that such an assignment is not in violation of section 3477, Revised Statutes. (17 Opin., 545.)
I do not feel at liberty to express any further opinion upon
the merits of this · controversy, or as to the course which
should be pursued by the parties, having fulJy responded to
the only inquiry submitted to me, as to the propriety of the
delivery by Quartermaster Jadwin of the Treasury draft to
the receiver of the court.
I herewith return all of the inclosures which accompanied.
the letter of the Acting Secretary.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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LIENS-PROPERTY OF UNITED ST ATES.
Mechanic's liens can not be acquired upon property of the United States.
(Opin. of May 11, 1894, followed.)
DEP AR'l'MEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

November 7, 1894.

SIR: I have your two favors of the 2d instant, relating to
the claim of Mr. ,James Bigler against Messrs. Byron Barlow
& Co., contractors for the construction of a dry dock on
Puget Sound, and requesting my opinion upon the questions
whether, in view of the contract provisions quoted and
referred to, your Department has become obligated to protect Mr. Bigler in the premises or has the legal power to
enforce payment of his claim against Byron Barlow & Co.,
arising by reason of his construction and furnishmg of a
caisson for said dry dock.
In my judgment, both questions must be answered in the
negative, the opinion of this Department of May 11, 1894,
cited in your letter, being directly applicable so far as any
mechanic's liens are concerned. It is plain that any representations of Commodore Farquhar, however much Mr. Bigler may have relied upon them, must be regarded as wholly
personal, binding himself, but of no effect as against the
United States.
Very respectfuJly,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WAR DEPARTMENT-MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT.
The contract with Edwards, Howlett & Thompson for the improvement
of the Hudson River may be legally modified, so as to provide for the
acquirement by the United States, through condemnation, of the lands
necessary for dumping grounds, to be maintained at the cost of the
contractors.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 10, 1894.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 7th
in tant, inclo ing copy of contract with Edwards, Howlett
Tbomp on, of ew ork City, for the improvement. of the
Hu on iv r; caning attention to the clau e by which the
ntra tor und rtake to 1 rovide th ir own dumping grounds
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at their own expense and to a proposed modification of the
contract by a supplemental contract of the tenor following:
"The Secretary of War will, whenever he deems necessary
and proper and for the best interests of the United States,
authorize proceedings to be taken in the name of the United
States with the same force and effect as if such work was
being performed directly by the Government for the acquirement by condemnation of lands, right of way, and material
to enable the work to be maintained, operated, or prosecuted,
but all expenses incurred in and about the maintenance of
such dumping grounds will be defrayed by the contractors
without reimbursement by the Government"; and requesting
my opinion upon the point whether the proposed modification is such an one as can legally be made under the original
· advertisement.
The advertisement under which the original contract was
made can no longer be regarded as of any material importance, since the work contracted for has been partially executed, while unforeseen obstacles have arisen which threaten
to greatly hinder and probably prevent its complete execution. Under such circumstances, what the contractors propose is a modification of the contract, which, while it relieves
them of their difficulty, is m reality more favorable to the
Government than the original contract. Under its terms the
contractors were to furnish the necessary dumping grounds.
But under the terms as modified, not only will the contractors practically furnish the dumping grounds by paying the
United States all they cost, but when the contract has been
fulfilled the United States will own the dumping grounds,
and will be pecuniarily benefited to the extent of their value.
Without approving the precise terms of the proposed supplemental contract-which I think may be advantageously
changed in some particulars-the advertisement, pursuant to
which the contractors bid for and were awarded the original
contra.ct, does not, in my judgment, offer any legal difficulty
to the making of substantially such a supplemental contract
as is suggested.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
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DUTY-IMPORTED. SALT-TREATY WITH PRUSSIA.
The treaty of May 1, 1828, between the United States and the Kingdom
of Prussia, is to be taken as operative as respects so much of the German Empire as constitutes the Kingdom of Prussia. Semble, that
it is not effective as regards the rest of that Empire.
The "most-favored-nation clause" in that treaty is not violated by paragraph 608 of the tariff act _of August 27, 1894, laying a discriminating
duty on salt imported from a country which imposes a duty on salt
exported from t,he United States.
In case of conflict between a treaty and a subsequent statute, the latter
governs.
The laws of a foreign country are not known to the Attorney-General,
but are facts to be proved by competent evidence.
As to when the discriminating duty aforesaid applies to a country which
imposes a duty on salt exported from the United States but lays a
countervailing excise tax on domestic salt. QuaJre.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November J 3, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of October 27, asking my official opinion upon the question
whether salt imported from the Empire of Germany is dutiable under paragraph 608 of the tariff act of A.ugust 27, 1894.
That paragraph, which puts salt in general on the free list,
contains the following proviso:
"Provided, That if salt is imported from any country
whether independent or a dependency which imposes a duty
upon salt exported from the United States, then there shall
be levied, paid, and collected upon such salt the rate of duty
existing prior to the passage of this act."
.As Germany imposes a duty upon salt exported from the
United States, German salt is apparently subject to the proviso just quoted. The German ambassador, however, claims
it is entitled to come into the United States free on two
grounds.
One is the "most-favored-nation clause," so called, which
i em bodied in the following provisions of the treaty of May
1, 1828, between the United States and Prussia:
"ARTICLE

V.

ther dutie hall be impo ed on the importate of any article the produce or
f Pru ia and no higher or oth r duties hall
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be imposed on the importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of
anx article the produce or manufacture of the United Stat~s
than are or shall be payable on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign cop.ntry. * * *
''ARTICLE

IX.

'' If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation
any particular favor in navigation or commerce it shall immediately become common to the other party freely, where
it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the
same compensation, when the grant is conditional."
It should be noted that while this treaty is to be taken as
operative as respects so much of the German Empire as constitutes the Kingdom of Prussia no facts or considerations
with which I have been made acquainted justify the assumption that it is to be taken as effective as regards other portions of the Empire. Neither am I informed whether the
German salt, for which free admission into this country is
demanded, is a product or manufacture of Prussia proper, or
of some other part or parts of the German Empire.
If it be assumed, however, for present purposes, that the
treaty of 1828 binds the United States as regards all the
constituent parts of the German Empire, the claim of the
German ambassador, founded upon the~" most-favored-nation
clause," must be pronounced untenable for at least two conclusive rea.sons.
In the first place, the "most-favored-nation clauses" of
our treaties with foreign powers have from the foundation
of our Government been invariably construed both as not
forbidding any internal regulations necessary for the protection of our home industries, and as permitting commercial
concessions to a country which are not gratuitous, but are in
return for equivalent concessions, and to which no other
country is entitled except upon rendering the same equivalents. Thus, Mr. Jefferson, when Secretary of State in 1792,
said of treaties exchanging the rights of the most-favored
nation that "they' leave each party free to make what internal regulations they please, and to give what preference they
find expedient to native merchants, vessels, and productions."
In 1817 Mr. John Quincy Adams, acting in the same offici~l
2638-YOL 2 7 P'.l.' 1--6
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capacity, took the ground that the ''most-favored-nation
clause only covered gratuitous favors and did not touch concessions for equivalents expressed or implied." Mr. Clay,
Mr. Livingston, ~fr. Evarts, and Mr. Bayard, when at the
head of the Department of State, have each given official
expressi9n to the same view. It has :1lso received the sanction of the Supreme Court in more than one well-considered
decision, while in Bartram v. Robertson (122 U. S., 116),
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the whole court, expounded
the stipulations of the "most-favored-nation clause" in this
language (p. 120):
"They were pledges of the two contracting parties, the
United States and the King of Denmark, to each other, that,
in the imposition of duties on goods imported into one of the
countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other,
there should be no discrimination against them in favor of
goods of like character imported from any other country.
They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid
hostile legislation in that respect."
This interpretation of the "most-favored-nation clause,"
so clearly established as a doctrine of American law, is believed to accord with the interpretation put upon the clause
by foreign powers-certainly by Germany and Great Britain.
Thus, as the cfause permits any internal regulations that a
country may :find necessary to give a preference to "native
merchants, vesi;;els, and productions," the representatives of
both Great Britain and Germany expressly declared, at the
International Sugar Conference of 1888, that the export sugar
bounty of one country might be counteracted by the import
sugar duty of another without causing any discrimination
which could be deemed a violation .of the "most-favorednation clause." So both Germany and Great Britain acquie ced in the position of the United States, that our treaty
with Hawaii did not entitle those nations to equal privileges
in regard to imports with those thus obtained by the United
State , the privileges granted to the United States being
in on ideration of conce ions by the United States which
rmany and Great Britain not only did not offer to make,
but, in he nature of thing , could not make.
If th e e tabli bed principle be app ied to the ca e in
ha
but oner ult eem to be po ·sible. The form which
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the provisions of our recent tariff act relating to salt may
have assumed is quite immaterial. It enacts, in substance
and effect, that any country admitting American salt free
shall have its own salt admitted free here, while any country
putting a duty upon American salt shall have its salt dutiable here under the preexisting statute. In other words, the
United States concedes "free salt" to any nation which concedes "free salt" to the United States. Germany, of course,
is entitled to that concession upo:n returning the same equivalent. But otherwise she is not so entitled, and there is nothing in the ''most-favored-nation clause" which compels the
United States to discriminate against other nations and in
favor of Germany by granting gratuitously to the latter
privileges which it grants to the former only upon the payment of a stipulated price.
In the next place, even if the provisions of our recent tariff
act under consideration could be deemed to contravene the
''most-favored-nation clause" of the treaty with Germanyas they can not be for the reasons stated-the result will be
the same. The tariff act is a sta_tute later than the treaty
and, so far as inconsistent with it, is controlling. The principle is too well settled to admit of discussion, and if any
relief from its operations is desirable it can be obtained only
through proper modifying legislation by Congress.
While the :first proposition of the German ambassador
proceeds upon the basis that Germany does levy an import
duty on American salt,- his second · proposition is that in
reality it does not do so. The duty, it is said, should be
regarded as in fact an internal excise tax, since a tax equivalent to the duty is levied upon all salt in the country whenever and however it appears, and is the same upon salt produced in Germany as upon salt coming from the United
States. It is matter of convenience merely that the tax
upon American salt is collected immediately upon its arrival
in port. In short, the claim is that there is no discrimination against American salt, whieh is the evil our statute aims
to prevent; that American salt and German salt are in
reality treated on a footing of entire equality.
The validity of this proposition I do not think I am in a
position to judge of, for want of sufficient data. The laws of
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Germany I do not and can not be expected to know, and, like
other foreign laws, are facts to be proved by competent evidence. The statement respecting them made by the German
ambassador in a communication to the Secretary of State
(copy of which you inclose) are undoubtedly correct, but
they leave me in doubt upon what seems to me a vital point,
viz, whether the internal excise tax on salt referred to is
imperial in character-that is, is levied by and belongs to the
Imperial Government-or is local, and is levied by and belongs to one or more constituent states of the Empire. If it
is of the latter character, it probably can not be considered
in relation to the matter in hand any more than a like domestic tax of any one or more of the States of the United
States could be considered in the same relation. If, however,
it could be considered under auy circumstances, then it is obviously material to know whether such tax is levied by all of
the constituent states of the Empire, without exception, and
actually or necessarily at the same rate.
As at present advised, therefore, salt imported from the
Empire of Germany is, in my judgment, legally dutiable
under the statute above quoted.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD _OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
NAVY-SPEED PREMIUMS.

The appropriation for special speed premiums, made uy the act of
July 26, 1894, chapter 165, is not limited in its application to premiums earned prior to Janmtry 1, 1894.
DEP .A.RTMEN'.1.1 OF JUSTICE,

November 16, 1894.
I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 9th
in, taut, replying to mine of the 6th instant, in which I made
·erta.in inquirie bearing upon the question respecting the
paym nt of pr minm earned by certain naval ves els, as to
whi h my pinion wa reque ted by your previous favor of
h ... d rn ·taut.
If h < t f 1894 had not contained the pecial-premium
, 11 rr minm lawfully am d aud b comiug due under
IR:
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contract during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, would
have been payable from the appropriation therein made.
That clause must have been added either to enlarge the
scope of the act or to narrow it; either to make it cover premiums that might otherwisel>e held not to be covered, or to
limit its operation to the particular class of premiums specifically mentioned. The choice is between one ·or the other
of these constructions, and the exact purpose of Congress
may not be entirely clear. But no reason can be assigned,
that I am aware of, why Congress should desire to exclude
from the operation of the act of 1894 premiums earned after
January 1, 1894, and during the fiscal year 1894-95. On the
other band, Congress niay well have considered that an
appropriation for the naval service for the fiscal year 1894-95
might not necessarily be held to embrace premiums earned
during the year 1893 or earlier, and may well have added the
special-premium clause to preclude any doubt on that point.
The best result I can reach, therefore, is that the latter is the
true construction, and that the appropriation for speed premiums made by the act of 1894 is not limited in its application to premiums earne d prior to January 1, 18U4.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l'HE NAVY.

GENERAL APPRAISERS-CHARGES-INVESTIGATTON.
The gen er al a ppraisers appointed under the customs administration act
of Juno 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department.
If inefficien cy, n eglect of duty , or malfeasance in office is charged
against one of them, it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
investigat e the matter.

DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
November 17, 1894.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication asking my
official opinion as to whether you have the power to investigate t h e action of one of the General Appraisers in valuing
an invoice of goods.
It appears that certain merchandise recently imported at
the port of New York was advanced in value by the local
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appraiser; tbat on reappraisement by one of the General
.Appraisers, under section 13 of the customs administrative
act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, the action of tbe local
appraiser was not sustained; and that you bave reason to
believe tbat investigation should be made as to the propriety
of the General Appraiser's conduct. You state that you <lo
not claim the right to review the decision on this case, but
that you wish simply to ascertain the facts on which the
General Appraiser based his conclusion; but that the latter
has refused all information on the subject, and stated that he
does not recognize your right to make the investigation.
It is true that by the terms of the customs administrative
act decisions of the General Appraisers upon valuat,ion are
final, and their decisions as to classification and charges
are final, unless appealed from, in which case they can be
reviewed only by the court, and that, on occasion, the
General Appraiser acts as an officer of the court. (Secs.
13, 14, 15.)
On the other hand, they are placed, to a great extent,
under your direction and control. (Secs.12, 18.) It was held
by Attorney-General Miller, in his ·opinion of July 6, 1891,
that the General Appraisers are officers of your Department,
and in that opinion I concur.
They are appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and may be removed from
office by the President only. (Sec.12.) They may be removed
by him, however, at any time for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office. · As they are officers of your Department, I think it is your duty, if inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office is charged, to investigate the matter, so
that if the facts seem to require you may report the matter
to the Pre ident for his action. There are many officers h1
the Government D epartments who have quasi judicial function independent of the head of the Department. I do not
think that tbi make them so independent that they can not
be inve. tigat ed y their chief if malfeasance is suspected.
Your que tion, t herefore, is answered in the affirmative.
V ry r pectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-STRONG AWARD.
Questions arising in settlement of an award made under a joint resolution of Congress approved July 10, 1888 (25 Stat., 1248), to . arbitrate
and settle certain questions at issue between the District of Columbia and Samuel Strong, considered and answered.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 20, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 8th
instant, in which you submit for my consideration and opinion certain questions arising in the settlement of an award
made under a joint resolution of Congress approved July 10,
1888 (25 Stat., 1248), to arbitrate and settle certain questions
at issue between the District of Columbia and Samuel
Strong.
The questions stated are:
1. What amount of money is required to be paid under
the decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia,
and to whom is the money to be paid¥
2. What rate of interest is to be ·allowed on the award
from the date fixed by the arbitrators, November 10, 1874, to
date of rendition, January 11, 1889 ¥
3. At what rate and for what period is interest to be
allowed on the award¥
4. Whether the amount paid to the arbitrators and $1,000
taxed as costs for printing are to be paid from the amount
awarded and charged pro rata to the beneficiaries of the
award.
I construe your first question to inquire what amount of
money is to be paid, not under the decree of the supreme
court of the District of Columbia, but under the award, the
United States having assented to be bound by the latter, but
not by the former, except so far as it may be consistent with
the award.
In that view, questions 1 and 2 may be answered together,
and my opinion is as follows:
·
1 and 2. The amount of money to be paid under the award
is $28,257.38, togethP-r with interest thereon at the rate of
6 per cent per annum from November 10, 1874, to J auuary 11,
1889.
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This amount, less $500, to be paid the receivers, William F.
Mattingly and A. B. Duvall, is to be paid as follows:
To William A. Cook, $8,869;
To Frank T. Browning, $8,869;
To George E. Kirk, $12,500, and
To Paul Butler, administrator, $22,323.15, or so much of
said sum as may remain after paying the sums above named
to Messrs. Cook, Browning, and Kirk.
3. No interest is payable on said award of January 11,
1889, the- money for the payment of the award being appropriated by the statute authorizing the arbitration as of and
from the time of the making of the award.
4. The amount paid the arbitrators and the $1,000 taxed
as cost of printing are not chargeable to the beneficiaries of
the award.
I return herewith the papers inclosed with your favor, and
remain,
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ARTICLES ·oF WAR-CITY ORDINANCE-ARREST.
A city ordinance is within the expression "laws of the land," .i,s used
in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a soldier violating such an ordinance and escaping to a military reservation should be delivered to
the civil authorities for trial on demand.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 26, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 21st

in taut, quoting the fifty-ninth article of war, and asking my
opinion upon the following points:
1. Doe the expression" laws of the land," as used in the
fifty-ninth article of war, include city ordinances and by-laws 1
2. May a soldier be arrested, tried, and punished by a
civil authority for the violation of a city ordinance1
3. f h
capes to a military reservation can a demand
be Ille
y the civil on he military authorities for his surr nd r · and if o, will it be the duty of the commanding
ffi r t urrender him
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If the first question is answered affirmatively, I see no
escape from the conclusions that a soldier may be arrested,
tried, and punished by the proper civil authorities for the
violation of a city ordinance, and that if he escape to a military reservation his surrender may be demanded by the
proper civil authorities, and should be made by the military
officer in command.
The real inquiry, then, being whether a municipal ordinance is comprehended by the phrase'' laws of the land,'' as
used in the fifty-ninth article of war, I have no hesitation in
saying that, in my judgment, it is so comprehended.
The general reasoning on the subject by the learned Acting Judge-Advocate-General, as contained in his elaborate
memo~andum of January 25, 1875, can not, I think, be successfully controverted, and need not be here repeated. But
it may not be amiss to make special reference to a class of
adjudications which clearly define the nature of municipal
ordinances and apparently render the result reached by Mr.
Lieber inevitable. They are illustrated by a recent case in
Vermont in which the facts were that a village charter
granted to the village certain powers in the matter of licensing eating houses which were repugnant to a general statute
already in force. The village made a by-law or ordinance,
pursuant to its charter, and the question arose which prevaile.d -the ordinance or the general law1 Did the general
law nullify the ordinance, or did the ordinance nullify the
general law pro tanto and as regards that particular village1
The decision was that the ordinance, conforming as it did to
the charter, repealed for that village the preexisting general
law. It was held to do so because, though in form an ordinance, yet being authorized by the village charter, it was in
reality a special statute of the State of Vermont. The same
principle is affirmed in numerous well-considered adjudications of the highest authority. But if valid municipal ordinances are in substance and effect special statutes of the
State chartering the cities or towns making the ordinances,
they are certainly to be regarded as among the "laws of the
land,'' unless that phrase is to be construed as covering the
general legislation of the State only and is exclusive of its
special legislation. But . no distinction of that sort, it is
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believed, has ever been attempted or has any foundation in
reason or precedent. The result is, as already sta.ted, that
the by-laws or ordinances of a town or city are to be taken
as part of the "laws of the land" within the meaning of
that phrase as used in the fifty-ninth article of war.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

TREASURY-FRAUD OF PARTNER-PENALTY.

Fraud committed by a partner in a transaction which be is conducting
on behalf of the firm is regarded by the law as fraud committed by
the firm, although it be unsuccessful, and although it was the intention of the partner to cheat his own firm as well as the other party.
The Secretary of the Treasury can not remit a penalty imposed on the
:firm under such circumstances.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 27, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of November 16, asking my official opinion upon a point
relating to the application of Messrs. Pitt & Scott for a
remission of penalties under section 5293 of the Revised
Statutes.
That section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
remit any penalty imposed under authority of the revenue
laws not exceeding $1,000, "if, in his opinion, it was incurred
without willful negligence or fraud." The sums asked to be
remitted in the present case were imposed as penalties or
so-called "additional duties" for undervaluation of imported
goods, under section 7 of the customs administrative act of
June 10, 1890, chapter 407.
The e good were as igned to Messrs. Pitt & Scott, who
are forwarder of foreign freight, :1nd thus came into the
hand of the managing partner at New York. You are of
the opinion that the undervaluation attempted by him was a
s a general
d liberat fraud again t the nited States.
rul , h n a , ucce ful fraud has been committed by one
memb r of a partner hip in a tran action which he is conduct-
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ing on behalf of the :firm, it is not regarded by the law as bis
individual fraud simply, but the :firm, as -, :firm, is regarded
as guilty. (Strang v. Bradner, 114 U. S., 555.) I think the
rule must hold good when the fraud is unsuccessful as well as
when it is successful. You are of the opinion, however, that
the managing partner intended to cheat his own firm as well
as the United States; that is, that he intended to appropriate to his own use the amount thereby realized, and in
fact made no entry of the goods on the :firm's books. If,
therefore, the fraud had been successful, the firm would have
reaped no benefit. I do not think, however, that this would
materially affect the case.
Since, therefore, you are of opinion that one member of
the :firm in entering goods consigned to the :firm committed
a fraudulent undervaluation, I advise you that you are not
authorized to remit the consequent penalty.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CIVIL SERVICE.
The phrase "no person appointed to a place," as used in the civilP.iervice rule substituteu by the President November 2, 1894, for section 4 of departmental Rule II, affects those holding places as well
as those thereafter appointed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 27, 1894.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th
instant, in which you quote the departmental civil-service
rule substituted by the President November 2, 1894, for
section 4 of Departmental Rule II (Tenth Report, U. S. Civil
Service Commission, p. 45), viz:
"No person appointed to a place under the exceptions to
examinations made by any departmental rule shall be trans.
ferred from such place to a place not also excepted from
examination."
You inquire whether this section is to be construed so as
to affect persons appoint~d prior to November 2, 1894.
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In my judgment, the phrasP "no person appointed to a
place," as used in the rule above quoted, describes every
person either holding a place at the time the substituted
rule took effect, viz, November 2, 1894, or thereafter holding
it by subsequent appointment.
Yours, respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.
CUSTOMS-WAREHOUSED COAL-REFUNDS.
"Sea stores" in our tariff legislation are the stores contained in incoming vessels which are necessary for their use for the purposes of the
voyage; articles which, brought into port aboard ship} are to be consumed aboard or carried off again in the outward voyage, or, if put
ashore at all, landed only for the convenience of the ship.
"Merchan<lise" is a word used in different senses in different parts of
sai'd legislation. In Revised Statutes, sections 2766, 3111, it covers
any tangible personal property; in sections 2795, 3113, it means property imported into the country, whether for sale or not. In the act
of March 3, 1875 ( chap. 136, sec. 1), it has n, narrower meaning, but
still includes all personal property not imported for the use or enjoyment of the importer himself.
Said act of 1875 has no application to a case where the duties were
correctly assessed, but the claim is that something happening subsequently has relieved them from payment of the exaction.
The written protest or notice provided for by the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, is required only for the purpose of instituting
a proceeding before the Board of General Appraisers, to review the
decision of a collector or appraiser. The collector's decisions so
reviewed are decisions made in pursuance of a duty imposed upon
the collector personally by the statute, not to decisions made by him
under authority delegated to him by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Tho decision of an application to withdraw warehoused goods or supplies for ve els under the statute of June 26, 1884 (chap . 121, sec.
16), is confided by the law in the ecretary of the Treasury.
DEP A.RTME T OF JUSTICE,

December 1, 1894.
ha e the honor to acknowledge your communicaovemb r 2 , a king my official opinion upon quesd b. the appli ation of Kenneuy & Moon for a
u i up n ·ertain warebou ed coal withdrawn
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It appears that the coal in question was imported under
the tariff act of 1890; that the duties thereon were duly liquidated, but that the coal was warehoused, so that the duties
were not at the time paid. Subsequently, in May, 1894, an
application was made to withdraw this coal free of duty under
the provisions of the merchant shipping act of June 26, 1884
(chap. 121, sec. 16). This application was refused by the
collector, who held coal not to be one of the articles covered
by that section. The applicants then paid the liquidated
duties in order to get possession of the coal, but, as you
inform me, '' without forma-1 protest." You have ruled that
the applicants ought to have been permitted to withdraw
the coal free of duty, and the practice has been changed to
conform with this ruling, as to whose correctness you do not
ask my advice.
You ask me first, however, whether you can refund the
duties thus erroneously collected under the provisions of
the act of March 3, 1875 (chap. 136, sec. 1). That section
provides that duties may be reliquidated aud refunded by
the Secretary of the Treasury when they "have been assessed
and collected under an erroneous view of the facts in the
case." The act then proceeds as follows :
'' But no such reliquidation shall be allowed unless protest and appeal shall have been made, as required by law:
Provided further, That the restrictive provisions of this act
shall not apply to such personal and household effects, and
other articles not merchandise, as are by Jaw exempt from
duty."
The protest and appeal referred to in that section were
plainly the protest and appeal described in section 2931 of
the Revised Statutes; and since the latter provision was
superseded by the customs administrative act of June 10,
1890, chapter 407, the reference must be construed as made
to the corresponding provisions of the latter act. You have
therefore no authority to reliquidate and refund under the
act of 1875, unless the coal can be brought within the meaning of the proviso above quoted.
It is claimed by the applicant that the coal is within this
proviso, because it is "not merchandise," and they base this
claim mainly on an argument that it can not be merchandise,
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because, having been withdrawn for use in fueling ocean
steamers, it comes within the class of '' sea stores." This
claim, however, is based upon a misunderstanding. "Sea
stores," in our tariff legislation, are the stores contained in
incoming vessels which are necessary for their use for the
purposes of the voyage. These stores are plainly enough
merchandise when purchased, and they .are so treated by the
statutes (Rev. Stat., sec. 3111) until put aboard ship. They
then become, practically speaking, part of the equipment of
the ship, which equipment, like the ship itself, is exempt
from duty, because, though personal property, it is not
regarded as an import. (The Conqueror, 49 Fed. Rep., 99,
103, 105.) This seems to have been assumed from the very
beginning of our Government, it being taken for granted
that sea stores were exempt from duty even before they were
expressly made exempt. The name was always restricted
to articles which, brought into port aboard ship, were to be
consumed aboard or carried off again on the outward voyage; or, if put ashore at all, landed only for the convenience
of the ship itself. (See act of .Aug. 4, 1790, chap.35, sec. 22;
act of Mar. 2, 1799, chap. 22, sec. 45; Rev. Stat., secs. 2795,
2796, 2797.) .Articles do not become "sea stores" until they
have thus become part of the ship's equipment.
The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in
different parts of our customs legislation. In Revised Statute , sections 2766 and 3111, it covers any tangible personal
property. In section 2795 and 3113 it means property
imported into the country, whether for sale or not. In the
a t of 1 75 it has a narrower meaning, but still includes all
p r.·onal property not imported for the use or enjoyment of
th import r Lim elf.
I reover, the r triction in the act of 1875 do not apply
to merchancli e al ne. I think they apply as well to all
dutia l g cl imr orted. The word "exempt from duty''
t h ta u of the article at the time of its importaIu f: ·t 11 a ·t f 1 75, a i plainly hown by the porqu t d, wa intended only to apply to ca"es
lu i
were improperly a e ed and therefore
· 1l t <1.
ha no application to a ca e where
ly a ·
d, but the claim 1s that
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something happening subsequently has relieved them from
payment of the exaction.
Your first question, therefore, is to be answered in the
negative.
You further ask whether, apart from the statute of 1875,
you are authorized to refund the duties without protest. I
assume the meaning of this question to be whether you are
authorized to make the refund in the absence of a written
protest or notice such as required by the customs administrative act. In your statement of the facts you inform me
that there was no '' formal protest," from which I infer that
there was an informal verbal protest or notice of objection
at the time, probably such as in the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary would have been sufficient to support a suit against the collector. ( Swartwout v. Gihon, 3
How., 110.)
The protest or notice required by the customs administrative act is .a step preparatory to a submission of the question
at issue to the Board of General Appraisers. If such a protest was required, then it follows that the question of the
right to withdraw this coal free of duty is not a question for
yourself to decide, but one which must be left with the General
Appraisers, subject to review by the courts. Is this, then, one
of the cases which the customs administrative act includes
within the jurisdiction of the administrative board thereby
established, The cases confided to the General Appraisers
are two: First, the decisions of the appraiser of the port,
or person acting as such, as to the value of merchandise
imported; second, the decisions '' of the collector as to the
rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise, including a,ll dutiable costs and charges." (Secs.
13, 14.) The collector's refusal to allow a withdrawal of the
coal was a decision as to the rate and amount of duties
chargeable thereon. Was it, however, a "decision of tlie
collector" within the meaning of the statute, I think not
The decisions thus referred to, in my opinion, are decisions
made by the collector in pur~mance of a duty imposed upon
him personally by the statute. In other words, they are the
decisions made by him under the provision that" the collector, or the person acting as such, shall ascertain, fix, and
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liquidate the rate and amount of duties to be paid on such
merchandise, and the dutiable costs and charges thereon,
according to law.'' (Sec. 13.) He is, however, given no
authority by statute to pass upon such questions as those
here presented. When he does so, it is not in pursuance of
any independent authority, but solely because you depute
him to act as your agent for that purpose. The decision of
the question presented by this application is confided by the
law in yourself personally.
"All articles of foreign production needed and actually
withdrawn from bonded warehouses for supplies, not including equipment of vessels, * * * may be so withdrawn
free of duty under such regulations as the Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe." (Stat. of June 26, 1884, sec. 16.)
You might prescribe that suGh applications be made
directly to you at Washjngton, or you might depute the
duty of passing upon such applications to some officer other
than the collector. I do not think, therefore, t,hat the customs administrative act has any application to the present
case. This is apparently the opinion of the General Appraisers themselves, who have disclaimed jurisdiction over the
analogous question of drawbacks. (Syn. Dec., No. 14522.)
Without considering the question, which does not now
arise in the administration of your Department, whether you
can properly refund duties paid on withdrawal entries by
mutual mistake of law, I advise you that under the circumstances of the present case you have authority to make the
refund desired.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The ECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

A.TT R EY-GE ERAL-CO TRACT ARTICLES-INFRINGEMENT
OF PATE T .
An opinion upon question of fact refused.
Injun tion will not lie ag~in t a Department of the Government to
re tram h u of an arti le alleged to be an infringement of a patnted rnv n ion, and the ov rnment ·an not be held liable in dam·
ag for such u e.
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Where loss may result to the Government or its officers from the use hy
contractors of patented inventions, or other property of third persons,
a board of indemnity should be required.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 18, 1894.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication
of the 8th instant, inclosing copy of a contract of 26th of
October, 1894, between the Chicago Car Seal and Manufacturing Company of Chicago, Ill., of the one part, and the
United States of America, by Charles W. Dabney, ...i\.cting
Secretary of Agriculture, of the other part, for furnishing
c~rtain supplies of lead car seals for the Government, with
a letter from E. J. Brooks & Co. to the Secretary of Agriculture of November 28, 1894, and a letter from A.H. Pierce
to the Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry of November
17, 1894.
Your several inquiries will be considered in the order in
which they are propounded.
"1. Does the seal contracted for and furnished this Department, manufactured under patent No. 464174, infringe upon
patents No. 323649, 481892, or 2986651"
This inquiry calls for my opinion as to matters of fact, and
as to such matters it has been the uniform practice of this
Department, for reasons that must be obvious, to decline to
give opinions.
Whether or not one patent infringes upon others is a matter of fact upon which the opinion of officers connected with
the Patent Office would be more valuable as a practical guide
than any which I would feel authorized to express.
"2. If contractor is manufacturing under a patent, would
he be subject to injunction prior to a determination by the
courts of the question of an infringement, and will an injunction lie against this Department, or its officials as individuals,
as parties to such suit 1"
Upon a proper case, aptly stated in a bill, a judge may
grant the preliminary injunction to restrain the manufacture
or use of a patented invention prior to a final determination
of the case. Such restraining order may be directed against
one who, as a contrator, is manufacturing articles under the
2638-voL 21, PT 1--7
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alleged infringing patent, or it may be directed against any
individuals charged with using such articles, who may be
parties to such bill. It will not lie against one of the Departments of the Government.
"3. Will any claim. for damages lie against the Government for using all the seals that might be obtained by the
Department under the contract prior to any judicial decree,
supposing such decree be adverse to claims of contractors!"
No action for damages for the infringement of a patent
will lie against the Government. No contract to pay for the
use of a patented invention will be implied as between the
Government and the owner of such patented device, unless
such use has been exercised and enjoyed by the Government
under circumstances from which it would be fairly and reasonably inferred that the two parties had actually intended a
contra~t, as., for example, where the Government uses a patented invention, fully recognizing and admitting the rights
of the true owner therein and using it with his knowledge
and consent.
In the case of Schillinger v. The United States, decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States November 19, 1894,
the Architect of the Capitol invited proposals for a concrete
pavement in the Capitol grounds and entered into a contract
with Cook for laying such pavement. He was admonished
by the owners of the Schillinger patent that the pavement
described in the contract with Cook was an infringement of
the Schillinger patent; and upon a petition filed by the
owners of the Schillinger patent in the Court of Claims it
was held there and by the Supreme Court that if the pavement laid by Cook, under his contract, did embrace the
Schillinger patent, that that at most was an infringement
of such patent, and that the circumstances of the case did
not raise a contract by implication. It was also held in
that ca e that "when a contractor, in the execution of his
contract, uses any patented tool, machine, or process, and
the Government accepts the work done under such contract,"
that it can not be said to have appropriated and be in poss ion of any property of the patentee in such a sense that
he pat ntee may waive the tort and sue as on an implied
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Where loss and injury may result to the Government from
the appropriation by its contractors of the patented inventions or other property of third persons it is desirable and
practicable to · require from the contractor, as part of his
contract, or as collateral or supplementary thereto, a bond of
indemnity, in a sufficient penalty conditioned to save the
Government and all persons representing or acting for it
against loss or injury arising from such wrongful use by the
contractor of such patented device.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.

CHINESE MERCHANTS-RETURN TO UNITED STATES.
Chinese merchants residing in the United States prior to November 3,
1893, can depart from and return to the United States under the same
conditions as prevailed prior to the taking effect of the Chinese
exclusion act approved May 5, 1892. (Lee Kan v. United States, 62
Fed. Rep., 914, cited, and opinion of May 14, 1894, supra, p. 21, reaffirmed.)
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 19, 1894.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 4th instant, in which you refer to a difference
of opinion between certain customs officers of the United
States "as to the right of Chinese merchants to leave the
United States to return thereto," and say that you have
"called the attention of the officers at New York to your
opinion of 14th of March last, wherein it was held that
Chinese merchants residing in the United States prior to
Novemb~r 3, 1893, on which date the act entitled 'An act to
amend an act entitled "An act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into the United States,"' approved May 5, 1892,
took effect, were not affected by said law, and that they
could depart and return to the United States under the same
conditions as prevailed prior to the passage of said act."
You also call attention to the fact that the district court
of the northern district of California bas decided "that tho
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evidence required by the act approved November 3, 1893,
shall be produced, notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese
merchant may have departed from this country prior to the
passage of said act."
You ask to be "advised whether or not appeals were taken
from the decisions above referred to, and also if officers of
this · Department charged with the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws should continue to be governed by the
opinion rendered by you, as herein before stated, on l\farch 14;
1894.''
On May 21, 1894, the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit,
reversed the judgments of the district court for the northern district of California in the case of Lee Kan v. Dnited
States (62 Fed. Rep., 914).
I am now advised by the U. S. district attorney in California that in consequence of that decision the petitioners in
the two cases to which you refer-In re Yee Lung and In re
Loo Yue Loon, reported in 61 Federal Reporter, pages 641
and 643-have been discharged from custody.
I do not find in the records of this Department any opinion
given by me on this subject on March 14, 1894. I do find,
· however, that on May 14, 1894, in reply to your letter of May
8, 1894, I did give an opinion, in which I said:
"I am constrained to the conclusion, therefore, that this
third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893,
is to be regarded as wholly prospective in its operation and
as applying exclusively to Chinese merchants who both came
into the United States for the first time since November 3,
1893, and having carried on business here, afterwards leave
the couutry, and return, as if the act of November 3, 1893,
had not been passed."
A reexamination of this opinion discloses to me no reason
for recalling or modifying it.
I :find that on May 14, 1894, a telegram was received by
tbe Chine e minister in Wa hington from the Chinese Merhant '
change of San Francisco, calling his attention to
hi subj ct, and that on l\lay 16, 1894, this telegram wa
·ommuni at d to you from the ecretary of State, and that
n
y 1 , 1 94, Mr. C. S. Hamlin, A sistant Secretary, etc.,
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by telegram, instructed the collector of customs at San
Francisco as follows.
'' You are authorized to permit landing, without exacting
stipulation from steamship company, of such of the forty
Chinese now on vessel at your port as can prove to your
satisfaction that they are merchants domiciled here and who
left this country prior to November third last with intention
of returning. This ruling in harmony with opinion rendered
by Attorney-General."
I see no reason why the course pursued with reference to
the 40 Chinese · referred to in that telegram should not be
adopted as to all Chinese persons of a like class, and
embodied in a general instruction to that effect to the collectors of customs at all the ports of entry. This would avoid
the necessity of recourse to the courts by returning Chinese ·
merchants in cases such as those referred to.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-REMITTING PENALTIES-PRACTICE.
Section 17 of the anti-moiety act of June 22, 1874, supersedes section
5292, Revised Statuj es, as to all cases arising under the customs-revenue
laws, except those of vessels and merchandise seized or subject to
seizure and of l ess value t.han $1,000.
Penalties not over $1,000 in customs-revenue cases may be remitted
under section 5293, Revised Statutes, without a proceeding before the ·
district judge.
Said limit of $1,000 refers to the amount of tho penalty -to be remitted
and not to the value of merchandise.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 20, 1894.
Sm: Your letter of December 1,5 informs me that applications are pending before you for remission of penalties
incurred under the provisions of section 7 of the customs
administrativ~ act of June 10, 1890, wh·ere the penalties
amount to more than $1,000, though the appraised value of
the merchandise imported was less than $1,000. You refer
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me to sections 5292 and 5293 of the Revised Statutes and
sections 17 to 20 of the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391,and ask my official opinion whether you have authority to remit the penalties "without a petition having first
been presented to the judge of the district in which the
alleged violation occurred." .
Your difficulty seems to have arisen from section 17 of the
antimoiety act, which provides for a proceeding before the
district judge instituted by petition of" any person who shall
be charged with having incurred any fine, penalty, forfeiture,
or disability other than imprisonment, or shall be interested
in any vessel or merchandise seized or subject to seizure,
when the appraised value of such v~ssel or merchandise is
not less than $1,000," this section being confined to matters
· arising under the customs-revenue laws. I do not think that
this $1,000 limit applies to anything besides vessels or merchandise seized or subject to seizure. I do not think, therefore, that it bas any application to merchandise imported by ·
reason of which the penalties of section 7 above referred to
have been assessed.
Construing together the sections cited from the Revised
Statutes, the act of Febr'u ary 27, 1877, chapter 69, amending
those sections among others, and the antimoiety act, my conclusions are as follo.ws: That section 17 of the antimoiety act
supersedes section 5292 of the Revised tatutes as to all
cases arising under the customs-revenue laws, except those
of vessels or merchandise seized or subject to seizure and of
Jess value than $1,000 (see In re Laidlaw, 42 Fed. Hep., 401);
that sections 19 and 20 of the antimoiety act, however, recognize the continued operation of section 5293 of the Revised
Statutes m customs-revenue cases involving not over $1,000;
that ~be latter class of cases form, therefore, an exception to
th . general language of section 17 of the antimoiety act, and
do 11ot r quire a proceediug before the district judge, but
that th limit of 1,000, r ferred to in section 5293 of the
R vi:ed tatute and in section 20 of the antimoiety act,
r ~ r · t the amouut of tbe penalty to be remitted, and 11ot
th
alu f b m rcltandi e who e importation led to the
impo ·i ion of hep nalty.
·
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I therefore ad vise you that' you are not authorized to remit
the penalties now in question until after the proper proceeding before the district judge.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
rrhe SECRETARY OF '.l'HE TREASURY.

NA VAL OFFICER.
Status of Commander Joshua Bishop considered, and held, that he must
be regarded as still on the active list of the Navy.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 21, 1894.
SIR: I have·the honor to acknowledge yours of the 13th
instant, by which it appears that Commander J .o shua Bishop
entered the Navy September 20, 1854; February 8, 1868, was
dismissed from the service; pursuant to a joint resolution of
Congress was reappointed lieutenant-commander by the
President as of Ma.rch 1, 1871; and, having applied August
22, 1894, to be put on the retired list, pursuant to section 1443
of the Revised Statutes, was notified by an order of the Acting Secretary of the Navy of September 13, 1894, that he
should regard himself as detached from duty ~t the Naval
Observatory on the 20th of said September, and from that
date would be transferred to the retired list in accordance
with the provisions of said section 1443. On this state of
facts you make two inquiries:
First. Whether Commander Bishop, having been dismissed
from the service February 8, 1868, and not restored till
March 1, 1871, had on September 20, 1894, "been forty years
in the service of the United States 0?'' and,
Second. What is his present status 1
1. I fully concur in the opinion of your Department, that
September 20, 1894, Commander Bishop had not been in the
service of the United States for forty years, and that on no
theory can the period between February 8, 1868, and Ma.rch
1, 1871, when he was not in fact in the naval service, be
counted as part of said forty years. The act of March 3,
1883 (22 Stat., 472), which closes the gaps in intermittent
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service so as to make it operate as continuous, shows conclusively that actual service and none other is contemplated
by the law.
2. I assume-it not appearing to the contrary in your
communication-that there has been no appointment to the
place on the active list supposed to be vacated by the attempt
to put Commander Bishop on the retired list. On that
assumption Commander Bishop must be regarded as still on
the active list of the Navy-the retiring order above referred
to having no effect upon bis status, because of the nonexistence of the jurisdictional fact of forty years of actual service.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE NAVY.
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANIES.
Sundry questions as to the principles to be adopted in the settlement of
accounts between the United States and the Pacific railroad companies answered.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 21, 1894.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 6th
instant, relating to the accounts between the Onited States
and the Pacific railroad companies, and submitting the fol.
lowing questions respecting the principles to be adopted in
the settlement of said accounts :
"1. Whether, under the language of section 8 of the Thurman .Act, the first mortgage bondholders have a lien prior to
that of the United States on the sinking fund.
"2. Whether the whole amount falling due in January,.
1895, of principal and interest, can be paid from the proceeds
of the siuking fund, or only in the proportion which that
amount bears to the whole amount of bonds to fall due
hereafter with intere t already advanced and paid by the
Gov rnment.
hether the maturity of all the i. sues must be awaited
b fi r any l im i made n the inking fund for the payment
f any in l i u and the intere t accru ct thereon.
h th r .: d mand i n ce ary to fix th liability of
h railroa
m any to r imbur e the United State for the
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principal of the bonds which they failed to pay; and if so,
how, when, and upon whom should such demand be made.
"5. Whether the method of accounting heretofore used in
making up the account is correct, or whether all the credits
should be charged against the debt as it matures, and not
apportioned in the ratio which the issue falJing due in January, 1895, bears to the whole issue."
Taking these questions in their order, I answer them,
respectively, as follows:
1. The language of the Thurman A.ct, section 8, does not
create a lien on the sinking funds prior to that of the United
States in favor of first mortgage bondholders.
2 a nd 3. The entire sinking fund belonging to the Central
Pacific, or its proceeds, may, if necessary, be used to pay the
indebtedness of the Central Pacific to the United States
maturing in January, 1895.
4. A demand upon the railroad company is not necessary
to fix its liability to reimburse the United States for all sums
paid by the latter on account of principal and interest of
subsidy bonds.
5. I do not understand that the United States has thus far
determined upon or adopted any method or rule in accordance with which the accounts between itself and the subsidized Pacific roads.are to be stated and adjusted. If I am
rightly informed, all that has been done is to charge each
road wjth the amounts paid from time to time as interest on
the subsidy bonds, and to credit it with the several amounts
(1) earned from time to time by each road for transportation
service, and (2) annually paid to the United States under
section 6 of the act of 1862 as amended by section 5 of the
act of 1864.
Whether the foregoing assumption be or be not correct, I
shall, when requested, be ready to express an opinion eitlier
upon the correctness of such method of settling the accounts
as the Treasury Department may have decided upon, or
upon such method as in my judgment the Treasury Department should adopt.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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SEA COLLISIONS-CONSTRUCTION OF ACT-ATTORNEYGENERAL.
The Great Lakes are "high seas'' within the meaning of the act of
August 19, 1890, chapter 802.
The regulations for preventing collisions at sea in said act are applicable to the Great Lakes and to all waters navigable for seagoing
vessels connecting therewith, or with the ocean, whet.her the connection be by a navigable river or canal, and are applicable to every
kind of steam vessel. .t?.ules 6 and 7 of section 4233, Revised Statutes, are thereby abrogated or repealed.
The Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels have power to
make regulations not inconsistent with the regulations aforesaid.
Said Board is not a "local authority" within the meaning of section
30 of said act.
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion except on a question presently arising.
·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 22, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of December 10 asks my official
opinion upon certain questions raised by the act of August
19, 1890, chapter 802, entitled "An act to adopt regulations
for preventing collisions at sea," which statute is to take
effect by proclamation of the President March 1, 1895.
This act commences by providing certain regulations which
"shall be followed by all public and private vessels of the
United States upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith, navigable by seagoing vessels." Section
2 repeals all inconsistent regulations '' for the navigation of
all public and private vessels of the United States upon the
high seas, and in all waters connected therewith navigable
by seagoing vessels." This language in both places is new.
It very materia1ly differs from the language of the preceding
act in pari materia, that of March 3, 1885, chapter 354.
In my opinion the questi<;>ns asked by you should be
an wered as follows:
The reat Lakes are to be regarded as " high seas " within
the meaning of thi statute, whatever may have been tbe
under the act of 1 5. (See United States v. Rodgers,
. S. 2 O· The orth Star, 62 Fed. Rep., 71, 75-76.)
are therefore applicable to all waters
a oino- v el and connected either with
'th the r a LakeR. Tt i. immaterial whether
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such connection is made by a navigable river or a canal.
(See Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S., 629.) What the standard
seagoing vessel is may be a question of some doubt. (See
Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S., 674, 695.)
The new regulations are applicable to every kind of steam
vessels including ferry boats, coal boats, etc. _The Board of
Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels will, however, continue to have power to make such further" regulations to
be observed by all steam vessels in passing each other as
they shall from time to time deem necessary for safety."
(Rev. Stat., sec. 4412.) These regulations must not be inconsistent with any of the regulations of the act of 1890, and
should be drawn with great ca.re to avoid embarrassment.
( The Grand Republic, 16 Fed. Rep., 424; The B. B. Saunders,
19 Fed. Rep., 118; The Lisbonense, 53 Fed. Rep., 293, 298-299.)
Whether the present regulations of the Board of Supervising Inspectors will be superseded March 1, 1895, or whether
they will continue in force without readoption by· the Board
is a question not presently arising in the administration of
your Department. It is therefore not a question which I am
authorized to answer. (18 Opin., 77.) If there is doubt the
doubt may be dispelled by reenacting such regulations as
are not inconsistent with the act of 1890.
In my opinion, Rules 6 and 7of section 4233 of the Revised
Statutes, relating to river steamers navigating waters flowfog mto the Gulf of Mexico and their tributaries, and to
coasting steam vessels, etc., navigating the bays, lakes, riyers, or other inland waters of the United States, are abrogated or repealed by the act of 1890.
In addition to the special questions referred to, you ask in
general for my "opinion as to the scope and force of article·
30 and of section 2 of the act of .August 19, 1890." I am not
authorized to give any opinion as to the scope of a statutory
provision, further than to imswer questions which presently
arise thereunder in your Department; nor do I perceive that
any questions under article 30 of the act of 1890 arise in
your Department. That article provides as follows:
"Nothing in these rules shall interfere with the operation
of a special rule duly made by local authority relative to the
navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters."
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The "local authority" therein referred to does not, in my
opinion, include the Board of Supervisin_g Inspectors of
Steam Vessels. I entirely concur i~ your view that" a plain
provision of Congress, embodying the requisite rules for
harbors, rivers, and inland waters, is desirable; but in the
absence of such legislation it is important that the private
persons concerned should know what is required of them."
I do not th_iuk, however, that I can be asked to give this
desired information, even were it in my power to do so.
Congress is now in session, and will remain in session until
after the act of 1890 takes effect. Whatever ambiguity is
found in its provisions can meanwhile be remedied by the
legislative branch of the Government. If there be ambiguity and it be not so remedied, I fear that the private
persons concerned will be obliged to wait for the necessary
information until some collision shall have occurred and the
opinion of the courts thereon subsequently obtained in the
ordinary course of admiralty proceedings. I can give no
opinion that would protect them.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS .A.DMINISTRA.TIVE A.CT-EXPORT DUTY.

A.n export tax levied by a foreign Government js not one of the "costs,
charges, and expenses," referred to in sectfon 19 of the customs
administrative act of June 10, 1890.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 26, 1894.
SIR: Your communication of December 21 asks my official
opinion whether an xport tax impo ed by a foreign Government upon merchandi. e . ubj ct here to an ad valorem
rate of duty or to a duty ba , cl upon or regulat d in any
mann r y the value of the merchandi e is to be regarded
a on of h ' o. t ·har
an cl exp en e. ' r ferred to in
e ·ti n 1 of he "U tom ad.mini trative act of June 10 1890.
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While the point is not entirely clear, especiaUy in view of
the provisions of section 2907 of the Revised Statutes, now
repealed, I am of the opinion that the export duty is not to
be taken under consideration.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

DRAWBACK-OIL CAKE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Under the tariff act of August 27, 1894, a drawback is allowable on oil
cake made from imported linseed.
The Attorney-General can only advise on cases actually and presently
arising. H e can not undertake to give a general definition of a word
applicable to all cases possibly arising.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
.December 27, 1894.
Sm: Your communication of December 19 asks my official
opinion whet.her a drawback is allowable, under the tariff act
of August 27, 1894, on oil cake made from imported linseed.
You call to my attention arguments which have been submitted before you to the effect that such oil cake is not an
article "manufactured or produced in the United States"
within the proper construction of section 22 of that act.
Under the drawback provisions of the act of August 5,
1861 (chap. 45, sec. 4), this oil cake was held by the Treasury
Department to be a manufactured article; and under that
act its right to a drawback seems never to have been questioned. The claim for drawback upon oil cake under this
section was carried to the Supreme Court and argued there
by able counsel as late as 1882, but it seems to have been
assumed without doubt that the oil cake was within the
meaning of the act of 1861.
By the tariff act of July 14, 1870, chapter 255, it was
specially provided that "no drawback shall be allowed on
oil cake made from imported seed." This clause, as a proviso to the paragraph imposing a duty upon imported linseed
or :flaxseed, was repeated in the Revised Statutes and in the
tariffs of 1883 and 1890. It remained in the tariff bill of
1894 as passed by the House of Representatives, but was
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stricken out by amendment in the Senate. (Cong. Rec., June
10, 1894, p. 7170.)
Under these circumstances, I think that the intent of Congress in the premises is clear, and that drawback upon this
article is to be allowed.
My authority to advise you officially is confined to cases
actually and presently arising in the administration of your
Department. I can not, therefore, undertake to give a general definition, appficable to all cases possibly arising, of the
term "materials," or the term "articles manufactured or
produced," appearing in section 22 of the tariff act of
August 27, 1894.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
DRAWBACK-IMPORTED LEAD.
Section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, applies only to articles
made of two or more materials.
In a mass of lead, of which 90 per cent is foreign in origin, and 10 per
cent domestic, the domestic lead can be regarded neither as a mere
incident to the other nor as small enough in amount to be disregarded.
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

December 28, 1894.
Srn: Your communication of November 16, asking my
opinion with relation to the claim of the Kansas City Smelting and Refining Company for drawback upon imported lead,
has received my careful attention.
It appears that the lead in question was imported in ihe
months of September, 1893, to March, 1894, iuclusive, from
the Republic of Mexico, contained in silver-lead ores known
commercially as lead carbonates. Silver being the component material of chief value in these ores, they are regarded
a silver ore , and the duty upon the lead therein contained
wa exacted uuder the proviso to paragraph 199 of the
McKinley Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, which
provi o i a follow :
"That ilver ore an<l all othel' ore containing lead shall
p a duty of 1~ cent per pound on the lead contained therein
ording to ample and a ay ct the port of entry."
'
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It appears that this ore was of the kind known as fluxing
ore, containing a large quantity of lead, and used in this
country for the purpose of SQJ.elting in combination with the
refractory or dry domestic ores; that is, ores containing little
or no lead. It appears that the imported and domestic ores
go together into the furnace. The main product in value is
the silver. An important by-product,however, is lead. The
lead in the ores which go into the furnace is about 90 per
cent foreign and 10 per cent domestic. Some of this lead is
wasted. It is presumable that the waste of foreign and
domestic lead, respectively, is in the proportions above
stated, and that therefore 10 per cent of the resulting byproduct is domestic in origm. Each molecule of domestic
lead being precisely like each molecule of foreign lead in this
product, it is, of course, utterly impossible to distinguish
between them by any examination of the completed article.
The importers claim a drawback under section 25 of the
McKinley Act, which provides:
"That where imported materials on which duties have been
paid, are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or
produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the
exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to
the duties paid on the materials used, less one per centum
of such duties."
The section, however, contains the following important
proviso:
"Provided, That when the articles exported are made in
part from domestic materials, the imported materials, or the
parts of the articles made from such materials shall so
appear in the completed articles that the quantity or measure
thereof may be ascertained."
The importers claim that they have sufficiently complied
with this proviso, because they have kept accurate records
showing the amount of foreign lead and also the amount of
domestic lead which went into the furnace, and because
they are thus able to state the proportions of each in the
mass of lead resulting from their operations with substantial accuracy. Your letter assumes, however, that this is
not the case. You assume that the proviso forbids the
allowance of a drawback except in cases where the article
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manufactured or produced can be so separated chemically
or mechanically into its component materials that the rela.
tive proportions of each material may be ascertained without reference to past books of account. This assumption, in
my opinion, is entirely correct. The section is intended to
apply only to cases where an article is made of two or more
different materials. The possible existence in commerce of
a mere mixture or melting toget her of articles identically
the same, though part domestic and part foreign, does not
seem to have been contemplated by Congress. It is a casus
omissus.
You ask my opinion "whether the presence of a slight
incidental percentage of domestic lead in the metal entered
for drawback should be regarded as a bar to the allowance
thereof," or "whether the lead produced as above described
may properly be considered as an article wholly manufactured from materials imported." I think that in no proper
sense can any portion of the lead entered for drawback be
regarded as incidental to any other portion thereof or to the
whole. Nor is the proportion of domestic lead in the total
product small enough to be disregarded. (Magone v. Luckemeyer, 139 U. S., 612.)
It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the question
whether this lead, in view of the various statutory provisions
above quoted, is an "article manufactured or produced in the
United States." (See United States v. Hathaway, 4 Wall.,404;
Junge v. Hedden, 146 U.S., 233,239; Seeberger v. Castro, 153
U.S., 32, 35; Attorney-General v. Lorman, 59 Mich., 157.)
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The ECRET.A.RY OF 'l'HE TliEASURY.

INCOME TAX-ARMY OFFICERS.
In construing the new income-tax law, mileage and commutation of
quarter pai<l to officer of the U.S. Army are to be considered as parts
of th inc m of n h offi ers, and are to be added to other income
in or<l r to a certain the total income.
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The amount of the tax on the excess over $4,000 of salary or compensation payable for the calendar year should be deducted by the paymaster or other disbursing officer of the Government from the first
installment of salary or pay after the aggregate amount paid such
officer in any calendar year has reached the sum of $4,000.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 2, 1895.
Sm: I have to acknowledge yours of the 13th ultimo, making the following inquiries respecting the construction and
effect of the new income-tax law, to wit:
"1. Whether 'mileage and commutation of quarters' paid
officers of the U. S. Army are to be considered as parts of
the incomes of such officers;
"2. Whether, if they are to be so considered, they are to
be added to, and held to be a part of, the salaries or 'payments for services' within the meaning of section 33 of the
act and therefore to be taken account of by paymasters
under said section; and
"3. Whether, in the case of an army officer subject to an
income tax on his salary, the tax is to be collected in installments by deductions from his monthly pay or be collected in
bulk annually and be based on the amount of salary received
in the calendar year preceding the time of the collection of
the tax."
·
Replying to these questions in their orderFirst. The answer to the first question is found in Division
V, page 33, "Regulations Relative to the Income Tax," just
issued by the Treasury Department, wherein it is expressly
provided that paymasters and disbursing officers shall deduct
the 2 per cent" from all salaries and payments of every kind
made in money to officers or other persons in the civil, military, naval, and any other employment in the service of the
United States upon the excess of said salaries over the rate
of $4,000 per annum."
In this particular, and though the phraseology of the two
statutes is not the same, the Treasury ''Regulations" construe the existing law to be the same in meaning and effect
as section 86 of the act of July 1, 1862 (see Treasury Regulations, Dec.1, 1862), distinction being drawn between suppJies
in kind which are not assessable, and pecuniary payments
2638-V0L 21,

P'.l'
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whi0h, though representing such supplies, are nevertheless
assessable. This ruling of the Treasury Department has
been promulgated since yours of the 13th ultimo, and will,
I assume, be accepted as satisfactory.
·Second. Under, the existing statute a salary in excess of
$4,000 is taxable as such at the rate of 2 per cent upon the
excess. If the recipient thereof has other income exceeding
$4,000 such excess is also taxable at the same rate. But if
the salary or other compensation is $4,000 or less, or is
uncertain or irregular in amount, or in the time of its accrual
or being earned, then nothing is taxed as salary, but the
salary is one item of the total income which becomes taxable
when exceeding $4,000. The answer to the second question,
therefore, is that commutation moneys received by an officer
are to be added to other income (includmg a salary of $4,000
or Jess) in order to ascertain the total income, the excess of
which over $4,000 is subject to a tax of 2 per cent.
Third. The third question seems to be completely answered
by the following paragraph of income ·tax "Regulations,"
Division V, page 33:
"Paymasters and disbursing officers of the Government
will make no deduction for taxes from the salary or pay of
any officer or person in the employ of the United States for
the year 1895 or thereafter, until the amount paid to any
such officer or Government employe on account of such
salary or employment has reached in the aggregate, for that
calendar year, the sum of $4,000, when, from the first payment on the excess of said amount, or any part thereof, the
paymaster or disbursing officer making the payment shall
deduct and withhold the tax of 2 per cent on the entire
amount of such excess of salary or compensation payable to
such officer or employe for said year. The excess upon
which the tax of 2 per cent is payable shall be ascertained
by deducting the sum of $4,000 from the fixed annual salary
or compen ation."
Respectfully, yours,

RICHARD OLNEY.
The

ECRET.ARY OF WAR.
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MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS.
By virtue of his general authority, the Secretary of the Treasury has .
not ·t he power to change binding contracts entered into with the
United States by responsible parties, secured by responsible sureties,
in the interest of private parties thereto, without consideration
inuring to the Government.
The express stipulation in certain contracts that the Secretary of the
Treasury may annul for cause, implies some fact or state of facts
inducing or justifying an abrogation of the contract for the benefit of
the United States.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January7, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the .
29th ultimo, asking my opinion upon the question whether,
in view of the facts and contracts accompanyi?g your communication, the Secretary of the -Treasury can lawfully modify certain contracts between the United States on the one
band and Me::;srs. Livingstone, French, and Silberman ·&
Joseph on the other, whereby each of said parties, in consideration of certain rentals or other stipulated payments,
secures for a term of years the enjoyment of certain exclusive
privileges in connection with the immigrant station at Ellis
Island. Your letter states that the parties '' have prayed
for relief under said contracts," and no suggestion is made,
as I understand, that any variation of the existing contracts
is desired on behalf of the United States or will be in -its
interest.
My attention is called to the fact that each contract contains an express stipulation that the Secretary of the Treasury may annul it for "cause." But by "cause," as used in
each of said contracts, must be meant in all probability some
fact or state of facts inducing or justifying -an abrogation of
the contract fe:>r the benefit of the United States. The right
to break the contract can hardly luwe been reserved to the
United States for the benefit of the contractor. Further,
the desired changes in the existing con tracts can not be
accomplished by the process of first putting an end to them
and then making others, since, being once canceled, new
ones could be made only in a prescribed statutory method;
that is, "after public competition."
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The single legal issue presented, then,iswhetherthe United
States, having contracts with responsible parties, secured by
responsible sureties, it is competent for the Secretary of the
Treasury, by virtue of his general authority, to change those
contracts in the interest of the private parties thereto without consideration inuring to the United States, and simply
because unforeseen circumstances make the operation of
their provisions unprofitable or even disa·s trous to such
parties. Substantially the same question has recently been
passed upon by this Departmeut in the case of the North
.American Commercial Company. .An abatement of the rentals due from the company to the United ·states, made on
purely sentimental grounds and because such an abatement
was thought to be equitable and fair between the parties,
was held to be beyond the power of the Secretary of the
Treasury. There seems to be no ground for doubting the
soundness of that ruling, and the inquiry with which your
letter concludes, "whether the Secretary of the Treasury has
the power to grant the relief prayed," is therefore answered
in the negative.
Returning herewith the nine inclosures accompanying
your Ietter, I am
Respectfully, yours,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
RATES OF DUTY-WAREHOUSED MERCHANDISE.
The new rates of duty imposed by the tariff act of August 27, 1894, do
not apply to any goods theretofore entered for warehouse, uuless the
goods are withdrawn for consumption within three years from the
date of original importation.
Goods imported before that act and then deposited in store as "unclaimed merchandise," under section 2965, Revised ·Statutes, may be
withdrawn for consumption at the new rates of duty at any time
withm three year from the date of original importation, as Jong as
they remain unsold. If sold, however, the duties to be deducted
from the proceeds of sale are tho of 1890.

e

DEPART ME T OF JUSTICE,
IR:

inion

January 17, 1895.
our communication of December 26 a k my official
t the rate of duty chargeable on certain goods
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which were originally imported while the provisions of the
tariff act of 1890, chapter 1244, were still in force, but which
goods remained in custody of the Government until after
the passage of the tariff act of 1894, chapter 349. I understand your questions to relate to goods still dutiable, but
upon which the rate of duty has been changed by section 1
of the latter act. The goods you describe are resolvable
into two classes.
First, those which have' been entered for warehouse and
deposited in bond prior to the act of 1894, but not withdrawn
for consumption within three years from the date of original
importation. SBction 54 of the tariff act of 1890 (superseding section 2970 of the Revised Statutes) provides as follows:
"That any merchandise deposited in bond in any public or
private bonded warehouse may be withdrawn for consumption within three years from the date of original importation,
on payment of the duties and charges to which it may be
subject by law at the time of such withdrawal: Provided,
That nothing herein shall affect or impair existing provisions
of law in regard to the disposal of perishable or explosive
articles." Section 2971 of the Revised Statutes provides,
among other things, as follows: "Any goods remaining in
public store or bonded warehouse beyond three years shall
be regarded as abandoned to the Government, and sold
under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury
may prescribe, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury."
Under prior tariff acts the question has arisen whether the
provision last quoted transfers to the Government the ownership of the abandoned goods, subject to a discretionary
power of remission under section 2972, similar to that given
by sections 5292, 5293, 1841, 2858, 3001, 3078, 3461, etc., or
whether the goods are to be regarded as still warehoused for
the benefit of the importer until the Government shall foreclose its lien by selling them. There is no such question,
however, under the tariff act of 1894. By the express Ian.
guage of section 1 of that act, the new rates apply not to all
warehoused goods, as by section 50 of the act of 1890, but
only to "articles [thereafter] imported from foreign countries
or withdrawn for consumption." The latter clause should be

118
- - - --

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Rates of Duty-Warehoused Merchandise.
---·····~-------------- --

---

construed with the prior legislation above quoted so as to
constitute a harmonious whole.
In my opinion, therefore, goods imported and entered for
warehouse prior to the act of 1894, and not withdrawn for
consumption within three years from the date of original
importation, are unaffected by the new rates of duty, and
the ''duties" mentioned in section 2972 of the Revised Statutes are the duties to which they were previously subject,
whatever be the construction to be put upon this section
in other respects. My opinion applies not only to goods
imported within three years before the act of 1894 took
effect, but to all goods theretofore imported and then subject
to the tariff rates of 1890.
The second class of goods to which you refer are those not
entered ·by the importer either for warehouse or consumption, but deposited in store as "unclaimed merchandise"
under the provisions of section 2965 of the.Revised Statutes.
These goods, like the others, are regarded as abandoned to
the Government after three years (sec. 2971). There is no
other limitation, however, upon their entry for warehouse or
consumption so long as they remain in the custody of the
Government. In my opinion, therefore, so long as they
remain unsold, they may be withdrawn for consumption upon
payment of the new rates of duty at any time within three
years from the date of their original importation, If sold,
however, under the provisions of section 2973, they can, of
course, 110 longer be withdrawn for consumption; wherefore
the new rates of duty are inapplicable, and the duties to be
deducted from the proceeds of sale by the terms of that section are those of 1890. As merchandise of this class is
directed to be sold after one year, I assume that there is
none now in your hands unsold which is not withdrawable
by the importer.
Very respectfully~
RIOBARD OL}S"EY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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"SPECIAL-REQUEST., ENVELOPES.

The provisions of the proviso contained in section 96 of the act of Congress, approved January 12, 1895 (Public, No. 15) when construed in
connection with Revised Statutes, section 3915, constitutes no substantial limitation upon the power to print and supply "specialreq nest " envelopes.
One ~tatute should not be held to have been impliedly repealed by
another, unless the inconsistency and antagonism between the two
was such that they could not stand together.
·
DEP AR'fMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 18, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 16th
instant calling my attention to a proviso contained in section
96 of an act of Congress approved on the 12th instant (Public, No. 15 ), which proviso reads as follows: '' Provided, That
no envelope furnished by t.he Government shall contain~any
business address or advertisement." You inquire whether
this proviso applies to and prevents your Department from
supplying in the future what are technically known as
"special-request envelopes."
To give the proviso that effect would be to repeal by implication the provisions of section 3915 of the Revised Statutes.
While one statute may impliedly repeal another, the inconsistency and antagonism between the two must be such that
they can not stand together. Otherwise, if by any fair and
reasonable construction the provisions of both can be given
a harmonious oper•ation, that construction is to be adopted,
and there is no repeal.
Further, it is plain from other legislation. on the subject
that when Congress did intend a repeal of that part of section 3915 now in question, it realized what provisions were
required to unquestionably accomplish that result, and
adopted them accordingly. Thus the act of July 13, 1892,
enacted as follows: "Provided, That it shall not be lawful
after the thirtieth day of September, 1894, for the PosmasterGeneral to have requests for the return of letters printed
upon any envelope sold by any postmaster or by the PostOffice Department." It is only reasonable to infer that 1f
Congress had attempted to reach the same result by the
above-quoted proviso to the act of 1895, it would have
adopted the same or equiva.Ien t provisions.
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The foregoing considerations clearly indicate that the proviso to the act of 1895 should, if it can reasonably be done,
receive such an interpretation as will not interfere with the
legitimate operation of section 3915. Such a construction,
in my judgment, is not only feasible, but is the just and true
construction. When the proviso prohibits the furnishing of
Government envelopes containing a '' business address or
advertisement," the thing aimed at is not "special-request
envelopes" proper, but envelopes which, purporting to be
such, are disingenuously and improperly made the advertising mediums of some trade or business. In other words,
what is condemned is not the use of "special-request envelopes" for their true purposes, but the abuse of them for other
purposes not contemplated. In this particular the proviso
to the act of 1895 is entirely in accord with section 3915.
That section expressly declares that" No stamped envelope
furnished by the Government shall contain any lithographing
or engraving nor any printing, except a printed request to
return the letter to the writer." The proviso to the act of
1895 is simply a more specific enactment, intended to accomplish the same general end as the first clause of this provision of section 3915.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the proviso of the act of
1895 constitutes no substantial limitation upon the power
of your Department to print and supply "special-request
envelopes," and has no other end or aim than to guard
against a real or apprehended abuse of that power.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The POSTM.A.STER-GENER.A.L.
AVAL RE ERVATION-RESTORATION TO PUBLIC DOMAIN.
Congre s alone is competent to subject to general governmental uses
land heretofore reserved from the public domain for the use of the
avy Department.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 19, 1895.
the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th,
wrm , beth r he land lying within the States of Aland i i i pi r rv d from the public domain for
of h J"avy D par ment b order of the Pre ident
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pursuant to an act of Congress can now be restored to the
public domain by Executive order without Congressional
action.
In my judgment, an order of the President is not sufficient.
Congress alone is competent to exercise the discretion by
which the land in question shall cease to be held for the
special purposes of the Navy Department and be made subject to general governmental uses.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
DUTY ON SUGAR TAKEN FROM WRECK.
Section 2928, Revised Statutes, only applied to goods wrecked while on
the voyage to the United States. Whether that section was repealed
by the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. Qucere.

JUSTICE,
January 21, 1895.
Sm: On June 1, 1894, the vessel Windsor sailed from Iloilo,
in the Philippine Islands, with a cargo of sugar for the
United States. On the following day the vessel was wrecked.
The sugar was taken back to Iloilo and the vessel repaired.
On October 9, the sugar having been again loaded on the
same vessel, it sailed from Iloilo for the second time.
The importers of the sugar claim the right to have it appraised under section 2928 of the Revised Statutes as merchandise taken from a wreck. You ask my opinion whether
the sugar is so classifiable.
Assuming that the vessel was a wreck in June, nevertheless the wreck did not occur in the course of the voyage which ended in the importation of these goods into the
United States. I do not think, therefore, that the sugar
comes within the purview of section 2928. It is consequently
unnecessary to consider the question whether, as assumed
by the editors of the Supplement to the Revised Statutes,
that section has been repealed by the customs administrative
act of June 10, 1890, section 23~
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
DEPARTMENT OF

The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS-RULES.
It will not be unlawful for the Commissioner of Patents, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to promulgate a rule limiting appeals to six months from the time when the matter is in condition for appeal.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 29, 1895.
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your. . letter of
January 19, inclosing a copy of a communication addressed
to you by the Commissioner of Patents, "wherein he propounds certain questions as to the power of the Commissioner
of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior,
to make and enforce such rules as will require of applicants
of patents for inventions greater diligence and the more
rapid prosecution of their claims."
You say: "Before answering the Commissioner's questions I have deemed it proper to submit the matter to you
for your consideration, and respectfully request that I be
furnished with your opinion on the questions in the letter
herewith inclosed."
The communication of the Commissioner of Patents submits to you the form of a " propose<l rule " designed to prevent the recurrence of the evil complained of, and the question submitted by him to you is:
"Has the Commissioner power to make rules, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, providing that no
appeal will be entertained by any tribunal in the office unless
taken within six months from the action which puts the case
in condition for appeal, unless it be shown to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable'"
I beg to say in reply that a rule or regulation made by the
Commissioner of Patents and adopted and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, under section 483, Revised Statutes, is a " regulation prescribed by the head of a Department," within the meaning of section 161, Revised Statutes,
and hat every uch regulation, when "not inconsi tent with
law, ha the for e of law and is taken judicial notice of by
the courts." (Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S., 13.)
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Section 4894, Revised Statutes, is as follows:
'' All applications for patents shall be completed and prepared for examination within two years after the filing of the
application; and in default thereof, or upon failure of the
applicant to prosecute the same within two years after any
action therein, of which notice shall be given to the applicant, they shall be regarded as abandoned by the parties
thereto, unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidable."
This appears to be the only provision of law as to the limitation upon the time of completing an application for patent.
I do not think that the proposed rule submitted by the
Commissioner of Patents in his communication is inconsistent with the law or beyond his power under the authority
given him to prescribe regulations for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office.
The communication of the Commissioner of Patents is
herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
RIOHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

CHINESE.
A certificate of naturalization issued to a Chinese person by the circuit
court of tho district of Montreal, Canada, and a passport issued by
the Governor-General of Canada, upon which the right is claimed as
a merchant to enter into and travel through the United States, can
not be accepted as a substitute for the certHicate prescribed by section 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 30, 1895.
Sm: I have yours ·of the 28th instant, from which it
appears that a Chinese person named Lee Bow, now at Montreal, Canada, claims the right as a merchant to enter into
and travel through the United States on a certificate of
naturalization issued to him by the circuit court of the district of Montreal, Canada, and a passport issued by the
Governor-General of Canada.
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You inquire whether the papers above mentioned may be
properly accepted in lieu of the certificate prescdbed by section 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884, amending an act
entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, approved May 6, 1882," and you inclose an
opinion given by the Solicitor of the Treasury to the effect
that the papers referred to can not be accepted as a substitute for such certificate.
I concur in the opinion expressed by the Solicitor of the
Treasury.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

LIFE-SA YING MEDALS.
The phrase "saving persons from drowning," for which, by section 12
of the act to organize the Life-Saving Service, approved June 18, 1878,
the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to oestow the life-saving
medal of the second class, has reference to the rescue of persons who
are subjected to the perils of the sea in any of the waters of the United
States and in the vicinity of any life-saving station, lifeboat station,
or house of refuge, either by shipwreck, or from ·being upon or connected with any vessel in distress.
Such medals of honor can not be awarded to any other persons than
those who are members of the regular or volunteer life-saving crew.
In construing a doubtful passage in a statute, resort can be had to the
immediate context and the legislation in pari materia.

JUSTICE,
January 30, 1895.
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of
the 21. t instant, transmitting the papers in three cases now
pending in your Department, to wit, that of John W. Kelly,
for the rescue of Gustav Heffler, that of Everett Bates, for
the re cue of Mary Dout, and that of Frank Sweezey, for
the re cue of two boys; and requesting my opinion "on the
proper con truction of ection 12 of the act to organize the
Life-Sa ing Service, approved June 18, 1878, in the following
particular .
The' particular "are stated in a serie of questions propound d in your lett r, which I will endeavor to answer in
DEPARTMENT OF
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the order in which they are stated, without repeating the
questions here.
It may be well to notice generally that the legislation under
which a few life-saving stations were established on the coast
of Long Island and New Jersey many years ago has since
then extended so far as to establish a general Life-Saving
Service, under which life-saving stations are now established
on all the lake and sea coasts of the United States; and
ample provision is made for an adequate supply of apparatus
and crews at all of such stations.
This body of legislation comprises a great many separate
acts passed at nearly every session of Congress during the
past twenty years, and it will be observed that careful
rega,rd bas not always been bad to perspicuity and accuracy
of expression in these acts, and from this cause has arisen
the doubt which your letter expresses as to the true meaning and intent of Congress in certain sections of these acts.
One simple and obvious rule of construction is to cast upon
the doubtful passage all the light which the immediate context and all the legislation in pari materia afford.
Your :first inquiry is:
'' Does the word 'persons,' in the clause of said section
which reads as follows: 'And saving persons from drowning,'
extend to or enlarge the class of persons, or apply to other
persons than those embraced in the word 'shipwrecked,' in
the clause immediately preceding the clause just quoted, as
follows: 'In rescuing and succoring the shipwrecked '1 Or
does said first-named clause extend the scope of the latter to
other than shipwrecked persons; and if so, to what other persons does it refer 1"
Section 12 of the act of June, 1878, is as follows:
" That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
to bestow the life-saving medal of the second class upon persons making such signal exertion in rescuing and succoring
the shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning as, in
his opinion, shall merit such recognition."
The legislation on the subject of Life-Saving Service will
be found collated in a note at the bottom of page 190 of the
Supplement to the Revised Statutes.
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. The enacting clause of the act of June 20, 1874, is as
follows:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
to establish life-saving stations, life-boat stations, and houses
of refuge, for the better preservation of life and property from
shipwreck, at or in the vicinity of the following-named points
upon the sea cind lake coasts of the United States."
And the enacting clauses of the acts of June 18, 1878, of
May 4, 1882, of June 19, 1886, and indeed of all subsequent
acts, are substantially the same.
·
Again, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to employ crews of experienced surfmen at such of the stations as
he may deem necessary and proper; and he is also author'ized to accept the services of volunteer crews at any of tbe
lifeboat stations herein authorized.
Again, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to have
prepared medals of honor to be "bestowed upon any persons
who shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving or
endeavoring to save lives from perils of the sea, within the
United States or upon any American vessel."
And in section 10 of the act of June 18, 1878, provision is
made for "extending the compensation of enrolled members
of volunteer crews of lifeboat stations therein named to occasions of actual and deserving service at any shipwreck or in
· the relief of any vessel in distress," etc.
From all which legislation it appears:First. That the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury
is to establish the_se life-saving stations, etc., "at points upon
the sea and lake coasts of the United States." That is, on
waters over which the United States has jurisdiction by
virtue of it authority to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, and not upon any other waters.
S cond. That the means provided are, crews of experienc d mfmen and volunt er . The field of their duties is
nece , arily confined to the vicinity of the life-saving stations
at w hi h they are appointed to serve.
.
Third. The ervic to b performed is "at any shipwreck
or in h reli f f any ve el in di tre ."
I hink then that the two term employed in section 12,
o i ' uccoring th hipwre ked and " aving per ons
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from drowning," were intended to embrace those persons, and
only those, who were suffering from the perils of the sea,
either by actual shipwreck or from being upon or connected
with any vessel in distress.
One may, without too great refinement, perceive how a
person may be suffering at sea from the effect of shipwreck
and yet be m no immediate danger of drowning-in an open
boat at sea without provis10ns, etc.-and that may have
been in the mind of the framer of this section and led to the
employment of these two forms of e~pression.
Your next inquiry is:
"Does the statute apply to the rescue or saving from
drowning of persons who accidentally fall from public or private docks, wharfs, or other places into the waters of harbors, landings, or other w_a ters of the United States; or to
such persons likely to drown in such waters from the capsizing of any skiff, row, sail, or other small boat, not connected with ships or commerce; or who may accidentally fall
or be precipitated overboard from any steamboat or other
vessel plying the waters of the United States; or to such
persons as may be drowning or about to drown while bathing in .any such waters 1" etc.
I think the statute applies to those only who, in the vicinity
of any life-saving station, lifeboat station, or house of refuge,
are in danger of drowning in any of the waters of the United
States.
Your next inquiry is:
'' Do the statutes relating to the award of any of the lifesaving medals in cases where the accident or casualty or
the person saved come within their contemplation yet still
limit or restrict the persons making the rescue to any particular class of persons with reference to their . calling or
occupation 1"
·
I take that question to mean simply whether those medals
of honor can be awarded to any other persons than those
who are members of the regular or volunteer life-saving crew.
The question is not without difficulty.
Section 7 of the act of June 20, 1874, provides that such
medals of honor "shall be bestowed upon any persons who
shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving or endeav-
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oring to save lives from perils of the sea within the United
States or qpon auy American vessel."
Now the term "any persons," taken alone, is certainly as
comprehensive as any form of expression can be. And yet,
that it is not safe to rely upon the form of expression alone
is shown by the next preceding section of the act, which provides that" Such volunteers, * * * for every occasion upon which
they shalJ have been instrumental in saving human life,
shall receive s'uch of the medals herein authorized as they
may be entitled to under the provisions hereinafter made."
Yet surely, by th·e expression "every occasion upon which
they shall have been im;trumen tal in saving human life,"
was not intended to embrace occasions that arose upon land,
but must be limited to occasions arising in the discharge of
their duty as a life-saving crew on the sea or lake coast.
I think the true meaning and intent of the statute was to
cause such medals of honor to be bestowed upon the members, whether regular or volunteer, and whether permanent
or temporary, of the. life-saving crews.
Finally, by "perils of the sea" is meant'' all losses which
occur from maritime adventures." (Hazard's Admr. v. New
England M. I. Go., 8 Pet., 557.)
In cases of marine insurance the term receives a much
more restricted meaning, but in its larger sense it embraces
every danger to which person and property are exposed at
sea and from which they would be free on land.
Herewith I return the inclosures with your letter of the
29th instant.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

MEAT I

PECTION-FALSE LABEL.

ongrea has n t provided for the punishment of persona who falsely
state iu a label placed upon canned meat that the meat contained m
th can ha b en inspected according to law.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

February 4, 1895.
SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 31st ultimo, call. ing attention to a label for canned corned beef used by Mr.
William Manning Hardy, of Victor, Cal., which label contains the statement that the meat contained in the can has
been inspected according to law enacted by Congress March
3, 1801, regulating inspection of meats. I understand you
to say that this statement is an entire misrepresentation and
to inquire whether or not it can be made the subject of a
criminal prosecution.
I regret to say that a careful examination of the statutes
of tpe United States fails to show that Congress has provided for the punishment of such a fraud as that committed
by the false statement contained in the label above referred to.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF AGRIOULTURE.

ATTOHNEY-GENERAL-REIMPORTATION OF LIQUORS.
Questions of fraud, or intent or colorableness in a transaction are questions of fact not within the authority of the Attorney-General to
determine.
Whether goods exported was immediately reimported, in order to evade
a provision of the customs laws, are an ''original importation".Q,uawe.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 5, 1895.
SIR: Your communication of December 6, asking my official opinion as to the reimportation of certain liquors at the
port of Ogdensburg, has received my careful attention. It
appears that the goods in question were imported and
entered for warehouse November 14, 1891; that they were
withdrawn for exportation in the regular wa.y on November
13, 1894, and exported across the St. Lawrence River to
Prescott in Canada; that proper papers for reimportation
were then obtained, and they came back on the next boat
2638-voL 21, PT 1--9
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from Prescott, and a new warehouse entry was made November 17, 1894. You ask me "whether or not the case pre.
sented by the special inspector should be regarded as a
mere colorable transaction in which there was no real exportation and importation of the goods!"
Whether the good faith of any such transaction can be
reviewed by the Treasury Department was a question
referred to by me in my opinion of May 19, 1894, with relation to certain wool reimported at Philadelphia, but it was
not found necessary to give an answer. The question turns
upon the definition of the phrase "original importation" in
section 2971 of the Revised Statutes. This topic has been
recently the subject of discussion by the Supreme Court
(Saltonstall v. Russell, 152 U. S., 628; Seeberger v. Schweyer,
153 U. S., 609), but the question whether goods exported for
the mere purpose of extending the three years' warehousing
period provided by the statutes, and immediately reimported,
can be regarded on the second arrival as an" original importation" is still an open one. It is a question which, in view
of the opinions of my predecessors (14 Opin., 574; 17 Opin.,
579; 18 Opin., 381), should, I think, be left to the courts to
decide.
Whatever the true construction of this phraseology may
be, the advice which you ask is not.within my authority to
give. · The transaction described by you may bear the most
distinct marks of an intent to evade the statute. But such
an intent would be a fraud on the statute. Questions of
fraud or intent or colorableness in a transaction are in so
far questions of fact that by familiar principles they are not
within my authority to determine.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

DI CHARGE FROM ARMY-CERTIFICATE.
The Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in the military arv ice of the United tates in such sense as to entitle Capt.
• r cl rick IIuidekoper to a certificate of discharge from the 'Gnited
'tat .
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 6, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 12th
ultimo, requesting my opinion upon the question whether
Frederick Huidekoper, of the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania
Regiment of Militia, is entitled to a certificate of discharge
from the military service of the United States.
It is to be assumed, as I understand, that the state of
facts respecting the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment is
the same as that existing in the cases of the Thirty-sixth and
Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiments, respectively, and considered by Acting Judge-Advocate-General Lieber in his
opinion of September 12, 1890. If that assumption is correctly made, then I concur in the legal result reached by the
Acting Judge-Advocate-General, and am of the opinion that
the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia can not
be regarded as having been so far and in such sense in the
military service of the United States as that Captain Huidekoper's request for a certificate of discharge should be
acceded to.
I return the inc1osures of yours, and remain,
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

INDIAN DEPREDATION JUDGMENTS.
The President is not charged with any power or duty of approval or
disapproval respecting the payments of Indian depredation judgments
from annuitites and property of Indians or from appropriations on
their account, but all authority and discretion in the premises are
vested in the Secretary of the Interior.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 6, 1895.
SIR: In the matter (?f the application of the Secretary of
the Interior for your approval of the payment of Indian
depredation judgments against the Osage Indians from the
interest on the proceeds of their lands in Kansas and for

132

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Indtan Depredation Judgments .

your approval of the payment of Indian depredation Judgments against the Ute Indians from a trust fuud held by the
United States for the benefit of the Ute Indians under the
fifth section of the act of June 15, 1880, I have the honor to
report as follows:
Section 12 of the act of July 15, 1870, referred to by the
Secretary, provides that the annual interest on tlrn proceeds
of sale of the Osage Indian lands shall be "expended by the
President for the benefit of said Indians in such manner as
· he may deem proper." But section 4 of the same statute
distinctly declares "that no part of the moneys appropriated
by this act or which may hereafter be appropriated in any
general act or deficiency bill making appropriations for the
concurrent and contingent expenses of the Indian Department, to pay annuities due to, or to be used and expended
for the care and benefit of, any tribe or tribes .of Indians
named herein, shall be applied to the payment of any claim
for depredations that may have been or may be committed
by such tribe or tribes, or any member or members thereof;
and no claims for Indian depredations shall hereafter be
paid until Congress shall make special appropriation therefor.'' It is apparent, therefore, that payments of Indian depredation claims can not be regarded as payments for the
''benefit" of the Osage Indians within the meaning of said
section 12, and can not be authorized by the President under
its terms.
The same considerations apply in the case of the Ute
Indians, and the annuity secured to them by the fifth section
of the act of June 15, 1880. Though the President is directed
by said ection to disburse or invest the annuity for the use
and henefit of the Ute Indians forever at his discretion, the
section mu t be interpreted not iudependently but in connection with ection 2098 of the Revised Statutes, which is the
ame in , ubstance and effect as section 4 of the act of July
15, 1 70, already above cited. The presumption is against
r p al of
tion 209 by the act of June 15, 1880, and
nly r
onable con truction of the two statutes taken
CT
h r i ha tl:e ati fa tion of Indian depredation judgm hin n fi r he ' u e and henefit" of the te
u cl th et 1·m in th act of 1 80.
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The payment of such judgments· against an Indian tribe is,
'however, specifically provided for by section 6 of the act of
March 3, 1891, which the Secretary of the Interior in his
communication to you quotes verbatim and by which they
are to be paid by the United States, are to be charged against
the Indian tribe concerned, and thereafter are to be deduc.ted
from any annuities, funds, or appropriations either then or
thereafter belonging to such tribe or inuring to its benefit.
But the act of August 23, 1894 (Stat.1894, chap. 307), enacts
that the deductions provided for by section 6 of the act of
1891 are to be ascertained and duly certified by the Secretary
of the Interior to the Secretary of the Treasury, and further
declares that "such deductions shall be made according to
the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, having due
regard to the educational and other necessary requirements
of the tribe or tribes affected; and the amounts paid shall
be reimbursed to the United States at such times and in such
proportions as the Secretary of the Interior may decide to be
for the interests of the Indian service." To the same effect
is section 5 of the act of July 28, 1892 (Stat. 1892, chap. 311.)
The inevitable result would seem to be, therefore, that the
President is not charged with any power or duty of approval
or disapproval respecting the payments of Indian depredation judgments from annuities and property of Indians or
from appropriations on their account, but that all authority
and discretion in the premises are vested in the Secretary of
the Interior.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The PRESIDENT.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-CUTS OF FOREIGN POSTAGE STAMPS.
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion regarding the act
of May 16, 1884, chapter 52, or the provisions of the act of February
10, 1891, chapter 127, except section 4, because they relate only to
criminal proceedings, and whether or not a crime has been committed
is a q110stion that in but rare instances can arise except in the Department of Justice.
Whether certain material or apparatus come within the scope of the
fourth section of the act of 1891 is a question of fact, and an opinion
thereon is declined.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 12, 1895.
· Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of February 7, asking my official advice as to whetller
certain " cuts and plates adapted to and used for the making
of sketches and pictures of foreign postage stamps'' come
within the terms of the act of May 16, 1884, chapter 52, '' to
prevent and punish counterfeiting within the United States
of notes, bonds, or other securities of foreign Governments;''
or within the terms of the act of February 10, 1891, chapter
127, "further to prevent counterfeiting or manufacture of
dies, tools, or other implements used in counterfeiting,'' etc.
I am not authorized to give you an official opinion regarding the act of 1884, because that act relates only to criminal
proceedings. Whether or not an act constitutes a crime is a
question that in but rare instances can arise except in the
Department of Justice. If there is reason to suppose that
acts coming to the attention of another Department are criminal in their nature, it is the duty of that Department to
report these acts to the proper officials of the Department of
Justice. It becomes, then, the duty of this Department to
consider whether or not the matter should be brought to the
attention of the courts. Criminal prosecutions are conducted
by U.S. attorneys, who are officers of this Department a::id
who are under the supervision, in nearly all matters, of the
Attorney-General. There are, indeed, rare instances (of
which this is not one) where the U.S. attorneys are placed
under your supervision instead of under mine. Such an
instance was the Cutajar case. (20 Opin., 715.) Even in such
ca e , however, the question whether certain acts constitute a
crime could not be presented in such a way as to warrant an
official opinion from the Attorney-General in the premises.
The que tion pre 'entecl to you in cases like that of Cutajar,
and to me in mo t ca es, whel'e prosecutions for crime are
uuder con ideration, i whether there is ufficient probability
f eooring a verdict to warrant a pro ecution. This is not a
qu tion of pure I w. I mu t, therefore, refrain from giving
m pinion on thi ca for the ' ame reason which comp 11 d my refr ining from giving au opinion upon the ad vis-
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ability of instituting a civil suit to recover money due the
United States. (20 Opin., 714; see also 19 Opin., 56, 670;
20 Opin., 277, 314, 539, 702.)
My predecessor declined to .advise the then Secretary of
the Treasury whether certain articles were in violation of
these acts of 1884 and 1891. (20 Opin., 210.) I think that
his declination was proper; and therefore the opinions which
were rendered to you on December 30, 1893, and January 16,
1894 (20 Opin., 691, 697), except so far as they may bear upon
the statutory provision below cited, must be regarded as
extra-official.
The same remarks apply to the provisions of the act of
February 10, 1891, except those of section 4. That section
authorizes any authorized agent of the Treasury Department
to seize '' all counterfeits of any of the obligations or other
securities of the United States. or of any foreign Government, or counterfeits of any of the coins of the United
States, or of any foreign Government, and all material or
apparatus fitted or intended to be used or that shall have
been used in the making of any of such counterfeit obligations or other securities or coins hereinbefore mentioned,
that shall be found ~n the possession of any person without
authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper
officer to have the same."
I can not advise whether the material or apparatus now
under consideration comes within the scope of this statutory
provision, because such advice would involve my de.c iding
questions of fact, such as similitude (20 Opin., 697, 698~, intent
(Opin. of Feb. 5, 1895), or fitness for a particular use.
Very respectfµlly
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ARKANSAS-INTEREST ON BONDS.
Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not to
bear interest after maturity. ( United States v. No1·th Carolina, 136
U. S., 211, followed.)
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 14, 1895.
I have the honor to acknowledge your joint
communication of the 12th instant, calling my attention to
certain coupon 6 per cent interest-bearing bonds of the State
of Arkansas, all dated January 1, 1838, and a portion of
which matured October 26, 1861, and another portion January 1, 1868. A copy of one of said bonds is inclosed, and
you inquire whether the State of Arkansas is liable for
interest on said bonds from and after their maturity.
In my judgment the question must be answered unhesitatingly in the neg·ative. The rule laid down in the case cited
by you ( United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S., 211) has
been explicitly declared to be the law of Arkansas by the
highest court of that State; and I find nothing in the terms
of the bonds themselves, or in any legislation of Arkansas,
having any tendency to show that the State has consented
to pay interest on the principal of these bonds aner such
principal became payable.
Respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
GENTLEMEN:

The SECRET.A.RIES OF THE TREASURY
.A.ND OF '.I.'HE INTERIOR.

FOREIGN POSTAGE STAMPS-COUNTERFEITING.
A counterfeit of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp is within the
meaning of the phrase "obligations or other securities " " " of
any Government" in section 4 of the act of February 10, 1891, chapter 127.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 18, 1895.
I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of February 15, askillg my official opinion whether the counterfeit of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes within
the ru aning of the phra e '' obligations or other securities
• •
of any foreign Government " in section 4 of the act
of
bruary 1 , 1 91, chapter 127. I have already advi ed
you th t , n uu an 1 d dome tic po tage stamp i an obliIR:
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gation or security of the United St~tes. (20 Opin., 697.)
That advice was largely based upon section 5413 of the Revised Statutes, which does not apply to foreign representatives of value. I think, however, that the words "obligations or other securities" should be given the same meaning
in the act of 1891, whether domestic or foreign, and therefore answer your question in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECR~TARY OF THE TREASURY.

SUPPLIES FOR PUBLIC PRINTER.
Revised Statutes, section 3709, inhibiting purchases and contracts for
supplies by the Departments of the Government except after due
advertisement for proposals, did not apply to paper and materials for
the Government Printing Office, and the acts arnendatory of the section
(Jan. 27, 1894, chap. 22, and Apr. 21, 1894, chap. 61, pp. 33, 62; Stat.
1893-94) enlarged it in respect to this office only so as to apply to fuel,
ice, stationery, and miscellaneous supplies.
The purchases by the Public Printer contemplated by the act of January 12, 1895, are paper and materials for printing and binding public
documents and such as do not come within Revised Statutes, section
3709.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 15, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 14th
instant, inclosing a copy of a letter dated March 11, 1895,
.from the Public Printer, and asking whether, in my opinion,
sections 15, 16, 18, and 38 of the act approved January 12,
1895, relieve the Public Printer from a compliance with the
requirements of the acts approved January 27 and April 21,
1894, amending section 3709, Revised Statutes of the United
States.
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes declares that all purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments
of the Government shall be made by advertising a sufficient
time previously for proposals respecting the same when the
public exigencies do not require ·the immediate delivery of
the articles.
By the act _approved January 27, 1894 (p. 32, Stat.'
1893-94), the section just referred to was so amended that
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advertisements for proposals must be ruade on the same
days by the Executive Departments, including the Governmeut Printing Office. But this act excepts from its operation " paper and materials for the use of the Government
Printiug Office, and materials used in the work of the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing, which shall continue to be advertised for and purchased as now provided by law." This act
reaches all supplies of the Government Printing Office except
"paper and materials for the use" of tliat office.
By section 2 of the act approved April 21, 1894 (p. 62,
Stat. 1893-94), the operation of the act of January 27,
1894, was limited to advertisements for proposals for fuel,
ice, stationery, and other miscellaneous supplies, to be purchased at Washington for the use of the Executive Departments and other Government establishments. The result
is, therefore, that these acts, taken together, have no effect
whatever upon the Government Printing Office, except in
respect of proposals for fuel, ice, stationery, and other miscellaneous supplies to be purchased at Washington, and do
not change, but expressly recognize as in force, the law previously existing in regard to advertisements for paper and
materials for the use of that office.
Section 15 of the act of January 12, 1895, is, with the
exception of substituting '' $1,200 " for "$250," and "Public
Printer" for" Congressional Printers," and leaving out the
words '' on public printing" after the words "joint committee," a literal copy of section 3780 of the Revised Statutes.
Sectio_n 16 of said act is, with like changes, not affecting
the question under consideration, a copy of tbe provisions of
an act approved July 31, 1876. (See 19 Stat., 105.)
Section 18 of said act is, with like changes, a literal copy
of section 3760 of the Revised Statutes.
These provisions existed and operated independently of
section 3709, and the acts above cited, amendatory of this
section, recognize independent regulations affecting the
'' pap r and materials for the use of the Government Printing Office" a in existence.
My conclu ion, therefore, i that section 3709 did not .apply
to pap rand materials for the Government Printing Office,
aud that the act amendatory th reof enlarged it in respect
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to this office only so as to apply to fuel, ice, stationery, and
miscellaneous supplies .
.As the act of January 12, 1895, only provides for printing
and binding public documents, the purchases by the Public
Printer therein contemplated are paper and materials for
that purpose an·d such as do not come within section 3709 as
amended. If section 3709 and the acts amendatory thereof
applied in terms to such purchases for the Government Printing Office, they would, in respect of the supplies and materials
specified in the act of January 12, 1895, be repealed by that
act, since it provides for such purchases in special ways
wholly repugnant to the method provided in the act approved
January 27, 1894.
Respectfully, yours, .
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SEORETA.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACT-REMISSION OF PENALTY.
The provision in contract with Jeremiah J. Kennedy, providing for a
forfeiture of $20 for each day's delay in completing the work, is to
be regarded as a penalty; and it is lawful to assess against the
contractor only the actual damages sustained.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 16, 1895.
SIR: 1 have yours of the 26th ultimo, referring to a contract for remodeling and enlarging the gas plant at the
Military .Academy, West Point, N. Y., entered into February
22, 1803, with Jeremiah J. Kennedy, and containing a provision that the work shall be completed within a certain time,
and that" for each day, excluding Sundays, required after
expiration of that time to complete this contract, the contractor shall forfeit to the United States twenty (20) dollars
per day, to be deducted from the final payment to be made
him."
There was a delay of one hundred and fifteen days in the
completion of the work, and you inquire whether it is competent for the Secretary of War to retain the actual damages arising from such delay, to wit, $225, or whether he
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must enforce the penalty according to the strict letter of the
contract.
The inquiry can be answered only by determining whether
the $20 a day forfeiture provided for by the contract is to
be regarded as in the nature Jf liquidated damages, or as a
penalty. The latter must, I think on the whole, be deemed
to be its true character, though the circumstances from
which a conclusion can be arrived at are, it must be admitted,
few and indecisive.
I am therefore of the opinion that it is competent for you
to settle with the contractor by retaining from the final payment a sum representing the actual damages sustained.
I return the con tract, and remain
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

CIVIL- SERVICE-REMOVALS.
Certain removals of superintendents and clerks in the Baltimore postoffice helll to have been properly made, and the appointment of their
successors to have been legal. (19 Opin., 411, cited.)
DEPARTMENT OF tTUS'.1.'ICE,
}lfarch 18, 1895.

SIR: Your communication of February 4 asks my opinion
whether certain removals of superintendents and clerks in
the B,iltimore post-office were properly made, and whether
the appointment of their. successors was legal. The facts
submitted relevant to this inquiry are as follows:
Prior to November 1, 1894, the postmaster at Baltimore
notified c rtain person that he had appointed them respectively to tbe po ition of uperintendents of divi ions and
clerk to he po t-office, and notified the incumbents of their
r m val.
On ovembe.r 1 h enter d the removals and appointments
in a privat mem randum book kept by him in the postoffic :£ r hat purp e.
11 the per OD then incumoents
r main d in ffic un il ovember 7, and on that day the
pp int
ualifi cl by taking the oath of office. On
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November 2 the President's order covering these places into
the civil service took effect. On November 7 the Post-Office
Department received official notification from the postmaster
of the removals and appointments as above stated, which
notification was dated November 1, but was not received
until November 7.
The Post-Office Department declined to approve the
appointments. Thereupon the postmaster appointed seven
of the original eight appointees as watchmen, intending, as
he stated, "to apply for their classification, and then to promote to the positions which I Ihe l had originally appointed
them by direct appointment on November 1."
The notification to the Post-Office Department of their
appointment as watchmen was dated November 8, and on
November 9 the Acting First Assistant Postmaster-General
notified the postmaster that the changes were approved if
made in accordance with the civil-service rules. On N ovember 14 the postmaster notified the Post-Office DepartmeJ?-t of
the promotion of the eight persons above referred to from
watchmen to superintendents of divisions a1id clerks, and on '
the same day the Post-Office Department approved the
changes in the roster if in accordance with the civil-service
rules. Thereafter the postmaster withdrew the appointments
of watchmen and promotions, as above stated, and in a letter
to the Post-Office Department of November 24 indicated his
purpose of standing upon his prior action.
The new appointees received compensation and performed
duties as clerks and never performed the duties of watchmen. The removals and appointments in question were up
to November 2, 1894, regulated by section 419 of the Postal
Laws and Regulations. In this section it is provided as
follows:
"The number, grades, and compensation of clerks for
post-offices, where allowance for clerk hire is made, are
fixed by the Postmaster-General. They are employed and
are under the direct supervision of the postmaster (except
as proyided in section 452), who is held responsible for their
acts. * * * All removals and new employments must be
reported to the First Assistant Postmaster-General as soon
as made."

142

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Civil Service-Removals.

The postmaster was empowered to employ the clerks in
question, and no formal appointment or approval was requisite. He was also empowered to make removals without
restriction.
The provision that a report of removals and employments
must be at once made to the First .Assistant PostmasterGeneral is not a condition precedent to the employment nor
of the consummation of the removal. They are to be reported after they have been made. It appears that prior to
November 1 the new employes were notified "that they
were appomted," and that the then incumbents were notified
of their removal. Thi~ completed the appointments and the
removals, and they were effected before the order ·of the
President operated upon these positions. The fact that the
new employes did not qualify or enter upon their new
duties before the order of the President took effect does not
impair the validity of the perfected employment.
In an opinion given on October 14, 1889 (19 Opin., 411),
Mr . .Attorney-General Miller held that a railway postal clerk,
duly appointed before the civil-service rules for the Railway
Mail Service went into effect, who did not take the oath of
office and enter upon its duties until after such rules went
into effect, was entitled to the office unaffected by such rules.
The fact that the incumbents of the clerkships held over by
permission of the postmaster after they had been notified
that they had been removed could not give them any title
to positions which had already been filled by the appointing
power.
My opinion is that the removals and appointments were
legal.
Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
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REGISTRY OF WRECKED FOREIGN-BUILT VESSEL.
A British steamship was wrecked outside the limits of the United
States, was finally towed to New York, and sank in or near Erie
Basin. The wreck was purchased by an American citizen at three
times the cost of the wreck. Held, that the vessel was "wrecked in
the United States," within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, section 4136; that the word ''cost" in said section is to be construed
literally, and that if the actual cost of the repairs is three times the
actual purchase price of the wreck, it is entitled to registry.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 21, 1895.
SIR: Your communication of March 14 informs me that
the British steamship Southery, which went ashore in the
Gulf of Mexico, outside the limits of the United States, and
was there al;>andoned by her crew and turned over to the
underwriters, was subsequently towed to Key West, where
she received further injuries, and :finally towed to New York,
where she sank in or near the Erie Basin. I assume from
your letter that her disasters at Key West and New York
were suffered bona fide and were not created for the purpose
of obtaining American registry. ( The Mohawk, 3 Wall., 566.)
You further inform me that the vessel~' was repaired and
purchased by an American citizen at three times the cost of
the wreck, * * * but evidence is submitted that the cost
was below the value of the vessel." An application has been
made for American registry under section 4136 of the Revised
Statutes, which is as follows:
"The Secretary of the Treasury may issue a register or
enrollment for any vessel built in a foreign country, whenever such vessel shall be wrecked in the United States, and
shall be purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United
States, if it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the repairs put upon such vessel are equal to· threefourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired/'
You ask me whether tbe vessel was "wrecked in tht
United States" within the meaning of that section, and also
whether the word ''cost" therein is to be interpreted literally, or as equivalent to "value."
The section under consideration has been very liberally
construed by my predecessors. (9 Opin., 424; 15 Opin., 402;
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20 Opin., 253.) Construing it liberally, I am of the opinion
that this vessel was" wrecked in the United States," whether
01 not it was in the eye of the law a wreck when first beached
iu the Gulf of Mexico, as to which I am not supplied with
sufficient information to judge.
Answering your further question, I am clearly of the opinion that the word "cost" in said section is to be construed
literally If the actual cost of the repairs is three times the
actual purchase price of the wreck, then in my opinion it is
entitled to registry. Whether the present case comes under
the law as so interpreted is not clear from your letter.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF THE TREASURY.
GENERAL APPRAISERS-RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION.
A protest under the customs administrative act of 1890 was overruled
by a, Board of General Appraisers on September 26, 1892. On July 6,
1894, the attention of the Board was called to the fact that it had
inadvertently overlooked some of the grounds of the protest, and a
review of its decision was requested. Held, that it was the duty of
the importer to watch for the decision of the Board, and that, after
the lapse of time stated, the Board was without further jurisdiction
in the premises.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 22, 1895.
Sr&: Your communication of March 5 informs me that a
protest under the customs administrative act of 1890, filed
by one L. Englelhorn, an importer, was overruled by the
Board of General Appraisers on September 26, 1892. This
decision was made in part inadvertently, the Board overlooking some of the grounds of the protest. On July 6, 1894,
Mr. Engelhorn first called their attention to this. The Board
thereupon requested the collector to return the invoice and
entry in the ca e, in order that consideration might be given
t th objection theretofore overlooked. The question thus
ar1 . wh th r the Board have the right, after such lap e
f tm , t r con icl r a deci ion. The Board is divided in
pini n n hi qu ion, and ou a k my official opinion
up

i.
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It is my opinion that the reasons of the Board of GeneraJ
Appraisers for their decision in overruling the protest can
not now be looked into even by themselves. Their d,ecision,
as I understand your letter, overruled the whole protest. It
was Mr. Engelhorn's duty to watch for the decision of the
Board, and no notice to him was necessary. (Compare
Westray v. United States, 18 Wall., 322.) Even a court,
after such lapse of time, would have no power to grant a
rehearing. (Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S., 410.) I therefore advise you that the Board have no further jurisdiction
in the premises.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.

CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMP ANY.
Views of counsel for the Central Pacific Railroad Company upon the
principle to be applied in the·accounting between that company and
the United States as to subsidy bonds loaned to the company, which
became due January 16, 1895, stated, considered, and not concurred in.
Construing the acts of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, and of July 2, 1864,
chapter 216, in the light of the Thurman Act of May 7, 1878, chapter
96, and sundry decisions of the Supreme Court: Held, that the onehalf of the earnings of the cotnpany on Government business and its
yearly payments of 5 per cent of its net profits can not be treated as
having liquidated the whole or any part of the company's indebtedness on account of the principal of the subsidy bonds maturing January 16, 1895; but, on the other hand, must be regarded as paying
interest debts exclusively. Held fur·ther, applying the familiar rule
that in case ·o f payments by a debtor to a creditor up0n distinct transactions for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an appropriation at the time, the payments are applied by law to the liabilities
of earliest date; that the sums applicable in any one year to the payment of the company's interest debts for that yea,r must be applied in
the order in which such debts arise, and the fact that bonds have been
issued at various times is of no consequence.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 25, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of January 9

last, which incloses a letter of the counsel of the Central
Pacific Railroad Company, containing his views upon the
2638-VOL 21, PT 1--10
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principle to be applied· in the accounting between that company and the United States, ·m ade necessary by the loan to
the company of subsidy bonds of the United States, of which
bonds to the amount of $2,362,000 became due January 16,
1895.
The rule laid down by the learned counsel is that credits
for transportation and for the 5 per cent of net profits referred
to in the act of 1862 are applicable, first, against the interest,
and second, against the principal of the first maturing bonds,
and thereafter first as against the interest, and second as
against the principal of subsequently maturing bonds in the
order of their maturity. You inquire" whether, in liquidating the subsidy bonds falling due January 16, 1895, it [the
Department l should be governed by the principle laid
'down in the company's statement; or if not, what method
in your f my] opinion should be followed in finally disposing
of the matter,"
The United States loaned the railroad company not money,
but semiannual interest-bearing bonds maturing in thirty
years. As it would itself not have to pay the principal of
the bonds until tlie end of the thirty years, it could not and
did not require the company to pay the _principal or any part
thereof before that time. But it went further. Though it
would have to pay interest on the bonds semiannually, it
agreed with the company that (with an exception to be presently noted) the amounts paid by it as such interest should
not become due to it from the company until the principal of
the bonds themselves also became due. While this was the
general plan, it was foreseen that the company would annually earn money by transportation service for the Government, and that after the completion of the road there might
be annual net pro.fits applicable to dividends. It was not
deemed neces ary that while the Government was actually
paying out money for interest it should also actually pay iuto
the company's treasury for its transportation all the money
hereby earned.
either wa it deemed wise that in tlie
c me year the Government was di bur ing money for intert all th ompany net pro.fit ' hould be di tributed among
h
·kholder . It was therefore provided, a the combined
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effect of the acts of 1862 and 1864, that one-half of the money
annually earned by the company on Government business
should be annually retained and applied to the payment 0f
the company's indebteduess on account of the subsidy bonds
and interest, and that 5 per cent of the net pro:fi ts of any
year should also be applied in the same manner.
The correctness of the foregoing statement is not, 1t is
believed, controverted. The difficulty arises when it is
sought to ascertain exactly what the statute means in prescribing an annual application to the company's indebtedness
of one-half of annual earnings from Government busi.J.ess and
of the 5 per cent fund. Is it that these annual credits and
receipts shall annually appear in proper accounts, but shali
actually extinguish debt only after the company;s entire debt
for both principal and interest of the subsidy bonds has
matured, Upon that construction the statutes in question
simply create a sinking fund, available to pay the whole debt
when matured, but not extinguishing any portion of it while
maturing. Upon that construction the controlling words
"annually applied,'' if not practically eliminated, lose their
natural meaning and operate as a simple requirement for
annual statements of account. Yet the Thurman Act of
1878 shows that Congress must be credited with appreciating
the difference between a sinking fund accumulating against
a thereafter maturing indebtedness and moneys applicable
to the actual reduction of a debt as fast as received. And, as
in the Thurman Act and other like acts, if the statutes of 1862
and 1864 bad merely intended to create a sinking fund they
would naturally have contained a provision for its interim
investment pending its application.
The construction in question is·, therefore, to be rejected,
and the alternative view adopted, . to wit, that the annual
application contemplated by the statutes in question is a real
application, one in fact annually extinguishing debt. But
what debt is to be thus extinguished, The debt of the company for the principal of the subsidy bonds does not arise
until their maturity and the payment of such principal by
t.he Government, and before that time is not susceptible of
actual extinguishment. The Government's payments for
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annual interest, on the other hand, create absolute debts,
whether payable in future, in whole or m part, is immaterial,
from the moment of each payment. It follows that when the
statutes of 1862 and 1864 direct one-half of the earnings
from Government business and 5 per cent of the net profits
for any year to be applied in such year to the company's
indebtedness growing out of the loan of the subsidy bonds,
the indebtedness referred to can be no other than that arising
from the Government's interest payments for the same year.
In short, what tlley in effect enact is that, though the company's debts for interest shall in general mature only when
its debt for prrncipal matures, yet so much of such debts
arising in each year as can be paid by one-half the earnings
from Governmeut business and 5 per cent of the net profits
for tllat year shall be held to ma.ture in that year, and shall
be paid and discharged accordingly.
The views above stated of the true construction of tile
statutes of 1862 and 1864 derive the strongest confirmation
from the provisions of the Thurman Act of 1878, wbicll,
indeed, if it were repugnant to the previous statutes, would
have to be regarded as amendatory thereof. Thus, the pre~
amble recites, as respects the Central Pacific, that tlrn United
States bad paid interest to the sum of more than thirteen
and one-half millious "which has not been reimbursed," and,
as respects the Union Pacific, that the United States lulid
paid over $10,000,000 interest "over and above all reimbursements." The enacting portions of the act of 1878 mark the
distinction between a sinking fund and credits and receipts
at once extinguishing debt in the most emphatic manner.
Thus section 7 declares that the sinking fund established by
the act ~hall, at the maturity of the bonds, be used for the
sati faction thereof. On the other hand, section 2 explicitly
provides that one-half the compensation due the two companies on Government business "shall be presently applied
to the liquidation of the interest paid and to be paid by the
nited :-.tat on the bonds." Aud section 4 provide , as
r pect ea h of th companie , that there bould be carried
to the r dit of the iuking fund one-half of the co·mpensa•
ti n a cruin · fr m ervic • for the Government "not applied
to li uid· ti n f int re ts."
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The doctrine that against current debts- for interest arising in any year are to be applied current credits and receipts
from the sources specified accruing the same year is also
strongly supported by the language used by the Supreme
Court when discussing and declaring the meaning and intent
of Congress, as evinced by the statutes in question and other
legislation in pari materia. Thus, in Union Pacific Railroad
Company v. United States (91 U.S., 72) the court (p. 78) says:
"The Union Pacific Railroad Company, conceding the
right of the Government to retain one-half of the compensation due it for transportation of the mails, military, and
Indian supplies, and apply the same to reimburse the Government for interest paid by it on bonds issued to the Government to aid in the construction of its railroad and telegraph line, seeks to establish by this suit its claim to the
other moiety." On pages 87 and 89 the court adds: "This
Congress did not choose to do, but rested satisfied with the
entire property of the company as security for the ultimate
payment of the principal and interest, and in the meantime,
with special provisions looking to the reimbursement of the
Government for interest paid by it, and to the application of
the surplus, if any remained, to discharge the principal."
And, "There could, however, be no reasonable objection to
the application 'of all compensation for services rendered for
the Government, from the outset and of, 5 per cent of the net
earnings after the completion of the road' to the payment of
the bonds and · interest. These exactions were accordingly
made.''
So, in the Sinking Fund Cases (99 U. S., 700, 719) occurs
the following _: "The contract of the company in respect
to the subsidy bonds is to pay both principal and interest
when the principal matures, unless the debt is sooner
discharged by the application of one-half the compensation
for transportation and other services rendered for the Government, and the five per cent of net earnings as specified
in the charter. This was decided in Union Pacific Railroad
Company v. United States (91 U.S., 72)." And again (p. 723),
"On the subsidy bonds, as has been seen, no interest is payable, except out of the half of the earnings for Government
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service and the five per cent of net earnings, until the maturity of the principal." (See also Union Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 99 U. S., 426.)
The result is that I am unable to concur in the opinion of
the counsel of the Central Pacific above stated. The onehalf of the yearly earnings of the company on Government
business and its yearly payments of 5 per cent of its net
profits can not be treated, in my judgment, as having liquidated the whole or any part of the company's indebtedness
on account of the principal of the subsidy bonds maturing
January 16, 1895. They must be regarded, on the other band,
as paying interest debts exclusively; and the only remaining
question is exactly what interest debts have been thus paid.
It being borne in mind that every year is to stand by ifa,elfthat there is to be in each year an accounting and settlement
by which the interest debts for that year are to be paid off
by the designated means-the answer to the question would
not seem to be difficult. It is a familiar rule that in case of
payments by a debtor to a creditor upon distinct transactions and for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an
appropriation at the time, the payments are applied by law to
the liabilities of earliest date. Hence the sums applicable
in any year to the payments of the company's interest debts
for that year must be applied in the order in which_such
debts arise; must be applied, for example, to the interest
debts arising in January in preference and priority to those
arising in July of the same year. The fact that bonds have
been issued at various times is of no consequence. Neither
is it important to determine on what issues of bonds the
interest disbursements of the Government for any year are
made. The indebtedness of the company arises at the
moment of each disbursement, is of the same nature, whatever be the bond i ue on account of which it is made, and
i each year u~ject to the same liquidation by the application thereto of one-half the P,arning on Government tran p rtation plu 5 per cent of the net profits for the same year.
If in any y ar th fund applicable to uch liquidation is
in uffi i nt t pay all the indebt dne ari ing from interest
di bur ment in that year, it i to be applied o as to first
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cancel the January interest indebtedness accruing in that
year, and upon all interest indebtedness accruing at the
same time in any year is to be applied pro rata.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DISPOSAL OF USELESS PAPERS.
The disposition of useless papers which have accumulated in the office
of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department is governed by the act approved February 16, 1889, chapter 171 (25 Stat., 672).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 28, 1895.
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 26th
instant, stating that there is a large accumulation of papers
in the office of the Auditor for the Post-Office Department
which can and should be disposed of under an act of Congress approved .August 5, 1882 (First Supp. Rev. Stat., p. 373),
unless said act has been repealed by the act of February 16,
1889, entitled "An act to authorize and provide for the disposition of useless papers in the Executive Departments."
Your communication incloses an opinion upon the question
by the Solicitor of the Treasury, dated the 26th instant, and
I do not deem it necessary for me to do more than to say
that I concur in the conclusion reached by the Solicitor.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
No·rE.-The conclusion of the opinion of the Secretary of
the Treasury was that a special act of Congress of August
5, 1882 (22 Stat., 219), by which the Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of useless papers
which might accumulate in the office of the Auditor of the
Treasury for the Post-Office Department, was impliedly repealed by the general and comprehensive statute of February 16, 1889, which provided for the disposition of useless
papers in the Executive Departments, for the reason that
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there was an insuperable repugnancy between the two statutes. He said: "In order that they both might stand and
operate together, we should . have the somewhat anomalous
and inconsistent practice of disposing of files of useless papers
in one bureau of the Treasury Department under a special act
and the disposition of such files and papers in all the other
bureaus of the same Department under the general law providing an entirely different method."-W. H.P.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-RELIQUIDA'fIO:N" OF ASSESSMENT.
On an importation of mohair goods, made after August 28, 1894, the
importer appealed from the classification of the appraiser, and, pend·
ing action by the Board of General Appraisers, upon notice by the
appraiser that a mistake of fact had been made, the collector-requested
a return of the papers for reconsideration, but the Board declined to
comply. Held, that section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136,
is still in force and that the Secretary of the Treasury has the power
to order a reliquidation of the assessment of duties in the interest of
the importers and to direct the return of the papers to the collector.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 30, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of March 6 and of certain correspondence relating to an
importation of mohair goods by Messrs. S. Babbit & Co. at
the port of New York. It appears that the goods were
imported after August 28, 1894, and were returned by the
appraiser as composed of wool or worsted derived from the
sheep; that duty was assessed thereon by the collector
accordingly; that the importers protested, or, more accurately speaking, gave notice in writing, as required by section 14 of the cu toms administrative act of June 10, 1890,
a a result of which the papers were transmitted to the
:Board of General .Appraisers; that subsequently the apprai er informed the collector that he had made a mistake
of fact and that the good were in fact composed of mohair
deriv d from the goat, and hence were liable to lesser duty
und r th opinion of this Department of October 9, 1894;
that the ollector thereupon requested a return of the papers
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for reconsideration, the protest being at that time pending
before the Board and undecided, but that the Board 'have
declined to comply with this request.
I understand from your communication that you have
authorized the collector to make a reexamination and reliquidation in this case. You ask my opinion whether the Board
of General .Appraisers is justifi~d under the provjsions of
the customs administrative act in further withholding the
protest from the collector.
In my opinion, section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, is still in force. That act expressly provides that
whenever the Secretary of the Treasury shall be of opinion
that duties "have been assessed and collected under an erroneous view of the facts in the case he may authorize a reexamination and reliquidation in such case" when protest and
appeal have been made, as required by law, and recognizes
the right to correct "errors in liquidation, whether for or
against the Government, arising solely upon errors of fact
discovered within one year from the date of payment."
The error in this case being one of fact, I am therefore of
opinion that you have the power to direct a reliquidation in
the interest of the importers and that it is not necessary to
make the importers go through the form of a bearing before
the Board of General·.A pp raisers. As the collector acted
under a mistake of fact, and there is no further controversy
between him and the importers, there is no reason for any
further proceedings before the Board. Their functions are
quasi judicial, and for a court to proceed with a case when
the parties are agreed and desire a discontinuance would be
an absurdity.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that you, as the head of the
Department, have the right to direct the return of the papers
to the collector.
Very respectfully,
RICH.ARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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EXAMINATION OF OFFICIAL .BONDS.
Attorneys for the United States are not required or authorized to make
the examination into the sufficiency of sureties upon official bond8
provided for in section 5 of the appropriation act for the next fiscal
year.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 30, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 28th
instant, referring to that provision of section 5 of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act for the next
fiscal year, which provides that" every officer required by
law to take and approve official bonds shall cause the same
to be examined at least once every two years for the purpose
of ascertaining th'e sufficiency of the sureties thereon," and
asking an expression of my views upon "the question of
having the necessary examination into the character and
value of the property of the sureties on the official bonds
approved by this Department made by the U. S. attorneys
for the respective districts in which the various bondsmen
reside."
Iain not advised of any statute which either requires or
authorizes a U. S. attorney to make an examination of the
character suggested, and am of the opinion that he can not
be called upon to render any such service to any officer of
the Navy Department charged with the duty of approving
official bonds.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

DISBURSEME 'T OF "GENERAL ARMSTRONG" FUND.
Directions given as to proper method of stating account with owners,
etc., of the U. S. brig of war General Arrnstrong, under the acts of
May 1, 1882, chapter 115, and March 2, 1895, chapter 187. Held, also,
that th ecretary of State can not apply any part of the unexpended
balance to the payment of the claim of amuel C. Reid, jr., for
"axp n
and charges" incurred in the recovery of the amount
appropriated.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 9, 1895.
Sm: I have your communication of the 3d instant, with
eighteen iuclosures, asking me to advise you as to what
amount, if any, you are authorized to pay to Mr. Samuel C.
Reid from the unexpended balance of the appropriation made
by the act of May 1, 1882, for the relief of the captain, owners,
officers, and crew of the U.S. brig of war General Armstrong,
under the act of March 2, 1895, entitled "An act making
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, and
for prior years, and for other purposes."
Under the act of 20th of April, 1882, the Secretary of State
is authorized and directed to examine and adjust the claims
of the captain, owners, officers, and crew upon the evidence
established before the Court of Olaims "and to settle the
same on principles of justice and equity."
Under this authority the Secretary of State, Mr. Frelinghuysen, ascertained that the amount originally appropriated
for the payment of these claims was $70,739.
That by an instrument of writing dated the 12th of September, 1835, the owners of the vessel, comprising fifteen
persons and firms, made an assignment in the words and
figures following:
"In consideration of one dollar, to each of us paid, and in
further consideration of the undertaking of Samuel C. Reid,
of New York, to bear all the expenses and charges and to perform all necessary services for the collection of the demands
hereafter mentioned, we, the subscribers, do assign, transfer,
and set over unto the said Samuel C. Reid, his heirs and
assigns forever, all our right, title, and interest in the late
private-armed brig the General Armstrong, captured and
destroyed at Fayal during the late war with England, subject to the payment to each of us of the one-half of any monies
that he may recover for or on account of said vessel." * * *
That $43,000 was the amount awarded by the Court of
Claims as indemnity for the losses of the owners of the
vessel.
That the said Uapt. Samuel C. Reid, by an instrument
executed _by him dated the 31st of October, 1851, assigned to
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Samuel C. Reid, jr., * * * "all my right, title, and interest to and in the undivided half of sixteen shares of stock
in the late privat_e -armed brig General Armstrong.''
That by a further instrument in writing dated the 12th of
December, 1856, the said Capt. Samuel C. Reid, assigned to
Samuel C. Reid, jr." .A.11 my right, title, and interest whatsoever to and in the
late private-armed brig of war General Armstrong, captured
and destroyed in the port of Fayal by a British squadron on
the 27th day of September, 1814, as assigned to me by the
stockholders and owners of said brig, in addition to the
shares of stock in said brig made over by me unto the said
Samuel C. Reid, junior, by deed dated 31st October, 1851;
and also all monies in virtue thereof which shall or may be
recovered from the Government of the United States, or the
payment of which may be provided for by the Congress of
the United States, in virtue of the claim of the said brig
General Armstrong now pending before the United States
Court of Claims.''
That the award made for the losses of the officers and crew
was $27,739.
That the award made as indemnity for the losses of the
owners of the vessel was $43,000.
Upon these facts the Secretary of State ascertained and
determined that Samuel C. Reid, jr., was entitled to recover
50 per cent of the amount awarded the owners of the vessel,
being $21,500, and to 40 per cent of the amount awarded
to officers and crew as compensation for his services, being
$11,095.60, making the total amount to which Samuel 0.
R~id, jr., was entitled $32,595.60.
It will be observed that in ascertaining the amount due to
the claimant for his services to be 40 per cent of the amount
awarded to the officers aud crew the Secretary of State
appear to have overlooked the fact that of those officers
apt. Samuel C. Reid had him elf been allowed by the Court
of Claims the nm of 1,037, which entered into and formed
part of th total award of 27,739.
could not have been intended that he should be allowed
40 per nt of th
1,037 a certained to be due him, nor
coul it ha b en intended that he hould be deprived of
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this amount which the Court of Claims had ascertained was
due him.
I think a proper statement of this branch of. the account
should beForty per cent of ($27,739-$1,037) $26,702 ....•••••...••.. * $11,080.80
To which add Captain Reid's share .......••.......••.. ---1,037.00

* 12,117.80

The statement of the entire account would then beF ifty per cent of $43,000 .........•.. : .•.............. - - - - . $21, 500. 00
Forty per cent of $26,702 ...........•... - - - - . . . . • . . . . . • • • • . * 11, 080. 80
Captain Reid's share ... _.. . . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • . .
1, 039. 00

* 33,619.80

Which amount Samuel 0. Reid, jr., the present claimant,
was entitled to receive from the appropriation of $70,739.
It appears that Samuel C. Reid, jr., the present claimant,
has made assignments to various persons ,and that payments
have been made to these assignees in the amounts appearing
in the tabulat,ed statement in Senate Executive Document
No, 164 of the first session of the Forty-ninth Congress.
It further appears that payments have also been made to
Samuel C. Reid, jr., the claimant, himself.
The sum of the payments made to Samuel C. Reid, jr., and
to his assignees, being deducted from the $33,619.80, would
leave the balance whieh he is entitled to receive out of the
unexpended balance which the act of March 2, 1895, directs
shall be applied for the liquidation and settlement of the
claims of Samuel C. Reid.
It appears, however, that Samuel 0. Reid, jr., now insists
that the unexpended balance shall be applied to reimbursing him the amounts which have been paid to his assignees,
on the ground that such amounts were so expended by
him in the expenses necessarily incurred in securing the
appropriation.
* Instating the account with reference to the amount awarded to the
officers an<l. crew, 40 per cent of $26,702 was carried out as $11,080.80
inst ead of $10,6~0.80, thus making the footing $12,117.80 instead of
$11,719.80. The footing of the "entire account" should, consequently,
be read $33,219.80, instead of $33,619.80. The attention of the State
Department was called to the errors indicated.-W, H.P.
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But the obje~tion to this is obvious and twofold.
First. The assignment of 12th of September, 1835, from the
owners of tJ:ie vessel to Capt. Samuel C. Reid, is subject to
the express condition that he shall "bear all the expenses
and charges and perform all necessary services for the collection of the demands hereafter mentioned."
Second. That the act of Congress approved March 2,
1895, under which alone the Secretary of State bas authority
to disburse the unexpended balance, expressly provides that
it" shall be applied for the fiquidation and settlement of the
claims of Samuel C. Reid, according to the vouchers now on
file in said Department.
And further, the claims of all the officers and crew of the
. brig, as well as those of the owners, have been recognized
by the Court of Claims and by Congress. And should the
Secretary of State now, without further authority than that
conferred upon him by the act of March 2, 1895, apply any
part of this unexpended balance to the payment of the
"expenses and charges" incurred in the recovery of the
amount appropriated, the Government woulrl still remain
liable to the officers and crew and the owners of the brig,
whose recognized claims have not yet been paid out of the
amount appropriated.
I am therefore of opinion that you have not the authority
to apply any part of the unexpended balance to the payment
of such " expenses and charges," or to the reimbursement of
Mr. Samuel C. Reid, jr., or anyone else who may have paid
them, but that the account should be stated as above indicated, and any balance left remaining should be reserved for
the yet unascertained claimants, or for further disposition
by Congr:ess. (Opinions on other features of this case will be
fouud 17 Opin. Att'y-Gen., 590,600; 20 Opin. Att'y-Gen., 373.)
The inclo ure are herewith returned.
Very re pectful1y,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor-General.
The E RET RY OF '1'.A.TE.
ppro ed:
RIO.II.A.RD OL EY.
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CUSTOMS DUTIES-DRAWBACKS.
Camel's-hair noils, resulting from the separation of imported camel's
hair into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback under section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manufactured article.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 17, 1895.

SIR: Answering your communication of April 6, I have
the honor to advise you that, in my opinion, camel's-hair
noils, resulting from the separation of imported camel's hair
into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback under
section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manufactured article. My opinion of December 27, relating to oil
cake, to which you refer, was based upon special considerations not applicable to any other by-product.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

COPYRIGHT ACT.
Section 3 of the copyright act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1106), prohibiting the importation into the United States of foreign editions of any·
book copyrighted in this country, 1s applicable to books copyrighted
prior to the passage of the act; and the exceptions in the case of persons purchasing for use and not for sale, who import, subject to the
duty thereon, not more than two copies of such book at any one time,
is not limited in its application to the'' authorized editions" of ·such
book.
DEP A.R'rMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 19, 1895.
SIR: I have your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing letter from Messrs. Harper & Bros., of February 15, 1895, with
a copy of your reply thereto, dated February 28, 1895, and
a further letter from said firm, dated March 2, 1895, and the
opinion of the Solicitor of tlie Treasury ;:ts to the application
of section 7 of the copyright act of March 3, 1891, to books
copyrighted before said act went into effect.
You ask my opinion " as to whether section 3 of said act
is applicable to books copyrighted prior to the passage of

a
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said act; and if so, whether the exception therein of two
copies of copyrighted books is limited to what are known as
'authorized editions,' as claimed by Messrs. Harper &
Bros.'' ·
The act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1106), is entitled ''Au
act to amend title 60, chapter 3, of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, relating to copyrights."
It win be observed as to this act that, although entitled
"An act to amend title 60, chapter 3," yet, in-fact, it amends
only certain specific enumerated sections of that chapter.
It will be observed further that it does not repeal the then
existing statutes on the subject, but that the amendments
consist solely in the addition of .uew provisions.
The rule of construction, as stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 133, is as follows:
"The portions of the amended sections, which are merely
copied without changes, are not to be considered as repealed
and again enacted, but to have been the law all along; and
tlle new parts, or the cllangecl portions, are not to be taken
to have been the law at any time prior to the passage of the
amended act. The change takes effect, prospectively, according to the general rule."
.And in Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, section
195:
"An amendment of a statute may or may not operate as
an implied repeal of the original law. If it does not change
the same, but merely adds something to it, it is not, in general, a repeal thereof."
The act of March 3, 1891, was intended, as is well known,
to protect domestic authors against foreign infringements of
their copyrights. .And, as appears by section 13 of that act,
it invited reciprocity in this matter from foreign Governments.
Section 2 is an amendment of section 4956, Revised Statute . It does not operate to repeal any provision of section
4956, but amend it only "by adding something new." It
provide £ r the <lepo, it in the mail or the delivery at the
office f the Librarian of ongre of a printed copy of the
itl of th work produced and al o two copie of such work;
ith the provi o, how ver, that '' during the existence of
uch 01 right the importa ion into the Uniwd States of
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any book * * * copyrighted, or any edition or editions
thereof, * * * shall be and is hereby prohibited."
Does this apply only to such books as shall have been
copyrighted since March 3, 1891 f I think not. It secures
to the owner of the copyright of every book which shall
have been copyrighted in accordance with the requirements
of this statute, whether before or after its passage, protection against the sale in this country of foreign publications
of his book by prohibiting the importation of such foreign
publications. The act is prospective only as to this new
security which it affords to the owner of the copyright, and
is not prospective as to the books to which that security
applies.
He can not claim indemnity for losses sustained by reason
of such importation and sale prior to the passage of the act;
but while his copyright continues, whether it was acquired
before or since March 3, 1891, the benefit of the act extends
to him.
Neither the letter, the spirit, nor the reason of the act confines the application of the protection it affords to those
books that have been copyrighted since its passage.
Tariff laws are prospective. But an amended statute
which places on the free list certain articles theretofore subject to duty is not limited in its application to those articles
of that class which have been produced or manufactured
since the passage of the amendatory act.
To this proviso there is an exception, as follows:
"And except in the case of persons purchasing for use and
not for sale, who import, subject to the duty thereon, not
more than two copies of such work at any one time."
Does this refer to two copies of an " authorized edition"
of such book,
The statute certainly does not say so, and the proviso to
which this exception is made provides that "during the
existence of such copyright the importation into the United
States of any book so copyrighted is hereby prohibited."
I am unable to see on what ground it can be claimed that
the exception refers to those books only the foreign publication of which has been authorized by the owner of the
copyright.
2638-VOL 21,
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ram therefore of opinion1. That section 3 of the act of March 3, 1891, applies as

well to books which have.been copyrighted before as to those
which have been copyrighted since the passage of the act.
2. That the exceptions in the case of persons purchasing
for use and not for sale, who import, subject to the duty
thereon, not more than two copies of such book at any one
time, is not limited in its application to the '' authorized
editions" of such book.
I herewith return the inclosures accompanying your letter.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
. Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Approved:

RICHARD OLNEY.

PURCHASE OF SEEDS.
The seeds purchasable out of tho appropriation made in the act
approved March 2, 1895, chapter 169, for the purchase, propagation
and distribution, as required by law, of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees,
shrubs, vines, cuttings, etc., are limited to those described in section
527 of the Revised Statutes, and must be such as are adapted to general cultivation and to promote the general interests of horticulture
::md agriculture throughout the United States.
It is competent for the Secretary of Agriculture to make the purchases
of seeds referred to conformably to section 3709 of th·e Revised Statutes, tho right to reject any and all bids being reserved.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 20, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 18th
in tant, in which you call my attention to a portion of the
act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1896, and approved
farch 2, 1895, and running as follows: "Division of seeds:
Purcha and di tribution of valuable eeds, and for the
printing, publication, and di tribution of Farmers' BulJetins:
r h pur ·ha. e, propagation, and di tribution, as required
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by law, of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees, shrubs, vines, cut.
tings, * * * one hundred and eighty thousand dollars."
You make two inquiries, as follows:
'' Can the Secretary of .Agriculture legally purchase any
other seeds than those described in section 527 of the Revised
Statutes, to wit, seeds ' rare and uncommon to the country,
or such as can be made more profitable by frequent change
from one part of our own country to another,' under authority of the act of March 2, 1895 ~ "
"Would it be proper and lawful for the Secretary of .Agriculture, in view of the verbiage of the act of March 2, 1895,
and the wording of section 527 of the Revised Statutes, to
advertise for proposals to furnish the Department of .Agriculture seeds, bulbs, trees, vines, cuttings, and plants 'rare
and uncommon to the country, and for such as can be made
more profitable by frequent changes from one part of our
own country to another,' reserving the right to reject any
and all bidsP
1. The seeds purchasable under the act of March 2, 1895,
are limited to those described in section 527 of the Revised
Statutes, there being no reasonable ground for claiming that
the act of March 2, 1895, operates or was intended to operate
as a repeal of the earlier statutes.
2. If not obligatory on the Secretary of .Agriculture to
purchase seeds, trees, etc., conformably to section 3709 of the
Revised Statutes, it is certainly competent for him to make
the purchases conformably to said statute, the right to reject
any and all bids being reserved. But tl;le form of the quest.ion is such that I think it proper to call attention to the
_fact that while seeds purchased must be such as are "rare
and uncommon to the country, or such as can be made more
profitable by frequent changes from one part of our own
country to another," the trees, plants, shrubs, vines, and
cuttings to be purchased are such "as are adapted to general cultivation and to promote the general interests of horticulture and agriculture throughout the United States."
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF .AGRICULTURE.

164

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Naval Ac:Ldemy- Ap1>oin tmeut of Cadets.

NAVAL ACADEMY-APPOINTMENT OF CADETS.
The proviso to the naval appropriation act of March 2, 1895, chapter
186, permitting and authorizing every Representative or Delegate in
Congress "whose district or Territory is not now represented at the
Naval Academy" to make recommendation on or before March 4, 1895,
of a candidate for appointment as a cadet at the Naval Academy of
the United States, was intended to apply to Members of the then
existing Fifty- third Congress.
To be valid, it was essential that a recommendation should be made
before 12 o'clock noon of March 4, 1895; and, in consequence, three
recommendations considered ·in the opinion are held to be ineffective
to deprive the successors in office of the signers of the recommendations of the general privileges granted to them by the Revised Statutes,
sections 1513 and 1514.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 24, 1895.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
30th ultimo, in which you ask my opinion as to the filling of
certain vacant cadetships at the Naval Academy under the
following clause of the naval appropriation act of March
2, 1895:
"Provided, That every Representative or Delegate in Congress whose district or Territory is not now represented at
the Naval Academy for any cause by a cadet shall be permitted and authorized to recommend a candidate for appointment as a cadet at the Naval Academy of the United States,
said recommendation to be made on or before the fourth day
of March, eighteen hundred and ninety-tive, subject to the
qualifications now prescribed by law. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to increase the number of cadets
at said Naval Academy as now provided by law."
It seems that about 9 o'clock on the evening of the 4th day
of March last a Member of the late House of Repre entatives handed to the A sistant Secretary of the Navy a paper
dat d farch 4, 1895, 11.30 a. m., iu terms appointing (but
undoubtedly to be construed as recommending) his son for a
cadet hip, that two other Members of aid House made recmmen ation al o dated March 4, 1895;• and tbat all three
r ommend ti n were not r ceived at tbe Department until
far h .
our inquiry i , ~ beth r you are authorized to
h m a alid recommend tion und r the provi ions of
f
9 above quoted.
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1. The recommendation contemplated by the statute is to
be made by a "Representative or Delegate in Congress."
Further, such Representative or Delegate is to be a Member of the then existing Congress, the language being that
"every Representative or Delegate in Congress whose district or Territory is not now represented at the Naval .Academy" may recommend. "Now," as thus used, designates
the time of the passage of' the act; it is nonrepresentation at
that time that gives the right of recommendation, and, in the
absence of language expressive of a contrary intent, must be
held to give the right to such persons as were Representatives or Delegates at the same time. .Any other construction
would be forced and unnatural.
2. If, however, there could be a doubt on that point, it is
settled. by the prescribed time within which a recommendation must be made. It must be made on or before March 4,
1895. But March 4, 1895, is not selected as the limit of t:b.e
::-.llotted time haphazard, n·o r without obvious reason. It
was undoubtedly chosen because by legislative usage, beginning with the foundation of the Government, never departed
from, and now having the force of law, the life of each Congress comes to an end at noon of the 4th day of March. The
different parts of the statute are thus mutually explanatory.
March 4 is prima facie the official March 4, because a Congressman is authorized to act on or before that time. On the
other band, the Congressman so authorized is prim a f a-cie a
Representative or Delegate in the Fifty-third Congress,
because otherwise there would be no reason for restricting
his action to a period bounded by March 4, 1895.
3. It being assumed, therefore, tbat a recommending Representative or Delegate in Congress under the statute of 1895
must at the time of his recommendation be a Member of the
Fifty-third Congress, the only remaining question is, Were
the three recommendations under consideration made before
12 o'clock on the 4th clay of March, 1895 f
It is clear that the O'Neill recommendation was not so
made. Though ben,ring date, and probably written, March
4, 11.30 a. m., nothing was done with it until 9 o'clock of the
evening of that day. Until then it was in the writer's possession . and csmtrol, and there is no ground upon which it
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can be he]d to have been made to the :Navy Department
until after the expiration of the prescribed time.
The recommendations from the two other Representatives
mentioned, also dated March 4, were received at the Department March 5. But I am not informed how or when they
were transmitted to the Department, nor do they bear any
indorsement throwing light on this question. The date of a
recommendation is of shgbt consequence. If it be true
that under some circumstances a recommendation might be
regarded as made before its receipt at the Department, still
uo such circumstances are develope·d in the papers submitted
to me. The result is that the writers of these letters, whose
terms of office had expired before their receipt, do not show
themselves to have taken the steps necessary to secure the
special privileges granted to themselves by the act of 1895
and to deprive their successors in office of the general privileg'es granted them by the Revised Statutes, sections 1513
and 1514.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE NAVY.

ALIEN ENGINEERS AND PILOTS.
The act approved June 26, 1884 (amending section 4131 of the Revised
Statutes), commonly known as the Dingley bill, was obviously
designed to make provision for a class of persons who, though aliens,
might be officers of the United States under peculiar circumstances
and for brief periods; and the provisions of the act not being in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the act approved April 17,
1 74, entitled "An act to authorize the employment of certain aliens
a ongin era and pilots," uoth statutes are to b e regarded as m force.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 9, 1895.
I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 23d
a king my opinion upon the question whether the
known a tbe ' Dingley bill,' approved June 26,
m ndmg ·ect1011 4131 of the Revised Statutes,
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repealed an act entitled "An act to authorize the employment of certain aliens as engineers and pilots," approved
April 17, 1874,
As the law stood prior to the act of 1884, above cited, two
classes of persons were competent to receive licenses as engineers or pilots on United States vessels. Citizens of the
United States were one class. Aliens on the way to citizenship by having declared their intention to become citizens
and by permanent residence in the United States for six
months prior to the granting of licenses constituted another
class. The amendatory act of 1884 did not affect, and was
not meant to affect, either of these classes. Leaving them
undisturbed, it was obviously designed to make provision for
a third class of persons who might be officers of United
States vessels under peculiar circumstances and for brief
periods.
·
The members of both the classes first named are regarded
as in effect citizens of the United States and as being eligible as such to permanent employment as officers of United
States vessels generally under Revised .Statutes, section
4131, and as engineers or pilots of such vessels under the
act of April 17, 1874. The members of the third class, on
the other hand, are aliens, whom the law excludes from general and permanent employment on United States vessels,
and permits to serve on such vessels only temporarily and in
emergencies.
The provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, being thus in
no way in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the
act of April 17, 1874, both statutes must be regarded as in
force, and the later did not have the effect of repealing the
former statute.
·
. Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF TI-IE TREASURY.

MEAT INSPECTION-REGULATIONS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Whenever power is given to ·public officers, to be exercised for the
public interest, the language used, though permissive in form, is
mandatory.

168

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Meat In spe cti on --Reg ulations-Attorney- General,

The provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 169, authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to make such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary to prevent the transportation, etc., of condemned carcasses or parts of carcasses of cattle, sheep, and swine, which have
been inspected in accordance with the provisions of the act, imposes
the duty to make su_c h rules and regulations.
A regulation requiring that inspected articles found to be diseased and
unfit for human food ·shall be at once removed and rendered in such
manner as to prevent its withdnawal as a food product, under the
supervision of employeR of the Department of Agriculture, is not
authorized by the grant of power to make regulations to prevent
transportation.
The Secretary of Agriculture is not required to effect the prevention of
the consumption of diseased meat as human food within the Stat,e of
its origin and without its having been carried out and brought back
into such State; nor, if the Secretary decides that pork affected with
trichinrn is unfit for human food, does the law provide for or authorize its destruction as food or grant authority to license its use under
limitations or restrictions.
Following 19 Opinions, 332,412, and 20 Opinions, 703, 729, the AttorneyGeneral declines to express an opinion upon a question propounded,
because not based upon a case which has actually arisen in the
administration of the Department of Agriculture.
DEP.A RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 10, 1895.
SIR: I have :vour letter of May 4, 1895, inclosing a copy of
"An act to provide for the inspection of live cattle, hogs,
and the carcasses and products thereof, which are the subjects of interstate commerce, and for other purposes,"
approved March 3, 1891; also a copy of "An act making
appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the
fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-six," approved March 2, 1895; also a copy of "Regulations for the .inspection of live stock and their products,"
made by you February 7, 1895:
Section 7 of the Regulation provides that"The in pee tor or his as i tant shall carefully inspect at
time of laughter all animal laughtered at aid establishm nt and make a post-mortem report of the same to the
D partn nt.
hould the carca of any animal on said
po t -mort m examin tion be found to be di ea ed and unfit
fir human fo d h ai
area
hall be marked with the
ond
ta
nd
di eased organ, or part
if r
1
id c·
, ball be immediately

TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICUL'rURE.

169

Meat Inspection-ltegulatious-Attorney-General.

attached to same. The entire carcass shall be at once
removed, under the supervision of the inspector or that of
some other reliable employe of the Department of Agriculture, to tanks on the premises, and deposited therein, and
rendered in such manner as to prevent its withdrawal as a
food product. Should the establishment have no facilities
for tbus destroying the said carcass it must be removed from
the premises by numbered permit from the inspector to
rendering· works designated by him, and there destroyed
under his supervision in such a manner as to make it unsalable as edible meat."
You ask whether the act of March 2, 1895, is "mandatory
to such a degree" that you are "legally compelled to prevent such transportation of said carcasses, thereby necessitating such regulations and their ·strict enforcement."
The provision of said act upon this point is as follows:
'' The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized to make
such rules and regulations as he may decide to be necessary
to prevent the transportation from one State or Territory or
the District of- Columbia into any other State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, of the
condemned carcasses or parts of carcasses of cattle, sheep, and
swine which have been inspected in accordance with the provisions of this act."
When power is given to public officers, whenever the public
. interest calls for its exercise, the Ia,nguage used, though
permissive in form is in fact peremptory. ( Supervisors v.
United States, 4 Wall., 446.) In Regina v. Tithe Omnmissioners (14 Q. B., 459),. Mr. Justice Coleridge observed:
"The wor<ls undoubtedly are only empowering, but it has
been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in
public statutes words only directory, permissory, or enabling
may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is
for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice."
The general rule is that permissive words in a statute are
peremptory when used to clothe a public officer with power
to do an act which concerns the public interest.
In my opinion, the words " hereby authorized to make such
rules," etc., though permissive in form, confer a power, coupled
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with a duty, to make regulations to prevent such transportation of carcasses so inspected and condemned.
You ask " where such i:r;ispection is instituted for export
or interstate trade, and animals are presented for inspection
and found diseased and condemned by inspector, is this
Department legally compelled to render the carccisses of such
ani11ials unfit for human food, or does the packer or owner
have the right to claim said carcasses for local trade or home
consumption as a food product'"
You say, referring to section 7 of the Regulations, '' In my
opinion, such method is absolutely necessary to insure the
destruction of condemned carcasses."
The law does not provide for the destruction of condemned
carcasses. It contemplates that they will not be destroyed
for section 5 of the act approved March 3, 1891, which is
unamended by the act approved March 2, 1895, imposes a
penalty for transporting the carcasses or the food products
thereof which have been declared by the inspector to be
unsound or diseased.
You are only authorized to make regulations to prevent
transportation. If <lestruction of the carcasses had been
intended, it is probable that such power, being in derogation
of property rights, would have been expressly given.
Rules and regulations to prevent transportation would not
have been necessary after such summary process. Such
power would hardly be implied, and certainly not unless it
appeared that no rules or regulations short of such destruction would be adequate to carry out the purpose of the law.
You state that, in your opinion, the method provided is absolutely necessary to insure the destruction of condemned carcasses but not that it is absolutely necessary to prevent
their transportation.
My conclusion is that you are not "legally compelled to
render the carcasses of such animals unfit for human food."
You a k, " Does the law in tend to prevent the consumption
of di eased meat as a human food and require this Department
to e:ffi ct uch prevention regardless of where consumed, 71
Th law intend to prev nt the transportation of diseased
me t a a human food a a part of interstate commerce or
e p r t foreign countries.
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Your Department is not required to effect the prevention
of the consumption of diseased meat as human food within
the State of its origin and without its having been carried
out and brought back into such State.
You ask," If this Department decides that pork affected
-with trichinre is unfit for human food, does the law compel
1ts destruction as a food, or is it left optional with the
Department to destroy it or permit its use under limitations
or restrictions¥"
The law does not compel its destruction as a food. I do
nut t hink any power to destroy it is conferred. You have
no authority to license its use under limitations and restrictions. If it bas been inspected and pronounced unsound or
diseased, your duties are confined to rejecting it for transportation and preventing the same by necessary regulations.
You ask, "Does the packer or owner have the right to
claim said carcasses for local trade or home consumption as
a food product¥" You do not state that any such case is
before you in the administration of your Department.
. It is respectfully submitted that, in accordance with the
interpretation put upon the statute by the settled practice
of this Department, it will not be proper for me to express
an opinion on this question until the case shall actually
arise. (19 Opin., 332, 412; 20 Opin., 703, 729.)
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICU;L'I.'URE.

LOTTERY-LE PETIT JOURNAL.
An advertisement in a French publication styled Le Petit Journal, considered, and held to fall within the prohibited class defined in section
3894 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of September 19,
1890, chapter 908.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 14,1895.
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 3d instant, inclosing a copy of Le Petit Journal, published in Paris, containing advertisements concerning
the premium bonds of the Credit Foncier de France, and of
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France; also.a copy of a communication from the Assistant
Attorney-General of the Post-Office Department, dated May
3, 1895; also a communication from the Secretary of State,
under date of April 16, 1895, accompanied by a copy of a
communication from him to the French ambassador, bearing
the same date; also a copy of a communication from your
predecessor in office to the Secretary of State, under date of
April 1, 1895, accompanied by copies of certain correspondence.
·
You ask my opinion as to whether the advert_isement published in Le Petit Journal falls within the prohibited class
defined in section 3894 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
by the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 465).
The following is a translation of the advertisement, from
which it clearly appears, in my opinion, that it comes within
the meaning and descriptive terms of the statute as construed
by the Supreme Court in Horner v. The United States (147
U.S., 449), and in McLaughlin et al. v. The National Mutual
Bond and Investment Company (64 Fed. Rep., 908):
PREMIUM SERVICE OF TIIE LITTLE JOURNAL,

The Little Journal bolds at the disposition of its readers and delivers
or sends immediately the values following:

Net prices at the wicket.
Francs.

3 franc annuity, 3 per cent .. 103. 90
15 franc, 30/0, redeemable .. 509. 00
3 franc 50 annuity, 31/20/0. 108. 30
City of Paris, 1865 ......... 579.10
City of Paris, 1869 ......... 432.10
City of Paris, 1871 ......... 422. 60
Quarters, 1871...... . . . . . . . 110. 30
City of Paris, 1875 ....... .. 589. 10
ity of Paris, 1876 ......... 592.10
City of Paris, 1886 . ..... ... 421. 60
Quarters, 1886 ............. 107. 80
City, 1 92, 90 fr. p...... . . 137. 05
Quart rs, 1 92, fr. 50 p...... 36. 55
ity of L , ons, .1 0 ........ 104. 55
Land bond 1 77. . . . . . . . . . 403. 60
onimuna.1 , 1 79 .......... 505.10
Land
ncl
.......... 505. 10

and bond
fr. 25.

fran

Francs.

Communals, 1880 .......... 505. 60
Land bonds, 1885 .. ........ 505. 60
Communals, 1891, freed .... 406.10
Communals, 1891, fr. p ...... 361. 55
Communa]s, 1892 .......... 507.10
Communals, 1892, fr. p ...... 257. 55
East, new...... . . . . . . . . . . . 480. 60
Paris L. M., new fusion .... 486.10
North, 3 per cent, old ...... 484. 60
OrJeans, 1884 ..•........... 482. 60
West, new ................. 485. 60
outh, new ................ 481. 35
Press bonds...... . . . . . . . . . . 14. 55
Bonds, 1887, red. Pone.... 17. 30
Bonds, 1888, Cred. Fonc.... 59. 80
Exposition bonds..........
. 75
Panama bonds, by lot...... 131. 80
. Intere t payment, 1 October. Net price, 101
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N ext dtawings.
15 March.
22d March,

l
f

City of Paris, 1865.
Land bonds, 1887.
{ Cornmunals, 1892.

In consideration of a postage stamp for answer we make known, e.a ch
t ime that one requests it, whether the numbers which one indicates
h ave come out at the dra wings.
To receive the titles free by mail, add to the above net prices 1 franc
for the first title and 50 centimes for each additional title.
Address the funds to the administrator appointed either i11 bank notes or
in a registered letter, or by means of a postal order, or check upon Paris,
payable to t he order of The Little Journal.
Write on the envelope: Service of premiums.
NoTE.-As an exceptional thing and by special agreement with the
Credit Foncier, the land bonds of 100 francs , 3 per cent, 1885, suffices,
then, to send 101 francs 25 per title, interest payment October, 1894.

The inclosures with your letter are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
The POSTMAS'l'ER-GENERAL.
Approved:
RICHARD OLNEY.

FREE-DELIVERY SERVICE.
An ext ension of the free-delivery service of the Detroit })Ost-office, so as
t o permit t he delivery of mail to vessels in Canadian waters, is not
legally authorized.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

May 18, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 15th
instant, from which, when taken in connection with yours of
the 10th instant, relative to the same subject-matter, I understand the only question presented for my opinion to be
whether the "free-delivery service" of the Detroit postoffice can be so extended as to permit the delivery of mail to
vessels in Canadian waters.
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In my judgment, such an extension of the free-delivery
service of the Detroit post-office is not legally authorized.
Respectfully, yours,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS.
It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion on questions submitted to him, except when needed for the guidance of the
head of a Department, and relating to some matter calling for action
or decision on his part. (20 Opin., 609, 723, followed.)
When, for the proper discharge of the duties of his office, the Commissioner of Patent,s desires lega.l advice, resort should be had to the
legal force assigned to the Department of the Interior.
The Attorney-General is not permitted to render an official opinion upon
questions of fact. (20 Opin., 697, 711, 717, and 740 1 followed.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 20, 1895.
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication of the 17th
instant, transmitting a copy of a letter to you of May 16,
1895, from the Commissioner of Patents, together with a
copy of correspondence between the Commissioner of Patents and Hon. A. P. Gorman, chairman Joint Committee on
Printing.
The Commissioner of Patents submits to you the following questious:
"First. May the Commissioner of Patents lawfully contract for the production of the Official Gazette, including the
weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual indexes therefor,
exclusive of expired patents, as a whole, upon proper advertisement, with the Jowest acceptable bidderf In another
form the question is, whether the Official Gazette, including
thew ekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual indexes therefor,
exclu ive of expired patents, is, as a whole, 'printing for
the atent Office, making use of lithography or photolithoo-raphy, together with the plate for the same.
'
nd. fa the Oommis ioner of Patent ·, upon the
ip of · al d pror al , pur uant to hi public adverm n ther for, I wfully award the contract to a bidd r
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who, being the lowest available bidder, proposes to do the
work by printing from type all parts Jf the text, inctuding
briefs and claims, and proposes to do the illustrated portion
by zinc or other suitable plates made by photo-engraving;
that is to say, are the words lithography and photolithography generic words, including processes of similar character, in which the transfer is not made to stone, and may
such liberal construction be put upon those words for the
purpose of saving as much as $22,000 in the production of
this work, or must the production of those pages be by lithogra,phy or photolithography in the most restricted meaning
which may be attached to thos.e words,
" Third. Are the communications received from Senator
Gorman, copies of which are herewith transmitted, limitations and conditions of the Joint Committee on Printing,
such as that ·committee may from time to time prescribe for
the conduct of the Commissioner of Patents in contracting
for and performing the work hereinbefore mentioned 1
" Fourth. Is there at the present time, or at the dates of
any of the letters herein before referred to, a Joint Committee
on Printing in existence for the purpose of prescribing lim- '
itations and conditions to the Commissioner of Patents for
his guidance in contracting and performing the work herembefore mentioned,"
You in turn submit all ·of said questions to me for my
opinion.
By section 8 of the act approved January 12, 1895 (Public
No. 15, p. 21); it is made the duty of the Commissioner of
Patents, under certain conditions, to have done the printing
referred to, and hence the questions submitted arise in the
administration of his office.
On June 7, 1893, upon a request from you, involving in
respect of my duties a similar case, I said as follows:
" It has been held frequently that the statutes prescribing
the duties of the Attorney-General (Rev. Stat., secs. 354 and
356) do not authorize or require him to give an official opin. ion except to the President or to the head of an Executive
Department; and it would seem to follow that the opinion
should be needed for the guidance of the head of a Department, and should relate to some matter calling for action or
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decision on his part. The reasonableness of this limitation
upon the authority of the Departments to call upon the
Attorney-General for official opmions is manifest when we
remember that the Attorney-General must personally pass
upon every question so submitted to him; for although he
may, under Revised Statutes, section 358, refer the question
to a subordinate for a written opinion, the action of the subordinate must be examined and approved by the AttorneyGeneral to give it effect.
"For the guidance of the beads of bureaus and other
officers of the Departments in the discharge of their duties,
provision is made by section .361 of the Revised Statutes· for
assistance from the officers of the Department of Justice,
under the direction of the Attorney-General; and an assistant attorney-general, and law clerks have accordingly been
assigned to the Department of the Interior, to whom, it
seems to me, the Commissioner of Patents should submit
his question.
"The power of disbarment given by·section 487 is conferred upon the Commissioner of Patents. It is only after
he has made a decision that his opinion is submitted to
review by the Secretary of the Interior. In determining
whether he shall make a reference, and if so to whom, he
acts in the first instance upon his own responsibility, and
not under the supervision or direction of the Secretary of
the Interior. An answer to the question submitted by the
Commissioner of Patents can not, therefore, at the present ·
stage of the proceeding, be required for the guidance of the
Secretary of the Interior; and the Attorney-General, if he
should make an answer, would not only overstep the boundaries which appear to be prescribed for him by a long line
of deci ions and by uniform practice, but would commit himself upon a question which may be properly submitted to
him hereafter by the Secretary of the Interior if the action
of the Commissioner of Patents shall come under his review."
Thi view wa adhered to in 20 Opinions, 723.
I further call to your attention that the first question asks
me to determine "whether the Official Gazette, including the
kly m nthly uart rly, and annual ind xe therefor,
xclu ·i of expired I tent , is, a a whole, 'printing for the
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Patent Office making use of lithography or photolithography,
t ogether with the plates for the same;'" and that the second
question asks, "are the words lithography and photolithograpby generic words, including processes of similar character in which the transfer is not made to stone."
I am not permitted by the statute to render an official
opinion upon questions of fact. (20 Opin., 697, 711, 717, 740.)
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SEAL FISHERIES-DEPOSIT OF BONDS BY LESSEE.
The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require of the North
American Commercial Company, in addition to the deposit of $50,000
in bonds of the United States already made pursuant to section 1963
of the Revised Statutes, security to the amount of the indebtedness
of the company for the years 1894: and 1895.

DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,
May 21, 1895.
SIR: I have yours of the 18th instant, in which the inquiry
is made whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury may
exact from the North American Commercial Company, as
lessee of the seal islands, in addition to the deposit of $50,000
in United States bonds already made pursuant to section
1963 of the Revised Statutes, a further deposit of such bonds,
or of other security, to the amount of the indebtedness of
said company, to wit, for the year 1894, $132,187.50, and for
the year 1895, $214,298.37, and in the event of the failure to
furnish such additional bonds, or other security, whether the
Secretary of the Treasury may annul the contract with said
company, made in 1890.
In my judgment, the Secretary of the Treasury can not
rightfully require the North American Commercial Company
to furnish the additional bonds or other security above
referred to.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
2638-VOL~ 21, PT 1--12
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ATTORNEJ-GENERAL-COMPTROLLER OF TREASURY .
The question whether or not the Secretary of"the Treasury, in view of
sections 192 and 3683 of tlrn Revised Statutes, is authorized by the
appropriation acts for the present fiscal year to purchase newspapers
or other articles for use outside of Washington, belongs to a class
of questions which, since the going into effect of section 8, chapter
· 174, of the legislative appropriation act of July 31, 1894, should not
be asked of the Attorney-General, at least except in matters of great
importance, but should be submitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury, whose opinion will form a complete protection.
DEP .AR'l'MEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE,

May 22, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of May 17, in which you ask my official opinion whether
section 192 of the Revised Statutes is limited in its application to the purchase of newspapers for the bureaus and
offices at the seat of Government, or applies to all bureaus
and offices under the Treasury Department, no matter where
situated; and also whether section 3683 of the.Revised Statutes applies to all offices and bureaus of the Treasury Department, whether situated in Washington or elsewhere, or js
limited only to those located in Washington.
Questions upon which the official opinion of the .AttorneyGeneral is asked must be questions actually arising in the
administration of one of the other Executive . Departments.
The questions actually arising in your Department are
whether, in view of the sections above mentioned, you are
authorized by the appropriation acts for the present fiscal
year to purchase newspapers or other articles for use outside
this city.
These are questions which, prior to October 1, 1894, could
properly be asked of the Attorney-General. But by the
legi lative appropriation act of July 31, 1894 (chap. 174, sec.
8), it was provided as follows:
'' The head of any Executive Department * * * may
apply for, and the Comptroller of the Treasury shall render, hi deci ·ion upon any que tion involving a payment
to be made by fhim l or under Ihim J, which deci ion, when rend red, hall govern the Auditor and the Comptroller of
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the Treasury in passing- upon the account containing said
disbursement."
By section 24 of the same act this provision took effect on
tbe 1st day of October.
The questions which you now ask me could ha-ve been
asked of the Comptroller of tue Treasury under this prov1s1on. I thmk that they belong to a class of questions
which, now that an opinion of the Comptroller forms a complete protection, should no longer be asked of the AttorneyGeneral, at least except in matters of great importance.
They are questions which the Comptroller, by bis greater
experience, iR better qualified to pass upon, and it is desirable to avoid any possible conflict of precedents.
Therefore it seems to me inadvisable for me to attempt to
pass upon these inquiries.
Very respectfu1ly,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-MORTAR
STEEL.
Questions submitted to the Attorney-General for his opinion must be
definitely formulated. (20 Opin., 711, 713.)
If a technical usage is not definite, uniform, and general, it is entitled
to no weight iil statutory construction.
Assuming that the term "mortar steel," as employed in the fortifica tions appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (chap.162, sec. 2), has not a
settled technical meaning, it is properly construable as including any
steel of such quality as is considered by experts to be adapted for use
in the construction of mortars.
The assertion on behalf of a certain firm or corporation that the term
in question refers to steel of their manufacture, and that the section of
the statute containing such term was introduced at the suggestion of
their attorney, is not entitled to any consideration.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 23, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your commnnica
tion of May 20, asking my opinion on certain questions presented by the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications and by
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the Chief of Ordnance. It is necessary, upon such an application, to formulate definitely the questions answers to which
are desired. (20 Opin., 711, 713.) The only question which
I find definitely formulated relates to the definition of the
term '' mortar steel" in the fortifications appropriation act
of March 2, 1895, section 2.
That section provides for the purchase of certain breech.
loading mortars, "built of mortar steel," in case they shall be
found "to be at least equal in accuracy, range, power, endur.
ance, material, and general efficiency to the best breechloading service mortar in use."
It appears that a certain :firm or corporation, known as
Cramp & Sons, claims that the term ''mortar .steel" is a
technical one, confined to a certain quality of steel made by
themselves by a secret process, not ·patented, and whose
nature can not be a·scertained from them.
To define this term it is :first necessary to ascertain
whether it has a settled technical meaning. If it has
none, then the words must be regarded as used in the ordinary sense. (Saltonstall v. Wiebusch, 156 U. S., 601, 602.)
Whether the _term has such a technical meaning is a question of fact (Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152 U.S., 581,585); and
questions of fact I am not authorized to decide. (20 Opin., ·
590, 592.) I think, however, that your letter sufficiently
shows that whatever technical usage may exist concerning
the words" mortar steel," it is not sufficient to ·establish such
a technical definition of that term as could affect its statutory construction. You say: ''The term can not be said to
be one in general use." If the usage is not definite, uniform,
and general, it i entitled to no weight. (Maddock v. Magone,
152 U . S., 368; B erbeclcer v. Robertson, 152 U.S., 373.)
So far, therefore, as the facts are stated by your letter,
t he term "mortar steel" is properly construable as including
any teel of such quality as is considered by experts to be
adapted for use in th e construction of mortars.
The laim t h at thi ection '' was introduced at the sugti n of the a ttorney for Cramp & Sons" is not entitled to
any n ideration. The ection wa introduced, whet.her as
p rt f th original bill or by way of amendment thereto,
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by some Member of Congress; and it can not be presumed
01~ proved that any Member of Congress acted in the performance of his duties on behalf of Cramp & Sons or any
other :firm or corporation.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONPURCHASE OF ENVELOPES.
The provisions of section 8 of the appropriation act of July 31, 1894,
chapter 174, make it obligatory upon the Comptroller of the Treasury
to render a decision upon any question involving a payment to be
made by or ~nder the head of any Executive Department, and contemplate the construction by him of statutes. (Opin. May 22, 1895,
reaffirmed.)
A question regarding the construction of section 96 of the act of January
12, 1895, chap. 23, which provides that "The Postmaster-General shall
contract for all envelopes, stamped or otherwise, designed for sale to
the public or for use by his own or other Departments," held to be a
general question, applicable to all the Departments, and to be.of sufficient importance to warrant its submission to the Attorney-General
for his opinion thereon.
The conclusion that a statute is repealed by implication is only reached
when there is irreconcilable conflict and when the two statutes can
not by reasonable construction stand together; and, in measuring the
legislative intent as to the. scope to be given to a statute in its operation upon previous statutes not specifically referred to, a consideration of the effect upon the public welfare must necessarily be taken
in view. (3 Opin., 438; 2 Opin., 260, cited.)
Applying the rule of construction stated in the previous paragraph and
construing the provisions of section 96 of the act of January 12, 1895,
in connection with sections 3709 and 3710 of the Revised Statutes,
helll, that the section of the act of 1895 referred to has no application
when an exigency may require an immediate delivery of envelopes to
a particular Department and the public service might be seriously
1mpaired by the necessity of a requisition upon the PostmasterGeneral.
In the event of an exigency requiring an immediate delivery of envel0pes the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes govern,
and the head of the Department in which .the exigency exists may
make the purchases required by the exigency.

· 1s2,

HON. RICHARD OLNEY.
Attorney-General-Statuto1·y Vonstruction-Purchase of Envelopes,

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 23, 1895.
SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of May 20, 1895, asking whether or not se~tion 96 of the _act of January 12, 1895,
providing for public printing, "is· intended to direct the
purchase by the Postmaster-General of all envelopes designed
for use in the Navy and .1J!Jarine Gorps, or whether- it is lim_
ited in its application to such envelopes as may be required
for use by the Executive Departments at Washington."
It is provided by 28 Statutes, 208, as follows:
"All decisions by Auditors making an original construction or modifying an existing construction of statutes shall
be forthwith reported to the Comptroller of the Treasury,
and items in any account affected by such deci~ions shall be
suspended and payment thereof withheld until the Comptroller of the Treasury shall approve, disapprove, or modify
such decisions and certify his actions to the Auditor. .All
decisions made by the Comptroller of the Treasury under
this act shall be· forthwith transmitted to the Auditor or
Auditors whose duties are affected thereby.
"Disbursing officers, or the head of any Executive Department, or other establishment not under any of the Executive
Departments, may apply for and the Comptroller of the
Treasury shall render bis decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by them or under them, which
decision, when rendered, shall govern the Auditor and the
Comptroller of the Treasury in passing upon the account
containing said disbursement."
This act makes it obligatory upon the Comptroller of the
Treasury to make a decision upon any question involving a
payment to be made by or under the head of any Executive
Department, and it contemplates the construction by him of
tatute ·.
It app ar · by the file of papers transmitted with your let·
ter that the omptroller, on pril 1, 1895, made the following
ruling:
ection 3709, Revised Statutes, purchase of
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"Section 96, act approved J anu:ary 12, 1895, 'providing for
the public printing and binding and the distribution of public documents.'
"Held, that where, therefore, the public exigency requires
the immediate delivery of the envelopes they may be procured under the provision of section 3709, Revised Statutes,
by open purchase, in the manner in which such articles are
usually bought and sold between individuals, but in all cases
where a contract can be made for the purchase of envelopes,
such contract ·must, under the provisions of section 96 of
the printed act, be made by the Postmaster-General."
This is broad enough to cover the question presented by
you, but it is suggested that the case is e~ceptional, and a
further ruling is asked.
In a recent opinion (May 22, 1895) I came to the conclusion that the opinion of the Attorney-General should not be
rendered upon questions which, under section 8, chapter 17 4,
Statutes 1894, could be referred to the Comptroller for decision (except in matters of great importance), inasmuch as a
conflict of precedents might ensue. ·
The Comptroller himself, as appears from the file transmitted by you, says: "As the question in the form presented is a
general one, applicable to all the Departments, it is respectfully suggested that it would be expedient to have the matter determined by an opinion from the Attorney-General."
This case falls within the exception stated in my opinion
May 22, 1895, and I therefore, without departing from the
precedent therein established, comply with your request.
By section 3709, Revised Statutes, all purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments of the Government shall be made by advertising for proposals "when
the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery."
When such delivery is required, such supplies may be procured "by open purchase or contract at the places and in the
manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold
between individuals."
By section 3718 "all provisions, clothing, hemp, and other
materials of every name and nature for the use of the Navy,
and the transportation thereof, when time will permitJ shall
be furnished by contract by the lowest bidder."
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Under these sections supplies of every name and nature
for the Navy are to be purchased by contract upon advertisement, except in cases when the public exigency will not
permit of delay, and then by open purchase as between
individuals.
By 28 Statutes, 33, section 3709 was amended so as to regulate the advertisements and award of contracts. It did not
affect that portion of the section applicable when the public
exigency requires immediate delivery.
.
Section 96 of the act of January 12, 1895, is as follows:
"The Postmaster-General shail contract for all envelopes,
stamped or otherwise, designed for sale to the public, or for
use by his own or other Depart_ments, and may contract for
them to be plain or with such printed ·matter as may be
prescribed by the Department making req~isition therefor:
Provided, That no envelope furnished by the Government
shall contain any business address or advertisement."
By this provision the several Executive Departments are
deprived partially or entirely, according to the construction
that may be given to the act, of all power to contract/or
envelopes, and this authority is transferred to the PostmasterGeneral. This act must be construed in pari materia with
sections 3709 and 3718. By section 100 all laws in conflict
with the provisions of this act are repealed. No part of
section 3709 is expressly repealed. The conclusion that a
statute is repealed by implication is only reached when there
is irreconcilable conflict, and when the two statutes can not
by reasonable construction stand together. In measuring
the legislative intent as to the scope ·to be given to a statute
in its operation upon previous statutes not specifically
:referred to, a consideration of the effect upon the public welfare must necessarily be taken in view. If holding a statute
to be repealed by im1 lication would produce an impracticable ituation and a erious embarrassment in the public
ervice, the reasonable conclusion would be that such was
not within the legislative intent, where effect, without such
onflict, can be giv n the new tatute, and with uch range,
a taking the ubject-matter of legislation into con ideration i i f:: irly infer ble, was ont mplated. In Opinion ,
in con truing a tatut providing for purcha es for the
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Navy, it was said: "These exceptions m_u st consist of cases
which plainly and manifestly were not within the view and
design of Congress when the law was passed, and which can
not, without injury to the public service, be subjected to the
operation of the rule laid down."
In 2 Opinions, 260, Attorney-General Berrien, construing
an act of March 3, 1809, said: " Where immediate delivery
is necessary to the wants of the public service, the article
required must be obtained by open purchase; that is, by purchase at the places where articles of the description wanted
are mmally bought and sold, and in the mode in which such
purchases are ordinarily made between individual and individual." Since that time (1829) this Government has sanctioned the policy of permitting immediate i:>urchases in cases
of emergency. Almost the exact language used by Mr. Berrien was enacted into law by the act of March 2, 1861 (12
Stat., 220), carried into the Revised Statutes as section 3709.
It can not be assumed that Congress, in an act specially·
treating of public printing, intended, in respect of any supplies necessary for the public service in an emergency, to set
aside a uniform policy extbllding over more than fifty years.
The Departments of Government in their operation cover
a wide territory, and even in the matter of envelopes exigencieA may require immediate delivery, and the public service
might be seriously impaired by the necessity of a requisition
upon the Postmaster-General.
My opinion is that this section does not apply in such
cases, but that it was intended to apply in those cases in
which contracts were to be made by advertisement, the
Postmaster-General, in respect of envelopes thus procured,
being charged with the duty which previously rested upon
the heads of the several Departments. I entirely concur in
the conclusion reached by the Comptroller of the Treasury
as above ·set out.
In my judgment, the fact of the use being for the Navy
and Marine Corps does not constitute any ground for distinction, the only exceptions being those arising out of the
public exigency and shortness of time.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY.
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WITHDRAW AL OF BIDS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
After a bid for the construction of public works has been accepted, the
bidders have not the right to withdraw their proposal merely because
of a mistake on their part which was not mutual and which was due
to their negligence. (20 Opiu., 1, distinguished.)
The Attorney-General will not answer questions propounded by the
head of a Department not presently arising. (20 Opin., 728.)

DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 1, 1895.
SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of May 27, asking my official opinion concerning the
application of Messrs. Thomas H. Stanley & Co. for leave to
withdraw a bid, after formal acceptance, for the construction
of certain public works at the New York Navy-Yard. It
appears that this firm, concerning whose competency and
responsibility no doubt is entertained, responded to an
advertisement soliciting proposals, and proved to be the
lowest bidders, and that their "proposal was formally
accepted by the Bureau by letter dated May 16." Thereafter, and under date of May 18, the firm requested leave to
withdraw its bid. The reason given is that in making its
estimates two errors in calculation occurred, making a difference of over $6,000 in the result. You inform me that there
is no reason for questioning the truthfulness of these statements. You add, however, that" while not desiring to take
advantage of the mistakes or carelessness of bidders, this
Department feels somewhat reluctant to concede to them
the privilege of withdrawing their proposals where miscalculations or other clerical errors appear, inasmuch as such
decision might prove to be a precedent opening the door to
fraudulent practices."
You ask me, fir t, whether the firm have a right to withdraw their propo al. I am clearly of the opinion that they
have not uch right. The mistake was not a mutual one,
and it wa due to negligence on their part. You refer to the
pi ion of my predece or iu the ca e of the Western Electric ,ompany (20 Opin., 1). That opinion r lated to a cleri , 1 err r in a bid, b which the fl ure 4 was ubstituted for
h figur 9, o that it r ad ' 4,350" in tead of " 9,350."

TO THE PRESIDENT.

187

Civil Service-Law t:lerks-t:onstruction of Statutes.

Whatever may have been the proper rule of the law applicable to that case, I think the present one is very clear.
You ask me also whether or not you are authorized, in your
discretion, to permit such withdrawal. I understand from
your communication that you do not intend to do so, even if
you have the authority. The question, therefore, seems not
to be one of those presently arising within the Department
which I am directed by the statutes to answer. (20 Opin.,
728.)

Very respectfully,
RICH.A.RD OLNEY.

The SECRE'..L'AI-f f

OF THE

N .A.VY.

CIVIL SERVICE-LAW CLERKS-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
The provisions of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 177 (28 Stat., 776, 777), with reference
to the offices of law clerk in the office of the Comptroller of the Treas- _
ury and in the offices of the Auditors of the Treasury, are to be construed in connection with the prior act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174
(28 Stat., 173 et seq.).
The mode of appointment of the law clerks referred to above is :fixed
by the act of 1894, and the provisions of that statute on the subject
are not repealed by the later statute.
The offices in question are not made the subject of competitive examination by the provisions of the statute of 1895.
DEP.ARTMEN'r OF JUS1.'ICE,

June 3, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the
1st instant, inclosing a communication from the Civil Service
Commission (herewith returned), in which the Commission
asks for an opinion from the .Attorney-General upon the
question whether the legislative, executive, and judicial
appropriation act of March 2, 1895, is to be construed as
making the offices of the law clerks in the office of the
Comptroller of the Treasury and in the offices of the .Auditors of the Treasury the subjects of competitive examination.
There is no question, in my judgment, that the act of
March 2 can not be given any such operation. It simply
enacts that clerical services may be exacted of such law
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clerks, leaving the mode of their appointment as fixed by
the prior act of July 31, 1894. The provisions of both statutes, though found in annual appropriation acts, are permanent enactments which are to be construed as a whole and
which, so construed, present no irreconcilable inconsistencies
or incongruities. There is no basis, therefore, for the contention that the later repeals the earlier statute.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The PRESIDENT.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMPTROLLER OF TREASURY.
The Attorney-General declines to advise upon a question submitted to
him, for the reason that the question can now be asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 8, 1895.
SIR: Your communication of May 31 asks my official opinion as to your right to refund certain duties claimed to have
been collected through mistake of law. This is one of those
questions which can now be asked of the Comptroller of the
Treasury, and for reasons set forth in recent opinions I
therefore feel that I should refrain from advising thereon.
Very respectfully,
RICHARD OLNEY.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

OPINIONS
OF

HON. JUDSON HARMON, OF OHIO,
APPOINTED JUNE 10, 1895.

WEATHER BUREAU.
A vacancy in the office of Chief of the Weather Bureau can only be
filled in the mode provided l>y section 4 of the act of October 1, 1890,
chapter 1266 (26 Stat., 653).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~

June 17, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receip~ of yours
of the 15th instant, and to reply as follows:
By section 4 of the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat.,. 653),
the W eatber Bureau is made to,, Consist of one chief of Weather Bureau," etc., who '' shall
receive an annual compensation of four thousand five hundred dollars, and be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate: Provided, That the
Chief Signal Officer of the Army may, in the discretion of
the President, be ·detailed to take charge of said Bureau,"
etc.
In my opinion, the clause in the act making appropriations
for the Department of Agriculture for the ensuing fiscal year,
to which you call my attention, namely, "and the Secretary
is hereby authorized to make such changes or assignments
to duty in the personnel or detailed force of the Weather
Bureau for limiting or reducing expenses as he may deem
necessary," does not affect the above provisions of the act of
1890. No intention to have such effect is expressed, so both
must stand if possible. By the former act the office of Chief
of the Weather Bureau was created, to be filled by appointment by the President. It is not reasonable to suppose that
189
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the authority given the Secretary of Agriculture in the latter
act was intended to apply to the Chief of the Bureau, especially as its language appears to be directed rather to the
''force" alone.
My opinion, therefore, is that upon the expiration of the
term of the present incumbent of the office of Chief of the
Weather Bureau the vacancy can be filled only by appointment by the President, or by detailing the Chief Signal
Officer of the Army under the proviso above quoted. The
authority to fill the office of Chief of the Weather Bureau
by detail from the Army being expressly limited to the Chief
Signal Officer, no other officer can be detailed to fill that
position, although other officers, not exceeding four, may be
assigned to duty in the Bureau. As I understand Major
Dunwoody i(S not the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, he
can not be detailed to act as Chief of the Weather Bureau.
I return herewith your inclosure.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'.l'ARY OF AGRICULTURE.

ENROLLED FISHING VESSELS-DEPOSIT OF SHIPS' PAPERS.
The masters of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered, are not
required by sections 4309 and 4310 of the Revised Statutes to deposit
their ships' papers with the United States consul when they arrive at
a foreign port where there is such a consular officer.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 9, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to submit my opinion, as requested
by your letter of the 25th ultimo, upon the question '' whether
the masters of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered,
are required by ection 4309 and 4310 of the Revised Statut to depo it their ship ' papers with the United States
con ul when they arriv at a foreign port where there is such
a c n ular officer."
The di tin tion betw en re!Ti tered ves el , being those
n ag d in foreign ommerce, and enrolled and licen ed ves1 b in o- th
employed in the c a ting trad or in fi bing
i 1 laiul m rked in ur tatut and decision and ha been
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well known for almost a century. It is kept up throughout
the legislation of Congress on the subject and has been
recognized by the courts. (The Mohawk, 3 Wall., 506.)
I t would seem clear, therefore, that sections 4309 and 4310,
which are found in Chapter XLIX, relating to "Regulation
of vessels in foreign commerce," and whose terms do not
include enrollment and license papers, could not be held to
apply to merely enrolled and licensed vessels unless there is
some other express provision or necessary implication of the
statutes which so requires.
It has been suggested that the last clause of section 4312,
viz, " and vessels enrolled, with the masters or owners
thereof, shall be subject to the same requirements as are
prescribed for registered vessels," has such effect. But it
was held in the case above cited that the provisions of sect ion 2 of the act of February 18, 1793 (1 Stat. L., 305), of
which section 4312 is merely the .revised form, applied only
to matters connected with the act of enrollment and the
proceedings therefor; and while the original act has been
somewhat changed and abbreviated in the revision-notably
by the omission of the phrase "in those respects," thereby
suggesting a broader meaning of the last clause of section
4312, above quoted-yet it is well settled that changes in
meanin g are not to be lightly inferred from me·r e alterations
in expression made in revision. And where there is doubt ·
as to the construction of a revised statute refere~ce may
always be had to the original act. (Myer v. Gar Go., 102

u. s., 11.)

It is evident that no such change in the effect of section
4312 was intended, from the fact that the original distinction between registered and enrolled vessels is carefully preserved in the Revised Statutes, and that section 8 of the act
of F ebruary 18, 1793, was kept in force as section 4337,
which provides for the seizure and forfeiture of any enrolled
or licensed vessel which shall proceed on a foreign voyage
without first giving up her enrollment and license and being
duly registered.
Se_ction 4309 is section 2 of the act of February 28, 1803,
which relates to vessels engaged in foreign commerce only,
and was supplementary to the act of April 14, 1792, concern-
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~ng consuls, etc. Section 1 of that act provided that before
a clearance should be granted to any vessel bound on a foreign voyage the master should deliver a list of his crew and
give bond to produce such list and the persons named
therein on his return, excepting such as should have been
discharged with the consent of a consul, etc., or have otherwise properly been stricken from such list. On .April 4,
1840, a Jaw was passed to make registers lawful papers for
vessels employed in whale fishery, section 2 of which act
provided that "all the provisions of the first section of the
act of February 28, 1803, shall apply to whaling vessels."
.A.s the language of such section 1 is no more mapplicable to
a whaling vessel enrolled and Jicensed than the language of
section 2 (now Rev. Stat., 4309) concerning the deposit of
the register, etc., this law of 1840 shows that section 2 (now
Rev. Stat., 4309), as well as the whole act of which it is
a part, was not understood by Congress as applying to
enrolled and licensed vessels.
There are many considerations, which I think it unnecessary to discuss, which tend to show it extremely improbable
that Congress intended the provisions in question to apply
to any but vessels engaged in foreign trade. Such vessels
always sail t~ foreign ports and do all their business in such
ports. One of the expressed objects of the requirements in
question was to protect seamen· from unlawful discharge
without the payment of wages as required by law. Fishing
vessels, on the contrary, are not bound for and do not visit
foreign ports except accidentally or incidentally, their business being carried on entirely at sea. The fact is well
known that those engaged on fishing vessels are not usually
hired on wages, but are interested in the catch. .Accordingly, title 51, Revised Statutes, page 850, contains regulations adapted to such ca es.
Without further extending this opinion I will simply say
that after careful examination of the subject I must answer
your que tion no.
ery re p t fully,
J DSO H RMO .
F

''.ATE .
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QUARANTINED CATTLE.

Under the provisions of chapter 839, act of August 30, 1890, the Secretary of Agriculture may adopt and enforce regulations requiring that
food and attendance should be provided to quarantined cattle by the
owners.
In cases where an outlay becomes necessary to prevent the loss of quarantined cattle, such outlay ma,y lawfully be made from the appropriation" To establish and maintain quarantined stations, and to provide proper shelter for and care of neat cattle imported at such ports
as may be deemed necessary," etc. ( chap. 169, act of March 2, 1895);
and the Secretary of Agriculture may hold such cattle until such
expenses are repaid, and sell them upon failure or refusal to repay
within a reasonable time.
DEP..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 11, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following opinion in
reply to your inquiry of June 26, whether your Department
has authority to pay for the feedings, etc., of quarantined
cattle; whether such expenses, if so paid, become a lien upon
the animals, for which they can be sold; and if so, in what
manner the sale is to be made.
The law under which you now act in the matter is that of
August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 414), by section 7 of which the
Secretary of Agriculture is "authorized, at the expense of
the owner, to place and retain in quarantine all neat cattle,
sheep, and other ruminants, and all swine, imported into the
United States, at such ports as he may designate for such
purpose, and under such conditions as he may by regulation
prescribe, respectively, for the several classes of animals
above described."
Under the general quarantine laws (Rev. Stat., 4792-4796),
cattle, as cargoes or parts of cargoes, were deposited at
quarantine "at the risk of the parties concerned therein,"
and remained in the joint custody of the collector and "the
owner or master or other person," etc.
The making of regulations was provided for in the latter
law as well as in the former, and the Secretary of the
Treasury, on June 8, 1883 (Synopsis of Decisions, Treasury
Department, p. 282), adopted '' regulations governing the
treatment and quarantine of imported cattle," the fourteenth of which required that food and attendance should
be provided by the owners thereof.
2638~VOL 21, PT 1--13
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It is fair to assume that Congress was aware of these
regulations when the law of 1890 was passed, and that the
phrase '' at the expense of the owner,'' in section 7 thereof,
above quoted, had reference to the existing practice. I
recommend that you adopt and enforce a similar regulation.
If you should undertake to advance the cost of food and
attendance it can readily be seen that you might become
involved in considerable outlays of money with some risk
of loss, as well as of disputes with owners. Such a regulation would, except in rare instances, such as the one which
occasioned your letter, prevent cattle being unloaded until
provision is made for the expense of their keep.
It may, however, happen in some cases that an outlay for
such cattle on the part of your Department may be required
to avoid their loss. In my opinion such outlay may lawfully
be made in such cases from the appropriation "To establish
and maintain quarantine stations, and to provide proper
shelter for and care of neat cattle imported at such ports as
may be deemed necessary," etc. (Act of March 2, 1895,
laws Fifty-third Congress, third session, p. 733.) While
this act, like previous appropriation acts for the same purpose, uses language which, taken alone, would seem to
impose upon the Government the expense of such care, it
must be taken in connection with the law of 1890, which
expressly provides that it shall be" at the expense of the
owner.'' But in cases where, by reason of the death of the
owner or his agent, or some event making it impossible to
secure provision for such expenses in advance, cattle must be
cared for or lost, you may lawfully expend the necessary
amount therefor, hold the cattle until such expenses are
repaid, and sell them upon failure or refusal to repay within
a reasonable time.
I would suggest that, to save all question, you make a
regulation providing for notice to owner in cases where, by
any bane , you are compelled to advance money, and fixing
a time within which uch expen es mu t be repaid or the
attle old. To avoid all que tion about the notice the
re<Yulati n hould pecify notice by po ting, publication, or
a. you m y d m b t.
n
r m fi r di ut on the que tion whether
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and a right to sell on notice to enforce it, I think that the
statutes on the subject are to be liberally construed in view
of their nature, and that their fair intention and effect include
the right not only to retain cattle to secure repayment of
expenses, but also to sell them if such expenses are not
repaid. Whatever doubt there may be will, in my opinion,
be removed by the making and publication of such a regulation as I have above mentioned.
I repeat, however, the suggestion that the regulations
should require the payment of such charges in advance or
provide for feeding and care by the owner or his agent in
person in all cases where some unavoidable event does not
prevent.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.

EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED ST.A.TES.

In view of the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 189, the Secretary
of the Navy is not authorized to employ counsel in foreign countries
to institute suit in behalf of the United States to recover for damages
caused to a war vessel of the United States, but the case should be
referred to the Department of Justice for attention.
DEP.A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

July 17, 1895.
Srn: I am in receipt of your letter of July 10, 1895, with
inclosed memorandum in the matter of the libel proceedings
begun against the English steamer Azov before the Tribunal
of Commerce, Antwerp, on account of a collision with the
U. S. S. Chicago in the harbor of Antwerp on the 11th of
June, 1894.
It appears that the Navy Department, on June 11, 1894,
received from Rear-Admiral Erben, by cable, a request for
authority to libel the steamer Azov, and that the Department immediately replied by cable, giving assent.
The suit was instituted in the name of Alfred T. Mahan,
who was the commanding officer of the Chicago, and upon
the authority given by the Navy Department he employed
counsel to represent him.
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It further appears that the suit was dismissed with costs,
ou the ground that Captain Mahan was not the proper party
plaintiff, and that now the question of appealing the cause,
or instituting a new suit in the name of the United States
Government, is under consideration.
The question upon which you request an opinion of this
Department is thus stated:
"I am, in view of the law establishing the Department
of Justice and of the provisions of those sections of the
· Revised Statutes relating to the employment of counsel to
assist in the trial of any case in which the Government is
interested, doubtful as to whether the circumstances in this
case, the cause coming necessarily under the jurisdiction of
foreign courts, are such as to warrant the Secretary of the
· Navy in employing an attorney to proceed in the matter,
and I have the honor, therefore, to request your opinion as
to whether this Department should continue the conduct of
this case, employing the necessary counsel, or whether the
matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for
its action and management."
In 7 Opinion, 141, the Hon. Caleb Cushing said:
"According to the traditional practice of the Government
it has belonged to the attributes S)f any head of D~partment
to employ counsel in his discretion for the conduct of legal
business arising in his Department. The act of February
26, 1853, for the regulation of fees in the legal business of
the Government, expressly recognizes the existence of this
power in any head of Department."
Subsequent opinions, which affirmed the right of heads of
Departments to employ special counsel in their discretion,
founded it on the act of February 26, 1853. (10 Stat., 162;
10 Opin., 43, 48; 12 Opin., 369.)
On June 22, 1870 (16 Stat., 162), was passed "An act to
establi h the Department of Ju tice."
The provi ions of this act were carried into the Revised
Statute under "Title III-Department of Justice."
ectiou 7 provid a follows :
' h ne r a ue tion of la ari e in the ad.mini tration
rtment f War or the D partm ut of th
avy,
he D
oguizauce of whi h i no given by tatute to ome
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other officer from whom the head of the Department may
require advice, it shall be sent to the Attorney-General, to
be by him referred to the proper officer in his Department,
or otherwise disposed of as he may deem proper."
Section 365 provides as follows:
"No compensation shall hereafter be allowed to any person, besides the respective district attorneys and assistant
district attorneys for services as an attorney or counselor to
the United States, or to any branch or Department of the
Government thereof, except in cases specially authorized
by law, and then only on the certificate of the AttorneyGeneral that such services were actually rendered, and that
the same could not be perfol'med by the Attorney-General,
or Solfoitor-General, or the officers of the Department of
Justice, or by the district attorneys."
Section 17 of said act, carried into the Revised Statutes
as section 189, provides: ·
"No head of BJ Department shall employ attorneys or
counsel at the expense of the United States; but when in
need of counsel or advice, shall call upon the Department of
Justice, the officers of which shall attend to the same."
The act of June 22, 1870, was construed to provide that
the Secretary of War had no authority to employ counsel,
without the consent of the Attorney-General, to appear in
court in habeas corpus cases. (13 Opin., 583.)
An opinion was also given to the effect that the Bureau of
Animal Industry could not employ counsel for the defense
of the employes of the Bureau for acts done by them in
carrying out the duties of their office. (19 Opin., 328.)
The question arises whether or not the above prohibition
in the act establishing the Department of Justice 1s broad
enough to forbid the employment of counsel in foreign countries by the Secretary of the Navy to institute a suit in
behalf of the United States to recover money for injury to
a war vessel of the United States.
The right and duty of a commander of such a vessel, or of
the Secretary of the Navy, to employ, in an emergency,
counsel in a foreign country when necessary for the protection of such vessel and all that pertains to it are not within
the contemplation of thif:3 opinion, and would involve prin-
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ciples other than those passed upon in determining the question submitted.
The act of June 22, 1870, was passed to correct what was
considered an abuse by the heads of Departments of the
power to employ counsel. Its terms are undoubtedly broad
enough to cover any employment of counsel in cases like
that now in question, although they have been so rare that
they were probably not a moving cause of the enactment of
the law.
Congress, however, must have contemplated, inasmuch as
ships of war are constantly on the high seas and in foreign
ports, that questions of law would arise in respect of them
in the administration of the Navy Department. No exception whatever is made of such cases in section 357 and none
in section 189.
I am of the opinion that the Navy Department should not
continue the conduct of this case, and that the matter should
be referred to the Department of Justice, which is charged
with the duty of determining when the United States shall
sue, for what it shall sue, and that such suits shall be brought
in appropriate cases. ( United States v. San Jacinto Tin Company, 125 U.S., 273,279, 280; In re Neagle, 135 U.S., 65, 67.)
I return, as requested, the memorandum sent by you, and
ask that you will have me furnished a copy of same and of
such other papers as may have a direct bearing upon this
case.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

REGISTRY OF WRECKED FOREIGN-BUILT VESSEL.

In view of the express reo-ula.tion and long-established practice of the
Tr , ury Department, which have put a narrow construction on the
lau e "wre keel in the ni ted tates," an application, under Revised
tatute. , s ction 41 6, for reo-istry of a foreign-built vessel wrecked and
a.ban loned v ral hnndrecl mil s from the coast of the United tates,
and ub qu ntl tow d into the United 'tates, where she was purh. d and r pair d l, Am ricao itizens, the repairs amounting to
mor ban hr time th pric paid for the wr ck at marshal's sale,
pr p rl leni d
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The Secretary of the Treasury has the undoubted right to change .the
regulation and practice of the Department and adopt a more liberal
construction of the clause in question.
Following 15 Opinions, 402, it is held that tbe word "wrecked," in section 4136, "must be taken in a very comprehensive sense * * * as
applicable to a vessel which is disabled and rendered unfit for navigation, whether this state of the vessel has been caused by the winds or
the waves, by stranding, by fire, by explosion of boilers, or by any
other casualty"; an.d, to carry out the manifest intent of the statute,
if any of the injuries which have made a vessel a wreck were
received in the United States, in the absence of bad faith, she should
be held to be embraced in the clause "wrecked in the United States,"
although other injuries had been received elsewhere.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 19, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to answer the questions in yours of
the 10th instant. They are, first, whether the application
for registry of the Southery, under section 4136, Revised
Statutes, which has been denied by your Department on the
ground that the vessel . was not "wrecked in the United
States" was properly refused; and, second, "what, in law,
is sufficient injury to answer the condition 'wrecked' ,,,
It appears from your statement and the accompanying
papers that the ship was wrecked and abandoned on Alacran Reef, which is not in the United States, but several
hundred miles from our nearest coast, and subsequently
towed into the United States, where she was purchased and
repaired by American citizens, the repairs amountmg to more
than three times the price paid for the wreck at marshal's
sale, which I presume you consider equivalent to "threefourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired," as the
application was refused on the ground that the "evidence
did not show that the injuries to the vessel, constituting her
a wreck, were received in the United States."
In view of the extremely liberal construction which has
been given to all the other provisions of section ·4136 (9
Opin., 424; 15 Opin., 402; 20 Opin., 253), I should not hesitate to say, if the question remained open, that the clause
"wrecked in the United States" was not intended by Congress to limit the benefit of that section to vessels which
receive within the boundaries of this country the injuries
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which constitute them wrecks, but intended them to apply
to any foreign-built vessel in the United States in such a
state of wreck as to require virtual rebuildmg, provided she
should be purchased and repaired by American citizens.
This construction certainly carries out the well-known object
of the law, and can be given without doing violence to its
language, although such language is capable of the other
construction, and at first sight seems to Darry it.
Your question, however, being whether you rightly denied
the application, I am compelled to answer yes, because in
so doing you merely followed the express regulation and
long-settled practice of your Department, which have put
the narrower construction on the clause " wrecked in the
United States." And in 1875, in the case of United States
v. The Brig Victoria Perez (8 Ben., 109), Judge Benedict,
having the exact question before him, gave the language the
same construction. He conceded the force of the opposing
argument, but based his decision upon the long and well
settled construction which your Department had given.
The question, therefore, really is one for you to settle·yourself, viz, whether you will change the regulations and practice of your Department. You undoubtedly have a right
to do this, the true meaning of the law being at least doubtful. Whether you should do it or not depends upon considerations with which you are doubtless quite as familiar as I,
and probably more so.
Your second, so far as it is one of law, becomes a moot
question unless I assume that you propose to change the
practice of your Depai;tment or reconsider your finding of
fact. .As you may do either or both, however, it would not
violate the well-settled rule of this Department to answer
it. It wa rightly held in an opinion given your Department
many year ago (15 Opin., 402) that the word "wreck" in
section 4136 "must be taken in a very comprehensive sense
• • • a applicable to ave sel which is disabled and rend red unfit for navigation, whether this state of the vessel
ha b en au ed by the wind or the wave , by stranding,
b fir , by e plo i n of b iler or by any other ca ualty."
Thi d finition i n t bro d r than the intention of Congre ,
ju tifi d in holding av el to be wrecked
and y u :vill

TO THE SECRETARY OF S'TATE.

201

· Consul-Attorney-General.

when she is in a condition unfit for use, no matter how
. brought about. For instance, without attempting to pass
upon the disputed question of fact presented by the claims
of the applicant and the resistant, if, as claimed by the
former, the vessel, though somewhat leaky and injured
before, struck ground on her way to Erie Basin, in consequence of which she sank therein, necessitating raising, dry
docking, and repairs to put her in such condition that she
could go to the place where it had been decided to make the
permanent repairs, this would undoubtedly constitute a
· wrecking, and 'the vessel would also have been" wrecked in
the United States."
There is nothing in what has been said above to prevent
the ruling, which I think is required to carry out the manifest object of the statute, that if any of the injuries which
have made the vessel a wreck were received in the United
States she should be held to come within the law, although
others had been received elsewhere.
Nor would failure to use diligence or the best means of
avoiding such further injuries prevent the above conclusion,
always assuming the absence of bad faith with respect to
the registry law in question.
This opinion is to be taken as supplementary to that ·of my
immediate predecessor, with respect to the same case at an
earlier stage, to which your letter did not refer, and to which
my attention was not called until the above opinion was
written.
Respectfnlly,
· JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CONSUL-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
When a consul intervenes in a controversy between master and seamen,
by mutual consent of the disputants, he acts as an arbitrator and not
as .consul.
The Attorney-General can not be called upon for an opinion unless
specific questions of law are formulated which relate to an existing
question calling for the action of the ~epartment requesting it.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 26, 1895.
Sm: I have your letter of July 24, 1895, inclosing a
statement of the United States consul at Havre that the
steam yacht Barraconta, a foreign- built vessel, owned by a
citizen of the United States and unregistered, arrived at
that port from the Mediterranean, destination, foreign ports,
and that he had intervened on account of disputes and differences that had arisen between the master and first officer
on the one side and the chief engineer and cook on the
other side.
·
You request ''an opinion upon the facts presented" in the
communication from the consul.
You further state: "I should have no hesitation in approving the action of the consul at Havre if the yacht in question were a registered American vessel, but I am unwilJing
to assume the responsibility of determining the legal status
of a foreign-built yacht."
It is not entirely clear to me upon what points you wish
an opinion.
It is against the settled practice of this Department to
give an opinion upon a general statement of facts without a
specification presenting special questions of law. (14 Opin.,
367; 20 Opin., 259, 493, 699, 711, 723.)
The Attorney-General can not properly give an opinion
where it does not appear that some question exists calling
for the action of the Department requesting it. (20 Opin.,
383, 420, 465, 618.)
It appears from the consul's statement that what he did
was "by mutual consent of master and seamen." It would
seem from this that he has exercised no consular authority,
and that he in effect act d a arbitrator by consent of parties,
and therefore it i not apparent to me that any question
arising out of his action i now pending in the admini tration of your Department.
If ther b no que tion pending in your Department
r quirin · ffi ial action nece arily involving a determinati n of ' th l gal . tatu of a foreign-built yacht," I would
rrant <l in i ino· to y u an opinion upon that
n t e
u

d t.
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If, in the administration of your Department, any action
is necessary in respect of what the consul has done in this
case, I request that you will formulate specific questions of
law upon which you wish to have my opinion.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONTROL OF CUSTOMS OFFICERS.
A collector of customs is merely a subordinate of the Secretary of the
Treasury; and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890 (chap. 407, 26
Stat., 131), authorizing a collector or the Secretary of the Treasury,
if dissatisfied, to apply for a review of the conclusions of law and
fact involved in the decision of a Board of General Appraisers, does
not mean that the collector may appeal against the decision or wish of
the Secretary.
The provisions of section 2652, Revised Statutes, making conclusive upon
all customs officers the decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury upon
all questions as to the construction and meaning of any part of the
revenue laws, remain unaffected by the act of 1890 referred to.
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 27, 1895.
SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of July 26, 1895, requesting an opinion whether or not in a case in which the General
Appraisers have decided that an article is not dutiable, section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, (26 Stat., 138), in so far as
it confers upon the collector the power, in case he is dissatisfied with the decisions of the Board of General .Appraisers,
to apply for a review of their decisions, repeals the authority
conferred by section 2652 of the Revised Statutes upon the
Secretary of the Treasury to control the officers of customs
in the administration of the revenue laws.
Section 2652, Revised Statutes, is as follows:
"It shall be the duty of all officers of the customs to execute and carry into effect all instructions of the Secretary of
the Treasury relative to the execution of the revenue laws;
and in case any difficulty shall arise as to the true construction or meaning of any part of the revenue laws, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be conclusive and
binding upon all officers of the customs."
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The decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury upon all
questions as to the construction or meaning of any part of
the revenue laws are by this section i:p.ade conclusive upon
all customs officers.
This law has been in force since 1842, and still remains part
of the revenue system of the United States.
A later statute does not abrogate a prior one unless such
intention is expressed, or the two are so entirely inconsistent
that they can not stand together.
Section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, provides that "the
collector or the Secretary of the Treasury," if dissatisfied,
may apply for a review of the questions of law and fact
involved in decisions of the Board of General" Appraisers.
This does not mean that the coUector may appeal against
the decision or wishes of the Secretary, but that, as either
may be the officer who ultimately acts for the Government,
the right of appeal is given to either, as the case may be. But
if the Secretary bas decided any matter no collector can by
appeal question such decision.
A coUector is merely a subordinate of the Secretary of the
Treasury, and no intention to give him such right as against
his superior is to be gathered from the act in question.
My opinion is that section 2652 is in full force, notwithstanding anything that is in section 15, and that it is the
duty of the collector to follow the decision and instructions
of the Secretary of the Treasury in all matters relating to
the revenue laws.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE TREASURY.

COURTS-MARTIAL-U. S. PE ITENTIARIES.
A prisoner sentenced by a con rt-martial to confinement in a penitentiary
of the nit t1 tates bould not be turned over to a marshal, but
houlcl b conducted to the prison by the proper officer of the Departm nt of War.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
July 27, 1895.
Srn.: R plying to your letter of the 20th in tant, with
in ·l ur , in hi h y u re ue t my opinion whetlier orpl.
John T.
<l , of 'ompany ll, Fourth Infantry, who h a
OF
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been sentenced by court-martial to confinement in the U. S.
penitentiary at Fort Leavenworth, is to be transported there
by the proper officer of your Department or turned over
tp the U. S. marshal of the State of Washington, where
the court-martial sat, I have the honor to say:
By the provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, which transferred the military prison at Fort Leavenworth to the Department of Justice, to be known and used as a U. S. penitentiary, it is provided that the same is to be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
of the act of March 3, 1891, entitled "An act for the erection
of United States prisons," etc. Said section 5 provides that
the transportation of all U. S. prisoners sentenced to imprisonment in a U. S. penitentiary and their delivery thereat
shall be by the marshal of the District or Territory where
the conviction occurs, and makes provision for his actual
expenses, including transportation, etc., to be paid, on the
approval of the Attorney-General, out of the judiciary fund.
This provision, however, applies, in my opinion, only to prisoners convicted by the civil courts of the United States,
and does not apply to prisoners sentenced by courts-martial.
The provision in the act of March 2, 1895, that prisoners
sentenced by courts-martial may be confined in the U. S.
penitentiary merely puts such prisoners in charge of the
civil authorities on their delivery at the prison, which must
be made by the proper officer of the. Department to which
the sentencing tribunal belonged.
The prisoner named should therefore be conducted to the
prison at Fort Leavenworth by the proper officer of your
Department, where he will be duly received.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE1.'ARY OF WAR.

OPINIONS
OF

HON. JUDSON HARMON, OF OHIO.
APPOINTED JUNE 10, 1895.

A'rTORNEY-GENERA.L-MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS.
A question of the legality of a provision of long standing in contracts
of the War and Navy Departments determined, as presented, in general terms, though a strict regard to the rule of the Department of
Justice which forbids the expression of an official opinion upon any
question of law which has not arisen in an existing case and presented
upon a definite statement of facts, might warrant a refusal of an
opinion thereon.
A clause contained in contracts of the War Department providing for
future modifications of the contract, set out, and held to be reasonable
and proper, and that a modification of such a contract, which does not
prejudice the interests of the Government or violate any statutory
provision, is not such a new contract as must be preceded by an
advertisement for proposals from bidders.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 13, 1895.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a lett er of Brig. Gen. W. P. Craig hill, Chief of Engineers, of July
27, 1895, addressed to you, and, by your indorsement thereon
of August 1, 1895, referred to the .Attorney-General, "with
request that he will please favor this Department with an
opinion upon the question within presented."
A strict regard to the rule of this Department, which forbids the expression of an official opinion upon any question
of law which has not arisen in an existing case and presented
upon a definite statement of facts, might prevent compliance
with your request did it not appear that the provision in the
contract upon which the question arises appears to be one
3513-V0L 21, P'.l' 2--1
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of long standing in the contracts both of the War and Navy
Departments of the Government. The provision referred to
is as follows :
"If, at any time during the prosecution of the work, it be
found advantageous or necessary to make any change or
modification in the project, and this change or modification
should involve sach change in the specifications as to character and quantity, whether of labor or material, as would
either increase or diminish the cost of the work, then such
change or modification must be agreed upon in writing by the
contracting parties, the agreement setting forth fully the reasons for such change, and giving clearly the quantities and
prices of both material and labor thus substituted for those
named in the original contract, and before taking effect must
be approved by the Secretary of ·war: Provided, That no
payments shall be made unless such supplemental or modified agreement was signed and approved before the obligation arising from such modification was incurred."
The objection urged against it is stated in the letter of the
Chief of Engineers to be that such modification operates to
form a new and independent contract between the partiessuch a contract as is contemplated and provided for in section 3709, Revised Statutes, as to which advertisements for
proposals from .bidders are required before the contract can
be entered into.
This objection seems to give to the word "modification"
the same meaning as "formation" or "creation." '' Modified," as defined by Stormonth, is ''·to change slightly, as in
the form or in the external qualities of a thing; " and by
Webster, "to change somewhat the form or qualities of.''
It would be remarkable, indeed, in view of the diversity
of subjects-matter and conditions under which public contracts of the Government are made, that modifications to
meet the infinite contingencies to which the limits of the
human forecast and sagacity subject us could not, even by
con ent of the contracting parties, be made without rescindertainly no su h
ing and abrogating the entire contract.
ml i kno n in the general law of contra t . The minds
whi h gr d to form may in like manner a ree to modify.
But h re, in recognition and contemplation of uch con-
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tingencies, the provision for the future modification is made
part of and expressed in the very contract itself. The objection, however, appears to be directed to the power of the
Executive Department of the Government to make such
contract, because, as is said, the modification made in pursuance of such provision in the contract-whether as to sub.
ject-matter or as to term~-is a departure from what was
advertised in the proposals; that the bidders are not, therefore, put upon equal terms, and that the beneficial object of
advertising for proposals from bidders is impaired, if not
defeated, by such subsequent modifications.
It will be seen, however, that those provisions of the statute which require advertisements for proposals of bidders
impose no such rigorous or restricted limitations to the
power of the executive officer by whom the contract was to
be made.
It is true, as was held by the Attorney-General in 1869 (13
Opin., 174), that where an advertisement for proposals for
furnishing the Government with stamped envelopes, etc.,
stated a definite term and did not provide for any extension
of the contract beyond the term, but the contract contained
a provision that it might be extended or modified by mutual
agreemeut, and it was subsequently modified and extended
repeatedly so as to embrace several successive years, that
such extensions were each new contracts, which should have
been preceded by advertisements for proposals. He said:
" If a Postmast,e r-General can extend a contract in this
manner for four years without opportunity for anyone to
compete for the supply of an article of such large consumptiou, I know no limit to his power in that respect. If it be
a valid contract binding upon the Government, although
extending beyond his own term of office, it binds his successors and cuts off for the term for which he chooses to .fix
the contract all advantage to the Government of any changes
in the market by which a saving could be effected."
The executive officers of the Government are expressly
prohibited from making contracts to extend beyond one
year and for which no appropriation by Congress has been
made.
The question now under consideration not arising from
1
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any actual statement of facts, in an existing case, can be
determined only as it is presented in general terms.
In United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Cornpany (91 U.S.,
321) the question was presented as to the power of the Secretary of the Navy to suspend work contracted for, when
from any cause in his opinion the public interest requires
such suspension, and to settle with the contractor upon such
terms as may be agreed on for the partial performance of
the contract. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Field, said:
"Contracts for the armament and equipment of vessels of
war may, and generally do, require numerous modifications
in the progress of the work where that work requires years
for its completion. With the improvements constantly made
in ship building and steam machinery and in arms, some
parts originally c0ntracted for may have to be abandoned
and other parts substituted, and it would be of serious detriment to the public service if the power of the head of the
Navy Department did not extend to providing for all such
possible contingencies by modification or suspension of the
contract and settlement with the contractors."
.And on the basis of that decision, Mr . .Attorney-General
Brewster, in a case submitted for his opinion (18 Opin., 101 ),
held:
"It is clearly competent to the Secretary of the Navy to
assent to a modification of the contract for building these
vessels where the interests of the Government wiU not be
prejudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby."
From which it would seem that at least the power to
modify the terms of an existing contract on the part of the
Secretary of the Navy has been judicially recognized.
But in Ferris v. United States (28 C. Cls. R., 332) the contract under consideration was the very contract and containing he identical provision which is the subject of consideration here. And in that ca e the validity of tbe contract and
th propriety of the provi ion, and the power of the Chief of
n ineer on behalf of the Government, are not even quesion d but were reco nized and cited approvin ly by court
in it opinion.
1 huponr a nand u horit ,then,Iam 1 rlyof pinion
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that such provision for future modification was reasonable
and proper and within the power of the Chief of Engineers
to make. That a modification " where the interests of the
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision
violated thereby" may well be provided for in every contract
to which the Government is a party; and that a contract so
modified is not such a new contract as must be preceded by
an advertisement for proposals from bidders.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

MEMBER OF CONGRESS-APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE.
During the term of R. as a Senator of the United States, Congress
increased the salary attached to a civil office under the authority of
the United States. On February 23, 1895, the President nominated R.
(whose term in the Senate would not expire until March 4, 1895) to the
office in question, and, on the same day, such nomination was confirmed by the Senate. R. took the oath of office on March ·4, 1895,
and his commission was delivered to him on the following day. Held,
1. The nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate constituted the appointrnent to the office in question; and
2. Sn:ih appointment was a nullity, because in conflict with paragraph 2,
section 5, Article I of the Constitution, which prohibits the appointment of a Member of Congress during the term for which he was
elected, to an office, the emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time.
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Aiigust 1.5, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of August 10, inclosing a copy of the decision
of the Auditor for the State and other Departments and
requesting my opinion upon the following statement of facts,
to wit:
"Matthew W. Ransom wa.s the United States Senator
from the State of North Carolina for the term beginning
March 4, 1889. During the said term the salary of envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico was
increased from $12,000 to $17,500 per annum by act of Congress approved March 3, 1891, making appropriations for the
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diplomatic and consula.r service. (26 Stat., 1053.) Congress
has since continued to appropriate the latter sum. On February 23, 1895, Mr. Ransom was nominated by the President
as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to
Mexico, and the nomination was confirmed the same day.
The commission bears date of February 23. According to
the statement of the President and his private secretary,
Mr. Thurber, the commission was signed March 5. Mr.
Ransom took the oath of office March 4, after the Senatorial
term had expired, and his commission was delivered to him
the following day."
The occasion of your request for my opinion, as to the
duty of the Department of State in the premises, appears to
be a decision of the Auditor for the State and other Departments, holding that Mr. Ransom is not entitled to salary as
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico,
because of the constitutional prohibition of section 6 of
Article I of the Federal Constitution.
Paragraph 2, section 6, Article I of the Constitution is as
follows:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under
the authority of the United StateR, which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time; and no person holding any office under the
United States, shall be a member of either House during his
continuance in office."
Here is contained a prohipition ·against the appointment to
office of Senators and Representatives; and also a prohibition
against one holding an office from being a member of either
House of Uongress.
It ha been repeatedly held that the acceptance of any
offi e under the United State' by a member of either House
of ongre 'S operates a vacation of his eat. He i disabled
b the Con titution from holding au office while a member or
eith r Ilou.·e.
Th ca in band, however, i governed by the other prohibiti u which i again t the appointment to any civil office
und r th , uthority of the nited tate the emolument
b en increa ed durin tbe time for which the
h r of he
pr enta i eappointed to uch officewa elected.
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Here, plainly, the prohibition is not against the holding,
but against the appointment.
Under section 2, Article II of the Constitution, power is
given the President to" Nominate, and by and with the . advice and consent of
the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of .the United States, whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by law."
He can appoint, however, only those who, under the Constitution, are eligible to office. His appointment of one not
eligible is a nullity.
One who was a Senator or Representative during the time
in which the emoluments of any civil office under the authority of the United States was increased is eneligible to such
office.
Judge Story says:
"The reasons for excluding persons from offices who have
been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are to take away, as far as possible, any improper
bias in the vote of the Representative and to secure to the
constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterostedness.
The actual provision, however, does not go to the extent of
the principle, for his appointment is restricted only during
the time for which he was elected, thus leaving in full force
every influence upon his mind, if the period of his election
is short, or the duration of it is approaching its natural
termination." (Story on Constitution, sec. 667.)
It is suggested in your letter that the commission of Mr.
Ransom was not actually signed by the President until the
5th of March, which was after the expiration of the time for
which Mr. Ransom was elected a Senator in Congress.
But it mus~, be observed that the language of the Constitution is that "no Senator shall, during the term for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the
authority of the United States."
In Jlfarbury v. Madison (1 Cranch., 155) the Chief Justice,
speaking for the court, after reciting the act of Congress,
said -:
"These are the clauses of the Constitution and laws of the
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United States which affect this part of the case. They seem
to contemplate three distinct operations:
"1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the President,
and is completely voluntary.
"2. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
"3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person
appointed might, perhaps, be deemed a duty enjoined by the
Constitution. 'He shall,' says that instrument, 'commission
all the officers of the United States.'
"The acts appointing to office and commissioning the person appointed can scarcely be considered as one and the same,
since the power to perform them is given in two separate and
distinct sections of the Constitution."
The vital question here, then, would seem to be, not when
was Mr. Ransom commissioned, but when was he appointed?
Although he might have been commissioned on the 5th
day of March, yet if he was nominated and confirmed on the
23d of February, that, under the rule stated, would seem to
be the date of his appointment.
And this view is confirmed by the facts stated by you,
that, having been nominated and confirmed on the 23d of
February, although not actually commissioned until the 5th
day of March, yet on the 4th day of March Mr. Ransom took
the oath as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary
to Mexico.
I am of opinion, then, that Mr. Ransom's appointment as
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico
was made on February 23, 1895; that that was during the
time for which he was elected a Seuator in Congress, and it
appearing from your letter that it was during that time the
emoluments of the office of minister to Mexico were increased,
Mr. Ran om wa not, in my opinion, eligible ta:appointment
to that office.
ry re pe tfully
HOLME CO RAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
Th
'l'.A.TE.
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WASHINGTON MONUMENT.
Congress has made provision for the protection of the Washington
Monument from chipping vandals, by the act of July 2Q, 1892, chapter
320, section 1, which provides "a penalty of not more than $50 for
each and every such offense," and in the police protection authorized
by the appropriation act of October 2, 1888, chapter 1069, whereby the
Secretary of War is "charged with the custody, care, and protection
of the monument," and an appropriation is made for a custodian and
other employees necessary for its care.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August

:u, 1895.

Sm: Replying to your request for information whether
any action can be taken for the protection of the Washington Monument from chipping vandals, I have the honor to
say that there appears to be none in the way of criminal proceedings except arrest and prosecution under the act of July
20, 1892, chapter 320, section 1 (27 Stat., 332), which provides " a penalty of not more than $50 for each and every
such offense." Section 18 of that act provides that prosecutions " shall be conducted in the name of and for the benefit
of the District of Columbia, and in the same manner as -now
provided by law for the prosecution of offenses against the
laws and ordinances of said District;" and that" any person
who shall fail to pay the fine or penalty imposed, or give
security where the same is required, shall be committed to
the workhouse of the District of Columbia for a term not
exceeding six months for each and every offense."
The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 536 (26 Stat., 848), gives
the police court originaljurisdiction of such prosecutions concurrently with the supreme court of the District of Columbia.
By the appropriation act of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat.,
chap. 1069), you are "charged with the custody, care~ and
protection of the monument," and an appropriation is made
for a custodian and other employees necessary for its care.
The police protection thus authorized, with the penalty above
named, seem to have been thought by Congress sufficient.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'.rARY oF WAR.
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WORLD'S l!"'AIR.
The receipt and distribution of medals and diplomas awarded by the
World's Columbian Commission at Chicago ip. 1893 are purely ministerial acts. They could therefore be delegated by the Commission; and
they were delegated, so that delivery can be made either to its executive committee or to the board of reference and control.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to make distribution to the
exhibitors directly.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 26, 1,895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of .August 20, asking my official opinion as to the distribution of the medals and diplomas awarded to certain
exhibitors at Chicago the World's Fair of 1893. Your
letter states no facts, but I understand that the awards to
successful exhibitors at the Fair have all been made, and
that the validity of these awards is unquestioned. I understand, further, from your inquiries that the medals and diplomas have all been prepared, and that nothing remains to be
done except for you. to deliver them to the proper person or
body of persons who are in turn to deliver· them to the successful exhibitors.
Your third question is: "Can the World's Columbian Commission authorize any committee or subordinate body thereof
to receive and distribute the said medals and diplomas¥"
Such receipt and distribution are purely ministerial acts,
involving no exercise of flj scretion. (See Butterworth v. Hoe,
112 U.S., 50.) I am very clearly of the opinion that these
duties, which are entirely distinct from the discretionary
function of making the awards, could be delegated by the
Commission. That body had express authority to appoint
committees by the act of .April 25, 1890, chapter 156, section
4 (26 Stat., 63), and while the World's Fair was to close not
later than October 30, 1803 ( ec. 9), it was contemplated that
the Commis ion might remain in exi tence for over four years
thereafter (sec. 14) for the purpose of winding up. It could
not have been contemplated that the whole unwieldy body
honld be brought together for purely mini terial acts. In
fact, meeting of a full Commi ion were expressly di 'coura ed b Congre . ( ct of .A.ugu~t 5, 1 92, chap. 3 o, 27
ta . 63.) In pr vidiug th r fir , that the "medal and
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diplomas shall be delivered to the World's Columbian Commission to be awarded to exhibitors" (act of March 3, 1893,
chap. 208, 27 Stat., 587), I think that Congress intended that
delivery to a duly authorized agent of the Commission should
be sufficient.
The Commission is not now in session, and the Treasury
Department is ready to deliver the medals and diplomas.
Your second question asks to what officer the delivery should
be made. This depends upon the by-laws of the World's
Columbian Commission and such prQceedings as may regularly have been had thereunder. You furnish me with two
pamphlets, one entitled "By-Laws (as amended) of the
W orlcl's Columbian Commission," and bearing no date; the
other entitled "Official Minutes of the Executive Committee
of the World's Columbian Commission, from December 12 to
December 19, 1893, inclusive." In a memorandum which
you have presented to me with the papers, you refer me also
to a certain rule adopted by the board of reference and control appointed by said Commission, and which, as you there
state, is the rule referred to in the proceedings of the executive committee of December 18, 1893. I have no official
knowledge of the by-laws or resolutions of this Coinmission,
or of any of its subordinate committees, and must confine
myself to the consideration of such as you furnish me with .
the appointment of
.Article 5 of the by-laws provides
an executive committee which, "when the Commission is not
in session, shall have all the powers of the National Commission, except in cases in which the act of Congress requires
the action of the Commission or a majority of the Commissioners." It further provides that "the committee may make
such regulations for its own government and the exercise of
its functions through the medium of such subcommittees as
it may consider expedient," and" shall select such employees
and agents as may be necessary." .Article 17 establishes a
"board of reference and control" of eight members, "upon
which board are conferred all the powers and duties of the
Commission when the said Commission or its executive committee shall not be in session, except in cases in which the
act of Congress requires the action of the Commission or of
a majority of the Commissioners."

for
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After the close of the actual exhibition it became necessary to provide in some way for the promulgation of the
awards and the distribution of the medals and diplomas.
You inform me that the board of reference and control
adopted a rule, called "Rule XI," providing that this should
be done by the Commission itself or by said board. On
December 18, 1893, the executive committee amended this
rule so as to provide that the committee of awards should
report the result of the work of the judges" to the World's
Columbian Commission or its P;xecutive committee, or, in its
absence, to the board of reference and control, by whom the
formal promulgation of the awards and the distribution of
the medals and diplomas shall be made with appropriate
ceremonies."
It is my opinion, therefore, that you are authorized to deliver the medals and diplomas to the executive committee,
and that if the executive committee shall not be in session
you are authorized to deliver them to the board of reference
and control. This answers your second question. As I do
not understand that you desire a meeting of the full Commission to be called, unless that course is unavoidable, the
answers to your second and third questions dispense with
the necessity of answering your fifth question.
The first and fourth questions substantially put the inquiry,
whether you are authorized to distribute these medals and
diplomas to the exhibitors without first actually delivering
them to the World's Columbian Commission. This inquiry is
suggested by certain provisions of the act of March 2, 1895,
chapter 189 (28 Stat., 928). The provisions referred to authorize you to procure suitable cases for the medals, "and to
pay for the same and also the expense of distributing said
medals." They also authorize you to do certain work at the
public expen e upon the diplomas. You are not directed to
provide for the expense of distributing the diplomas. I do
not think that these statutory provisions authorize you to
di regard the ommittee appointed by the World's Columbian ommi ion and deal yourself directly with the exhibitor .
our :fir t and fourth que tion, are th refore answered
. fi 11 w : That ou may make delivery to the World
om mi ·i n hrough it duly authorized agencie
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above mentioned, but that you have no authority to make
distribution to the exhibitors directly.
I return herewith the amended by-laws and the December
minutes of the executive committee; also the letters received
by you from .the acting chairman of the executive committee
on awards and from the president of the World's Columbian
Commission.
Very respectfully,
EDWARD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General can give no opinion upon a case not actually
arising in the Department the head of which requests the opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 7, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of September 5, with inclosures, asking my official
opinion concerning the ownership of certain machinery
located in the sugarhouse of the Audubon Park Sugar
School, at New Orleans, La. It appears that this machinery
was paid for out of moneys of the United States, by authority of the then Oommissioner of Agriculture, in 1888, but
that it is not in your possession or control. It is in the
hands of some person or corporation not connected with
the United States Government. It further appears that,
believing the title to this machinery to be in the United
States, you have sold it at public auction, and that the purchase moneys have been paid and are in the Treasury. The
persons in possession of the machinery refuse to deliver
it, claiming that it has become their property by gift from
the United States or otherwise. I do not see that there
is any official action which you can take in the premises.
The question is at present one between the purchasers
and the persons in possession. If any claim is made against
the United States it will not be presented to your Department. Under these circumstances, it is not a question upon
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which the Department of Justice can officially advise yon.
(20 Opin., 724.)
Very respectfully,
EDWA.RD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF AGRICULTURE.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
When an opinion is desired by the head of a Department a statement
of facts upon which th,l question arises must be submitted. The
Attorney-General can not investigate the papers for the purpose of
ascertaining these facts.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
September 10, 1895.
Sm: Your indorsement upon the :file of papers of the War
Department transmitted to me, in which you request an
opinion ''whether the amount can be paid as recommended
by the Board in their report of August 15, 1895, herewith,
attention being especially invited to the written views of the
Judge-Advocate-General and to the preceding remarks of
the Chief of Engineers," was to-day received.
It has been uniformly held by my predecessors that, when
an opinion is desired by the head of a Department, a statement of the facts upon which the question arises must be
submitted. The Attorney-General can not investigate the
papers for the purpose of ascertaining these facts. (12 Opin.,
206; 14 Opiu., ,'367; 19 Opin., 396-467, 696; 20 Opin., 270,
493, 526, 711.)

I re pectfully return the file and request that you will formulate the fact and state the questions of law upon which
you wi h an opinion.
Re pectfully,
HOLMES OONRA.D,
A cting A ttornezJ- General.
Tb
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COMPTROLLER OF 'fHE TREASURY.
Whether certain expenses of the Department of Agriculture are payable
from a certain appropriation for that Department is a question which
should have been addressed to the Comptroller of the Treasury.

DEPARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,
September 14, 1895.
SIR: Replying to your request of September 3, for my
official opinion whether certain expenses are payable from
your appropriation for the distribution of seeds, I beg to say
that your question comes within the rule and not within the
exception stated by my predecessor (20 Opin., 655; 21 Opin.,
178, 183, 188) and should, therefore, be addressed to the
Comptroller of the,Treasury.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON,
Attorney- General.
The SECRE1'ARY OF AGRICUL'l'URE.

SECRETARY OF WAR.
The Secretary of War, under the river and harbor act of August 18,
1894, and the act of April 24, 1888, has full authority to condemn
whatever land may be needed for the construction of the boat railway
provided for in the former act.
If a change in the location of au existing railway is a necessity in the
building of said boat railway, the acquisition by the Secretary of
War of the necessary land to make such change is merely an incident
to the enterprise intrusted to him.
DEP ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,

September 14, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
letter of the Acting Secretary of War of July 9, with the accompanying papers, upon which my opinion is asked whether,
on the facts and circumstances shown thereby, you have
authority, without further legislation, to acquire by condemnation the right of way for the boat railway provided for in
the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 359).
It appears that the right of way required for such boat rail .
way crosses or encroaches at several points upon the right
of way of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company,
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now actually occupied in the operation of its railway; that
said company is willing that such portions of its right of way
may be taken on condition that it be furnished by the Government with sufficient space to change the location of its railway without impairing its continuity, and that such change
be made without cost to it.
You suggest a doubt, raised by the letter of the United
States attorney which you inclose, as to your right, under
existing laws, to condemn the land required for such changes
in the line of said company's railway.
I do not think any further legislation is required, or is
possible. You have full authority under the act referred to
and that of .April 24, 1888 (25 Stat., 94), to condemn whatever land may be needed for the construction of the boat
railway. You state that it is impracticable to operate such
railway with crossings of any other line, and that the proposed location is required. The change in the location of
the existing railroad is therefore a necessity in the building
of the boat railway, and your apquisitiou of the necessary
land to make such change is merely an incident to the enterprise intrusted to you. If it be not such incident, and therefore included within your present authority, I do not see how
authority can be given you, because Congress has no right
to condemn the property required upon any other theory
than its necessity for the prosecution of your work.
The statement and proof of the above facts and necessity
in the application for condemnation of the laud will, in my
judgment, give the court fuH authority to appropriate the
land needed.
If you desire to make the arrangement suggested with
the railroad company, and institute condemnation proceeding for the lands hown by the plat submitted to me, I will,
if you de ir it, end additional in tructfous to the United
States attorn y.
Re p ctfully,
J DSO HARMON.
h

F
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APPROPRIATION-DAMAGES.
The appropriation by the act of March 2, 1895, for raising the height of
the dam at Great :Falls, and for damages on account of flooding of
land and other damages, was intended to cover all damages that might
result from raising the dam 2½ feet higher than bad been contemplated
under the act of July 15, 1882.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 14, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of September 12, relating to the expenditure of the appropriation by act of Congress approved March 2, 1895, "for raising
the height of the dam at Great Falls, together with the cost
of such other work as may be found necessary in connection
therewith, including the cost of strengthening the conduit,
and for damages on account of flooding of land and other
damages."
I have considered the matter quite thoroughly and have
examined the papers accompanying your communication,
and am of opinion that the amount of $12,300 appropriated
by the act approved July 15, 1882, was intended to cover
the damages likely to result from raising the embankment
between the Potomac River and the canal to the height at
that time contemplated; and that the sum of $15,000 recommended by the commission consisting of an officer of the
Corps of Engineers and the engineer selected by the canal
authorities to "report in regard to the damage that would .
probably be sustained by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
by raising the W ashingtou .Aqueduct dam at Great Falls
2½ feet" was inMnded to cover all the damages that might
result from raising the dam 2½ feet higher than had been
contemplated under the act approved July 15, 1882.
The suggestion that the actual amount of the damages
resulting from increasing the height of the dam 2½ feet can
only be determined by waiting until injuries are actually
inflicted does not commend itself as altogether practicable;
and the suggestion of the Chief of Engineers, that "an ounce
of prevention is better than a pound of cure," is approved
by all past experience.
I am of opinion, on the whole case as presented, that the
Department is authorized to pay the $15,000 as recommended
3513-V0L 21, PT 2--2
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by the commission and the Chief of Engineers from the
money appropriated by the act of March 2, 1895. The in- .
closures accompanying your letter are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.

.Approved:
JUDSON HARMON.

The

SECRETARY OF WAR.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-ILLEGALLY STRETCHING WIRES.
The stretching of wires without authority across the Iowa resel'.vation
in the District of Columbia is governed by section 1818 of the Revised
Statutes, and should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of
the Interior.
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

September 16, 1895.

Sm: In reply to the question whether or not the Chief of
Engineers is authorized to cut down wires stretched, without
authority, across the Iowa reservation in the District of
Columbia, and which was erected in the absence of the
watchman, my opinion is that section 1818 of the Revised
Statutes, which provides that '' the Secretary of the Interior
is directed to prevent the improper appropriation or occupation of any of the public streets, avenues, squares, or
reservations in the city of W asbington, belonging to the
United States, and to reclaim the same if unlawfully appropriated," governs in this case, and that this is a proper
matter to be brought to the attention of .the Secretary of
the Interior.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR.

ATTOR EY-GENERAL-DUTIE
n opinion whi h ould have been a ked of the Comptroller of the
Trea ur. j giv n by the ttornoy- 'en ral, it appearing that the
qu tion i on of importance, and the omptroller joins in requestin the opinion.
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Cases stated in which duties can be refunded to the importer on the
ground that they were collected by mistake.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 21, 1895.

SIR: Your communication of September 10 asks an official
opinion as to your power to refund customs duties in certain
cases.
This question, like other questions involving the right to
disburse moneys, is one which belongs more properly to the
sphere of the Comptroller of the Treasury since the act of
July 31, 1894, chapter 174, section 8, and hence AttorneyGeneral Olney declined to answer it. (21 Opin., 188.) Mr.
Olney bad, however, held that this Department might properly still consider questions of this class "in matters of great
importance" (21 Opin., 179), and did so in one case, where
the Comptroller himself joined in asking the opinion (21
Opin., 183). His rulings in this regard have been approved
by the present Attorney-General in an opinion rendered to
the Secretary of Agriculture September 14, 1895. In sending
the question here a second time, however, you state that the
Comptroller advises you that under the circumstances the
opinion of this Department will be followed by him. As
the question is one of importance, and the Comptroller thus
joins in asking that it be answered here, I proceed to its
consideration on the merits.
It appears that certain goods which were dutiable, according to the rulings of your Department, under the tariff act
of 1894, were actually subjected by the customs officials to
higher rates of duty under the tariff act of 1890. The
importers protested against this exaction, but their protests
were insufficient, as held by the Board of General Appraisers, in one case for insufficiency of specification, in the other
for delay in filing.
You now ask whether you have the power to refund the
excess of duties, notwithstanding that no lawful protests
were filed by the importers.
Sections 3012½ and 3013 of the Revised Statutes have been
repealed, but the act of .March 3, 1875, chapter 136, is still
in force (21 Opin., 153), and, with the customs administrative
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act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, contains all of our legislation upon the subject of refunds for error in imposition of
duties.
The cases in which you il,re authorized to make such
refunds, in the absence of a proper protest, are the following. First, when the duties as provisionally :fixed and paid
upon entry of the goods, called "unascertained duties," are
reduced upon the :final liquidation (Oust. Adm. Act', sec. 24);
second, for mere clerical error (id.); third, for "errors of
fact." (Act of 1875, sec. 1.) The latter provision, in my
opinion, refers to mistakes of fact in the meaning of the
common law-that is, to mutual mistakes of fact-a mistake
of fact on the Government's part alone being provided for
elsewhere in the section last cited, under the name of '' an
erroneous view of the facts in the case." In the latter contingency the importer can ask for a refund only when he
duly protested. This construction of the act of 1875 gives
effect to all of its somewhat obscure provisions. A mistake
of the customs officials, duly pointed out by the importer in
his protest, may be remedied, if a mistake of law, after the
importer's position has been sustained by a judicial decision.
It may be remedied, if a mistake of fact, when a reexamination of the goods satisfies the Secretary that the officials
were mistaken. For a mutual mistake of law, the importer
has no remedy. For a mutual mistake of fact, he may have a
remedy if he discovers the mistake within one year from the
payment of the duties, and brings it to the notice of the
collector within ten days after its discovery.
As these importers come within none of the classes above
mentioned, the mistake being a mistake of law, not duly
protested against, your question must be answered in the
negative.
Very re pect fully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
A cting A ttorney- General.
Th
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COLLISIONS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The provision of section 4234, Revised Statutes, requiring sailing vessels to show a lighted torch on the approach of any steam vessel during the nighttime, was not repealed by section 3 of the act of February
19, 1895.
Repeals by implication are permitted only in cases of absolute inconsistency.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 25, 1895.
SIR: In a letter of 12th instant you ask my opinion
whether the provision of section 4234, requiring saning vessels to show a lighted torch on the approach of any steam
vessel during the nighttime, was repealed by section 3 of
the act of February 19, 1895, which reenacts portions of
section 4234, but omits that relating fo torches.
I have the honor to say that in my opinion there was no
such repeal.
Section 4234 is part of the general chapter 5 relating to
navigation, and providing rules for preventing collisions, to
be observed by American vessels on all waters. August 19,
1890, an act was passed (26 Stat., 320) making regulations
for preventing collisions, to be observed by American vessels on the high seas and connecting waters. This act was
passed pursuant to a plan for the adoption of a common
code of regulations by maritime nations, and therefore section 3 provided that it should take effect at a time to be fixed
by the President's proclamation. Such proclamation has not
been issued, and the act, therefore, is not yet in force.
Congress, however, anticipating that such proclamation
would be issued on or before March 1, 1895, passed two acts,
which, with that of 1890, would cover the various navigable
waters formerly dealt with together in the general chapter
on navigation.
The first was that of February 8, 1895 (28 Stat., 645) providing rules for preventing collisions, to be observed by
American vessels "upon the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal." It was
made to take effect on and after March 1, 1895.
The other was that of February 19, 1895, to which you
refer (28 Stat., 672), which covered "harbors, rivers, and
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inland waters of the United States, except the Great Lakes
and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as
Montreal," and is stated in the caption to be supplementary
to the act of August 19, 1890, above mentioned. Article 30
of the act of 1890 ha.d provided for special rules for harbors,
etc., and the act of February 19, 1895, undertook to provide
these on and after March 1, 1895, by adopting as such special rules the provisions of certain sections of the Revised
Statutes which are mentioned by number and include 4233,
but not 4234. In section 3 the first part of the first sentence
of section 4234, requiring all sailing vessels to be furnished
with proper signal lights, is literally quoted, but the last
part of the sentence, requiring the showing of a lighted
torch, is omitted. The last sentence of section 4234, providing the penalty, is also repeated, changing the expression
'' navigated without complying with the provisions of this
and the preceding sections" to "navigated without complying with the statutes of the United States or the regulations
that may be lawfully made thereunder."
The act of August 19, 1890, section 2, repeals all laws and
parts of laws inconsistent with its own provisions, but such
repeal, even if it applied to section 4234 in so far as that section relates to harbors, has not taken effect.
The act of February 8, 1895, likewise repeals all laws and
parts of laws inconsistent therewith, so far as applicable to
the navigation of the Great Lakes, etc.
The act of February 19, 1895, contains no express repeal
in any form.
This state of legislation is novel, and the question presented
is not easy to answer, but in view of the established rules
which permit the declaration of repeals by implication only
in case of absolute inconsistency (3 Howard, 646; 16 Peters,
362), section 4234 can not be held to be repealed, and its provi ion therefore applied to the case of the schooner Wm. A.
teelm,an in the harbor of Baltimore, to which your question
relate .
pe tfully,
J DSO II.A.RMO .
Th
ETA.RY OF 'l'HE TRE
URY.
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DUTIES.
21 Opinions, 110, reaffirmed as to drawback of duties on lead in imported
silver ores.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE,

September 25, 1895.
SIR: You were advised (21 Opin., 110) that lead made in
this country in a smelter from a mixture of domestic and
imported silver lead ores was not entitled, upon exportation,
to any drawback under section 25 of the tariff act of 1890,
chapter 1244, because that part of the lead which came from
the imported ore did not so appear that its quantity or
measure could be ascertained in the method contemplated
by that act.
Your letter of September 19 inquires whether "white
lead'; (carbonate of lead) manufactured in the United States
from pig lead produced as aforesaid is entitled, on exportation, to drawback under the section above named or under
section 22 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, chapter 349.
You do not state the ingredients of this manufacture other
than lead, and I understand your question to be whether
any drawback can be allowed by reason of the existence of
product of foreign ore in the lead of which the manufactured
article is partly composed. The reasons given in the opinion above cited fully cover the case now presented, which is
really the same in another form. I therefore answer no.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF 1'HE TREASURY.

EXPORTS-MEAT-INSPECTION.
An act of Congress providing for the inspection of beef intended for
exportation, and that no clearance shall be given to any vessel having
on board for exportation uninspected beef, does not authorize the
making of a regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring that
meats other than beef products shall be so marked as to show the species of animal from which it was produced, classifying all unmarked
packages of meats as nninspected beef, and refusing clearance to vessels having on board such unmarked pac_kages.
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DEP..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 28, 1895.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of September 19, 1895, inclosing a copy of an "Order
concerning the exportation of meat," of August 28, 1891, and
asking whether or not that portion of the regulation requiring the marking of packages of meats other than beef products, providing for classifying such unmarked packages as
uninspected beef, and the refusal of clearance because of the
assumption that such unmarked packages contain uninspected beef, is consistent with the law.
The regulation in question is as follows:
"It is ordered that from and after September 16, 1895, all
beef offered for transportation, whether fresh, salted, canned,
corned, or p~cked, shall be accompanied by a certificate
showing t,hat the cattle from which it was produced were
free from disease and the meat sound and wholesome, by an
inspector of this Department. And in order that it may be
determined whether all beef has been so inspected and found
to be wholesome, it is further ordered that the meat of all
other species of animals which for ariy reason does not bear
the inspection tags and stamps of this Department, shall be
packed in barrels, cases, or other packages, which are legibly
marked in such manner as to clearly indicate the species of
animal from which the meat was produced. Meat which is
not so marked, and which is not accompanied by a certificate
of inspection, will be classed as uninspected beef and will
not be allowed exportation.
"Notice is hereby given to exporters of meat, whether said
meat is fresh, salted, canned, corned, packed, or otherwise
prepared, and to owners and agents of vessels upon which
aid meat is exported, that no clearance can be given to any
ves el having on board said meat until the provisions of this
ord r are omplied with."
Thi order is ba d on ection 2 of the act approved March
2 1 95 (2
tat., 7 ..,), which i a follow :
That th e r tary of griculture shall al o cau e to be
d
areful in p tion of all Ii e cattle the meat of which,
h
It I, cauu d orned, packed, cured, or otberwi e
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prepared, is intended for exportation to any foreign country,
at such times and places and in such manner as he may think
proper, with a view to ascertain whether said cattle are free
from disease and their meat sound and wholesome, and may
appoint inspectors who shall be authorized to give an official
certificate clearly stating tlie condition in which such cattle
and meat are found, and no clearance shall be given to any
vessel having on board any fresh, salted, canned, corned, or
packed beef being the meat of cattle killed after the passage
of this act for exportation to and sale in a foreign country
from any port in the United States until the owner or shipper shall obtain from an inspector appointed under the provisions of this act a certificate that said cattle were free from
disease and that their meat is sound and wholesome."
This section relates alone to live cattle and the meat of
cattle.
Any reasonable regulation affecting these and these alone
is authorized by the statute.
However desirable it might be to effect the object of the
statute, this result can not be reached by regulating commerce in respect of commodities not embraced in the statute.
The fact that the purpose of the statute may practically
fail of realization, unless the regulations be extended to
other articles of commerce, would be no warrant for such
extension.
The order in question, for the purpose of identifying the
products of cattle, directs that meat of all other species of
animals shall be marked in such manner as to clearly indicate the species of animal from which the meat was produced.
Thus, in aid of the regulation of commerce in beef, and to
give practical effect to the inspection provided for, jurisdiction is assumed over other meats not embraced in the statute.
On the same principle an order might be made regulating
the marking of all other artic]es of commerce contained in
barrels, cases, or other packages, and on the ground that
this is necessary for the purpose of segregating and ide~tifying the beef, so that the rule not permitting a vessel having on board beef, unaccompanied by a proper certificate, to
clear could be enforced.
This is an extreme illustration, and I do not mean to
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suggest that there is any probability of such an extension,
but it tests the soundness of the regulation in question .
. The provision in question, coupled with the restriction
upon the clearance of vessels, is a regulation affecting commerce in respect of commodities not controlled by the statute.
Under it a vessel having no beef on board, but other meat,
could not clear unless such meats were marked as provided
for in this order.
I am of the opinion that the provision in question is not
warranted by the statute.
This opinion does not cover by implication the question of
your authority to make regulations affecting the clearance
of vessels, as the proposition presented in your letter did
not necessarily involve that issue.
Respectfully, _
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

DUTIES.:_DELIVERY TO IMPORTERS.
After the duty on imported goods which have been deposited in a
private bonded warehouse has been paid and a withdrawal permit
issued, the Government has no further concern with the goods, and
the right to withhold or deliver same rests with the warehouseman
alone.
The collector of customs has no authority to interfere or direct the United
States storekeeper to interfere in a controversy between the importers
and the warehouseman and deliver the goods.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE 7

September 28, 1895.
Sm: Yours of September 23 states the following facts:
Importers of whisky deposited it in a private bonded warehou e under the provisions of sections 2961 and 2962, Revised
Statutes, taking a negotiable warehouse receipt therefor,
which they afterwards pledgea to a bank. The importers
having afterwards paid the duties, the collector issued to
them a withdrawal permit, which they filed with the United
Stat toreke
r in such warehouse, but allowed the whi ky
iro ided in Revi ed Statutes, section 2977.
hi ky a o tored, all dutie paid, the bank
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sent the warehouse receipt, indorsed in blank, to the warehouseman, directing him to deliver ten barrels which had
been sold by the owner, and to return the receipt after
indorsing such delivery thereon. The warehouseman delivered the ten barrels, and claims that he mailed the receipt to
the bank with such delivery indorsed thereon, but the bank
claims it never arrived. The importers having, with the
consent of the bank, sold other portions of the whisky, the
warehouseman refuses to deliver unless the importers either
produce the warehouse receipt or give a bond of indemnity.
The importers have thereupon applied to the collector of
customs requesting him to direct the storekeeper to deliver
the whisky, in which request the bank has joined.
You ask my opinion whether, in view of these facts, your
Department, "having issued the delivery permit, can lawfully direct the delivery of the whisky as requested, in the
absence of said warehouse receipt."
When imported goods are deposited in a private bonded
warehouse they are in the joint custody of the United States
storekeeper and the warehouseman, as expressly provided
in Revised Statutes, 2960. The custody of the former is to
secure the Government's rights. The custody of the latter
is to secure his own. Neither is concerned with the origin
or enforcement of the rights of the other, and neither may
interfere with the custody of the other. As the custody is
joint, action of both custodians is required for delivery. In
the case put, all duties having been paid and the delivery
permit issued, the Government has no further concern with
the whisky, and the right to deliver or withhold delivery
rests with the warehouseman alone. The collector of customs has no authority to take any further action in the matter or to interfere or direct the storekeeper to interfere in the
controversy between the importers and the warehouseman.
You also refer me to the letter of the collector and that of
counsel for the bank, which you inclose, in which attention
is called to the hardship resulting to the importers by reason
of Revised Statutes, section 934, which forbids the replevin
of the whisky. The collector well says: "As a matter of
administration, the presence of sheriff's officers in Government warehouses where large quantities of dutiable goods
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are stored and where the Government's power should be
paramount, would lead to constant complication and be a
source of danger to the revenue." I beg to say, however,
that in the case of a private bonded warehouse, where the
custody is joint as above stated, the Government's custody,
after all duties are paid and a withdrawal permit is issued,
is merely nominal. The right to drawback in case of export,
or refunder in case of destruction, to which the collector
refers, which are secured by leaving the goods in the warehouse, is waived when the owner demands delivery, and, the
goods in that case being really detained by the warehouseman and not by the Government, it is open to question
whether section 934 applies. I see no reason why you may
not instruct the collector to waive objections to replevin in
this instance so that the parties may be free to settle their controversy in the courts. But any question which may arise
as to the effect of such waiver can also be there determined.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

SEIZURE OF SE.A.LING VESSELS-LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL
SEIZURE.
British sealing schooners, having on board prohibited and unsealed
firearms, together with a large number of seal skins, were seized by
American cruisers in Bering Sea and the Nortlt Pacific Ocean for
alleged violations of the laws for the preservation of fur seals passed
in pursuance of the award of the tribunal of arbitration at Paris and
delivered to British naval officers, with a written statement of the
facts upon which the seizures bad been made, but which did not specifically assert that seals bad been taken contrary to law, which officer , without in anywise invoking the action of the courts, released
them, having reached the conclusion, after investigation and legal
advice, that no case could be made out against them. The Briti h
Government presented claim for damages on account of such seizure .
Held:
1. That nothing in the British statut

or in the orders and instructions
i ued for th due execution thereof require any formal charge by
officer making eizures.
n indorsem nt of the grounds upon which
they were eized on th c rtifi.cate of th ve els is required to enable
th e ls t pr eed to port f r trial.
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2. The mode provided by the Bering Sea award act for dealing with
vessels so seized is to subject them to legal proceedings in the British
courts. Delivery to the naval authorities in place of the judicial
authorities was merely for convenience, and not for the purpose of
dispensing with legal proceedings or for a trial by such naval authorities instead.
3. A naval officer to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized under the
provisions of the treaty has no authority to investigate the seizure or
release the vessel.
4. There being nothing in the acts of either country about liability for
wrongful seizures, if such liability exists it is governed by the wellsettled principles of law common to both countries relative to such
liability.
5. The right to seize, conferred by the acts of both countries, was not
limited to vessels caught in the act. In all other cases action must
depend upon evidence and indications. In any case where reasonable
grounds for the seizure are shown there is no liability for damages on
account of such seizure.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 3, 1895.
SIR: In the matter of the claims presented by the British
Government for damages on account of the seizure by United
States cruisers of the British sealing schooners Wanderer and
Favorite, I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested
by your letter of September 27.
It appears from the letters of the Secretary of the Treasury to yourself, dated June 12 and September 24, which you
inclose, that these schooners were seized by American
cruisers, one in the North Pacific Ocean June 9, 1894, the
other in Bering Sea August 24, 1894, and delivered to
British naval officers with a written statement of the facts
upon which the seizures had been made, which officers,
without in anywise invoking the action of the courts,
released them, having reached the conclusion, after investigation and upon legal advice, "that no case could be made
out against them."
The British naval officers in releasing the schooners apparently proceeded on the theory that they were invested with
the authority of an ordinary examining magistrate or court
to determine whether the accused vessels should be subjected to regular judicial inquiry or not. So acting, they
seem to have held that the statements of the United States
commanders, as well as the facts developed by their own
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investigation, failed to show even probable cases of violation
of the laws for the preservation of the fur seals passed in
pursuance of the award of the tribunal of arbitration at
Paris under the treaty between _the United States and Great
Britain concluded at Washington February 29, 1892. (See
act of Parliament, April 23, 1894, 57 Viet., chap. 2, 31 L. R.
Stat., 4.)
The statements made and delivered by the United States
officers were to the effect that prohibited and unsealed firearms, together with large numbers of seal skins, were found
on board the seized schooners. In the case of the Wanderer,
at least, there were other circumstances of suspicion, such as
evasion and concealment. The alleged defects in these statements were that they merely set forth as grounds of seizure
the facts above stated, but did not specifically assert that
seals had actually been taken contrary to law. In other
words, considering the statements as pleadings, they set
forth mere evidence and not the ultimate fact.
• I find nothing in the British statutes, or in the orders and
instructions ·issued for the due execution thereof, which
requires any formal charge by officers making seizures.
"An indorsement of the grounds on which it was seized" on
the certificate of the vessel is required when it is returned,
to enable the vessel to proceed to port for trial. (57 Viet.,
chap. 2, sec. 2 (1).) Section 12 of the act of Congress
authorizing seizures of .American ships by British officers
provides for the delivery with the ship of "any witnesses
and proofs on board." ( Act approved April 6, 1894, 28
Stat., 52.) The instructions of the Secretary of the Navy
to the commander of the United States naval force in Bering
Sea, dated May 4, 1894, a copy of which was sent by the
Seer tary of State to the British minister (Senate Ex. Doc.
67, Fif y-thir<.l Congres , third session, p. 124), required
th ·ommandillg officer making the seizure to draw up a
d claration in writing and deliver the ame with the ves el,
wheth r uch delivery bou1d be made to Briti h or merican auth ritie (id., 126). I have found no imilar requirem nt in the Briti ha t, order in council, or in truction and
b declaration directed by the instruction to American
ollic r' w re m r ly int nded to carry out ection 12 of the
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act of Uongress. These, as well as the indorsement on
the certificate above mentioned, were manifestly required,
not for t.he purpose of justifying the seizures to other naval
officers to whom delivery might be made, but to indicate evidence for use in the courts, where proper charges would be
formulated from the evidence produced. As all seizures are
to be made by naval officers and the vessels seized delivered
to other naval officers, when not taken direct to the judicial
authorities, it could not have been expected that the niceti~s
of legal procedure should be observed in such statements.
The authority of American cruisers to seize British ships
is found in the act of Parliament above cited and in the
orders in council authorized thereby, which bear date April
30, 1894. Section 1 of such orders provides that American
officers may "seize and detain any British vessel which .has
become liable to be forfeited to Her Majesty under the provisions of the recited act, and may bring ·her for adjudication before any such British court of admiralty as is referred
to in section 103 of 'The merchant shipping act, 1854' (which
section is set out in the second schedule to the recited act),
or may deliver her to any such British officer as is mentioned
in the said section for the purpose of being dealt with pursuant to the recited act."
The mode provided by the Bering Sea award act for dealing with vessels so seized is to subject them to legal proceedings in the British courts (second schedule, section 103).
Section 2 of said orders in council, which relates to the
conduct of British cruisers seizing American vessels, provided that" such officer, after seizing and detaining a ship
of the United States in exercise of the said powers, shall take
her for adjudication before a court of the United States
having jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter, or deliver her
to any naval or revenue officer or other authorities of the
United States." While it is not explicitly stated, it is manifest that the intention was to substitute delivery to the
naval authorities of the country to which the vessel belongs
in place of delivery to its judicial authorities, merely for convenience and not for the purpose of dispensing with legal
proceedings or having a trial by such naval authorities
instead. Such delivery is a mere transfer of custody.
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The law of each country requires tbat its vessels, when
seized by its own cruisers, shall be brought into court for
adjudication (second schedule, act of Congress, supra, secs.
9 and 11), and intended to give to the cruisers of the other
country the same rights given those of its own. (Act of
Parliament, 3 (3); act of Congress, sec.12.)
It may be suggested that the commander of a cruiser conducts an investigation in deciding whether to seize or not to
seiz~, and further, that after seizure he may revoke his decision
and release. But two things would prevent the conclusion
that a naval officer, to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized
under the provisions of the treaty, has power either to review
or to investigate anew. One is the spirit of comity shown by
the acts of both countries which requires a construction
thereof not inconsistent with mutual confidence and respect.
The other is that the power of British officers receiving seized
vessels from American cruisers is expressly limited to bringing them into court for adjudication. (Orders in council, sec.1,
second schedule, Bering Sea award act, sec.103.)
Nothing is said in the act of either country about liability
for wrongful seizures. If it be conceded, upon principles of
comity or otherwise, that such liability was contemplated, it
must be assumed that both countries had in mind the wellsettled principles of the law common to both relative to such
liability.
While the acts of both countries are, of course, directed
only against actual cases of unlawful seal :fishing, it would
be absurd to limit the right of sefaure thereby conferred
upon each other's crujsers to vessels caught in the act. In
all other cases action must depend upon evidence and iudi~ation . This wa recognized by the authorities of both
ountries. See instructions of Secretary of the Navy (supra,
p. 126), which adopts from "Instructions to British cruj ers
a to eizur " ent by the British minister to the Secretary of
tate ( enat E . Doc., supra, 116) the following: "Whether
the s I has been engaged in hunting you must judge from
the pre ence of seal skin or bodie of seals on board, and
th r ircum tan e and indication ." The po sibility of
mi ake in uch ca e i well known. Certainly it could not
h a e been intended by Great Britain to have liability for
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wrongful seizures by American officers depend upon any
different rules from those expressly made applicable to seizures by its own. These are merely the rules of the common
law in the analogous case of groundless arrest or prosecution
by the civil authorities. There is no liability in any case
where reasonable grounds for the seizure are shown, even
when the court has discharged the vessel. (Second schedule,
supra, sec. 103.)
Th~ schooners in question, having been seized by due
authority, have never been lawfully discharged. It is not
even suggested that the American officers who made the
seizures did not act in good faith, and they seem to have
acted on reasonable grounds of suspicion. My opinion,
therefore, is that the Secretary of the Treasury is right in
holding that there is no liability for damages on account of
such seizures, assuming that there was, in. fact, no violation
of law by either of the schooners seized. While voluntary
release by the seizing officer might dispense with judicial
discharge as one of the conditions of liability, this would
result only because such release would be an admission of
innocence. It will hardly be claimed that the release by
British naval officers operated as an admission by the American officers who made the seizure.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.ARY OF S'l'.A'l'E.

SEAL FISHERIES.
Veesels engaged in fur-seal :fishing in other waters than those covered
by the award of the Paris Tribunal and the act of Congress of April
6, 1894, are not required to be licensed.

DEP.ARTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 4, 1895.
Sm : I beg to say in reply to the letter of Acting Secretary
W. E. Curtis, of October 3, that I think the construction
your Department has placed upon tho articles of the award
of the Paris Tribunal, and the act of Congress approved April
6, 1894, to give effect thereto, is correct, and that licenses are
3513-VOL 21, PT 2--3
OF
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not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal :fishing in other
waters than those covered by said award and act. Any
doubt which there might be from the sections to which you
refer seems to be removed by section 10, which recognizes
both licensed and unlicensed vessels.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-MEMORIAL HALL AT WEST POINT.
The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a matter not pending
in the administration of a Department.
The Attorney-General will not determine questions of fact.
The method to be followed in selecting granite, marble, and plan and
specifications for building a memorial hall at West Point.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 24, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours
of the 21st instant, in the matter of the advertisement for
the erection of a memorial hall at West Point, and to carry
out the terms and conditions of the bequest made by Gen.
George W. Cullum.
Your :first question is as follows:
"I. Is it necessary, under the act referred to, for a definite
plan of the building and definite and certain specifications
for the same to be absolutely determined upon by the board
of trustees and approved by the Secretary of War before the
advertising can be legally done 1"
My opinion is that, if it would subserve the public interest,
the board could adopt a definite plan, certain specifications,
and an addendum with specifications certain in character,
which may be, at the option of the board, substituted for
p ification in the original plan particularly designated,
and that, on the approval of said plan, specifications, and
addendum by you, bid may be taken, and that then the
board can adopt cle.finitely,from the original plans and specification and ub tituted peci:fi ation , a :fixed plan and
for the building, and ·ubmit them for your
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II. Inasmuch as you have rejected all of the bids made
under the former advertisement, the second, third, and fourth
questions submitted by you do not arise in a matter now
pending in the administration of your Department, and they
are therefore not such questions as can be submitted to the
Attorney-General for his opinion.
III. The fifth question is substantially answered in the
answer to the first question.
IV. The sixth question is as follows:
"Should a considerable item of the building which is patented and controlled by a single person, .firm, or company,
and which could be let in a separate contract, be advertised
for separate from the rest of the building and let in a
separate contracU"
Whether or not this should be done involves the determination of questions of fact, in respect of which I can not express
an opinion. I am of the opinion, however, that this could be
done, and that such course would be legal.
V. The seventh question is as follows:
"Is it permissible to defer the selection of the particular
kind of granite to be used until after the bids are opened
and then select it by the samples presented by the bidders,
or must the board, with the approval of the Secretary of War,
determine in advance the particular kind of granite to 'b e
used; or that it would accept any one of a number of kinds
to be named in the advertisement; or that it would accept
any granite having color<>!'-' colors; and other qualities named
or described or otherwise designated in the advertisementf"
This also is a · mixed question of fact and law. If such
procedure would be of any advantage to some bidders over
others, it would not be lawful. It occurs to me that the safe
way would be to designate certain fixed standards of granite
and let each bidder bid upon these separate kinds, with the
right to the board to make selection.
I wish to call your attention to what seems to me to be an
erroneous opinion on your part.
On page 6 of your communication is the following:
That the granite "is to be of the best quality of pink Milford, or other light-colored granUe equally satisfactory to the
architeots and the bo~rd of trustees/' and that the m qrb1~·
0
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should '' be from either the Tuckahoe, Vermont, Lee, or Beaver
Dam quarries, or other white marble equally satisfactory to
the architect and the board of trustees,':
You proceed upon the assumption that this language gives
to the Government the right to select any other light-colored
granite, or any white marble other than those specified,
equally satisfactory to the archjtect and board of trustees.
In my opinion, you would have a right to demand pink Milford granite or marble of the kinds designated, and if others
than these should be tendered by'the contractor as a substitute you could accept them; but I do not think you would
have the right to demand any light-colored granite or any
white marble other than those named.
I return herewith the papers sent with your letter.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.

PARDON.
Inasmuch a.s in some of the States a person convicted of an offense
which the laws of the United States call a misdemeanor loses his
right to vote, sit as juror, etc., if the action of the President on an
application for a pardon depends simply on the question of necessity
for pardon, such necessity exists, unless the applicant is to be prevented from freely changing his residence under penalty of losing his
rights of citizenship thereby.

DEP.A.RTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 31, 1895.
IR: I have investigated the question of the nece sity of
a pardon in the ca e of Jacob Warren which you referred to
me ye terday in connection with a letter from Judge Sage,
of the nited State court for the outbern district of Ohio,
and beg to report a follow :
It i probably true that, owing to the language of the
n titution and law of Ohio, Jacob Warren would not lose
hi ri ·ht to vote, it a juror, etc., by reason of his conviction fi ran offi n e whi h the law of the United tates call
nor. n ome other States, however, such loss
uld r ult.
have not examined them all, but
OF
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this is true of Alabama, California, and Connecticut. If the
case, therefore, be one in. which your action on the application for pardon depends simply on the question of necessity
for pardon, I should say that the necessity exists, unless
Warren is to be prevented from freely changing his residence
under penalty of losing his rights of citizenship thereby.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The PRESIDENT.
DUTIES.
Dutiable articles purchased by the United States from the importers
while in bond remain dutiable, and the duties must be paid before
deliver y .
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 2, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of October 25, asking an official opinion with relation to
a recent purchase made by the Supervising Surgeon-General
of the Marine-Hospital Service, who is an officer of your
Department. It appears that he purchased certain goods
for the use of that Service, after advertisement for proposals,
and that the proposals specified that the price named was for
the article "in bond." He now asks you to authorize the
collector of customs to allow these goods to be delivered to
him free of duty. They are goods which under ordinary
circumstances would be dutiable. You ask whether you
can lawfully give the authorization requested.
The free list in the tariff act of July 14, 1870, chapter 255,
contained the following paragraph:
'' Articles imported for the use of the United States: Provided, That the price of the same did not include the duty."
This provision remained in force until the tariff act of
October 1, 1890, when it was entirely omitted. It was
restored by the tariff act of August 27, 18.94, chapter 349,
but with a material change of form. It now appears in the
free list as paragraph 385, as follows: "Articles imported
by the United States."
·
The answer to your question depends upon this clause,
because the articles in question are not included among
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those enumerated in the only other clause in the free list of
the present act relating to things for Government use, viz,
paragraph 412:
"Books, engravings, photographs, etchings, bound or
unbound, maps and charts, imported by the authority or for
the use of the United States or for the use of the Library of
Congress."
This was also in the act
1890, paragraph 5~4, and that
of June 6, 1872, chapter 315. My opinion is that the present
clause in the free list applies only to articles· which are purchased by the Government in foreign markets and imported
for its own use. You therefore can not lawfully give the
desired authorization. This seems to dispose of the case
before you and to avoid the necessity of considering the
other que~tions in your letter.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

of

PUBLIC WORKS-CONTRACTS.
After an appropriation is exhausted, a contract not for the completion
of any specific work, as the erection of a building, the construction of
a road, or rendering a channel adequate for the passage of vessels of
a certain draft, is at an end. Work done after the appropriation is
exhausted would not come within such a contract. Executive officers
a.re prohibited by sections 3679, 3732, 3733, and 5503, Revised Statutes,
from continuing the employment of the contractors. If further
appropriations are made, there must be a new contract for their
expenditure .

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
November 4, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of October 14, with its inclosures, referring
to the contract of October 10, 1892, between Maj. A. N.
Damrell, Corps of Engineer , United States Army, of the
fir t part, and .1: c tional Dredging Company of the second
I art and
u ubmit for my pinion the foJlowing question :
1. D
h w 1k whi h the ational Dredging Company
r po
d com
ithin their contract,
If the work i wi bin th contract, can the Secretary
th am a required by the contr~ct
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without waiting for further appropriation to be made by
Congress i"
It ~ppears from your letter that"The National Dredging Company has notified the Secretary of War that it elects to carry on the work of dredging
in the Mobile Harbor, at Mobile, .A.la., under its contract
hereinafter referred to, without waiting for an appropriation
to be made by Congress to pay for the same, and respectfully
asks the Secretary to supervise the same."
It appears from the contract" That the party of the second part shall excavate, remove,
and deposit, in accordance with specifications hereunto
attached, 17,000,000 cubic yards, more or less, of material
from Choctaw Pass (commencing at the intersection of the
channel by a line parallel to Maryland street, halfway be_
tween Texas and Maryland streets) and the channel below
down to the 23-foot curve in the bay.
'' That the party of the fi_rst part shall pay to the party of
the second part for such excavating, removing, and depositing the sum of 7.7 cents per cubic yard."
The legislation by Congress on the subject of this improvement is as follows:
.A.ct of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat., 152, chap. 264): "For the
improvement of Mobile Harbor, $10,000, to be applied to
making tests, surveys, and borings to determine whether the
ship channel now leading from the lower anchorage in Mobile
Bay can be deepened so as to admit vessels drawing 22 feet,
or any less draft above 13 feet, to the wharves at the city of
Mobile."
.A.ct of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 370): "For improving
Mobile Harbor, to secure a 17-foot channel, one hundred
thousand dollars."
Act of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 181): '' Improving harbor
at Mobile, .Alabama: Continuing improvement, one hundred
and twenty-five thousand dollars."
.A.ct of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., 470): "Improving harbor
at Mobile, Alabama, one hundred thousand dollars."
Act of August 2, 1882 (22 Stat., 194): "Improving harbor
and river of Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement, one
hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars."

246

HON. HOLMES CONRAD.
Public Works-Contracts.

Act of July 5·, 1884 (23 Stat., 135) : '' Improving harbor
and river at Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement,
two hundred thousand dollars."
Act of August 5, 1886 (24 Stat., 314): "Improving harbor
at Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement, ninety thousand dollars."
Act of August 11, 1888 (25 Stat., 404): "Improving
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Oontinuing improvement on
enlarged project for securing a channel twenty-three feet
deep and two hundred and eighty feet wide, two hundred and
:fifty thousand dollars."
Act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 431): "Improving
harbor at Mobile, Alabama, up to the mouth of Chickasabogue Creek. Continuing improvement, three hundred and
:fifty thousand dollars."
Act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat., 92): "Improving harbor at
Mobile, Alabama. Continuing improvement, two hundred
and twelve thousand five hundred dollars. Provided, That
contracts may be
entered into by tlie Secretary of War for
I
such materials and work as may be necessary to complete
the present project of improvement, to be paid for as appropriations may from time to time be made by law; not to
exceed in the aggregate one million one hundred and eightyone thousand three hundred dollars, exclusive of the amount
herein and heretofore appropriated."
Act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 603) : "For improving
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Continuing improvement, :five
hundred thousand dollars."
Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 342): "Harbor at Mobile,
Alabama. The Secretary of War shall cause a survey to
be made to ascertain the cost of widening the channel
of said harbor now in course of improvement, to obtain ' a
width of one hundred feet at the bottom, with a proper slope
therefor, and also a survey to ascertain the best point for and
the co t of a u:fficient channel between Mobile Bay and the
Mi i ippi Sound for the proper accommodation of comm r · and the xpen e of said two urveys shall be paid
out of any ar propriation made for the improvement of the
ch nn 1 f Mobile Harbor.
he
r tar f War i authorized, at hi di cretion, to
u e n t exc eding ten thousand dolJars of the amount appro-
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priated for the improvement of Mobile Harbor in keeping
the channel clear of timber, logs, and other obstructions."
Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 404): '' For improving
harbor at Mobile, .A.labama. Continuing improvement, three
hundred and ninety thousand dollars."
.Act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 947): "For improving
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Completing improvement, two
hundred and ninety-one thousand three hundred dollars."
It will be observed from this course of legislation that the
first appropriation of June 18, 1878, was to ascertain whether
the improvement then proposed was practicable and that
the appropriations from that date to August 11, 1888, were
for the_purpose of constructing the improvement as then
projected.
The appropriation of August 11, 1888, was for "continuing
improvement on enlarged project for securing a channel 23
feet deep and 80 feet wide."
On J nly 13, 1892, there was appropriated the sum of
$212,500, with the proviso :
"That contracts may be entered into by the Secretary
of War for such materials and work as may be necessary to
complete the present project of improvement, to be paid for
as appropriations may from time to time be made by law; not
to exceed in the aggregate one million one hundred and
eighty-one thousand three hundred dollars, exclusive of the
amount herein and heretofore appropriated."
The amounts thereafter appropriated were as follows:
March 3, 1893 _... ___ . _.............•...•..••. ...•••..•.• _. __ $500, 000
August 18, 1894 .. ............•••............•••.....•.. _.. _.
390, 000
March 2, 1895 - - - . _. ...............••••...•.••••..••• ___ .. _. .
291, 300
Making in the aggregate. _...•..•• _...• _•.... ___ . _. __ . 1, 181, 300

which was the limit prescribed by the act of July 13, 1892.
By section 3679, Revised Statutes, it is provided: " No
Department of the Government shall expend in any one fiscal
year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress
for the fiscal year; or involve the Government for the future
payment of money in excess of such appropriations."
·
By section 3732, Revised Statutes: "No contract or purchase on behalf of the Unite~ States shall be made unless
the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation
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adequate to its fulfillment, except in the War and Navy
Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the
necessities of the current year."
By section 3733, Revised Statutes: ~, No contract shall be
entered into for the erection, repair, or furnishing of any
public building, or for any public improvement which binds
the Government to pay a larger sum of money than the
amount in the Treasury appropriated for the specific purpose."
Section5503: "Every officer of the Government who knowingly contracts, for the erection, repair, or furnishing of any
public building, or for any public improvement, to pay a
larger amount than the specific sum appropriated for such
purpose shall be punished by imprisonment not less than
six months, nor more than two years, and shall pay a fine of
two thousand dollars."
The object of these provisions of the statute was, it is
manifest, to prevent executive officers from involving the
Government in expenditures or liabilities beyond those contemplated and authorized by the lawmaking power.
In Shipman v. United States (18 C. Cls. R., 146) that court
said:
"The liability in this case rests wholly upon the appropriation, and is different from those cases which frequently
ari e wherein Congress passes an act authorizing officers to
construct a building or do other specified work, without
restriction as to cost, and then makes an appropriation inad
equate to do the whole of it or makes none at an.
"In such cases the authority to cause the work to be done
and to make contracts therefor is complete and unrestricted.
All work, therefore, done under the direction of the officers
thu charged with thee ecution of the law creates a liability
on the part of the Government to pay for it, and if a written
contract be made and work be done in exce of the contract
pecification , or entirely outside of or in addition to the
writt n contract, and uch work inures to the benefit of the
nit d tat in th e ecution of the law, or is accepted by
h pr 1 r publi officer a promi e to pay its rea onable
alue i implied and nforced.
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".Authority to contract for the completion of an entire
structure, the pla.n of which has been determined on, can not
be inferred from the mere fact that an appropriation of a
certain sum to be expended on the structure has been made.
Hence, a contract, though it might be good to the extent of
such appropriation, could not be made to affix itself to future
appropriations and control their expenditure. A contract of
this character would be in violation of the spirit of section
3733, Revised Statutes, if not of its express terms." (15
Opin . .Att'ys-Gen., 236.)
"After an appropriation is exhausted the contract is at an
end. If further appropriations are made there must be a
new contract for their expenditure." (9 Opin., 18.)
It is plain that the contract here is not for the completion
of any specific work, as the erection of a building, the construction of a road, or rendering a channel adequate for the
passage of vessels of a certain draft.
It is, by its very terms, for the excavation, removal, and
deposit, in accordance with certain specifications, of 17,000,000
cubic yards, more or less, of material, within certain prescribed limits.
The result anticipated by the engineer officers from such
removal may wholly fail. The removal of the mass may
prove to be a total loss to the Government; and yet the contractor, not having contracted to produce any certain results
by such removal, would be entitled to the full consideration
contracted for.
Indeed, it appears from the letter of October 8, 1895, from
the Acting Chief of Engineers, accompanying your communication, that to carry out fully the object for which the
aggregate appropriations of $1,181,300 were made, it was
found necessary to contract with another dredging company,
to wit, the Rittenhouse-Moore Dredging Company, to excavate, remove, and deposit material from another section of
the channel in Mobile Harbor; and that officer quotes from
the official report of Maj. A. N. Damrell, of the Corps of
Engineers, as follows :
''lt is, however, estimated that the amount of work in the
bay (Choctaw Pass) would be about 17,000,000 yards; and
that amount was placed in the wording of the contract, and
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the words 'more or less' were added to cover this uncertainty. Since then it has been found that the amount necessary to complete the bay part of the project is about
16,000,000 yards."
I think, then, the true construction of the contract as to
·the work to be performed by the contractors is that they
were to excavate from Choctaw Pass, within the limits defined
in the contract, material, 17,000,000 cubic yards, more or less.
The contract was made October 10, 1892, and evidently on
the basis and in full view of the act of July 13, 1892, which
prescribed $1,181,300 as the limit of the amount to be
expended on the entire project.
It appears from your letter and the accompanying papers
that the amount has now been appropriated and expended.
I am of opinion on the whole case, as presented, that
the contract of 10th of October, 1892, has been fully performed, and that you are without authority to continue the
employment of these contractors on the work under that
contract. That the work which they propose to do does not
'' come within their contract." That you can not, through the
engineer officers of the Army, continue any supervision of
the work of which the National Dredging Company may
hereafter perform; or extend to that company any recognition as a continuing contractor with the Government without exposing the Government to the liability of an implied
contract.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting ..Attorney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.
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DUTIES.
Prior to the custon;is administration act duties collected by mistake of
law could not be returned after one year from the time of entry in
the absence of a protest by the importer under Revised Statutes, section 2931.
Opinion of September 21, 1895 (21 Opin., 224), reaffirmed that duties paid
by mistake can now be refunded only (1) when duties provisionally
paid are reduced upon the final liquidation; (2) for mere clerical error;
(3) for mutual mistake of fact.
DEP .A.RT~NT OF JUSTICE,

November 8, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of October 31, asking my official opinion as to whether the
decision ·of the United States district court for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania in the suit .of the United States v.
Alfred Earnshaw requires or authorizes you to refund to said
Earnshaw certain moneys claimed by him as customs duties
unlawfully exacted. If I understand the facts aright, certain goods were imported by Earnshaw in 1881, and the
duties thereon, as provisionally estimated by the collector,
were paid by him and the goods received. Supsequently
the collector liquidated the entry by raising the amount of
duties on the goods, thus leaving a balance due the United
States, for which an action was brought. Upon the trial of
this action a special verdict was rendered, upon which the
court directed judgment for the defendant, holding the collector's liquidation to be erroneous. The United States
acquiesced in this decision. Hence, I assume, for present
purposes, the duty properly payable by Earnshaw was less
than the amount actually paid by him to the collector, and
therefore, had he taken proper steps to protect his rights,
he could have sued the collector for a balance of $291.60,
and recovered this amount for him in an action at law, or he
could properly have applied to your Department for a refund.
He, however, failed to prote_s t against the collector's decision as required by section 2931 of the Revised Statutes, and
for this reason the collector's decision was "final and conclusive" against him. The decision of the court was, therefore, clearly erroneous. ( Westray v. United States, 18 Wall.,
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322; Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S., 542.) Whatever dispensing power the Secretary of the Treasury may have had
und.er section 3013 of t.be Revised Statutes expired after the
lapse of one year from the time of entry under section 21 of
the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapt~r 391. Nor has
your power in the premises been increased by subsequent
legislation. Your power to refund in the absence of a proper
protest has recently been the subject of careful consideration
by .Acting .Attorney-General Conrad in an opinion rendered
to you September 21, 1895, and he shows that the cases in
which you can thus refund are the foll9wing only: First, when
duties provisionally paid are reduced upon the final liquidation; second, for mere clerical error; third, for mutual mistake of fact. You have· now no right to refund, in the
absence of proper protest, either for mistake of ·1aw or for
any mistake of fact which is not mutual. Your statutory
powers were not enlarged by acquiescence in the erroneous
decision aforesaid, nor was your power to refund involved
at all in that decision.
For these reasons you were advised by the then .Acting
Attorney-General, on .August 7 last, that the decision in Mr.
Earnshaw's case" does not carry with it the obligation of
your Department to repay to him any part of the amounts
paid or deposited by him at the time of entry of his goods,
he having failed to protest at the time." You now inform
me that the custom-house brokers representing Mr. Earnshaw have addressed you, arguing against the correctness of
that decision, and that you thereafter referred the matter to
the Solicitor of the Treasury, who expressed the opinion that
the points raised by the brokers were well taken. You therefore return me the papers and ask me to review the opinion
of the cting .Attorney-General. I have done o, and believe
it to be correct, and therefore advise you that you have no
pow r to make the refund desired.
Th opinion of the olicit.or of the Treasury appears to be
ba ed upon the :fir t clan of the act of March 3, 1875,
hapt r G, e ·tion 1. That clau e appears to be restrictive
and 11
nabling, o that whatev r power tor fund belong
to th
er tary of the Tr a ury must be found elsewhere.
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But however this may be, that clause can not affect the
present question, because the Solicitor is mistaken in presuming that the .Attorney-General decided that no writ of
error would be taken by the United States in the action of
United States v. Earnshaw. The case appears never to have
been reported to the .Attorney-General. The district attorney's acquiescence in the decision was upon the advice of
the then Secretary of the Treasury.
Very respectfully,
JDDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-WORLD'S FAIR-MED.A.LS.
So much of section 3 o( the act of .A.ugust 5, 1892, as provides for the
duplication of medals at the mints of the United States was repealed
by the act of March 3, 1893.
The express object of a later act being to amend an earlier act, a feature
of the earlier act which was omitted from the later act was necessarily repealed.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 11, 1895.
SIR: Your letter of November 4 submits for my opinion
the question whether section 3 of the act of Congress
approved .August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 389), which provides" That fifty thousand bronze medals and the necessary
dies therefor, with appropriate devices, emblems, and inscriptions commemorative of said Exposition celebrating the four
hundredth anniversary of the discovery of .America by Christopher Columbus, shall be prepared under the direction of
the Secretary of the Treasury, * * * and authority may
be granted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the holder of a
medal properly awarded to him to have duplicates thereof
made at any of the mints of the United States from gold, or
silver, or bronze at the expense of the person desiring the same,"
is repealed by act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 587).
The act of March 3, 1893, is in express terms an amendment of the corresponding section 3 of the act of ,August 5,
1892; and these two sections are manifestly identical, except
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as to the provision in the act of .August 5, 1892, authorizing
the holder of a medal to have duplicates thereof made at his
own expense at any of the mints of the United States from
gold, silver, or bronze, which is omitted from the act of
March 3, 1893.
In Tracy v. Tujfiy (134 U. S., 223), the court said:
"And while it is true that repeals by implication are not
favored by the courts, it is settled that without express
words of repeal a previous · statute will be held to be modified by a subsequent one, if the latter was plainly intended
to cover the whole subject embraced by both and to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject that are to
govern."
Here the express object of the statute of 1893 is to amend
a specific section of the act of 1892. A comparison of the
section in the two acts shows very plainly wherein the
earlier act was amended by the later. It would be an excess
of refinement to enter upon an argument to show that the ·
feature of the earlier act, which was omitted from the later
act, was necessarily repealed.
"Where two acts are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, without any repealing clause, operates to
the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the :first." (District Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U. S., 18.)
I am, therefore, of the opinion that so much of s.ection 3
of the act of Congress approved .August 5, 1892, as provides for the duplication of medals at the mints of the United
States in gold, silver, or bronze was repealed by the act of
March 3, 1893.
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
pproved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The

E RETAR
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CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKERS-DRAWBACKS-:--ATTORNEYGENERAL.
The word "broker" has now no definite legal signification.
The term "custom-house broker" in section 23 of the tariff act of 1894:
includes persons dealing in drawback matters exclusively. Such a
broker, when his license has been revoked, can not thereafter deal
directly with the customs officiaJs, except when acting for themselves
as principals.
Dr awback moneys are duties repaid to the importer or the person to whom
he has transferred his rights.
The existence of a usage is a question of fact, of which the AttorneyGeneral can not take notice unless officially informed.
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion upon the construction of customs regulations which may be modified at any time by the
Secretary of the Treasµry.
In construing the main provisions of a statute too great weight should
not be put upon exceptions and provisos which may have been inserted
from e; cess of caution.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 14_, 1895.
Sm: Your communication of October 18, asking my official
opinion upon the question raised by Messrs. Des Brisay and
Allen, has received very careful consideration, counsel have
been heard on behalf of the parties interested, and inquiry
has been made as far as possible into the custom-house practice in this and analogous cases. For these reasons the
answer to your inquiry has been delayed.
The question arises upon the construction of sections 22
and 23 of th~ tariff act of August 27, 1894. Section 22 relates
to drawbacks allowable upon ·exportation of articles made
wholly or in part from imported materials. The section provides for the identification of the imported materials antl
completed articles and the ascertainment of the facts necessary to enable the duties which have been paid thereon to be
estimated. It then proceeds as follows:
"The drawback due thereon shall be paid to the manufacturer, producer, or exporter, to the agent of either, or to the
person to whom such manufacturer, producer, exporter, or
agent shall in writing order such drawback paid, under such
regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe."
3513-V0L 21, PT 2--4
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Section 23 of the act is as follows:
"That the collector or chief officer of the customs at any
port of entry or delivery shall issue a license to any reputable and competent person desiring to transact business as a
custom-house broker. Such license shall be granted for a
period of one year, and may be revoked for cause at any
time by the Secretary of the Treasury. From and after the
first day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, no
person shall transact business as a custom-house broker without a license granted in accordance with this provision; but
this act shall not be so construed as to prohibit any importer
from transacting business at a custo1:11-house pertaining to
his own importations."
Messrs. Des Brisay and Allen w~re licensed custom-house
brokers, but on account of certain alleged irregularities practiced by them, renewal of their license was refused. Although
they are thus forbidden to do business as custom-house
brokers, they nevertheless claim the right to receive payment
of drawback as" agents" under section 22. Your inquiry is,
whether a person in their position "can legally transact business at the custom-house as agent for other persons."
The first point to be settled is the definition of the phrase
"custom-house broker" in section 23. This phrase has not
as yet been legally defined. Its proper legal definition must
therefore now be found. Counsel for the disbarred firm claim
that it has acquired by usage a settled technical definition,
and that this definition does not include persons dealing with
the custom-house in relation to claims for drawback, nor does
it include persons who do business in their own names.
Evidence of this kind I can not consider. Nothing is better
settled than that the existence of a usage affecting the legal
definition of a statutory term is a question of fact, not of
pon the trial of an action at law it would be left to
law.
the jury. Being a que tion of fact, I can not pass upon it.
(21 Opin., 1 0.) A you give me no official information of
any uch cu tom I as ume that there i none, and that the
que ti n must be ettled by applying the legal principles of
n tru tion the language of the act of 1894.
l hou h the late t dition of the standard dictionarie
nt in definition of the phra e "custom-house broker' I
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do not think that these definitions are sufficiently well settled or definite in their limitations to dispose of the present
question.
Nor is the word "broker" used with sufficient precision
for this purpose. According to the Century Dictionary, it
includes anyone" who attends to the doing of something for
another." Webster's first definition is '' one who transacts
business for another; an agent." Originally the term had a
much more definite meaning than at present. It was confined to persons negotiating sales who bad no possession
of the goods sold and who did not act in their own name.
These limitations are not now recognized. It is only necessary to refer to the familiar cases of stock brokers, real-estate
brokers, and insurance brokers.
From the necessities of business at large centers transactions between private parties and custom-house officials
must mainly be done through agents. These agents, when
devoting themselves wholly or mainly to that branch of work,
are generally known as custom-house brokers. The main
work of the customs officials is, of course, to collect moneys
due the Government by way of impost duties. A considerable incident to their work, however, . is the repayment of
moneys which have thus been paid in. Such moneys may
happen to be repaid because of mistakes in the original estimate, or by way of drawback. All of this business is done
at the custom-house. All of it may be negotiated by customhouse brokers. Whether the middleman's negotiation concerns the amount of duties to be paid by the importer, or the
amount to be repaid either to him or to the assignee of his
rights, the negotiation relates to custom-house work, and is
in the nature of a broker's business. Drawback moneys are ,
duties. They are a repayment to the importer, or the person
to whom he has transferred his rights, of a part of the duties
which have been paid by him upon receiving his goods,
(Rev. Stat., secs. 3015, 3038, 3040, 3041; tariff act of 1894.
sec. 22.)
Hence, in my opinion, the term "custom-house broker"
includes persons who deal in drawback matters exclusively
as well as those who (like Des Brisay and Allen) combine all
branches of custom-house work. The phrase, therefore,
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includes some of the persons mentioned in the :final clause
of section 22, which section governs. Are, then, the class of
agents referred to in section 22 excepted from the necessity
of obtaining official recognition of their reputability and
competence, or are they subject to the same regulations as
other agents who do business at the custom-house¥ I think
that the object of Congress in adopting section 23 was to
protect the whole custom-house, the drawback department
included, from the risks and annoyances of dealing with
improper persons. It is, therefore, my opinion that section
22 is to be construed as subject to an implied proviso, that
persons actually transacting business with the Government,
when acting as brokers for others and not as principals
themselves, must be persons officially recognized by the
chief officer of the customs as reputable and competent.
It will be noticed that every agent referred to in section
22 need not necessarily be a licensed custom-house broker.
Authority to collect drawback may, for instance, be delegated
by an inland manufacturer to his general selling agent in
New York, or to some attorney at law; but the person so
authorized must conduct his business at the custom-house
through some licensed broker, unless he prefers to obtain,
himself, for the occasion, a license, which, if he is a reputable
and competent person, the collector is obliged by the law to
give him. It has been suggested, indeed, that it would be
unreasonable to require a license for a single transaction.
This formality, however, need not be made oppressive; while,
on the other hand, to admit such exceptions to the general
language of section ~3 might give rise to abuses. An attorney at law admitted to practice in the courts of one State
occasionally wishes to argue in another. If he have but a
single case, however, he must obtain special leave of the
court to appear. I think that Congress intended, for the
pro ection of importer , exporters, and manufacturers, and
of the Government itself, to subject the business of customhou e broking to re tri tion somewhat similar to tho e which
court have impo ed upon practice at the bar.
I ha 110t overlooked th la t clau e of section 2 , which
I rovid that it hall not b o onstru d a to prohibit any
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importer from transacting business at a custom-house pertaining to his own importations." It is argued that this clause
shows the whole section to be intended to apply only to
importations and not to exportations. Care must always be
had not to put too great weight upon such exceptions and
provisos. They are apt to be thrown in upon a Congressional
debate or in committee without full appreciation of the scope
of the section under consideration, but in order to protect
some particular class of persons from any possibility of
embarrassment. This clause is entirely unnecessary, for an
importer transacting business pertaining to his own importations is not acting- as an agent and therefore not acting as a
broker. I do not think that the insertion of this unnecessary
exception in the statute indicates an intent to exclude drawbacks from its scope.
Hence, it is my opinion that Des Brisay and Allen may
collect, through the medium of licensed custom-house brokers, any moneys due them as agents for others; that they
may have complete access to the custom-house whenever
they are acting for themselves as principals; but that they
can not deal directly with the customs officials in any other
case.
You ask me a further question which seems to involve the
construction or application of one of the Customs Regulations
of 1892. These are regulations formulated by your predecessor, and which you have the power to modify at anytime.
For these reasons their construction is not a proper subject
of an opinion by the Attorney-General. (18 Opin., 521; 20
Opin., 649, 652.) Probably the principles hereinabove laid
down will enable you to solve this question without further
assistance from me.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY

OF THE

TREASURY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-TRADE-MARKS.
Whether one trade-mark simulates another is a question of fact upon
which the Attorney-General can not give an official opinion.
A foreigner who has simulated the trade-mark of a domestic manufacturer can not obtain the right to import his goods into this country
merely by recording his fraudulent trade-mark under section 6 of the
tariff act of 1894 before the latter has taken the steps necessary to
protect himself. ·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 23, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of November 20, asking an official opinion with relation
to the construction of section 6 of the act of August 27, 1894,
which provides" That no article of imported merchandise which shall
copy or simulate the name or trade-mark of any domestic
manufacture or manufacturer shall be admitted to entry at
any custom-house of the United States."
The section further provides for registry, on books in
your Department, by '' any domestic manufacturer who has
adopted trade-marks," to aid in carrying out the purposes of
the statute.
It appears from your letter that the agents of a foreign
manufacturer have registered an alleged trade-mark which
is claimed to be a simulation of the trade--mark of a domestic
manufacturer. Three days later the domestic manufacturer
registered his own trade-mark.
You ask me whether one of these is a simulation of the
other. This presents a question of fact which I am not
authorized to answer. (20 Opin., 698; 21 Opin., 135; Erhardt
v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S., 177.)
An wering your second que tion, I advise you that the fact
that the foreign trade-mark was the one first filed in your
Department has no bearing upon the question. A foreigner
can not obtain the right to send fraudulently marked goods
into the country merely by recording his fraudulent mark in
your Department before the domestic manufacturer, who e
go d are to be imulat d, has taken the teps necessary to
pr t ct them.
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Your third question does not seem to be one presently
arising in the administration of your Department.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
Draftsmen temporarily employed by the Secretary of the Treasury under
the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189, may be appointed without certification from the Civil Service Commission.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
November 25, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of November 20, asking an official opinion whether you have
the authority to make appointments, without certification
from the Civil Service Commission, of the persons to be
employed by you under the following provision of the sun<lry civil appropriation act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28
Stat., 911 ), relating to the proposed new Government building at Chicago:
"The sum of thirty thousand dollars is hereby authorized
to be expended by the Secretary of the Treasury to employ
temporarily draftsmen and skilled service, which may be necessary in the preparation of plans and specifications for the
said building, this sum to be exclusive of any moneys that
he may be authorized to expend for the services of engineers,
draftsmen, and other persons employed in the preparation of
plans and specifications for any other public buildings."
Your authority to appoint persons employed is not conditioned upon certification of eligibles by the Civil Service
Commission except in the cases provided for by the rules
which the President has made under the act of January 16,
1883, chapter 27. It is my opinion that these rules do not
apply to appointments under the statute above cited.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF 'I.'HE TREASURY.
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BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS.
The Board of General Appraisers has jurisdiction to decide whether
cartage charges made by a collector of customs are proper.
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

November 26, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of November 21, asking an official opinion as to the protest of R. Helwig with regard to cartage charges. It appears
that certain goods imported by Mr. Helwig were carted to a
warehouse, under the provisions of section 2926 of the Revised Statutes, on account of defective entry. The carting
was done by draymen duly hired according to the provisions
of the antirnoiety act of June 22, 187 4, section 25. The collector has paid the draymen at the regular contract rate, yet
the importer protests, claiming it to be an overcharge. You
ask whether this is a case of which the Board of General
Appraisers have jurisdiction under section 14 of the customs
administrative act of June 10, 1890.
This is a case which under the former practice would have
been a proper subject for an action against the collector under
Revised Statutes, section 3011. For an example of such
action see Kennedy v. Magone (158 U. S., 212). That action
has been abolished, and I think that section 14 of the customs administrative act provides a substitute therefor which
is applicable in the present instance, for it gives to the Board
of General Appraisers jurisdiction to review the collector's
decisions not only as to the "duties chargeable upon imported
m rchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges," but
al o ''a to all fees and exactions ofwhatevercbaracter(except
dutie on tonnage)." Your questiou is therefore answered in
the affirmative.
bile holding that the Board of General Appraisers have
juri diction, I do not xpre au opinion a to whether or not
th
oard ould be bound by the rates :fixed in the contract
i h h draymen.
ery r p ctfully
JUDO HARMO .
Th
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WITNESS FEES.
A Department clerk when subprenaed to testify on behalf of the United
States has no right to witness fees, but his expenses are allowable.
When subpcenaed by a private party he may demand and accept
witness fees.
DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Noi•ember 26, 1895.
SIR: Answering your communication of November 22, with
relation to the case of Mr. Stewart, I have the honor to say
that in my opinion he has no right to witness fees when subpamaed in behalf of the Government. (Rev. Stat., sec. 850.)
In that case his necessary expenses, including the exp,mse
incident to the production of records for the court when he
is served with a subpama duces tecum, are allowable. When
subpamaed on behalf of a private party I am not aware of
any rule of law which would prevent his demanding and
accepting witness fees. If the ~egal fees should not be suffi- cient to pay him for the expenses incident to producing the
records before the court, I presume that the persons at whose
expense he is subpamaed would willingly pay the difference
if you should call upon them to do so.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OP THE TREASURY.

Same as above.

WITNESS FEES.
DEP.A.R'.L'MENT OF JUSTICE,

November 26, 1895.
SIR: Answering your communication of November 22, with
relation to the case of Mr. Stewart. I have the honor to say
that in my opinion he has no right to witness fees when subpcenaed in behalf of the Government. (Rev. Stat., sec. 850.)
In that case his necessary expenses, including the expense
incident to the production of records for the court when he
is served with a subpcena duces tecum, are allowable. When
subpcenaed on behalf of a private party I am not aware of
any rule of law which would prevent his demanding and
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accepting witness fees. If the legal fees should not be sufficient to pay him for the expenses incident to producing
the records before the court, I presume that the persons at
whose expense he is subpamaed would willingly pay the difference if you should call upon them to do so.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The S:E;CRETARY OF WAR.

COMPROMISE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to compromise or release a
judgment in favor of the United States from which there is no appeal
and of whose collectibility in full there is no doubt.
A claim once fully considered and held unlawful by one AttorneyGeneral can not, with proprjety, be reconsidered by his successor, at
least except in some extraordinary case.
There is a clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case
and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability.

DEPARTMENT OF JVSTICE,
November 27, 1895.
Sm.: Your communication of November 25, asking my official opinio..i in the matter of the petition of the International
Cotton Press Company of New Orleans, has received my
careful attention.
The facts of this case are, in main, well known to this
Department. One Snyder, a tobacco manufacturer, was
indebted to the United States in the amount of several
thousand dollars under the internal-revenue laws, and the
claim of the United States, on or about November 20, 1879,
became a lien upon his property by virtue of sections 3186
and 3371 of the Revised Statutes. On February 5, 1881, he
sold c rtain real property to the petitioner, failing to disclose
the fact that there wa a lien thereon; and it was purchased
without knowledge of uch lien. The United States has
obt in d a de ree against the pAtitioner, under which it is
ntitled to 11 thi r al e tate in s~ti faction of its claim.
Thi,' d r e ha r ei ed the sanction of the highe t court
( nit d tat
. nyd r l 9 U. S., 210), and is not appealI . It i n t laim d th t there i an doubt of the ability
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of the United States to realize the amount due by a sale of
the property. It is claimed that the decree established a
new rule of law; but, in fact, it was merely a new application of very familiar and elementary principles.
The petitioner seeks to be relieved from this adjudged lien
on its property on the ground of hardship, because, being
protected by no recording act, it bought in ignorance of the
Government's claim. This is a hardship shared with all persons who, without sufficient inquiry, buy property subject to
claims which the law does not require to be recorded, such
as dower rights in estates. The petitioner also claims that
the full amount could have been collected from Snyder if the
Government had proceeded promptly against him individ- _
ually instead of relying (as it had a right to do) upon its lien
on his property; and that Snyder has since become insolvent,
so that, if petitioner's land were sold, it could have no
recourse against him.
Upon taking up this claim for consideration you were confronted with the question, whether it is within your power
to release, in whole or in part, a judgment recovered by the
United States, from which there is no appeal and of whose
collectibility in full there is no doubt. The petitioner claims
that you have jurisdiction under section 3469 of the Revised
Statutes, which is as follows:
"Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special
attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim
and the terms upon which the same may be compromised,
and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so
offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the
Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of
this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the
po~tal laws."
This question was referred by you to my predecessor in
office in 1894; and it was referred in connection with this
very claim of the International Cotton Press Company and
upon the same statement of facts. It was carefully considered by this Department, and an opinion rendered by
Solicitor General Maxwell, ~hich opinion was approved by
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Attorney-General Olney. Their conclusions are stated as
follows (21 Opin., 51):
"The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and
clearly recoverable, but to 'compromise,' which implies a
claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement.
'' In the case which you submit there is nothing to 'compromise,' for the right of recovery and the amount have been
:finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property
is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt."
Whatever may be the power of an executive officer to
·review the decisions of his predecessors, I think that a claim
once fully considered and held unlawful py one AttorneyGeneral can not with propriety be reconsidered by his successor, at least except in some extraordinary case. (2 Opin.,
8.) I should not feel justified in reversing the former action
of this Department unless I were ·convinced that it was
clearly erroneous.
I am, however, clearly of the opinion that the opinion
already given is correct. The construction given to the
statute accorded with that of Mr. Evarts (12 Opin., 543),
and with that of Mr. Devens and Mr. Phillips (16 Opin.,
617). If the opinion of Mr. MacVeagh (17 Opin., 213) is to
be construed as holding that a claim may be compromised
when there is no doubt of its entire and ready collectibility,
I am unable to concur with it. It appears to ignore the
clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case
and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability.
(Rev. Stat., secs. 3461, 5292.) The former power, as said by
Mr. Evarts in the opinion above cited, is strictly a :fiscal one.
The latter is in the nature of a pardoning power. ( The
Lau,ra, 114 . S., 411, 413-414.)
For the ab ve rea on I have the honor to advise you that
pinion the application of the ln,ternational Cotton
ompany hould not be granted.
ry re pectfully,
J D O H.A.RMO .
0
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-CUBAN INSURRECTION-EXECUTIVE.
International law takes no account of a mere insurrection confined within
the limits of a count,ry which has not been protracted or successful
enough to secure for those engaged in it recognition as belligerents by
their own government or by foreign governments.
The rules of international law with respect to belligerent and neutral
rights and duties do not apply to the present Cuban insurrection.
Neither our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge, and
therefore are not bound to take notice, who are and who are not loyal
subjects of Spain so long as their actions are confined to her own
territory.
A failure by the United States to pass neutrality laws would not
diminish its international obligations; so passing them does not
increase such obligations.
The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of wa,r by persons in
the United States to persons in Cuba is not a violation of international
law, however strong a suspicion there may be that they are to be used
in an insurrection against the Spanish government. Individuals in
the United States have a right to sell such articles and ship them to
whoever may choose to buy.
The goods, and sometimes the ship carrying-them, are subject to seizure
by the government within whose jurisdiction they may come, if its
domestic laws or regulations are violated, but international law imposes
no duty upon our Government with respect to such transactions.
The sale and shipment or carriage of such articles to Cuba does not become
a violation of international law merely because they are not destined to
a port thereof which is r ecognized by the Spanish Government as open
to commerce, nor because they are to be, or are, landed by stealth.
If, however, the persons supplying or carrying arms and munitions from
a place in the United States are in anywise parties to a design that
force shall be employed against the authorities of Spain, or that, either
in the United States or elsewhere before final delivery of such arms
and munitions, men with hostile purpose toward the Spanish Government shall also be t aken on board and transported in furtherance of
such purpose, the enterprise is not commercial but military, and is in
violation of international law and of the United States statutes.
The duty of the United States, when a state of war is declared or recognized by another country, is of its own motion to use diligence to discover and prevent within its borders the formation Qr departure of any
military expedition intended to carry on or take part in such war.
The Executive has no right to interfere with the judiciary in proceedings
against persons charged with being concerned in hostile expeditions
against friendly nations.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 10, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to comply with your request by letter
of 5th ultimo for a full expression of my views on the legal
propositions stated in the communication of the Spanish minister ~o you of October 19, a copy of which you inclose.
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Referring to the President's proclamation in June last,
concerning the insurrection in Cuba, to opinions expressed
by officers of this Government, to comments upon recent
decisions in cases involving charges of violations of our
neutrality laws, and to acts of which he has made complaint,
the minister states at length the positions he takes with
regard to the rules of international law by which the course
of the United States should be directed. The acts complained of were the shipping of arms and munitions of war
from ports of the United States under circumstances showing that they were destined for the use of the insurgent
forces in Cuba.
The minister says that commerce with that island can not
be carried on except through Havana and six other ports
which are open to commerce in general, and eight ports which
are partially open to commerce; that all these ports are held
by the Spanish Government with a sufficient force; that, in
order to ship arms and•munitions to the insurgents, it is not
sufficient to elude the Spanish cruisers about the island and
the garrisons at such ports, but vessels carrying such supplies
must have pilots who are advised of the movements of the
insurgents and have a system of signals with them by means
of which the cargoes are delivered to armed bodies prepared
to use force; and that, in many cases, such vessels also carry
men who are prepared to resort to force to effect the landing
of the cargoes. It is therefore evident, he says, that avessel carrying arms and munitions intended for the insurgents
can not deliver them without committing acts of force which
make the enterprise military and not commercial. Further,
lte says, such vessel "may, if cleared for au intermediate
port, or if its cargo be taken on board at one port and its
men at another, whether that port be in the United States
or another country, or if the munitions of war and arms go
1 and the men in another, be simply a part of a
ring xpedition, but it i , in my judgment, no less a
xp dition.
l, im
n the auth rity of ' mo t eminent writers on
int rn i nal 1 w, hat th dom tic law of tbi country
1 d n t
ider d by him in a kin o- for th fulfillment
f ur iu rn ti n, 1 bli ati n , ud expre e the pinion
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that when the departure of arms and munitions of which he
has furnished information is permitted, or when the persons
engaged have been arrested at the moment of embarking and
are discharged, not only is international law violat~d, but the
true spirit and meaning of the internal laws of the United
States are disregarded.
My views are as follows:
1. Int ernational law takes no account of a mere insurrection, confined within the limits of a country, which has not
been protracted or successful enough to secure for those
engaged in it recognition as belligerents by their own government or by foreign governments. (Cobbett, Leading
Cases on I nt. Law, 87; Glenn's Int. Law, sec. 75; Calvo,
Droit Int. T., 1, p. 178.)
This is said to result from the equality and dignity of
nations, which prevent other nations from taking notice of
what passes between a particular one and its own subjects
within its own limits (Abdy's Kent's Int. Law, pp. 46-47),
except in those rare cases where atrocity or barbarity provoke intervention in the interest of humanity.
'f he facts, so far as they are known, do not bring the Cuban
insur recti9n within the principle of the Prize Cases. (2
Black, 635.) No state of war is acknowledged by Spain
and, if the insurgents are in possession of any seaports, no
blockade has been declared.
It follows, therefore, that the rules of international law
with respect to belligerent and neutral rights and duties do
not apply to the present case. Neither Spain nor any other
country h as recognized the Cuban insurgents as belligerents.
They are, therefore, simply Spanish citizens with whom Spain
is dealing within her own borders, and the fact that, by common r eport, they are engaged in armed resistance to her
authority is· merely a circumstance of suspicion to be· considered in any inquiry which may be had concerning the
conduct of persons within the United States who may be
suspected of hostile intentions toward Spain. But neither
our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge,
and therefore can not be bound to take notice who are and
who are not loyal subjects of Spain, so long as their actions
ar~ confined to her own territory.
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The President's proclamation of June 12 did not change
the situation in any respect, but was simply made out of
abundant caution in view of the notorious fact that such
insurrection existed and that, judging from experience during former insurrections in Cuba, attempts to violate our
laws might be made.
While called neutrality laws, because their main purpose
is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the United States
while occupying a position of neutrality toward belligerent8,
our laws were intended also to prevent offenses against
friendly powers whether such powers should or should not be
engaged in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. But as
our failure to pass such laws would not diminish our international obligations, so passing them does not increase such
obligations.
2. The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of
war by persons in the United States to persons in Cuba is
not a violation of international law, however strong a suspicion there may be that they are to be used in an insurrect10n
against the Spanish Government. The right of individuals
in the United States to sell such articles and ship them to
whoever may choose to buy has always been maintained.
The goods, and in some cases, perhaps, the ship carrying
them, are subject to seizure by the government within whose
jurisdiction they may come, if its domestic laws or regulations are violated, but international law imposes no duty
upon our Government with respect to such transactions.
( The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, 283 (340); The Berrnuda, 3 Wall., 514; United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. Rep.,
99; The Itata, 66 Fed. Rep, 505; Hendricks v. Gonzale,'I, 67 Fed.
Rep., 351; 2 Pradier-Fodere Droit Int. Pub., sec. 469; Oobbett's Leading Oas son Int. Law, 167-171; Phillemore's Int.
Law, Vol. III, 274; Snow's
on Int. Law, 408-420; 11
Opin. Atty-Gen., 451.)
Thi principl applies the more trongly in a case like the
pre nt than in one where insurgents have been recognized
as b llig r nt . :1erchant can not follow their cargoe to
uba in rd r to di co r th character of their cu tomer ;
arrier condu ·t an inve tigation into the
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motives or designs of consignees. Such restrictions on commerce would be most onerous and have never been recognized.
The sale and shipment or carriage of such articles to Cuba
does not become a violation of international law merely
Lecause they are not destined to a port thereof which is
recognized by the Spanish Government as open to commerce,
nor because they are to be, or are, landed by stealth. If
taking arms, etc., into Cuba, or landing them at particular
times or places, be contrary to Spanish law _or regulations,
so doing would nevertheless be mete smuggling, which must
be prevented by the Spanish Government and in no wise
concerns that of the United States. The revenue and police
regulations of a country have never been recognized by international law as coming within the rules regulating the conduct of other nations. (The Steamsli-ip Florida, 4 Ben., 452;
..A.bdy's Kent Int. Law, 491; Snow's Cases on Int. Law, 497.)
3. If, however, the persons supplying or carrying arms and
munitions from a place in the United States are in any wise
parties to a design that force shall be employed against the
Spanish authorities, or that, either in the United States or
elsewhere, before final delivery of such arms and munitions,
men with hostile purposes toward the Spanish Government
shall also be taken on board and transported in furtherance
of such purposes, the enterprise is not commercial, but military, and is in violation of international law and of our own
statutes. (Rev. Stat., 5286; United States v. Rand, 17 Fed.
Rep., 142; United States v. The Mary N. Hogan, 18 Fed. Rep.,
529; United States v. 214 boxes of arms, etc., 20 Fed. Rep., 50;
The Oonserva, 38 Fed. Rep., 431; United States v. Lumsden,
1 Bond, 105.)
4. The duty of the United States, when a state of war is
declared or recognized by another country, is of its own motion to use diligence to discover and prevent, within its borders, the formation or departure of any military expedition
intended to carry on or take part in such war. (3 Whart.
Dig. Int. Law, pp. 630, 637.) It is by no means certain that
knowledge of the existence of a mere insurrection, even
when its location or alleged motives may be thought likely
to lead to violations of our laws in its behalf, imposes any
3513-TOL. 21, PT 2--5
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general duty of watchfulness, the neglect of which would be
just ground of complaint by the nation involved which does
not itself acknowledge a state of war. Actual notice, however, of hostile expeditions against a friendly nation, undertaken or threatened, creates tte duty of vigilance to prevent
them; and the fact that the _different elements intended to
constitute a hostile expedition are separately prepared or
transported does not change such duty, but merely renders
it more difficult to perforiµ. But the obligation is one of
diligence and not a guaranty against ~uch expeditions; and
what constitutes diligence must always depend on the circumstances in each case. (3 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, p. 639;
Creasy Int. Law, pp. 160-164.)
5. It can not be truly said that our laws, which have been
tested by the. experience of a century, do not fully cover and
adequately punish all violations of the duties imposed both
by international law and by treaty on all persons within the
United States. Nor can it be charged that our courts are
either unfair or inefficient. I do not understand the expressions in the minister's letter to indicate anything more than
dissatisfaction at the result of some recent prosecutions
wherein strong suspicion appeared to lack convincing proof.
It is therefore, ordinarily, due diligence to cause the arrest
and trial by our courts .of persons charged with engaging in
enterprises against the authority of Spain which our laws
forbid.
If there should be a manifest failure of justice in such a
judicial proceeding, resulting in the consummation of a hostile enterprise against Spain causing her damage capable of
proof, the question would arise .whether under the ruling
of the Geneva tribunal (III Whart. Int. Law Dig., sec. 329,
p. 193; id., sec. 238, pp. 672-673; and 11 Opin., p.117) Spain
would be concluded by the judgment. This question would
be omewhat differently presented in cases where such proceeding are commenced on the complaint of the Spanish
authorities and they are afforded and embrace the opportuni y to pre ent evidence or attend by counsel. I do not
und r tand, how ver, that I am now required to determine
thi u tion.
h ' b n held that p r on ju ly u pe ·ted of an inten-
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tion to engage in such enterprises may be required by the
courts to give bond not to do so. ( United States v. John A.
Quitman, 2 Am. Law Reg., 645.) Persons in charge of any
armed vessel may be required to give like security as a condition of clearance. (Rev. Stat., secs. 5289, 5290.)
It is certain, however, that the Executive has no right to
interfere with or control the action of the judiciary in proceedings against persons charged with being concerned in
hostile expeditions against friendly nations. The President
may employ the military and naval forces to disperse or prevent the departure from our territory of any such expeditfon, or of any men, arms, or munitions which are manifestly
parts thereof; and, being a coordinate authority, he would
not be precluded from so doing, in a proper case, by the
action of the judiciary. But it is plain that such means are
practicable only when there is open defiance of the authority
of the Government by an organized body of men.
Occasions may be imagined when the summary process of
martial law might perhaps be resorted to against the persons composing such a body. But in all such cases as those
which have come to the notice of the Government these conditions do not exist, and the judicial authority is the only
one which can be properly or efficiently invoked. (See Mr.
Bayard to the Spanish minister, 3 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, p.
625.) Our Government possesses all the attributes of sovereignty with respect to the present subject, and has for their
exercise the appropriate agencies which are recognized among
civili7,ed nations; but our Constitution forbids the arbitrary
exercise of power when the liberty or property of individual
citizens is involved. It can not therefore resort to some
measures which are still possible in some· countries. But I
do not think that it can be held chargeable with lack of
diligence for not taking steps which would be inconsistent
with the principles on which all republics are founded.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
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TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO-INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Article VII of the treaty of February 2, 1848, between Mexico and the
United States, known as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, is still in
force, so far as it affects the Rio Grande.
The taking of water for irrigation from the Rio Grande above the point
where it ceases to be entirely within the United States and becomes
the boundary between the United States and Mexico is not prohibited
by said treaty.
Article VII is limited in terms to that part ot the Rio Grande lying
below the southern boundary of New Mexico, and applies to such
works alone as either party might construct on its own side.
The only right the treaty professed to create or protect with respect to
the Rio Grande was that of navigation. Claims against the United
States by Mexico for indemnity for injuries to agriculture alone, cause<l.
by scarcity of water resulting from irrigation ditches wholly within
the United States at places far above the head of navigation, find no
support in the treaty.
The rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no
duty or obligation upon the United States of denying to its inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the Rio Grande lying entirely
within the United States, although such use results in reducing the
volume of water in the river below the point where it ceases to be
entirely within the United States.
The fact that there is not enough water in the Rio Grande for the
use of the inhabitants of both countries for irrigation purposes does
not give Mexico the right to subject the United States to the burden
of arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants the use of
a provision which nature has supplied, entirely within its own territory. The recognition of such a right is entirely inconsistent with
the sovereignty of the United States over its national domain.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 12, 1895.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 5th ultimo in which you refer to the concurrent
re olution of Congress passed .April 291 1890, providing for
negotiations with the Government of Mexico with a view to
the remedy of certain difficulties mentioned in the preamble
to u h resolution, which ari e from the taking of water for
irrigation from the Rio Grande above the point where it
es to be entirely within the United States and becomes
boundary between the nited State · and Mexico. I
al o the opy which you iuclo e of the note of the Mexannum r to your If, dat d O tober 21 1895, in which he
I neth h p ition t ken by hi
o ernmeut.
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You say: "The negotiations with which the President,
acting through the Department of State, is charged by the
foregoing resolution, can not be intelligently conducted
unless the legal rights and obligations of the two Governments concerned and the responsibility of either, if any, for
the disastrous state of things depicted in the Mexican minister's letter are first ascertained.
"I have the honor, therefore, to call your attention to the
legal propositions asserted in Mr. Romero's letter and to
inquire whether, in your judgment, those propositions correctly state the law applicable to the case-in other words:
(1) Are the provisions of article 7 of the treaty of February
2, 1848, known as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, still in
force so far as the river Rio Grande is concerned, either
because never annulled or because recognized and reaffirmed
by article 5 of the convention between the United States
and Mexico of November 12, 1884¥ (2) By the principles of
iuternational law, independent of any special treaty or convention, may Mexico rightfully claim that the obstructions
and diversions of the waters of the Rio Grande iu the Mexican mini~ter's note referred to, are violations of its rights
which should not continue for the future and on account of
which, so far a,s the past is concerned, Mexico should be
awarded adequate indemnity¥"
I reply as follows :
(1) Article VII of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, while
it was declared to have been rendered nugatory for the most
part by the first clause of Article IV of the treaty concluded
December 30, 1853, and proclaimed June 30, 1854, was, by
the second clamse thereof, reaffirmed as to the Rio Grande
(norn. Rio Brovo del Norte) below the point where, by the
lines as fixed by the latter treaty, that river became the
boundary between the two countries. Said Article VII is
recognized as still in force by Article V of the convention
concluded November 12, 1884, and proclaimed September 14,
1886.
So far, therefore, as it affects the subject now in hand,
said Article VII, in my opinion, is still in force. I am unable, howevp,r, to agree with the minister in the interpretation
which he gives it.
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His statement is that the city of El Paso del Norte has
existed for more than threA hundred years, during almost all
of which time its people have enjoyed the use of the water
of the Rio Grande for the irrigation of their lands. A.s that
city and the districts within its jurisdiction did not need
more than 20 cubic meters of water per second, which was
an almost infinitesimal portion of the volume of water even
in times of severest drought, they had sufficient water for
their crops until about ten years ago, when a great many
trenches were dug in Colorado, especially in the St. Louis Valley and in New Mexico, through which the upper Rio Grande
and its affluents flow, so greatly diminishing the water .in
the river at El Paso that, except when rains happen to be
abundant, there is scarcity of water from the middle of June .
untn March. In 1894 the river was entirely dry by June 15,
so that no crops could be raised and even fruit trees began
to .wither. The result has been to reduce the price of land
and cause great hardships to the people, whose numbers in
Paso del Norte, Zaragoza, Tres Jacales, Guadalupe, and
San Ignacio diminished from 20,000 in 1875 to one-half that
number in 1894.
The minister further states that from a report of the assistant quartermaster-general addressed to the General in Chief
of the United States Army, dated September 5, 1850, it appear. that Captain Lowe (meaning Love), U.S. A.., ascended
the river in a vessel to a point several kilometers above Paso
del Norte, showing that it was then navigable at that place.
The minister has been misinformed. The original report,
which i now before me, hows that Captain Love was
in tructed to carry '' to the highest attainable point in the
Rio Grande ' hi 'mall keel boat, which "drew, with her
er w, provi ions, arms, etc., on board, 18 inches of water."
He found thi point at ·ome "impassable falls," which he
11am d ' Brooke Fall .' Carrying around them '' the skiff
whi h had accompanied hi boat," he rowed 47 mile farther
tooth r fall , which he named "Babbitt Falls." "Beyond
thi p int he fi und it impossible to proceed with the skiff
ith r y land or at r and i wa "about 1 0 miles by
land b 1
◄ 1 Pa o.
h mini t r c n end th t the irrigation di che in Colo-
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rado and New Mexico, which result in diminishing the flow
of water at El Paso, come within the treaty prohibitions of
"any work that may impede or interrupt, in whole or in part,
the exercise of this right" (of navigation), because, as he
says, '' nothing could impede it more absolutely than works
which wholly turn aside the water of these rivers." But
Article VII is limited in terms to "the part of the Rio Brovo
del Norte lying below the southern boundary of New Mexico."
Article IV of the treaty of 1853 continues the provisions of
said Article VII in force "only so far as regards the Rio
Brovo del Norte below the initial of said boundary provided
in the first article of this treaty." It is that part alone which
is made free and common to the navigation of both countries,
and to which the various prohibitions apply. It is plain that
neither party could have had, in framing these restrictions,
any such intention as that now suggested. The fact, if such
it .were, that the parties did not think of the possibility of
such acts as those now complained of would not operate to
restrain language sufficiently broad to include them, but the
terms used in the treaty are not fairly capable of such a construction.
They naturally apply only to the part of the river with
which the parties were dealing, and to such works alone as
either party might construct on its own side if not restrained.
'fhough equally divided, in theory, between the two nations
where it is their boundary, the river is in fact a unit for
purposes of navigation, and therefore the treaty required
the consent of both for the construction of "any work that
may impede or interrupt" navigation, even though it should
be "for the purpose of favoring new methods of navigation."
(Art. VII.) Up to the head of navigation no such work
could have been constructed save by one of the two Governments or by its authority. The prohibition was, therefore,
appropriately made applicable to them alone, anrl not to the
citizens of either-" neither shall, without consent of t,he
other, construct," etc. Above the head of navigation, where
the river would be wholly within the United States, different rules would apply and private rights exist which the
Government could not control or take away save by tbe exercise of the power of eminent domain, so that clear and explicit
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language would be required to impose upon £he United States
such obligations as would result from . the construction of
the treaty now suggested.
·
Moreover, the only right the treaty professed to create or
protect with respect to the Rio Grande was that of navigation. The claim now made is for injuries to agriculture
alone at places far above the head of navigation. Captain
Love, in the report referred to, said~ "The mouth of Devils
River, which is about 100 miles below the mouth of the
Puerco (Pecos) and 617 above Ringgold Barracks, is the
head of steamboat navigation," and that ,~ with some difficulty" navigation by keel boats was possible "to a point 56
miles above the 'Grand Indian Crossing,' or about 283
miles above the mouth of Devils River." So far as appears,
the large and numerous tributaries below El Paso supply a
sufficient volume of water for the needs of navigation..
In fact, the part of the treaty now under consideration
merely expresses substantially the same rights and duties
which international law would imply from the :fixing of the
middle of the river as the boundary, viz, free navigation of
the entire stream below the point where it becomes common
to both nations without any levy or exaction or the construction of any work which might impede or interrupt navigation
without the consent of both.
In my opinion, therefore, the claim now made by Mexico
finds no support in the treaty. On the contrary, the treaty
affords an effective answer to the claim by the well-known
rule that the expression of certain rights and obligations in
an agreement implies the exclusion of all others with relation to the same subject.
It i not necessary in order to bring this principle into
play that it shall appear that either party or both actually
thought of the particular matter whose exclusion i asserted,
although that fact, when it appears, may serve to emphasize
the inferenc . I am not aclvi eel whether the subject of the
u e of th~ water of the Rio Grande for irrigation was mention d during the negotiation or not, but it is stated that
u h u had long been made by the Mexican , and it was
kn n ha agricnltur could not b carri d on in that region
'thout it. lt wa known, too-certainly to Mexico-that
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this necessity existed also throughout the entire region
watered by the upper Rio Grande and its tributaries, for, as
a province of Spain and then as an independent nation,
Mexico had included both New Mexico and Colorado, and
from the independence of Texas, in 1836, down to the treaty
of 1848 Mexico's eastern boundary was the Rio Grande to
its source. By this treaty Mexico ceded to the United States
the territory west of the Rio Grande and north of the southern boundary of New Mexico, just as she had abandoned to
Texas all the territory east of that river, without any reservations, restrictions, or stipulations concerning the river
except those above mentioned.
Settlements had long existed in the region of Santa Fe, and
the probability of the ultimate settlement of the entire territory along the Rio Grande must have been apparent to both
parties. Yet the treaty made no attempt to create or reserve
to Mexico or her citizens any rights or to impose on the United
States or their citizens any restraints with respect to the use
of water for irrigation, although rights of property in the
territory were secured to all Mexicans whether established
there or not. (A.rt. VIII.)
The treaty of 1848 was a treaty of peace; and a different
rule for the construction of such treaties is laid down by
some writers. (Vattel, Law of Nations, Ohitty's Ed., p. 433.)
If it be suggested that the circumstances under which this
treaty was made bring its terms, as against the United States,
within the operation of such rule, it is a sufficient answer that,
even if the existence of the rule be acknowledged, it simply
subjects provisions in favor of the United States to strict
construction; like all rules of construction, it has no application except in cases of doubtful meaning of language used,
and can not be made the means of introducing new terms.
Moreover, the United States paid $15,000,000 for the territory
acquired by the treaty (Art. XII), and by the treaty of 1853,
which was not a treaty of peace, Mexico ceded further territory in consideration of $10,000,000 (A.rt. III), repeating
without enlarging the stipulations of the former treaty as to
rights on the Rio Grande.
(2) I have given my opinion of the construction and effect
of the treaty because it is responsive to your general request,
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though not to your specific questions. That opinion, perhaps, in strictness, makes it unnecessary for me to consider
your second question, but as that question is not put alternatively or conditionally, I proceed.
An extended search affords no precedent or authority
which has a direct bearing.
There have been disputes about rights of navigation of
international rivers, but they have been settled by treaty. ·
(For a Ust of such treaties see Heffter Droit Int., Appendix
VIII.) The subject is fully discussed by Hall (Int. Law, sec.
39), who denies that the people on the upper part of a navigable river have a natural right to pass over it through foreign territory to its mouth. But if such right be conceded,
no aid is afforded for the present inquiry, because use for
navigation, being common, would not curtail use by the proprietary country, while in the case now presented, there not
being enough water for irrigation in both countries, the question is, which shall yield to the other.
It is stated by some authors that an obligation rests upon
every country to receive streams which naturally flow into
it from other countries, and they refer to this as a natural
international servitude. (Hefl'ter Droit Int., sec. 43; 1 Phillemore Int. Law, p. 303.) Others deny the existence of all
international servitudes, apart from agreement in some form.
(Letters of Grotius quoted, 2 Hert., p. 106; Kluber Droit des
Gens Moderne, sec. 139; Bluntschli Droit Int. Cod.; Woolsey' Int. Law, sec. 58; 1 Calvo Droit Int., sec. 556.)
Such a servitude, however, if its existence be conceded,
would not cover the present case or afford any real analogy
to it. The servient country may not obstruct the stream so
as to cause the water to back up and overflow the territories
of tbe other. The dominant country may not divert the
cour e of the stream so a~ to throw it upon the territory of
th oth r at a different place. ( ee authorities supra.) In
ither of uch cases there would be a direct invasion and
injury by one of the nation of the territory of the other. But
h nth u of ater by the inhabitant of the upper country r ult in r ducing the volume which enter the other, it
i. diminn ion of the ervitude. Th injury no complained
f i
nd indir
con equ n ·e of act which
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operate as a deprivation by prior enjoyment. So it is evident that what is really contended for is a servitude which
makes the lower country dominant and subjects the upper
country to the burden of arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature
has supplied entirely within its own territory.
Such a consequence of the doctrine of international servitude is not within the language used by any writer with
whose works I am familiar, and could not have been within
the range of his thought without finding expression.
Both the common and the civil law undertake to regulate
the use of the water of navigable streams by the different
persons entitled to it. Neither has fixed any absolute rule,
but both leave each case to be decided upon its own circumstances. But I need not enter upon a discussion of the rules
and principles of either system in this regard, because both
are municipal and, especially as they relate to real property,
can have no operation beyond national boundaries. (Creasy
Int. Law, p. 164.) So they can only settle rights of citizens
of the same country inter sese. The question must, therefore,
be determined by considerations different from those which
would apply between individual citizens of either country.
Even if such a question could arise as a private one between
citizens of one country and those of another, it is not so presented here. The mere assertion of the claim by Mexico
would make tt a national one even if it were of a private
nature. ( Gray v. United States, l C. Cls. R., 391-392.) But
the use of water complained of and the resulting injuries are
general throughout extended regions, so that effects upon
individual rights can not be traced to individual causes, and
the claim is by one nation against the other in fact as well
as form.
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, within
its own territory. Of the nature and scope of sovereignty
with respect to judicial jurisdiction, which is one of its elements, Ohief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 7 Cranch, p. 136):
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
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limitation not imposed by itself. .Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction.
".A.II exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source."
It would be entirely useless to multiply authorities. So
strongly is the principle of general and absolute sovereignty
maintained that it has even been asserted by high authority
that admitted international servitudes cease when they conflict with the necessities of the servient state. (Bluntschli,
p. 212; see criticism by Creasy, p. 258.) Whether this be true
or not, its assertion serves to emphasize the truth that selfpreservation is one of the :first laws of nations. No believer
in the doctrine of natural servitudes has ever suggested one
which would interfere with the enjoyment by a nation within
its own territory of whatever was necessary to the development of its resources or the comfort of its people .
. The immediate as well as the possible consequences of the
right asserted by Mexico show that its recognition is entirely
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States over
its national domain. .A.part from the sum demanded by way
of indemnity for the past, the claim involves not only the
arrest of further settlement and development of large 1·egions
of country, but the abandonment, in great measure at least,
of what has already been accomplished.
It is well known that the clearing and settlement of a
wooded country affects the flow of streams, making it not
only generally less, but also subjecting it to more sudden
fluctuations between greater extremes, thereby exposing inhabitants on their bank to increa e of the double danger of
drought and flood. The principle now asserted might lead
to on quence in other ca es which need only be , uggested.
It will be remembered that a large part of the territory in
ue tion
po bli domain of M xico and was ceded a uch
th
nit d tate
o that th ir proprietary a well as
b ir o r ign right are in ol etl.
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It is not suggested that the injuries complained of are or
have been in any measure due to wantonness or wastefulness
iu the use of water or to any design or intention to injure.
The water is simply insufficient to supply the needs of the
great stretch of arid country through which the river, never
large in the dry season, flows, giving inuch and receiving
little.
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances make it possible or proper to take any action from
considerations of comity is a question which does not pertain
to this Department; but that question should be decided as
one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability
or obligation upon the United States.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
REMISSION OF PENALTIES.
The Secretary of the Treasury has the power to remit penal duties
under Revised Statutes, section 5293, in the case of any invoice under
$1,000, although it may be part of an entry whose total amount is
over $1,000.
Revised Statutes, section 5292, in its relation to penal duties, was
repealed by the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391.
DEPAR'.rMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 13, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of December 10 concerning the penal duties levied upon
certain sugar imported at the port of New York. It appears
that a firm of consignees representing two different principals made an entry covering two invoices of sugar imported by the same vessel. One invoice was from the island of
Trinidad in the British possessions, the other from Paramaribo in Dutch Guiana. Upon each invoice penal duty
accrued under the provisions of section 7 of the Cl!Stomsadministrative act of June 10, 1890. Upon each the penal
duty was less than $1,000, but the duties if combined exceed $1,000. You ask me whether you are authorized to
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remit these penal duties under the provisions of section 5293
of the Revised Statutes.
It is well settled that these penal duties are penalties
which come within your general power of remission. (4
Opin., 182; 20 Opin., 660; 21 Opin. 1 90, 101.) Your power
under section 5293° is limited to cases where the amount of
the penalty does .not exceed $1,000.
You ask me to advise you whether the invoice or the entry
is to be treated as the unit. In my opinion the invoice is to
be treated as the unit. One firm of consignees often, as in
this case, has consignments coming from different principals
who have nothing in common except that they employ the
same agent at the port of importation. Section 5 of the customs-administrative act forces the agent to include all the
invoices received by him in the same declaration. I do not
think, however, that this requires the penal duties upon the
various articles imported to be lumped together so as to
deprive the principals of the benefit of the simple and easy
proceedings for remission in small cases provided by section
5293.
As you refer to section 5292 of the Revised Statutes, I
would call your attention to the fact that this section in its
relation to penal duties was repealed by the antimoiety act
of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, section 17. (21 Opin., 102.)
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l'HE TREASURY.

SEAMEN-REMUNERATIO
ection 4609, Revised Statute , does not forbid the-demaud or receipt of
r muneration, by any one, from any seaman or person seeking employm nt as ·uch on ail or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade,
except as stated in the opinion.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 23, 1895.
he honor to give my opinion a reque ted in
ptember ..A for your guidance in the i ue of
nited tat
hipping ommi ioners upon

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

285

Se amen-Remuneration.

the question" whether section 4609, Revised Statutes, should
be construed to apply to seamen shipped in foreign trade, or
should be applied generally for the protection of an seamen
in both foreign and coasting trade.''
Section 4609 originated in section 11 of an act authorizing
the appointment of shipping commissioners by the several
circuit courts of the United States, etc., passed June 7, 1872·
(17 Stat., 262.) Its terms were changed · in the Revised
Statutes so as to apply to all persons instead of to shipping
commissioners, their clerks and employees. This fact, in
connection with the definitions given in section 4612, would
lead to the conclusion that the prohibition in section 4609
forbids the demand or receipt, by anyone, from any seamen
or persons seeking employment as such in the coasting trade
or otherwise, of renumeration, other than commissioner's
fees, for obtaining such employment, but for the act of June
9, 1874 (18 Stat., 64), which provides that none of the provisions of the act of June 7, 1872, "shall apply to sa.il or
steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," except as
therein stated, the exceptions stated being "the coastwise
trade between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts," "the lakegoing trade touching at foreign ports or otherwise, or in the
trade between the United States and the British North
American possessions," and cases "where the seamen are by
customary agreement entitled to participate in the profits or
result of a cruise or voyage."
Section 5601 declares that acts passed since the date of
the Revised Statutes, December 1, 1873, shall have full effect,
notwithstanding the revision, so that the reenactment in a
changed form of section 11 of the nict of 1872 as section 4609
does not prevent the application to it of tpe act of 1874.
( United States v. Buckley, 12 Sawyer, 508; United States v.
King, 23 Fed. Rep., 138-141; Scott v. Rose, 2 Lowell, 381.)
That Congress so understood the effect of the act of 187 4
appears from the acts of June 19, 1886, section 2 (1 Supp. Rev.
Stat., 493), and August 19, 1890 (id., 780, chap. 80i), which
extend to vessels in the coastwise trade certain sections of
Title LIII, Merchant Seamen, of which section 4609 is a
part, but do not include that section. The only other act
upon the subject is that of February 18, 1895, which contains
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nothing that restores the operation of section 4609 to vessels
engaged in the coasting trade generally, or to seamen employed or seeking employment thereon.
Your instructions, therefore, should not direct that section
4609 be applied generally for the protection of all seamen in
both foreign and coasting trade.
·
· Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
Under the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189, officers of the RevenueCutter Service who have been placed upon permanent waiting orders
are withdrawn from the line of promotion, but may be restored to the
service in their former rank when their disability ceases.
There is no legal limitation of the number of tliese officers.
An officer is "permanently incapacitated" within the meaning of thi1:1
act, as of the pension acts, when his disability appears to ue chronic
or of indefinite future duration.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 23, 1895.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of December 5, asking an official opinion as to the construction of that provision of the sundry civil appropriation
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28 Stat., 910), which relates
to the Revenue-Cutter Service.
The President is authorized to procure a medical report
upon all officers of that Service who "through no vicious
habit of their own are now incapacitated, by reason of the
infirmitie, of age or physical or mental disability, to effici ntly perform the duties of their respective offices." Those
who "may be reported by said board to be so permanently
in apacitat d ball be placed on waiting orders out of the
line of promotion, with on -half active-duty pay, and the
va anci tb reby created in the active Ii t of the officers
h 11 b fill <l. by promotion in the order of seniority a now
law et .
pro id l
, arnin d la t "pring under the
b ·bi f n in r wa
·t. nd 1· p rted a being p rman utl incapacitated.
ou
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inform me that he was thereupon placed upon "permanent
waiting orders." You now ask my opinion, however, whether
these" permanent waiting orders" were really" permanent;"
or whether he ''can be restored to the active list without Congressional action, should he be found upon a reexamination
to be qualified physically to perform active duty."
This act is so badly drawn that it is practically impossible
to give it a satisfactory construction.
Its use of the word "permanently" would ·tend to indicate
that it was intended to provide for absolute retirement from
the service. There is, however, a well-recognized distinction
between retirement and "waiting orders." (See Rev. Stat.,
secs. 1443 et seq.; sec. 1556.) Moreover, it is unnecessary
to give so sweeping ail interpretation to the word "permanently." A disability may properly be said to be permanent
when it appears to be chronic or of indefinite future duration;
just as an innkeeper distinguishes the "permanents" from
the "transients" among his guests. The term seems to be
used in this sense in the statutes. Thus, the officers and
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service, when wounded or disabled, are entitled to be placed on the navy pension list (sec.
4741); and therefore they may be pensioned at various rates
"in cases of permanent specific disability," while the pension
is to "continue during the existence of the disability" (sec.
4692). Hence it is held in the Pension Bureau that the
granting of a pension for "permanent specific djsability"
does not necessarily imply an adjudication that the disability
is one which can not terminate.
On the other hand, the "wa.iting orders" of this statute
are not the same thing as the ''waiting orders" previously
known in the Revenue Cutter Service. For instance, the pay
of a captain under the old" waiting orders" is $1,800 a year
(sec. 2753); under the new "waiting orders," $1,250. Moreover, the former "waiting orders" did not affect the line of
promotion.
On the whole, I think that the act should be construed as
establishing a class of officers who may be properly termed,
as you term them, upon "permanent waiting orders;" that
this class are neither upon "waiting orders" properly so
called nor upon a retired list; that while they are upon
3513-V0L 21,
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"permanent waiting orders" they are withdrawn from the
line of promotion, but that in case their disability should be
found to have ceased at any time they may be restored to
the Service in their former rank.
I have not referred to the proviso ''that the number of
officers upon the active list now authorized by law shall not
be increased by this act." It is impossible to give any effect
whatever to this proviso, because there is no legal limitation
of the number of such officers.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

PUBLIC WORKS.
The Secretary of the Navy has no power to incur any obligation for
work on an uncompleted dry dock when the appropriation has been
exhausted, even though immediate action is very important.
DEP .A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

January 2, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of December 30 with relation to the new dry dock in the
Brooklyn Navy-Yard. I assume that you have referred me
to all the statutory provisions specially referring to this dry
dock. It appears that the work upon the dry dock is not
yet ~ompleted, but that the appropriations therefor have
been exhausted; that by an immediate expenditure of about
$1,500 the efficiency of the dock will be greatly promoted;
but that the condition of the work is such that the change
mu t be made at once in order to avoid a very great increase
in the co t, amounting to many times the snm for which it can
b now done. You inform me tha·t the contractors are willing to und rtake the additional work and wait for an appropria ion act for their pay; and you a k whether you have
authori to incur any obligation. In view of the provisions
of
ion
7 2, 373 , and 5~03 of the Revi ed Statutes, I
d to an wer in the n ati ve.
r re p c full
J DO H.ARMO .
Th

E.

T.A.R

THE
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REMISSION O~, PENA_!-,TIES.
In proceedings for remission of penalties under the act of June 22, 1874,
chapter 391, the Secretary of the Treasury may return the findings to
the United States commissioner for a further hearing before him upon
a claim of newly discovered evidence.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 4, 1896.
SIR: Your communication of December 31 asks my opinion
whether it is within your discretion in remission proceedings
under the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, sections 17 and 18, to return the findings to the United States
commissioner for a further hearing before him upon a claim
of newly discovered evidence. It was the opinion of the
court in The Palo A.Ito (2 Ware, 343), that the Secretary had
such power under the act of March 3, 1797, chapter 13, section 1, which, so far as the present question is concerned, is
similar to the act now in force. Your question is therefore
answered in the affirmative. It would appear from the result
of the case above cited that this power to order rehearings
is one of much greater advantage to the claimant than to
the Government. The question, however, whether any
restrictions are needed, is one for the sole determination of
the Secretary of the Treasury.
Very respectful1y,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
An irregularity in the certification of the name of an eligible for appointment under the civil service is cured by the probational and absolute
appointment of such a person.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 9, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of December 31, accompanying a letter from the Civil Service Commission, asking my opinion upon the case of Mr.
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Frank 0. Moore. It appears that on February 11, 1895, the
surveyor of customs at St. Louis, Mo., in accordance with the
civil-service rules, requested certifications of male eligibles
for .filling two vacancies in the grade of clerk. Moore_'s name
was the sixth on the eligible list, and should probably therefore not have been certified (Customs Rule IV, sec. 1),
although possibly, had everything been done regularly, it
would eventually have appeared. (General Rule IV, sec. 3.)
The surveyor, assuming, as he had a right to do, that the
certification made to him was in accordance with the civilservice rules and regulatiom1, selected Moore, who was probationally appointed, served six months, and was then
absolutely appoi~ted to .fill one of such vacancies. It is
not suggested that the certifying of Mr. Moore's name was
due to anything but a mere error or inadvertence on the part
of the person who drew the certificate, or that Moore was
in any wise responsible for or a party to the error. Nor is
there any complaint as to his .fitness or .fidelity in the discharge of his duties. You ask me, among other things,
whether Moore's appointment "can be considered conclusive, notwithstanding the fact that his place on the eligible
list did not entitle him to certification."
The civil-service act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, section 2, relating to the civil-service rules, provides, among
other things, as follows:
"When said rules shall have been promulgated it shall be
the duty of all officers of the United States in the Departments and offices to which any such rules may relate to aid
in all proper ways in carrying said rules and any modifications thereof into effect."
The same section provides that positions in the classified
service " hall be filled by selections according to grade from
among tho e graded highest as the results of such competii ve examination ; " but it doe not specify the number of
eligible from whorn a election may be made. That is left
to be d termined by rule drawn by the President.
Th r mu t be some point of time when the mere irregularitie in certification mu t be regarded a cured. The civils rvi e rul hav n great r dignity than the law which
authorize h m, and it would be highly unreasonable that
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persons who have· left other employments should be ousted
from positions which they are satisfactorily filling simply
because it is discovered that employees of the Civil Service
Commission have made mistakes in their certifications. To
hold that the irregularity in the present case has been cured
by the probational and absolute appointments of Mr. Moore
and by his long service is in line with the decisions of the
courts upon cognate questions, and with the opinion of
Attorney-General Miller in 20 Opinions, 274, in which it was
held that an appointment made contrary to the rule of apportionment enjoined by the statute should not be disturbed
because the violation of the rule bad been due to mere inadvertence, though the fault was that of the appointee in failing to give notice cf a change of residence which occurred
between his examination and his appointment. I therefore
answer that the appointment should now be considered conclusive. The irregular certification should not, under the
last paragraph of Customs Rule IV, section 1, be counted
against the persons certified with Moore. This is the only
correction of the error which is now possible.
Answers to the other questions put by the Civil Service
Commissioners seem to be unnecessary.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The PRESIDENT.
FORFEITURES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
Revised Statutes, section 5294, as amended by the act of December 15,
1894, chapter 7, applied to fines aud penalties only, and did not
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit a forfeiture.
A clear omission from a statute can not be supplied upon any considerations of supposed oversight, inconsistency, or hardship.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 10, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of January 8 relating to the American schooners Winchester
and Bowhead. It appears from your letter that libels for forfeiture are pending against these vessels under the Bering
Sea act of April 67 1894, chapter 57, section 8. Application
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has been made to you for a remission of ·the forfeiture, and
you ask my opinion as to your authority to consider it.
If these proceedings had been brought for the purpose of
collecting pecuniary penalties, like that under consideration
in The Laura (114 U. S., 411), you would have the power to
remit under section 5294 of the Revised Statutes as amended
by the act of December 15, 1894, chapter 7, which is as
follows:
"The Secretary of the Tr~asury may, upon application
therefor, remit or mitigate any fine or penalty provided for
in Jaws relating to vessels, or discontinue any prosecution to
recover penalties denounced in such laws, except the· penalty
of imprisonment or of removal from office, upon such terms
as he in his discretion shall think proper."
These proceedings, however, are not to collect penalties,
but, as I understand, to enforce forfeitures of the_vessels,
together with their tackle, etc~
Section 5294 is contained in a chapter of the Revised Statutes which includes other sections providing for remission
in various cases. These sections recognize the well-known
distinction between a penalty and a forfeiture. (Secs. 5292,
5293, 5204, 5295.) Other sections of the Revised Statutes
show that the distinction was observed by the revisers.
(Secs. 1841, 1958, 2858, 3078, 3461; see also the anti moiety
act of June 22, 187 4, chap. 391.)
Section 5292 of the Revised Statutes provides for the mitigation or remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred
under the customs and navigation laws. Section 5294 provided for the remission of fines or penalties provided for in
law relating to steam vesse]s, but did not mention forfeitures. The amendment extended the section to all vessels,
but did not broaden its terms so as to include forfeitures of
e el .
clear omis ion from a tatute, like this, can not be suppli d upon any consideration of upposed ov rsight, inconsi ten y, or hard hip.
am th r fore compelled to advi e yon that you have no
au hority to r mit in the pre n a e.
ry r pectfull
JUDSO HARMO .
EORETARY F THE TREA URY.
h
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SECRE1'ARY OF WAR-BRIDGES.
Where a State has granted authority to construct a bri<lge over a navigable river, and the location and plan have been approved by the Secretary of War, the question whether the purchasers of such right are
authorized to proceed is one which does not concern the Government.
The action of a State with reference to the rights of the parties among
themselves concerning the construction of a bridge does not affect the
interests of the United. States so long as the directions concerning the
location and plan of the bridge are respected.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, .

January 18, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of January 15 concerning the East River bridge commission.
It appears that by an act of the legislature of the State of
New York, approved March 9, 1892, chapter 101, the East
River Bridge Company was incorporated for the purpose of
constructing a bridge over certain navigable waters between
the cities of New York and Brooklyn; and that by an act of
May 27, 1895, chapter 789, a commission was provided for,
representing the cities of New York and Brooklyn, which
commission was authorized to purchase the rights and powers of any corporation which might possess a valid charter
to build said bridge, it being the intent of the act that the
bridge should be built by the commissioners as a public
enterprise.
By section 7 of the river and harbor act of September 19,
1890, chapter 907, as amended by section 3 of the river and
harbor act of July 13, 1892, chapter 158, it was made unlawful to commence the construction of any bridge in navigable
waters of the United States under any act of the legislative
assembly of any State untii the location and plan of such
bridge be approved by the Secretary of War.
You inform me that under this act your predecessor has
approved a location and plan submitted by the East River
Bridge Company for the bridge aforesaid. You now ask me
whether, by purchase of the rights of the East River Bridge
Company, the commission aforesaid is authorized to proceed
to construct the bridge. This is a question which I do not
think concerns the Government. The action of the State of
New York with reference to the rights of the parties among .
themselves does not affect the interests of the United States
so long as your directions concerning the location and plan
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of the bridge are respected by whatever corporat~on or commission may actually perform the work of building it.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

RAILWAYS-SECRETARY OF WAR.
The Secretary of War it1 not authOiized to approve a survey of a railway
over lands of the United States, under the provisions of the act of
July 29, 1892, chapter 322, where the inner rail of said railway will be
less than the required distance from the point specified in said act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1896.
Sm: In your letter of January 15, 1895, you request an
opinion from me as to whether or not you are authorized to
approve a certain survey of the railway of the Washington
and Great Falls Electric Railway Company over lands of
the United States pertaining to the Washington Aqueduct,
under the provisions of the act incorporating said company,
approved July 29, 1892, as follows:
"Wherever the said railway shall run over or across any
of the lands of the United States or any of the accessory
works of the Washington Aqueduct, as provided in this act,
it shall be done only on such lines, in such manner, and on
such conditions as shall be approved by the Secretary of
vVar and accepted by said company, and no work shall be
done on aid rail way on any of said lands until after such
approval and acceptance in writing."
You state that in the survey of which approval is asked
'' the inner rail of said Washington and Great Falls Railway will be "Jess than 100 feet of the middle of the paved
I ortion of the Conduit road," but will not be le s than 50
fi t from the am , and that the Wa biugton and Great
FaJl I ailway omp ny ha purchased the property, rights,
and fran hi
of th (+Jen Echo Railroad Company, "incorp ra db , n a t f ougr
approved Jun 15, 1 92, and
Iaim b right of that purcha · , to be entitled to locate the
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inner r ail of its railroad less than 100 feet from the middle of
the paved portion of the Conduit road, provided it will not
be less than 50 feet from the same."
_The act of July 29, 1892, entitled "An act to incorporate
t he Washington and Great Falls Electri~ Railway Company,"
provides that "the inner rail of said Washington and Great
Falls Railway shall not at any place on the line of said railway be less than 100 feet from the middle of the paved port ion of the Conduit road."
This is a restriction upon your authority to approve, and
I am of opinion that the language set out in your letter
above quoted does not authorize an approval of the survey
as submitted.
The act of June 15, 1892 (27 Stat., 51), does not incorporate
the Glen Echo Railroad Company. It merely gives it a
license "to extend and operate its line of railway across the
Washington Aqueduct and the land pertaining thereto in
Mont gomery County in said State." The provision that "at
no p oint on the line of said Glen Echo Railroad, except at
the crossing aforesaid, or of any extension of said railroad
under wh atever name, shall the inner rail be less than 50
foot from the middle of the paved portion of the Conduit
road," is not a license but a restriction upon the license
above given.
Said act does not authorize the Glen Echo Railroad Company to parallel the Aqueduct upon land of the Government
upon condition that the inner rail shall not come within less
than 50 feet from the middle of the paved portion of the
Conduit road.
The papers accompanying your letter show that the location sought to be made by your approval on land of the Government is not incident to nor in any way connected with
the exercise of the right to cross conferred by the act of June
15, 1892. On the contrary, the portion of the road thus
sought to be located would take merely a small strip on the
south edge of the lands of the Government, entering and
leaving such lands on the same side.
I am. therefore of opinion that there is nothing in this act
which affects the question submitted by you.
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You will of course understand that this opinion is given
upon the facts alone submitted in your letter and the accompanying papers.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

ACCOUNTS.
The Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174, does not require the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Congress the bala:pces due on postal
accounts for the past fiscal year.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 23, 1896.
Srn: Section 12 of the so-called Dockery Act of July 31,
1894, chapter 174, relating to the rendition of public accounts
to the auditors of the Treasury, provides that you may waive
delinquency of the accounting officers in certain cases. The
following provisions also are contained in the same section:
"And provided further, That this section shall not apply
to accounts of the postal revenue and expenditures therefrom, which shall be rendered as now required by law.
"The Secretary of the Treasury shall, on the .first Monday
of January in each year, make report to Congress of such
officers as are then delinquent in the rendering of their
accounts or in the payment of balances found due from them
for the last preceding fiscal year. Sections two hundred and
.fifty and two hundred and seventy-two of the Revised Statutes are repealed."
Your communication of January 20 asks my official opinion whether you are required to report to Congress the balance due on postal accounts for the past fiscal year. I
think that thi question should be answered in the negative.
ry re pectfully,
J DO HARMO .
Th 'E R TA Y
THE T EA URY,
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ACCOUNTS-TRANSPORTATION OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE
NAVY-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The methods adopted in settling accounts for transportation of the ·
Army under the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 183, are not applicable
to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of the Navy and
Marine Corps.
An omission by Congress of some accounts from an act providing for
the settlement of certain accounts for transportation shows that it
was not the intention of Congress to make said act apply to all
accounts for transportation furnished under preceding acts.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 24, 1896.
SIR: I have examined the question which you submit to
me by your letter of 22d instant and have the honor to give
my opinion thereon as follows:
The question is, "Whether or not the methods adopted in
settling accounts for transportation of the Army under thA
act of March 3, 1879, should not be regarded as applicable
to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of the
Navy and Marine Corps."
As you very properly put it, the act of March 3, 1879
(:!O Stat., 420), dealt only with the settling of accounts-a
mere matter of bookkeeping. It provides that the act shaU
in nowise affect rights or duties under existing laws. · The
opinion of the Attorney-General, to which you refer (20
Opin., 11), related to the construction of the acts which
created rights and duties. It he]d that the provisions of
those acts that railroad companies to which the Government
has furnished aid in construction, shall "transport mails,
troops, and munitions of war, supplies and public stores,"
included the transportation of marines and seamen enlisted
in the Navy as well as officers and men belonging to the
Army, both being intended to be included in the word
''troops."
The act of March 3, 1879, however, applies in terms only
to accounts ''for transportation of the Army and transportation of the mails." While it may be doubtful whether
accounts for the transportation of "munitions of war" come
under this act, it is clear that accounts for transportation of
"supplies and public stores" do not, so that Congress omitted
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from the accounts covered by the act of March 3, 1879, some
accounts for transportation of articles under previous laws.
The only possible theory upon which it could be held that
accounts for transportation of the Navy were intended to be
included in the expression "transportation of the Army,"
would be that the clear intention was to · make the act of
March 3, 1879, apply to all accounts for tra.nsportation furnished under preceding acts. That possibility is taken away
by the undoubted omission of some accounts, so that, in my
opinion, the act does not apply to accounts'for transportation
connected with the Navy.
While there is no apparent reason for this discrimination
on the part of Congress, I see no escape from the conclusion
I have expressed as to the meaning of the language which
Oongress has employed.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.
An agent of the Government who receives money to pay secret agents is
not guilty of either receivin g or being concerned in receiving a contrilmtion for a political purpose, within the meaning of the act of
January 16, 1883, chapter 27, where he received and honored an order
from one of said secret agents to pay money out of the next remittance he should receive to a person not in the Government service as
a contribution in aid of a political campaign, it appearing that said
agent had nothing whatever to do with soli citing, inducing, or causing said secret agent to give the order, and had no relation or connection with the person to whom he paid the money, and had no concern
in or control over the money after it was so paid, although he knew
for what purpose it was paid.
aid act does not forbid voluntary contributions for political purposes
by p r ons in the employ of the Government, but protects such person from solicitation or coercion with r espect to such contributions.

JUSTICE,
Jamiary 25, 1896.
IR: I hav th honor to giv my opinion upon the qu stion
whi h you ubmit in ur l tt r of 2 din tant with r lation
the ca
f
. M. B llm n an agent of your D partment,
DEPAR'l'MEN'l' OF
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against whom the Civil Service Commission have filed a
charge upon which you are required to act.
1t appears from your statement that prudential. reasons
have led you to adopt a peculiar system with regard to secret
agents. Instead of receiving their pay directly from your
Department they receive it from postmasters in designated
cities. Those postmasters send the money in envelopes by
express to one of these agents located in the Department at
Washington for that purpose, who&e duty it is to reship these
packages by express to the various agents at the points
where they may happen to be. Bellman was the agent
detailed for this service." The established practice was for
the agents to send orders to Bellman to open the envelopes
so received by him directed to them, and make payments out
of the money therein to their families, creditors, etc., which
he did. One of the agents on duty at Chicago sent an order
to Bellman at Washington to pay $50 out of the next remittance be should receive to a person in Washington not in the
Government service. Bellman honored the order and paid
the money accordingly at the private office of this person.
It is clear from your statement, which is based upon the
transcript of evidence which accompanied your letter, that
Bellman had nothing whatever to do with soliciting, inducing,
or causing the agent in Chicago to give the order, and had
no relation or connection whatever, direct or indirect, with
the person to whom he paid the money, and no concern in or
control over the money after it was so paid. Bellman's relation to the transaGtion was as purely mechanical as th~t of
. a banker who simply pays the check of a depositor.
It appears that the money was a contribution by the agent
in Chicago in aid of a political campaign which the party to
which he belonged was conducting in one of the States, arnl
that this fact was known to Bellman when he received
and carried out the order. The charge is that Bellman's
action was a violation of sections 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, or of
one or more of them, of the act "to regulate and improve
the civil service of the United States." (1 Supp., 392.)
It is well settled that the intention of this act was not to
forbid voluntary contributions for political purposes by persons in the employ of the Government, but to protect such
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persons from solicitation or coercion with respect to such
contributions. Knowing the difficulty of detecting the actual
operation of means and influences whose employment had
become a public evil, Congress absolutely prohibited the
solicitation or receipt of political contributions by all persons
in the Government service in any place or in any way, and
forbade such solicitation or receipt by any person in any room
or building occupied in the discharge of official duties. .All
who are in the Government service are thus protected against
the possibility of actual coercion and from that of the coercion implied in the relation of the person soliciting or receiving to the Government or implied in solicitation or receipt
in a public office; but Congress did not attempt to prohibit
solicitation by or payment to persons not in the Government
service otherwise than in Government offices. The agent in
Chicago therefore had a right to make the contribution to
the persou in Washington, either with or without the solicitation of such person; and if the agent had himself taken
the money to such persou no question would have arisen.
Sections 13 and 14 of the act clearly have no bearing whatever upon the question of Bellman's conduct. The only
question is whether he received or was concerned in receiving a political contribution in violation of sections 11 and 12.
Section 12 may be laid aside for the purpose of the inquiry,
because, as Bellman was in the public service, the place
where he received the contribution, if be received it at all, is
quite immaterial.
Bellman's action must therefore be judged by section 11
alone. I can not see how it can fairly be said that it was a
violation of the provisions of this section. It is admitted
that he did not solicit the contribution. Nor can it be said,
iu any proper sense of the term, that he received it. He
pby ically took the money from the package, but he did so
rn r ly as th agent of the owner, and so long a it remained
in hi p
ion be held it a the agent of the owner, who
had a right at any time to revoke hi order and reclaim the
m n . Thi right continu d until Bellman a ·tually hand d
th mon yo r to the third per on, who alon can be said
t h
1 it. Wh n he rec ived it it wa from th
h b hand of B llman and uot from
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Bellman. He was accountable to the agent in Chicago and
not to Bellman for its use or misuse. Bellman had no more
to <lo with the transaction than a mere messenger would have
had to whom the owner had handed it for delivery. The
receipt of money, etc., intended by the statute is acceptance
of possession which confers a right of disposal, not possession
which simply constitutes the taker a mere custodian without
right on his own behalf or that of others.
The phrase •' in any manner concerned in soliciting or
receivin g " was intended to cover evasions of the purpose of
the st atute and to punish all persons for whom or on whose
behalf or at whose instance the person actually receiving
the money is acting. Your statement excludes all relation
whatever on the part of Bellman to the transaction other
than the mere physical one which I have already described.
In my opinion he was not guilty of either receiving or being
concerned in receiving a contribution for a political purpose
within the meaning of the act in question.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

DUTIES.
Books imported for the purpose of sale to any customers who may apply
are dutiable under the tariff act of 1894.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 3, 1896.
Sm: Answering your communication of January 31, I have
the honor to say that, in my opinion, books imported for the
purpose of sale to any customers who may apply are not free
of duty under paragraph 413 of the tariff act of August 27,
1894, even though imported to take the place of books which
had been previously imported by the same person, and upon
which duties had been paid by him, and which he had afterwards sold to a State library.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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OPTION-SHILOH BATTLEFIELD.
A contract of option for the sale of certain lands to certain officers of
the Shiloh Battlefield Association considered and held not to constitute a very serious cloud upon the title to the land referred to.
DEP.ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,

February 3, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of January 17, with inclosures as stated, all
of which are herewith returned.
Referring to the contract of option of 22d of December,
1893, from H. Duncan and J. R. and S. B. Duncan, by which
they " agree to sell to John A. McOlernan, president, E. T.
Lee, secretary, and J. W. Colman, treasurer, of the Shiloh
Battlefield Association, certain land therein referred to," you
request that I advise you "if tbis option would, in point of
law, be considered valid and a sufficient cloud upon the title
to preclude a purchase by the Government, supposing such
purchase be consummated prior to the expiration of the
option. In other words, can these options be disregarded,
supposing that mutual agreements a.s to price be entered into
satisfactory to the United States and to the owners, and
supposing always that the titles are good in all other
respects , ,,
I have examined all of the exhibits accompanying your
letter and have considered what I understand to be the subject upon which you desire my advice, and beg to reply as
follows:
The contract of option-a copy of which accompanies the
letter of Cornelius Cadle of January 8, 1896, addressed to
you, and one of the exhibits with your letter-does not, in
my opinion, con~ titute any very erious cloud upon the title
to tbe land referred to in it. It i hardly clear and explicit
nough in its description of the land to put a purchaser upon
llO i e.
I tipulate for waiver and conveyance of borne tead and
do er, wh n the wive~ of the vendors are not partie to the
agreement.
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It purports to have been duly admitted to record in the
clerk's office of the State court, when, so far as it appears on
its face, it has not been duly acknowledged by the vendors
and is not attested by witnesses as to either of the vendors,
and appears further to have been executed by a partnership
firm.
In addition to this, Mr. E.T. Lee, who appears from the
exhibits with your letter to be the obdurate and recalcitrant
party to the transaction, was not acting in his own rights
in obtaining these options, but for the Shiloh Battlefield
A ssociation, of which he was secretary.
It must be that the association, then, in its corporate or
partnership character, as the fact may be, is the only person
who could assert a claim under this contract of option; and
Mr. E.T. Lee must look to that association for the amount
of his personal claim for services which he asserts in one of
his letters.
If all the contracts of option for these lands are like in
form to the one submitted in your letter, I do not think that
they afford ground tojustify serious apprehension of loss to
the Government by disregarding them altogether.
It would seem, however, especially in view of the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in the Gettysburg cases, that
the most comrenient and economical course for the Government to pursue to obtain title to so much of these lands as
may be desired would be by proceedings for condemnation
in the Federal courts for the judicial district in which the
land lies; and such proceedings may well be instituted after
the 4th day of March, 1896, o_n which date all the contracts
for option referred to expire.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor-General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
3513-VOL 21, PT 2--7
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·suPPLIES-CONTRACTS.
Contracts for the purchase by the Government of seals used to secure
packages entered for transportation in bond must be awarded upon
a,d vertisement.
It is unlawful for the head of an Executive Department to make a contract for such supplies for a longer term than one year from the time
the contract was made.
Locks and seals used to secure packages while being transported in
bond, paid for and owned by common carriers, are not required to be
. purchased upon advertisement.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 5, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of January 24, 1896, requesting an opinion as to.whether
or not certain fastenings for bonded cars, and packages
entered for transportation in bond, are such supplies as are
governed by section 3709, which provides for awarding contracts upon advertisement.
It appears from your l(jtter that seals used to secure packages in transportation are purchased and paid for by the
Government.
As to these, I think there can be no question tbat section
3709 applies, and also section 3735, which makes it unlawful
for any Executive Department to make a contract for supplies for a longer term than one year from the time the contract was made.
It appears from your letter that locks and seals use.d fqr
securing cars are paid for by the common carriers.
The purpose sought by section 3709 was to give the Government the advantage of competition in prices.
The locks and seals for securing the cars never become the
property of the Government.
While sections 3001 to 3007, inclusive, Revised Statutes,
and the act approved June 10, 1880 (21 Stat., 173), and secti n 2998, Revised Statutes, referred to in your letter, contemplate and authorize that bonded goods in transportation
hall be ecured by eal and locks, there is nothing requiring
that the eals and locks shall be furnished by the Governmen.
The bject i to prevent the perpetration of frauds upon
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the Government during transportation, and this is to be
accomplished under the rules and regulations of the Treasury Department providing for proper fastenings.
If, by contract with the common carriers, the expense of
these fastenings can be saved to the Go-l ernment, I see no
reason why it should not be done.
They are at all times under the control of the officers of
your Department.
The conclusion that these locks and seals are supplies
within the meaning of section 3709 would carry with it the
necessary result that they must be paid for by the Government, for that section certainly was not intended to apply to
what the Government did not purchase and own.
I am therefore of the opinion that section 3709 does not
apply to fastenings paid for and owned by common carriers.
Respectfully,
·
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SECRETARY OF WAR-NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES.
It is the duty of the Secretary of War to act upon a petition to have
designated the portion of a river within which refuse matter may be
discharged, in accordance with the provisions of the act of August 18,
1894, ch. 299, sec. 6, although the navigability of the river will not
be affected.
The Secretary of War, in deciding this question, should be governed
only by considerations affecting. the navigation of the river, or which
may affect future navigation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 12, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of February 8, 1896, in which, after setting out section
6 of the river and harbor bill (28 Stat., 363), you say:
"New River in Virginia is a 'river of the United States, for
the improvement of which money has been appropriated by
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Congress,' and the Crozier · Iron Company and others have
located on and near it extensive mining and ore-washing
industries, to maintain and carry on which it is necessary to
discharge into the river large quantities of ore-washing; a
material of such a character that it is conceded to be a violation of the said section of law to discharge it into the river
'elsewhere than within the limits defined and permitted by
the Secretary of War.'
''And the owners of the industries mentioned have petitioned the War Department to designate a portion of the
river as 'limits defined and permitted by the Secretary of
War,' within which they may discharge ore washings into
the river without violating the provision of law referred to.
But it has been determined by investigation and report of
the Chief of Engineers that the discharge of the ore washings into the river does not and will not affect the navigability of the river, and that therefore the navigation interests
are not concerned in the matter of a portion .of the same
being designated as they request. And your opinion is
desired as to whether, in view of the fact that the navigability of the river is not and will not be affected by discharging the ore washings into the stream, and that therefore the
navigation interests are not concerned, it is the duty of the
Secretary of War to take action in the premises, and to
either decide against the petitioners and reject their applica- ·
tion, or decide in their favor and designate a portion of the
river, accordingly as the merits of the case may appear to
him-that is, is it the duty of the Secretary of War to act
on every petition presented under the circumstances involved
in this case, or is it only his duty to act in cases in which the
interest, of navigation will be affected?
'' ow, while the navigability of the river would not be
affected if the prayer of the petitioners should be granted,
and th navigation int rest are therefore unconcerned as to
wb ther it i granted or not, interested parties are urging
that it hould not be granted because, as it is claimed, the
di bar e of the ore wa bing into the river destroys the
ft b, pollute the ater o a to destroy it usefulne for
dom i purpo e and injure the cenery along the str am.
nd iu c
you d terrnine that it i tile duty of the ecre-
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tary of War to act on the petition, your opinion is requested
as to whether it is his duty to take into consideration, in
deciding the matter, only the interests and importance of the
mining and ore- washing industries and Ila vigation and the
navigation interests, and decide iu favor of the petitioners
and designate a portion of the river when he :finds that this
will not injuriously afl'ect•navigation to a greater extent than,
in his opinion, the interests and importance of the mining
and ore-washing industries warrant, or whether it would be
proper for him to also take into consideration the matter of
the discharge of ore washings into the river injuriously
affecting the :fish and the water of the streain and the scenery along the same, and decide to grant the petition or not
accordingly as he found the merits of the case to be with
these things considered along with the others mentioned
above."
Section 6 is as follows:
"That it shall not be lawful to place, discharge, or deposit,
by any process or in any manner, ballast, refuse, dirt, ashes,
cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other
matter of any kind other than that :flowing from streets,
sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the waters
of any harbor or river of the United States, for the improvement of which money has been appropriated by Congress,
elsewhere than within the limits defined and permitted by
the Secretary of War." * * *
First. I am of the opinion that it is your duty to act upon
the application.
If you should decline to act in this and similar cases the
above section would operate as an absolute prohibition.
This was not the intention of Congress. The fact of lodging a discretion with the Secretary of War clearly shows
that the prohibition is to be removed when it is not necessary to effect the purposes contemplated by Congress in the
exercise of the power conferred upon it by the Constitution.
Second. The discretion given to the Secretary of War is
very broad, and no principles governing it are declared. ·
There is no appeal from his action. These facts impose the
obligation of a careful scrutiny of the considerations which
should control his judgment.
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The jurisdiction of Congress over New River, so far as this
question is concerned, is based alone upon the power to regulate commerce between the States, and it must be assumed,
notwithstanding the broad language used in the act, that
Congress has not sought to exceed its powers.
If Congress had passed a statute to protect the fish or
scenery of New River, or the purity of its water, if it bore no
relation to navigation, and to that end bad prohibited the
acts referred to in your letter, its invalidity would be conceded, because these are subjects which belong to the States
alone.
As Congress could not directly legislate for these purposes, it could not and has not sought to reach them indirectly through the discretion committed to you.
You should, therefore, be governed only by considerations
affecting the navigation of the river, and if there be none
now, then by considerations which may affect future navigation, whether it is likely to become important or not, which
Congress must be presumed to have had in mind in authorizing the frequent and large expenditures which have been
made in the improvement of the river.
Respectfully, ·
JUDSON HARMO .
The SECRET.A.RY OF W A.R.

PUBLIC WORKS-SECRET.A.RY OF W A.R.
If in the judgment of the Secretary of War justice either to the Government or to the contractors on the works at tlle outh Pass channel of
the Mississippi River requires him to determine the actual height of
average :flood tide as a datum of measurement, he h as the right to
determine sucll height.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 13, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to give my opinion upon the matter
ubmitted by our letter of December 2, viz, "the applicati n of the executor of the estate of James B. Eads for
r adju tment of the datum plane of average flood tide to
hl h he ounding in the channel at the South Pas Jetti . re referred by the in pecting officer."
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By the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 463), Eads was '' to
construct such permanent and sufficient jetties and such
auxiliary works as are necessary to create and permanently
maintain, as hereinafter set forth, a wide and deep channel
between the South Pass of the Mississippi River and the
Gulf of Mexico." He was to secure a navigable depth of
20 feet of water through the pass within thirty months, and
an additional depth of not less than 2 feet during each succeeding year thereafter. He was to receive $5,250,000 "for
constructing said works and obtaining a depth of thirty feet
in said channel, and the annual sum of one hundred thousand dollars for each and every year that said depth of
thirty feet shall be maintained by the jetties and auxiliary
works aforesaid in said South Pass during twenty years
after :first securing the said depth."
Payments were to be made on certified statements of an
engineer officer to be detailed by the Secretary of War, reporting the depth of water and width of channel secured
and maintained from time to time. Partial payments, aggregating $4,250,000, were provided for when certain depths of
channel should be produced and maintained, and "when a
channel thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty
feet in width shall have been obtained by the effect of said
jetties and auxiliary works aforesaid the remaining one
million dollars shall be deemed as having been earned."
But this amount was to be retained as security, interest
at 5 per cent per annum being payable semiannually "from
the date when a channel of thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty feet in width shall have been first secured."
Further, after securing the said channel, $100,000 per
annum was· to be paid in equal quarterly payments every
year that it should be maintained by the effect of said je_tties and auxiliary works for a period of twenty years. At
the end of the :first ten years one-half of the $1,000,000 retained was to be paid, and the other half at the end of the
second ten years, " the said channel of thirty feet in depth
and three hundred and fifty feet in width having been maintained" continuously during such periods.
The Government reserved the right to pay the sum so
reserved at any til_Ile, thereby terminating its liability for
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interest and Eads's liability for the maintenance of the jetties, but has never exercised this right.
The Chief of the Coast Survey was directed to cause a
careful topographic and hydrographic survey to l,e made of
said pass and bar and submit the same to the Secretary of
War, "in order to facilitate the proper location of said jetties * * * and to correctly determine such effects as
may be produced by them." The results of such surveys
were to be furnished to Eads .
.At the end of the recital of the various depths of channel
which were to entitle Eads to the partial payments amounting to $4,250,000 is this clause: "The respective depths and
widths of channel being measured at average flood tide, as
ascertained and determined by the Secretary of War." But
while no directions are given for measurements during the
period of maintenanr-e, the only fair construction is that
they were to be made in the same manner.
It was made the duty of the Secretary of War to report
payments and all important facts relating to the progress of
the works, their character and permanency, to the end that
Congress might be kept fully ad vised as to the faithfulness
and efficiency with which the works were being executed,
"it being expressly understood that while said Eads shall
be untrammeled in the exercise of his judgment and skill in
the location, design, and construction of said jetties and auxiliary works, the intent of this act is not simply to secure
the wide and deep channel :first above named, but likewise
to provide for the construction of thoroughly substantial and
permanent works by which said channel may be maintained
for all time after their completion."
The act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 376), made some slight
changes as to tbe payment of the installments, its relevant
provisions being as follows:
"When a channel thirty feet in depth, without regard to
width, hall have been obtafoed through the jetties, there
hall be paid :five hundred thousand dollars; and the one
million dollar provided for by the hereinbefore recited act
t b p id by he nit d States in ten and twenty year
hall
e, rned by ai l Ead and bi associate , and the
c m
ith intere t, shall b paid to said Eads or bi legal
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representatives at the times and in the manner provided by
said act.
"The one hundred thousand dollars per annum provided
by said recited act to be paid to said Eads and his associates during a period of twenty years shall be paid at the
times and in the manner therein provided, upon the maintenance by said Eads and his associates of a channel through
. the jetties twenty-six feet in depth, not less than two hundred feet in width at the bottom, and having through it a
central depth of thirty feet without regard to width."
The jetties and other works were completed, the required
depth of channel was produced and has been maintained,
Eads receiving the stipulated yearly payments.
The present application is based upon the alleged fact that
the average flood tide is now, and has been for several years,
about 1 foot higher than the plane established in 187 5, and
that the u~e of the plane so established as a datum necessitates the maintenance of a channel 1 foot deeper than was ·
contemplated by the law, resulting in needless additional
expense, delay of payments, and loss of interest.
From the letter of General Craighill, Chief of Engineers,
which you inclose, it appears that when the height of average flood tide was ascertained in 1875 bench marks and a
gauge were established as a basis for future measurements;
but from the reports of the officers in charge of the measurements it appears " that at the present time and for several
years past the reading on the United States official gauge at
Port Eads of the plane of mean high tide bas been about 1
foot higher than it was in 1875."
The Chief of Engineers states that " the plane of high
tide as indicated by the gauge is unstable, the curve of changes
haR not been regular, and, while uniformly higher, at times
recedes, having at the present time a downward tendency.
These changes must result from changes in the level of the
Gulf tides, the tendency being higher, or from a general subsidence of the delta of the Mississippi, together with the
gauge and bench marks to which it is referred. The only
fact which can now be particularly stated is that the elevation of the Gulf level as referred to the gauge and established
bench marks has changed since 1875."
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It is not clear, according to the statement of the Ohief of
Engineers, whether the change is a real or only an apparent
·one, the increased reading on the gauge being due, as claimed
by some, to a genera.I subsidence of the delta together with
the gauge and bench marks.
The only question is, whether in either case, viz, that of
an actual change in the height of average :flood tide, or that
of a disturbance of the bench marks by which its height in •
1875 was indicated, you have authority, for the purpose of
present and future measurements, to ascertain the actual
average height of flood tide for the time being. ·
In the latter case your authority is undoubted. It certainly was not intended that an artificial mark should be
substituted for a natural level and adhered to at all events.
In the former case your authority is the same. I find
nothing in the law which fairly justifies the construction that
when once the height of average flood tide was ascertained,
for the purpose of determining whether the channel provided
for had been produced, that level should be adhered to during the subsequent period of maintenauce, whatever might
happen. ·whether Congress did or did not contemplate the
possibility of changes which might cause the average height
of flood tide to vary does not appear, but it is plain that the
object which it intended to secure was a certain depth of
water in the channel at the average height of :flood tide. And
this object would not be certainly secured unless the obligations which Congress intended to impose and Eads to assume
were to adapt his work to the actual situation, fixed if the
situation remained the same, varying as the situation might
change. In other words, it was a condition which was to be
produced and maintained, not a specific work; a volume of
water, not an artificial waterway.
uch being my view of the true construction of the acts in
que tion, my opinion is that you have the right whenever, in
your judgment, ju tice either to the Government or to the
con ractor o requires, to determine the actual height of
av rag flood tide a a datum for mea urement.
Thi view seem to be confirmed by the fact stated by the
ngin r thu~ vhile the height of average flood tide at the
m uth of tb pa i affected on1y 1.. y the natural ebb and
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flow of the waters of the Gulf, its height at the head of the
pass is affected also by the state of the river and possibly
other causes which introduce greater possibilities both of
original inaccuracy and of subsequent changes.
The period to be covered by observations for the purpos~
of fixing the proper average depends on science, not on law;
but it should be sufficiently long to include every phase of
the situation as it is affected by the various causes which
operate upon it.
As the surveys, measurements, and observations doubtless
involve expense, I deem it proper to add that in my opinion
you are authorized to 1·equire such expense to be provided
for by the representatives of Eads when it is to be incurred
on their application.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

UNMAILABLE MATTER-LOTTERY.
The business of a certain company considered and determined to be in
the nature of a lottery within the meaning of the United States
statutes.
The name "lottery " covers any determination of gain or loss by the
issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1896.
Sm: I have carefully examined the papers which accompany your letter of December 9, requesting my opinion with
respect to your action in refusing use of the mails to various
''bond and investment companies." Those papers included
briefs of counsel for the companies and of the Assistant
Attorney-General for your Department. I have also heard
counsel and had briefs from them. I have the honor now to
give my opinion as requested.
The statute (sec. 3929, as amended September 19, 1890, 26
Stat., 466) provides that "The Postmaster-General may, upon
evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money or of any real or personal prop-
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erty, by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind," direct that
registered letters directed to ~mch person or company be
withheld and returned to the senders, and that payment of
money orders payable. to such person or company be refused.
By the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 964), these powers
are "extended and made applicable to all letters or other
matter sent by mail."
These acts were within the constitutional authority of
Congress, and empower you to deny all mail facilities to those
whom you ma.y find to be engaged in any of the classes of
business described. (Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S., 727; In re
Rapier, 143 U. S., 110.)
Your remaining question is whether the business conducted
by the companies you name, as it is disclosed by the evidence
before you, comes within the description given by the statute.
I have chiefly considered the case of "The Pettis County
Bond and Investment Company," of Sedalia, Mo., that being
t.he :first one you name, the one which has been most heard,
and the one which presents what is claimed and appears to
be the strongest case. I shall therefore give my opinion upon
that case only, believing that it covers all the others. If you
think it does not, I shall be glad to consider any to which
you may call my attention.
The question presented has twice been the subject of opinions by my immediate predecessor (20 Opin., 748, and 21
Opin., 4), who in each case concurred in the conclusions which
the .Assistant .Attorney-General for your Department bad
reached after careful study and exhaustive research. I can
see no difference in principle between the case now presented
and those covered by the opinions just cited. In fact, all
companies of this class are alike in their general design and
differ only in details and methods. The design is to induce
sub criptions for bonds by holding out the chance of receiving large sum for mall payments, the chance depending
on the numbering of the bonds. The schemes for determining the fortunate number vary, and so do the terms in which
th bond an l coupon expr s the undertaking of the comp ni ; but it an not be fairly denied that, without the ever
pre nt chance of p edily getting much for little, not one of
th
mpanie
uld attem1 t to do busine s or succeed in
th ttempt if made.
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While the forms of legitimate investment are carefully presented, they alone would not tempt the most unwary. I do not
mean that they are necessarily intended to deceive, because
they must be known by the public generally, as well as by the
promoters, to be designed merely as a legal pretext or background for the schemes of chance in which it is the immediate
and primary objecttoengage. That the intention is generally
to carry out fairly those schemes as proposed and understood
need not be denied; but this does not relieve them from legal
condemnation.
The Pettis County Company issues a bond for $1,000 upon
payment of $10 and an agreement to pay $3 monthly until
the four coupons which accompany the bond are all paid.
The solicitor receives $9 commission out of the first payment. The remaining $1 and the monthly payments are
divided among expense, redemption, and reserve funds. The
bond has four coupons, numbered 1 to 4, each calling for $250,
and bonds are numbered serially as issued.
These coupons are payable in the order determined by the
application to the numbers of the bonds of a rule partly
serial and partly multiple, thus: 1, then 4; 2, then 8; 3, then
12, etc. .A table showing, as an example, the operation of
the rule up to 400, provided bonds bearing all the numbers
are outstanding, is printed on the back of each bond.
Except in the rule adopted to determine the order of payment, this plan does not materially differ from those of the
myriad of such companies which were springing up all over
the country until they were checked by your action in refusing them the use of the mails. .As no subscriber could know
what number his bond would bear when issued, he would
simply take the chance, in paying bis $10, of receiving a
bond which would soon yield him $250 at the expense, necessarily, of the unlucky bondholders. This is so clearly a
mere scheme of chance in the nature of a lottery, and has
been so often held to be such by the courts, that it would be
a waste of time to discuss it.
In order to avoid this ruling, made in its own case, as I am
advised, this company changed the form of its printed application, so that instead of paying the $10 at the time of signing, the subscriber merely agrees to pay it if the bond is satisfactory when delivered and examined. It is now claimed
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that the subscriber takes no chance whatever because he does
not embark in the scheme, unless he sees from his bond when
presented that it bears one of the numbers which entitle its
coupons to payment early enough to suit his views of expected
gain.
This is ingenious and specious enough, no doubt, to induce
subscriptions by the unthinking. .At any rate, the company
is eager to make the attempt, though it is not willing to eliminate the preferred coupon fea,ture. · But it is manifest that
if every subscriber, by merely comparing the number on his
bond with the order of :q.umbers printed on the back of it,
could tell with any approach to certainty the. order in which
his coupons would be reached for payment, nobody would
take the bonds which are to be passed by; and unless these
are taken there is an end of the business. One might as
w_ell try to run an ordinary lottery without blanks as such
a preference investment scheme without any unpreferred.
Some must lose what others gain. It is manifest upon the
slightest reflection that, as all the subscribers have the same
right _of rejection upon the presentation of the bonds, and the
numbers are given upon issuance for presentation, no subscriber can possibly tell how many of the bonds bearing lower
numbers than his own are really outstanding when his bond
is presented. So that it may justly be said that the change
has made the chance feature of the scheme worse rather than
better, because if the elements of uncertainty are not in fact
increased they are given a fictitious appearance of certainty.
It appears that although this company bas a capital of
only 2,000, $100,000 in bonds have been deposited for it as
required by a law of Missouri from insurance and other
companies. This wa", of course, done by its promoters and
shows their faith in the profitableness of the cheme. But if
it be conceded that thi depo it is available to subscribers,
whether to tho e who realize the profit which all hope for,
or tho e, if uch there hould ever be, who keep up their
pa m nt to the end and thereby escape the forfeiture which
any default, tbi doe not affect the inqury as to the
follo
r al nature f the ompany husine, . A lottery is none
the le a lo t ry b
u it i fairly conducted or because
u h ondu t i amply ~ cur d.
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lt is claimed that actuarial computation shows that the
"reserYe fuud" will be sufficient to pay off the unpreferred
bonds at their maturity. Investment at a high rate of compound interest, without any allowance whatever for loss of
time or other loss, is assumed in the calculation. But assuming its correctness, the lottery nature of the scheme does not
disappear, because it is incredible that without the chance
thereby afforded anyone could be found to pay money into
such a company for twenty years without return. The coupling of a sale or other ordinary transaction with a scheme of
chance does not save it from legal condemnation. This is a
very common device.
It has been urged that the "investments" offered by these
companies do not differ in principle from insurance, and are
in fact '' fairer and better because the bondholder does not
have to die or lose his property to realize them." The fallacy
consists in confusing mere chance with uncertainty. One's
property may not burn at all, and the time he will die is not
k11own; but neither event depends upon mere chance, and the
law therefore recognizes contracts contingent upon them while
it doesnotcountenancelotteries. Yettheargumentad vanced
applies as well to lotteries as to the preference feature of the
business of this company. If the prizes in lotteries had been
made to depend upon the happening of some serious event
to which all persons are liable, it is quite likely that the law
respecting lotteries would not be as it is. But the name
''lottery," which originally implied casting lots, now covers
any determination of gain or loss by the issue of an event
which is merely contrived for the occasion.
It is said, also, that as one of the features of these "investments" is that the bondholders who persist gain advantage
from the forfeiture of the bonds of those who fail in their
payments, the case presented is the same as that of insurance
on the "tontine" plan. If one of these companies should
eliminate the preference in payment of coupons -to be determined by the mere holding of a lucky number, this question
might arise. But the chance of preference lies among bondholders of equal standing in all respects. The fact that the
prospects of all who continue to pay are impr:oved by the
dropping out of holders of bonds bearing lower numbers
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does not eliminate the element of mere chance, and therefore
does not alter the case.
The principle of survivorship involved in tontine insurance has been the subject of doubt and discussion because,
in its simple form, it has been claimed to be mere wagering
among tbe members on the length of their lives. Bat it
involves no lottery element. If, however, to a series of ton.tine endowment policies a scheme should be added for paying some of them before maturity, according to the determination of any form of hazard, we should have ~ partial
analogy to the present case. But the argument would fail
because no such system has ever been held or admitted to
be lawful.
In my opinion the Pettis County Company comes within
the terms of the statutes, and all other companies which
promise payments to part only of a class, who all stand on ·
an equal footing, leaving the selection to depend on any rule
of hazard, whether such payments constitute the entire
scheme of their business or are connected with other features
which _w ould not, by themselves, be objectionable.
Respectfully submitted.
JUDSON HARMON.
The POSTMASTER-GENER.AL.
FURLOUGHS-REGULATIONS.
It is not necessary for the Secretary of Agrieulture to give a notice of
furlough without pay of assistant microscopists over his official signature in each indf vidual case when their services are not required.
A general order, signed by him, directing inspectors in charge of assistant microscopists to furlough them without pay when their services
are not required will be sufficient.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1896.
SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
le ter of February 18, 1896, in which, reforring to assistant
micro' opi t being furloughed by you without pay, you say:
I would req ae tan opinion from your office as to whether
it i ne e ary for me to give a noti e of furlough over my
offi ial ignatur in each individual ase, or will a general
ord r i n db me dire tin er in pe ·tor in charge of a i t pi t to furlough them without pay when their
re no r uired be ufficient
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"In view of the fact that the active employment of the .
assistant microscopists depends upon the orders received by
the packing houses, it was impossible to tell more than a few
days ahead when their services would be required, and it is
much more convenient to direct the inspector in charge to
furlough without pay when necessary. It would be almost
impossible for me to give individual furloughs in each case
unless I sent to inspectors blank furloughs, signed, for them .
to fill in with the name and time."
In United States v. Murray (100 U. S., 537), it was held,
where a clerk in the Treasury Department was furloughed
against his remonstrance, that" there is nothing to prevent
the Secretary from putting him on furlough without pay at
any time, if the exigencies of the service require it. He
may be dismissed absolutely, and it is difficult to see why, if
this can be done, he may not be furloughed without pay,
which is in effect a partial dismissal. If he desires to be
free from all obligations to serve in the future he may resign;
but if he permits his 1iarne to continue on the rolls it must
be on sueh terms as are imposed by the Department."
Your right to furlough can not be questioned.
Inasmuch as the contingencies upon which it is desirable
to furlough microscopists arise from time to time and upon
conditions which you can not foresee nor control, the advantages to the Government of this system would be largely
sacrificed if you are compelled to act personally in each individual case, and after the occasion bas arisen. I am of the
opinion that you can make general regulations, under which
your subordinates in charge of particular localities can, as
circumstances call for such action, furlough microscopists, to
take effect at once, reporting their action to you.
I suggest that you employ microscopists who may have
intermittent work, with the understanding that the employment is only from time to time as their services may be .
needed, and that the furlough system is for their benefit and
to avoid a formal discharge, and employment from time to
time.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.
c:$51::$-YOL 21, PT 2--8
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DUTIES.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to refund penal duties
which have been paid into the Treasury on the ground that they were
incurred without willful negligence or an intention of fraud on the
part of the importer.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUS'.I.'ICE,

llfarch 13, 1896.

SIR: Answering your communication of February 4, asking my official opinion as to your power to refund penal
duties which have been paid into the Treasury under the
provisions of section 7 of the customs administrative act of
June 10, 1890, chapter 407, I have the honor to saythat section 20 of the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391,
to which you refer me, confers, in my opinion, no power to
refund any duties, pena.l or otherwise. The cases in which
you are authorized to refund duties were described in the
opinions of this Department rendered September 21 and
November 8, 1895. I can find no statutory authority to
refund penal duties on the ground that they were incurred
without willful negligence or an intention of fraud on the
part of the importer.
I return herewith the opinions of the Solicitor of the
Treasury and the Comptroller of the Treasury upon this
question.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.ARY OF '.I.'HE TREASURY.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-LIBEL.
An opinion given by the Attorney-General, which under the uniform
practice of the Attorneys-General of withholding any expression of
opinion on a mere moot question until a case has actually arisen, he
mio-ht with entire propriety have declined to give.
Any publication in an official circular of the ground upon which an
employee of the Governmen1; has been suspended or discharged from
th public service will not support a cause of action for libel against
the officers making such publication, provided it was made in good
faith, witbou t malice, in the performance of official duty, and with the
design only f promoting the public interests.

DEP.ARTME '.I.'

OF

JUSTICE,

March 14, 1896.
IR: I have the honor to a knowledge receipt of your letr f h 6 h in t nt, in lo ing a " pecimen of a, monthly

TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

321

App ro pr i ati on-Seeds _.

· circular issued by the Weather Bureau of the Department of
Agriculture and distributed among its employees for the purposes of information and discipline." You invite my attention particularly to such portions of the circular as are marked
111 blue and ask my opinion whether "the printing anrl distribution of this circular might give cause for civil action
against the Chief of the Weather Bureau for libel on the
part of any person who13e name appears on such circular."
Inasmuch as the circular has been already issued and distributed-and a cause of action, if any, has already accruedI am unable to perceive precb,ely the object of your inquiry
for my opinion; and, indeed, uuder the uniform course of
practice observed by my predecessors in office, I might with
entire propriety withhold any expression of opinion at all on
a mere moot question until a case has actually.arisen. But I
may say for your information that any publication in an official
circular of the ground upon which an officer or employee of
the Government has been suspended or discharged from the
public service will not support a cause of action for libel
against the officer making such publication, provided it was
made in good faith, without malice, in the performance of an
official duty, and with the design only of promoting the public
interests.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.
APPROPRIATION-SEEDS.
The appropriation which was made for the purchase of seed .for the
Agricultural Department, in accordance with the provisions of section
527 of the Revised Statutes, for the year 1896 is available for purchases made under joint resolution S. R. 43.
Said joint resolution authorizes and directs the purchase and distribution of seeds for the year 1896 according to the practice which had
been followed by the Departme:.::.: ~" Agriculture up to the year 1895,
and the Secretary of Agriculture is to inquire how the distribution
has been made in previous years, and follow the same course. If it
has varied from year to year, he has a discretion, which he is free to
exercise, but it will be a discretion of choice and not to do or leave
undone.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 16, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested,
upon the question submitted by your letter of 14th instant,
whether, under joint resolution (S. R. 43) "authori_zing and
directing the Secretary of ..Agriculture to purchase and distribute seeds, bulbs, and so forth, as has been done in preceding years," you are '' compelled to use any part of an
appropriation which was made for the purchase of seed in
accordance with the provisions of section 527 of the Revised
Statutes."
You ·were advised, ..August 15, 1894 (21 Opin., 55), that the
act. making appropriations for your Department for the :fiscal
year 1895 did not authorize the purchase of any other seeds
than those described in Revised Statutes, section 527; that
is to say, seeds "rare and uncommon to the country or such
as can be made more profitable by frequent changes from
one part of our own country to another." You were further
advised upon the same subject ..April 20, 1895 (id., 162). ..Acting under those opinions, you refrained from purchasiug and
distributing seeds, as had theretofore been done by your
Department, on the ground that the seeds which had been
distributed and those which you would be able to procure
for di tribution did not come within the description of seeds
to which you are limited by section 527.
The manifest object of the joint resolution was to authorize and direct the purclJa 'e and distribution of seeds for the
year 1896 aceording to the practice which had been followed
by your Department before your action above mentioned.
The word "rare," which i found in section 527, is omitted in
the re olution and the word" valuable" only used. While it
i an unu ua] manner of lP.gislating to refer to previous practi e only as he tandard aud mea ure fot the official action
dir cted I ee no r a on for ho]diug that the resolution i
invalid or ineffective for that rea'on. You are thereby
dire t d t "di tribute vah.w:.,:8 seeds for the year 1896, a
ha b n one in preceding y ars."
ou ar imply put to
h inquiry how the di ri utio~ has been made in previou
r .·, a11d r quired t foll ,
h ame •our e, o far a
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practicable, for the year named. The resolution assumes that
the course has been uniform in previous years. If it has
varied from year to year you have a discretion which you
are free to exercise, having in mind the general object of
legislation on the subject, but it will be a discretion of choice
and not a discretion to do or leave undone. fo other words;
the plain intent and effect of the resolution are to remove all
question of the construction of previous legislation on t~e
subject and direct you to distribute seeds for the present
year as has, in fact, been done heretofore, whether strictly
in conformity with law or not. This Congress unquestionably had the authority to do. If an amendment or suspension of existing legislation be involved, such amendment_or
suspension is accomplished by the resolution. · The direction
is mandatory and should be followed.
The object of the last part of the resolution was to remove
all doubt as to your authority to purchase seeds for distribution without resorting to advertisement for bids, a question
of such authority having been raised by you in the communication upon which the second opinion above cited was
given. You are authorized and directed to make purchases
for the current year in the open market at your own discretion, provided you do not pay more than a reasonable and
fair price. The appropriation for the purchase of seed for
the year 1896 is available for purchases which you make
under the resolution.
RespectfuUy submitted.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.

ACCOUNTS--MISTAKE OF LAW.
A soldier should not
of the amount he
through a mistake
Government.

be held accountable for money paid him in excess
was entitled to where such payment was made
of law on the part of the executive officers of the
·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

jlpril 1, 1896.

SIR: I beg to acknowlPdge tte receipt of the communication of Capt. Owen J. Sweet, Twen-ty-fifth Infantry, U.S. A.,
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of February 23, 1896, to the Adjutant-General of the Army,
"referring to a communication from the .Adjutant-General's
Office of date February 17, 1896, stating that the records on
file in that office show Private Edward Langford, Company D,
Twenty-fifth Infantry, to have been erroneously mustered for
arlditional pay on account of continuous service in explanation
of his action in mustering the soldier for $4 per month additional pay since March 28, 1894, was by virtue of remarks on
descriptive and assignment roll of the soldier to that effect
and that the overpayment of $231.13 will be entered as a
stoppage on muster and pay roll of the company against
the soldier and that the soldier will be mustered for $2 per
month for five years' continuous service as directed, etc.,"
which communication, by the in<lorsements thereon, appears
to have been forwarded through regular channels to the
Adjutant-General's Office of the War Department and by the
Secretary of War referred to the Judge-Advocate-General of
the Army, with the request that he return the paper, with
an expression of his opinion as to whether or not, in view of
all the circumstances of the case, the Secretary of War has
the power to remove the stoppage on account of overpayment
to the soldier of the amount of $229.13 (to December 31,
18!l5); and by a further indorsement thereon presents the
clear and well-reasoned opinion of the Judge-.AdvocateGeneral of the Army, supporting the conclusion expressed
by him that the money so paid to Private Ed ward Langford
in excess of the amount which that soldier was entitled to
was made through a mistake of law on the part of the
executive officer of the Government, for which the soldier
hould not be held accountable.
I fully concur in the reasoniug and conclusion here expre ed.
In Colon 1 wayne' ase (17 Opin., 448), Colonel Swayne
a cepted a commi ' ion a colonel of the Forty-fifth United
ate Infantry on the 10th eptem ber 1866. From the time
f hi appointment a colonel to 1 t .Augu t, 1867, when he
wa int rm mu tered out of the rvice as major-general of
ol nteer , olonel wayue ontinued to draw the pay of
n ral. Th que tion pre ented for opinion was,
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whether the Government was entitled to set off against his
allowance for percentage increase so much of the pay received by him · as :µiajor-general from the 10th September,
1866, the date of his acceptance of the appointment of colonel, to 31st August, 1867, when he was mustered out of the
service as major-general of volunteers, as represents the
excess of a major-general's pay over that of a colonel.
Mr. Brewster, Attorney-General, was "of opinion that
upon principles of administrative policy which ought to be
considered firmly established the settlements between Colonel Swayne and the accounting officers in the matter of his
pay as major-general of volunteers are conclusive ·u pon the
executive department of the Government and can not be
reopened in the way indicated."
John W. Pulliam, captain~ assistant quartermaster, United
States Army, filed a claim for service .P ay "under any and
all laws allowing credit for cadet service at United States
MiJitary Academy." Re was allowed $583.09 on that claim.
After that allowance was made the Supreme Court of the
United States held all such allowances to be without the
authority of law. Captain Pulliam afterwards filed a claim
for longevity rations a_nd increased pay. It was proposecl to
set off against the .amount to which be was justly entitled
the sum which had been improperly paid to him. Mr. Miller,
Attorney-General (19 Opin., 439), held, following the rule
in Lamborn v. County Commissioners (97 U. S., 185), that "a
voluntary payment made with a full knowledge of all the
facts and circumstances of the case, though made under a
mistaken view of the law, can 110t be revoked, and the money
so paid can not be recovered back;" that" the settlement in
Captain Pulliam's case can not be reopened upon the ground
that it proceeded on a mistaken view of the legislation
governing the subject involved."
I am clearly of opinion that the rule of law thus invoked
and applied for the relief of educated and experienced officers of the Army should apply ct multo fortiori for the relief
of an ignorant and unlettered private soldier who bad no
part whatever in the statement of the accounts which resulted
in the balance paid to him and who appears to have been paid
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s·u ch balance without any demand or application on his part
for it.
Very respectfu1Iy,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HAUMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

DUTIES.
The operation of section23 of the customs administrative act is not confined to damaged goods.
It is not the intent of Congress that the United States should in any
case exact ·as duties an amount greater than the value of the property
imported.
DEP.ARTMENT OF

JUSTICE,
April 10, 18.96.
SrR: I have the honor to acknowlerlge your communication of March 31, 1896, asking my official opinion as to the
constructio1i of section 23 of the customs administrative act
of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, which is as follows:
"That no allowance for damage to goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the U11ited States sha1I hereafter be
made in the estimati011 and liquidation of duties thereon;
but the importer thereof may, within ten days after entry,
abandon to the United States all or auy portion of goods,
wares, a11d merchandi e included in any invoice, aud be
r lieved from the payment- of the duties on the portion o
abandoned : Provided, That tlrn portion so abandoned shall
amount to ten per centu1I,1 or over of the total value or
quantity of the invoice; and the property so abaudoned
baII be 'old by public auction or otherwh;e disposed of for
tb a c unt and ·r dit of t.b United State' under such regulation , a, th
cretary of th~ Tr asury may pre ·cril>e."
n a 1 me wheth r an import r of good , no part of
wl1i ·h i.· <lama 0 ·ed ma be r lie ed from the payment of the
duti
n c ny por i n (not I , . than 10 per ~entum iu value
r nanti ·) f hi inv i
by ah, 11doni11g it to tlie United
t·1t . Ju my pinion h l eratiou of thi ection i not
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eonfined to damaged goods, and it is not the intent of Congress that the United States should in any case exact as
duties an amount greater than the value of the property
imported. Your question is, therefore, answered in the
affirmative.
Very respectfully,
.JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
N A VY-CONTRACTS OF MINORS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

A minor who at, the age of 19, with the consent of his father, enlisted
in the Navy, has not the right on coming of age to demand his discharge under the rule which applies to his ordinary civil contrac.ts.
The United States have the right to prescribe the rules and conditions
under which voluntary or compulsory services are to be rendered by
citizens.
The period at which persons reach their majority and become sui jur-is
with respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge this power
of the General Government.
If a statute authorizes a minor by enlistment to bind himself during _
his minority, he can bind himself for a further period.
The phrase "other persons" in the act of Ma.rch 2, 1837, included minors above 18 as well as men of full age.
DEPAR'.l.'MEN'r OF

JUSTICE,

April 16, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion on the question
submitted in your letter of the 9th instant, whether or not
one who at the age of 19, with the consent of his father,
enlisted in the Navy, has the right on coming of age to
demand his discharge under the rule which applies to his
ordinary civil contracts.
The question is controlled by the following sections of the
Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of May 12, 1879 (21
Stat., 3), and by section 2 of the act of "February 23, 1881
(21 Stat., 338):
"SEC. 1418. Boys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years may be enlisted to serve in the Navy until they
shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years; other persons
may be enlisted to serve for a period not exceeding .five years,
unless sooner discharg~d by direction of the President.
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"SEC. 1419. Minors bet.ween the ages of fourteen and
eighteen years shall not be enlisted for the naval ervice
without the consent of their parents or guardians.
"SE·c. 1420. No minor under the age of sixteen years, uo
insane or intoxicated person, and no deserter from the naval
or military service of the United States shall be enlisted in
the naval service.
"SEC. 1G24, ART. 19. Any officer who knowingly enlists
into the naval service any deserter from the naval or military service of the United States, or any insane or intoxicated person~ or any minor between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen years, without the consent of bis parents or guar"diau, or any minor under the age of fifteen years, shall be
dishonorably dismissed from the service of the United
States."
It will be noted that section 1418 provides that all persons
other than boys between 14 and 18 years may be enlisted to
erve for a period not exceeding five years. Section 1419
requires the consent of parents and gua,r dians for the enlistment of such minors; but no such condition is required by
this or any other law for the enlistment of minors over 18.
Section 1420 prohibits the enlistment of any minor under
14, but there is no prohibition against enlisting minors over 18.
Section 1624, article 19, requires the dishonorable dismissal
of any officer who knowingly enlists into the naval service a
minor under 18 without the consent of his parents or guardian;
but there is no penalty for enlisting minors over 18 with or
without such consent.
It js clear from these provisions that Congres has authorized the enlistment in the Navy of minors who are over 18,
and that the consent of parents and guardian i not nece ary to make the enli tment valid.
The United States are empowered to raise and maintain a
navy, and have a right to prescribe the rules and condition
nnd r which voluntary or compulsory services are to be rendered by itizen .
The p riod at which per ons reach their majority and
be ome ,"ui juri · with re pect to the ordinary affair of life
an not a ridg tbi pow r of the Creneral Government. If
th
ral tate hould, a the may, extend the period of
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minority to the age of 25, it is manifest that the power of the
Federal Government to provide for the common defense would
be greatly abridged if its relations with its citizens, in respect
of service in the Army or Navy,arelimited by the status which.
such citizens have under State laws. Our armies and navies
would lack stability if terms of enlistment could be abridged
at the will of those who reach their majority according to the
laws of their States of domicile.
As a minor over 18 can by enlistment bind himself during
bis minority, there is no reason why he can not bind himself
for a further period.
The conclusion I have reached is not in accord with that of
my predecessor, the Hon. JolmNelson . . (4 Opin., 350.) He
treated the question as if citizens of the United States sustain the same relation to the Government with respect to
service in the Army and Navy as they do to ordinary persons
in matters of contract, and tests the question by the usual
rules applicable to the contI;acts of minors.
In re McNulty, 2 Lowell, 270 (Federal Cases, 8917), minors
over 18, who enlisted without the consent of their parents,
were discharged on habeas corpus. The reasoning of that
case is opposed to my conclusion, but carried to its logical
result it would deny the right of the Government to enlist
any minor over 18 with or without the consent of parent or
guardian, for it holds that the act of March 2, 1837 (5 Stat.,
153), now carried into section 1416, which provided for enlisting "boys" between the specified ages and "other persons,"
meant by the latter only men of full age by the law of the
State where the contract of enlistment is made. This construction would entirely deprive the Government of authority
to enlist minors over 18, although it is well known that this
class is peculiarly desirable and may be necessary for military and naval service. I know of no reason for supposing
that Congress did not consider minors above 18 to be "persons." On the contrary, the use of the expression '' other
persons," after the mention of minors under 18, shows that
Congress had no such idea.
It seems clear to me that minors between 14 and 18 are ·
treated as one class and their enlistment made lawful conditionally, while all persons over 18, whether of age or not,.
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were included in the phrase "other persons" who may be
enlisted for five years. This view is supported by In re
Doyle (18 Fed. Rep., 369), which sustained the enlistment of a
minor over 18 made without consent of parent or guardian.
If the statute authorizes the enlistment of a minor, then
his contract is binding. (Tyler on Infancy and Coverture,
sec. 96.) If it is bindin_g, it affects him just as it would affect
any other person. It is not strange that the Government,
which bas the undoubted right to require the involuntary
service of minors, should provide for obtaining it voluntarily.
In reaching a conclusion I have been ·much influenced by
Judge Story's discussion of the principles involved. (See
United States v. BainlJridge, 1 Mason, 71.)
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE NAVY.

WORLD'S FAIR-MEDALS.
The law authorizing tl.ie Secretary of tl.ie Treasury to furnish electrot,ypes and photographs ot tl.io medals of award to exhibitors at th e
·world's Fair to whom medals have been awarded, and to newspapers
and periodicals for publication, carries with it the authority to those
to whom snch electrotypes and photographs may be furnished. to have
prints made therefrom without further or lllore specific authority.
The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the right to insert the
u·a me of the exhibitor in the blank space which will be used for that
purpose on the medal.
After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas
awarded tl.iem, the Treasury Department has no further authority over
th m, and is not authorized to say what use shall or shall not b o
made of them, or to restrict the-making or using of facsimiles of them
by exhibitors to whom they have been awarded, beyond what is prescribed by the express provisions of the statutes referred to in this
opinion .
DEPARTMENT OF Ju TICE,

April 18, 1896.

r, ·

t
,

your ornm
f ct of
a t f

·

·

u

n

15th in tant, r fer(27 tat., 3 9), and
7 tat., 87), und r
ury Department to

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

331

World's Fair-Medals.

make certain medals and diplomas to be awarded to exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition; also to the .section
in the general appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat.,
928), by which the Secretary of the Treasury is "authorized
to furnish electrotypes or photographs of the medal of award
of the World's Columbian Exposition to exllibitors to whom
medal has been awarded, at the expense and cost of such
exhibitors, and also to furnish the same to newspapers and
periodicals for publication, provided the publishers to whom
the electrotypes or photographs are furnished pay the expenses thereof, but that no electrotypes or photographs shall
be furnished to any persons except those to whom medal bas
been awarded and to newspapers aud periodicals paying for
the same, and any other person printing facsimiles of said
electrotypes or photographs of said medals shall be liable to
the penalty prescribed by act of August 5, 1892."
You request an expression of my opinion "whether the
law authorizing the furnishing of electrotypes to exhibitors
carries with it also the authority to have prints made therefrom, or must the printers and publishers receive authority
from the Department before using the electrotypes in the
advertisements of their customers."
You further inquire whether "either the exhibitors or
printers or publishers hnive the right to insert the name of
the exhibitor in the blank space which will be utilized for
that purpose on the medal."
You further request to be advised whether, "after the
exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas
awarded them, this Department_has any further authority
oTer them, or any authority to say what use shall or shall
not be macle of them, or to restrict the making or using of
facsimiles of them by exhibitors to whom they have been
awarded."
The evident purpose and intent of Congress in its legislation on this subject was that the medals and diplomas
awarded to exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition
should receive and retain the character of credible and
abiding testimon-ials of the truth of .what is inscribed on
them, and to that end severe penalties were attached to
counterfeiting and to fraudulently and unlawfully having in
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possession or causing to be circulated any duplicate or
counterfeits of such medals or diplomas.
In an opinion heretofore given by me, in response to a
request from you of November 4, 1895, I stated that section
3 of tbe act of August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 389), which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to give the holder of a
medal properly awarded to him permission to have duplicates thereof made at any of the mints of the United States,
from gold or silver or bronze, at the expense of the person
desiring the same, was repealed by act of March 3, 1893.
(27 Stat., 587.)
The purpose there manifested of denying- to lawful holders of such medals the privilege of having tl1e same duplicated at the mints of the United States is Rtill more clearly
evinced by the expr~ss provision of section 3 -of the act of
March 3, 1893, prohibiting every person within the United
States or any Territory thereof, without lawful authority,
from making- or aiding or assisting in making any dies, hub,
plate, or mold, in steel, plaster, or any other Rubstance whatsoever, in the likeness or similitude as to the design or
inscription ther~on, of any die, hub, plate, or mold, designated for the striking of the medals and diplomas of award
for ·the World's Columbian Exposition, as provided in section
3 of the act of August 5, 1892.
It appears from your letter that the provision of the act
of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 928), authorizing tile Secretary of
the Treasury to furnish electrotypes or pllotographs of the
medals of award, was induced by the unexpected delay in
the completion and delivery of the medals awarded to the
exhibitors, and to enable the successful exhibitors to enjoy
the privilege of u ing cuts of their medal8 without incurring
the penalties prescribed by the act of March 3, 1892.
Th act of l\farch 2, 1895, is specific in the authority granted
to th Bureau of Engraving and Printing, under the upervi ion of the ecretary of the Treasury, "to print upon tl.t
blank 1iploma au horiz d by ection 3 of the act of Augu t
,> 1 :c, a amend d by the act of farch 3, 1 93, the name
f b 1) r n to whom the diploma are to be awarded by
rld
lumbian "ommi
th
h n t r pl
a foll w :
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furnish electrotypes and photographs of the medals of award
to exhibitors to whom medals have been awarded, and to
newspapers and periodicals fo~ publication, carries with it
the authority to those to whom such electrotypes and photo-.
graphs may be furnished to have prints made therefrom
without further or more specific authority.
2. The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the
right, in my opinion, to insert the name of the exhibitor in.
the blank space which will be utilized for that purpose on
the medal.
3. After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and
diplomas awarded them, the Treasury Department bas not
any further authority over them, and has not any authority
to say what use shall or shall not be made of them, or to
restrict the making or using of facsimiles of them by exhibitors to whom they have been awarded, beyond what is prescribed by the express provision of the statutes already
referred to.
Very respectfully,
HOLM.ES CONRAD,
t~olicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The S'.ECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES-REGULATIONS.
A limitation by the Secretary of the Treasury of the right to kill sea
otter within a certain area to a certain race or class of people would
be granting a special privilege and would violate section 1956 of the
Revised Statutes.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 21, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested by
your letter of the 18th instant. The question presented is
whether Article VI of your proposed regulations as to the
killing of sea otter conflicts with the last sentence of section
1956 of the Revised Statutes. By act of Congress approved
Febmary 21, 1893 (27 Stat., 472), the provisions of that section are made applicable to the waters of the North Pacific
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Ocean and Bering Sea as defined in the award of the Paris
Tribunal. Sectiori 1956 prohibits the killing of various furbearing animals, but permits you, under such regulations as
you may prescribe, to authorize the killing of any such animals
except fur seals, but provides that you shall not "grant any
special privileges." Your said .Article VI prescribes that
only resident natives of Alaska (Inoians) and a certain class
of white men shall have the privilege of killing sea otter
within said area.
A special privilege is one which is not open to all persons
alike who comply with terms and conditions fairly within
the power of all. The limitation of a right to people of a
specified race or class, therefore, is necessarily a special
privilege. In my opinion, your proposed regulation would
be a violation of the last clause of section 1956.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTIES.
Section 14 of the customs administrative act did not in any way limit
the power of collectors of customs to reliquidate duties in the interest
cf the Government within one year after entry.

DEPARTMENT

,JUSTICE,
April 29, 1896.
SIR: Answering your communication of .April 27, I have
the honor to say that, in my opinion, section 14 of the custom administrative act of June 10, 1890, did not limit in
any way the power of the collector of customs to reliquidate
dutie in the interest of the Government within one year
after the time of entry, as recognized in section 21 of the
antimoiety act of June 22, 1874. (See opinion of General
pprai er omerville, G. . 1304.)
ery r pectfully,
HOLMES CO R D,
Acting Attorney-General.
Tb
ET R
F TIT
TREA URY.
OF
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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
The certificate of eligibles delivered to the appointing officer by the
,mbordinates of the Civil Service Commission is a complete authority
to such officer to make any selection he may desire therefrom., and is
a complete protection to the appointee.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 1, 1896.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of April 23, accompanying a letter from the Civil Service Commission, asking my opinion upon the case of James
P. Baggott. It appears that on March 14, 1896, the postmaster at Racine, Wis., iu accordance 'with the civil-service
rules, requested a certificate of eligibles for filling a vacancy
in a clerical posit,iou in his office. Baggott's name was the
fourth on the eligible list and should not have been certified
(Postal Rule IV), although possibly had everything been
done regularly it would eventuaUy have appeared. (General Rule IV, sec. 3.) The postmaster, assuming, as he
lrnd a right to do, that the certification made to him was
in accordance with the civil-service rules and regulations,
selected Baggott, who was appointed. So far as appears
from the facts stated by the Commission, Baggott's appointment was made before the appointing officer was aware of
the irregularity in the certification.
This case is similar to that of Frank C. Moore, discussed
in my opinion of J auuary D, 1896, except that in Moore's case
the irregularity was not discovered until be bad served over
six months and received an absolute as well as probationary
appointment. In my opinion, however, this distinction is not
material. The appointing officer must necessarily place absolute reliance upon the certificate received by him from the
board of examiners. The appointment is usually made
promptly, and the appointee often gives up other employ. ment, so that it would be a great injustice to him to be thrown
out of his new place in the Government service on account
of a mistake made by som~ subordinate of the Civil Service
Commission.
I think that the regularity of the steps taken by the Civil
Service Commission is not jurisdict_ional; and that, while the
subordinates of that Commission are subject to discipline for
3513-YOL 21, PT 2--9
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such misfeasances as occurred in the present case, nevertheless the certificate which they deliver to the appointing officer is a complete authority to the latter and a complete protection to the appointee.
Answering the first question submitted, therefore, it is my
opinion that Baggott's appointment was legal. This disposes
also of the second question.
Answering the third question, as to whether there is "any
·1aw or rule which will be ~ffective in preventing a board
from securing the appointment of a person who is ineligible
or who has never been examined by simply entering his
name on the certificate," I know of no method except the
selection of competent and careful boards of examiners.
Doubtless every effort to this end has been made by the
Civil Service Commission; and this case, therefore, must be
classed among the mistakes that occasiona1ly and unavoidably occur in all business affairs. I do not think that I can
properly advise as to whether the eligible whose right to
certificate was ignored has any redress in law.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The ·pRESIDEN'.l'.

TAX ON STATE BANK CIRCULATION.

The tax on State banks, imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, chapter
36, sections 19 and 20 does not apply to paper which can not be used
in the community as money without danger of total loss to whoever
may take it.
DEPAR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

May 5, 1896.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of April 30, reque ting my opinion as to whether the
:fi llowing order ''i uch a note, on the irculation of which,
in li u of the money or c~rrency of the nited tate a ta.·
f 1 I er entum i impo eel by ction 19 and 20 of the
a t f
bruar
1875 (1
tat., 311)."
IR:
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The order is as follows:
"OFFICE OF COLUMBUS

S.A.VIN GS B.A.NK,

[10.

'·No. 1.]
"Columbus, Ga., 1st day of .April, 18.96.
"Pay to Louis F. Garrard, or bearer, ten dollars ($10.00)
in merchandise silver bullion, at retail.
"H. B. CROWELL,
".Assistant Treasurer.
"To G. GUNBY JORDAN,
"President."
In HolUster v. Mercantile Institution (111 CT. S., 65), Chief
Justice Waite, speaking for the court, said:
"From this review of the legislation on the general subject,
and the apparently studied use by Oongresf; of words of
appropriate signification, whenever it was intended to cover
anything el~e than promissory notes, in the commercial sense
of that term, we are led to the conclusion that only such
notes as are in law negotiable so as to carry title in their
circulation from hand to hand, are subjects of taxation under
the statute."
If the instrument be expressed to be payable "in cash or
specific articles" in the alternative, or "in merchandise," or
in any other article than money, as, for instance, "an ounce
of gold" (Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt., 494), it becomes a special
contract and by the law merchant loses its character as commercial paper. In order to possess the quality of negotiability it should afford on its face every element necessary to
fix its value.
The order here is not payable in money; it is payable in
silver bullion, which is an article of merchandise; its value
is measured in dollars; but the order is expressly for merchandise and not for money.
It is not a contract on which an action of debt could be
maintained by the holder of it. It is not negotiable, can not
t e used as currency, will not pass from hand to hand by
delivery merely, without indorsement, can not in short, be
used in the community as money without danger of total
1os8 to whoever may take it, Hence, it is not, in my opinion,
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such a note as is embraced within sections 19 and 20 of the
act of February 8, 1875.
Yours; respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- Genera.l.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMO_,__ .
The SECRE'.l.'ARY OF THE TREASURY.

DEPARTMENT CLERKS-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE.
Employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing are entitled to
leave of absence under the act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, notwithstanding the provisions of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, section 5.
When an act of Congress has received for ten years a uniform departmental construction, which was known to Congress, and a subsequent
act in pari 1nate1·ia is enacted, without change of language, there is a
presumption of considerable force that the new language is intended
to receive th e same construction as the old.
A general act does not operate as a r epeal of a prior special act when
there is no necessary inconsistency in their standing together.
The provisions of the act of 1893 apply only to clerks and employees in
the city of Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 6, 1896.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of April 30,
asking my official opinion as to the statute governing leave
of absence in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
The act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, applicable only to
employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printiug, provides that they " shall be allowed leave of absence with pay
11ot exceeding thirty day in any one year." It contain
p cial provi ion for the pieceworkers in that Bureau, regulating their pay while on leave of ab ence "by the average
amount of work doue by uch person and the pay therefor
durin th ev ral m nth of they ar."
b l o-i lativ , t ., appropriation act of March 3 1 03
b pt r .:111
tion o, a provi ion applicabl to all cl rk
and tli r mplo
ill th
v ral x cutiv Departm n
pr id
hat th b ad of a D partment "may gran thirty
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days' annual and thirty days' sick leave in any one year to
each clerk and empioyee" with the possible extension of sick
leave to sixty days "in exceptional and meritorious cases,
where to limit such sick leave would work peculiar hardship."
The question now presented is whether the act of 1893
operates as an implied repeal of the act of 1892 and is applicable to employees of said Bureau.
The Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in his
letter of May 4 to yourself, which has been submitted to me,
claims that his Bureau is not strictly a part of any Executive
Department. and therefore is uot within the purview of the
statute of 1893. Assuming, however, that this claim is not
well founded, and that the Bureau is properly a part of the
Treasury Department, nevertheless it is my opinion that its
employees are still subject to the provisions of the statute of
1892.
The language of the statute of 1893 describing the clerks
and employees who are entitled to leave of absence thereunder is copied from the provision in pari materia of the
legislative, etc., appropriation act of March 3, 1883, chapter ·
128, section 4. The Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing states in his letter that by the uniform departmental
construction of the statute of 1883 it was held inapplicable
to bis Bureau. This was certainly also the understanding
of subsequent Congresses, as is shown by their action in
adopting ~pecial legislation for the benefit of the employees
of the Bureau. (Acts of March 3, 1887, chap. 392, and July
. 6, 1802, chap. 154; Cong. Rec., Feb. 28, 1887, p. 2429, and July
1, 1802, p. 5723.) When an act of Congress has for a considerable period of time received a uniform departmental
construction, and this construction was known to Congress,
and a subsequent act in pari materia is enacted without
cbang·e of language, there is a presumption of considerable
force that the new language is intended to receive the same
construction as the old. (20 Opin., 719, 721.) Moreover, the
statute of 1893 contains no express repeal of or reference
to the statute of 1892. There is no necessary inconsistency
in the two acts standing together. The maxim generalia,
specialibus non d,Jrogant applies, and the later act does not
operate as an implied repeal. (Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.,
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556, 570.) It should be added that the nature of the work
done in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is so different from that done in the other Executive Departments as to
confirm the view that the special act governing leaves of
absence to its employees was not intended to be repealed.
I therefore have the honor to advise you that the statute
of 1892 is still in force and is the only law governing leaves
of absence in that Bureau.
Your further communication of May 4 asks my opinion
whether the above-cited provisions of the statute of 1893
relate to all employees of your Department, whether located
at the seat of Government or elsewhere. This question is,
in my opinion, to be answered 1n the negative. As already
stated, the persons affected by the act of 1893 were intended
to be the same as those affected by the act of 1883, and by
the settled executive and legislative construction of the
former act its operation is confined to clerks and employees
in this city: (See acts of June 27, 1884, chap. ]26; August
28, 1890, chap. 812; October 1, 1890, chap. 1260.)
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
Sick seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit
of the Marine-Hospital fund provided for sick and disabled seamen.

DEP.A.RTMEN'l'

OF

JUS1'ICE,
May 7, 1896.

SIR: r have your letter of May 2, requesting my opinion
upon the questjon whether the Treasury Department "i
required under existing law to extend the benefits M the
Ma,rine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers and
eamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service." You call my attention to tb a t of June 29, 1870, March 3, 1875, and June
20, 1 4, and you tate that while it would appear from
tb wording of
tion 1 of the act of June 29, 1870 that
all
rnm nt v el were xempt from the ho pital tax,
amen on re enue ut r were r quir d to pay
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this tax and that the regulations of the Revenue-Marine
Service, paragraph 69, expressly provide for this contribution to the Marine-Hospital fund.
A. review of the legislation on this subject from 1798, when
the tax of 20 cents a month on seamen employed on vessels
of the United States engaged in foreign and coasting trade
was :first laid for the purpose of establishing such hospital
fund, down to the present time shows that little, if any,
regard was bad to symmetry or consistency in the adaptation and structure of the several statutes.
The fund for the maintenance of what was known as the
Marine Hospital was derived originally, and as late as 1875,
from taxes laid upon seamen employed on vessels of the
United States arriving from a·foreign port or registered vessels employed in the coasting trade.
A.n obvious propriety would seem to require that a fund
thus derived from the wages of seamen should be devoted
exclusively to the care, comfort, and maintenance of those
who contributed to the fund.
By section 15 of the act of June 26, 1884, all the acts and
parts of acts providing for the assessment and collection of a
hospital tax for seamen were repealed, and the expenso of
maintaining the Marine-Hospital Service thereafter was
to be home by the United States out of the receipts for
duties on tonnage provided by that act. So the United
States Government from that time on has provided the fund
from which this service has been maintained.
While in the earlier acts the fund appropriated for the
Marine-Hospital Service was directed to be employed "for
the care and relief of sick and disabled seamen employed
in registered, enrolled, and licensed vesse]s of the United
Sta,t es," yet by the act of March 3, 1875, section 3, it was
provided:
"That term 'seaman,' wherever employed in legislation
relating to the Marine-Hospital Service, shall be held to
include any person employed on board in the care, preservation, or navigation of any vessel, or in the service, on board,
of those engaged in such care, preservation, or navigation."
This clearly embraces seamen on board revenue cutters.
In the chapter of the Revised Statutes on the Government
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Hospital for the Insane, section 4843, insane persons belonging to the Revenue-Cutter Service are provided for in express
terms. I do not think, however, that the express provision
for them in that chapter justifies their exclusion from the
other provisions of the statute wherein they are not expressly
named. On the contrary, I think it manifest that the later
statutes plainly indicate a general policy on the part of the
Government to extend benefits of the hospital service to all
persons, whether in the navy, marine, or revenue ~ervice.
4-nd I am of opinion, therefore, that the sick seamen of the
Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit of the
Marine Hospital provided for sick and disabled seamen.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

NAVAL ACADEMY-APPOINTMENT OF CADETS.
A cadet, nominated to the Naval Academy upon the recommendation of
a Member of the House of Representatives who, since the recommendation and nomination, has been unseated by contest of election, can
not be lawfully deprived of his place if he passes his examination.
The Secretary of the Navy is not to revoke such a nomination and notify
the newly seated member that a vacancy occurs. He has no right to
call for a new recommendation, except under section 1516, Revised
Statutes, when the candidate fails to pass his examination.
The notice provided for by section 1514, Revised Statutes, as amended,
was intended to be given to the Member of Congress actually sitting,
and the recommendation provided by said section was intended to be
made by such Mero ber and action duly taken thereon should not be
affected by any subsequent event, except the failure of the nominee to
pass his examination.
Until a deci ion is made which unseats them, Members of Congress
who
ats ar contested are con idered to be in all respects endowed
with the same rights, power , and privileges as other members.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
R:

I bav

May 7, 1 96.
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of a naval cadet recently nominated to the Naval Academy
at Annapolis" upon the recommendation of a Member of the
House of Representatives, who, since the recommendation
and nomination, has been unseated by contest of election.
The practical question is whether or not you are to revoke
the nomination and notify the newly seated Member that a
vacancy exists.
The answer depends on section 1514, Revised Statutes, as
amended July 26, 1894 (2 Supp., 206), which provides that"The Secretary of the Navy shall, as soon after the fifth of
March in each year as possible, notify in writing each Member and Delegate of the House of Representatives of any
vacancy that may exist in his district.
"The nomination of a candidate to fill said vacancy shall
be made upon the recommendation of the Member or Delegate, if such recommendation is made by the first day of J _u ly
of that year; but if it is not made by that time the Secretary
of the Navy shall fill the vacancy by appointment of an actual ·
resident of the district in which the vacancy exists," etc.
The date named in the statute was undoubtedly chosen
with reference to the meeting of Congress. The requirement of prompt notice was due to manifest reasons of public
policy. The object was not so much to confer a privilege on
the Members of Congress as to insure full classes of cadets.
Congress of course knew that nominees require time for
preparation and travel, and also knew that seats of Members of Congress are often contested; yet no exception was
made with respect to notice in cases of Members whose seats
are contested, and none for the suspension or revocation of
recommendations iu such cases, or of the nominations made
thereon. It follows, therefore, that Congress intended the
notice to be given to, and the recommendation to be m·ade
by, the Member of Congress actually sitting, and that action
. duly taken thereon should not be affected by any subsequent
event except the failure of the nominee to pass the examination.
This is quite consistent with the general rules which apply
to Memuers of Congress whose seats are contested. They
are considered, until a decision is made which unseats them,
to be, in all respects, endowed with the same rights, powers,
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and privileges, as other members. Laws passed by their
votes are valid; all acts done by them are binding, and
there is no reason why a mere recommendation to an executive department should be governed by any different rule.
Even if you had not acted upon the recommendation until
after the Member who made it was unseated, your nomination thereon would be perfectly legal and valid. This was
held by Attorney-General Bates (10 Opin., 46), who said, a
question having arisen as between recommendations made
by a Member of Congress and his predecessor, "I am clearly
of the opinion that yon have power to appoint anyone who
stands recommended by a Member of Congress who was, at
the time he recommended, representing the district in which
the applicant resiqes." The opinion sets forth the "very
injurious, not to say absurd, results" which would follow from
the view that the Member of Congress referred to in the
statute is the one who represents the district at the time of
final appointment or entry into the Academy. As the decision in a contested election case is not retroactive, new
Members who succeed to seats made vacant by death or
resignation must be held to occupy the same position with
respect to recommendations as successful contestants. The
uncertainty and embarrassment which would follow if recom.
mendations should be considered annulled in such cases are
quite apparent.
But, however it might be in case you had not acted on
the recommendation, I do not think you have any right to
call for a new recommendation except under section 1516,
which provides that, when any candidate nominated upon
the recommendation of a Member of Congress fails to pass
the examination, "the Member or Delegate shall be notified
to :recommend another candidate," etc.
As it appears from your statement that you acted on the
recommendation while the Member who made it then actualiy represented his district in Congress, my opinion is that
the matter has passed beyond your reach, and that, if the
can lidate pa ses the examination, he can not lawfully be
d priv d of hi pla e.
il th . xa t questi n was n t there con idered, ome
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of the reasons for my opinion are sustained in 10 Opinions,
494, and 21 Opinions, 164.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
DU'fIES.
Th e Secretary of the Treasury has no power to permit collectors of customs to receive special deposits of penal duties, to be returned by them
to the importers in case the duties should be remitted. All duties
paid to the collector must be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of
the United States.

DEPARTMENT

JUS'l'IOE,
May 16', 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of May 8, in which you ask my official opinion whether you
have the power to make a customs regulation whereby collectors of customs in cases where penal duties have been
assessed may receive the amount of such duty personally as
a special deposit, pending your . action upon the importers'
application for a remission or mitigation of the penalty, the
amount to be returned to the importer by the collector's
check should you grant such application, and to be turned
into the Treasury by the collector should your decision be
adverse.
Section 3010 of the Revised Statutes provides that all
moneys paid to a collector for "unascertained duties" shall
be "placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United
States, and shall not be held by the collector * * * to
await any ascertainment of duties." This is a reenactment of
the statute of 1839, which was intended to avert the danger of
future defalcations by collectors, such as had occurred in the
famous case of Samuel Swartwout. (Barney v. Rickard, 157
U. S., 352, 356.) This section was not repealed by the customs administrative act of 1890, and it ~s my opinion that it
is applicable to these penal duties, and therefore that it forbids the adoption of a regulation such as you propose. ·
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
OF
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SEAL FISHERIES-REGULATIONS.
Section 1956, Revised Statutes, as amended, applies to the Territory of
Alaska and the waters thereof, and to all the t'.ominion of the United
States in the waters of Bering Sea. It is lawful for the Secretary of
the Treasury, under said section, to <Hrect captains of the fur-sealing
fleet to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to have hunted sea
otter within said waters.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 20, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowled_g e the receipt of your
letter of May 15, 1896, asking for an opinion as to whether
or not a direction under section 1956 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by section 3 of the act of March 2, 1889
(25 Stat., 1009) 1 to the captains of the fur-seal patrolling fleet
to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to have hunted
sea otter within three miles of the coast of Alaska or other
territory of the United _States would be in violation of law.
Section 1956 is as follows:
"No person shall kill any otter, mink, marten, sable, or
fur seal, or other fur-bearing animal within the limits of
Alaska Territory, or in the waters thereof; and every person guilty thereof shall, for each offense, be :fined not less
than two hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both; and all vessels, their ta·c kle, apparel, furniture, and cargo, found engaged in violation of this section shall be forfeited; but the
Secretary of the Treasury shall have power to authorize the
killing of any such mink, marten, sable, or other fur-beadng
animal, except fur seals, under such regulations as he may
prescribe; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary to prevent the killing of any fur seal and to provide for the execution of the provisions of this section until it is otherwise
provided by law; nor shall he grant any special privileges
under thi ection."
ection 3 of the act of March 2, 1889, is as follows:
"That ction nineteen huudredand iifty- ix of the Revised
ta ute ftlie nit d tate i h rebydeclared to includ . and
pply to all th dominion of the nited State in the waters
f B bring a; and jt hall b the duty of the Pre i<lent, at
·m ly
on in e ch year to j ue hi proclamation and
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cause the same to be pul>lished for one month in at least one
newspaper, if any such there be published, at each United
States port of entry on the Pacific Coast, warning all persons
against entering said waters for the purpose of violatiug the
provisions of said section; and he shall also cause one or
more vessels of the United States to diligently cruise said
waters and arrest all persons, and seize all vessels found to
be, or to have been, engaged in any violation of the laws of
the United States therein."
Section 1956, as amended, applies to the Territory of
Alaska and the waters thereof, and to all the dominion of
the United States in the waters of Bering Sea.
In respect of the waters thus embraced, I am of the opinion that your instructions are authorized by law. (In re
Cooper, 143 U. S., 472.)
·
Respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TREATIES-CHINESE.
A treaty, so far as its provisions are self-executing, repeals a prior statute with which it is in conflict.
The convention of 1894 between the United States and China is a treaty.
Under its provisions a Chinese subject resident in a British colony,
and belonging to one of the privileged classes, may be admitted here
upon a certificate from the colonial government.
·
DEP ARTMEN'.l.' OF JUSTiCE,

May 20, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of May 13, asking an official opinion as to the construction
and operation of Article III of the convention of 1894 between
the United States and China. (28 Stat., 1211.)
This article provides that'' Chinese subjects, being officials,
teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or
pleasure, but not laborers," when seeking admission into
the United States, "may produce a certificate from their
Government or the Government where they last resided." The
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question bas arisen whether Chinese subjects belonging to
the privileged classes above mentioned and who are residents
of the British colony of Hongkong, may obtain admission
to the United States upon production of a certificate signed
by the registrar-general in that colony. I assume, for the
present purposes, that the registrar general is the proper
representative of the colonial government.
While called a convention, the document to which you
refer is clearly a treaty within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. It is, therefore, so far as its provisions are self.executing, a part of the supreme law of the
land. It is my opinion that the provisions of the article
under consideration are self-executing. Its language is clear.
It requires a certificate from the government of the colony
of Hongkong. It requires nothing more than that. Its
requirements would not be satisfied by a certificate from the
Government of China.
The act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, section 6, requires
that certificates in similar cases should be issued by the
Chinese Government, "or of such other foreign Government
of which at the time such Chinese person shall be a subject."
Prior, therefore, to the treaty of 1894 a certificate from the
authorities at Hongkong would have been insufficient in
the cases now under consideration, and a certificate from
the Chinese Government would have been necessary.
You ask my opinion whether the treaty "waives or modifies the requirement of" the act of 1884. As the treaty is
subsequent to the statute, and as its provisions are selfexecuting, I am of the opinion that it does modify the
r equirement of the statute, so that tb e certificate must now
come from Hongkon g and not from China. ( The Oherolcee
Toba,cco, 11 W all., 616, 621; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.,
190, 194 ; 13 Opin., 354.)

Very r e pectfully,
H OLMES CO RAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The

ECRE'J'.A.R
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INTERIOR DEPARTMENT-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE.
The Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb is not a part of the
Interior Department.
Advertisements for proposals under section 3709, R. S., are not required
for supplies or services for this institution.
Uniform departmental practice should receive great, if not,cont.rolling,
weight in statutory construction, especially where the statutory language was not modified when incorporated in the Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE,

May .20, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of May 12, asking my official opinion as to whether purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the use of
the Columbia Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and
Dumb must be made in conformity with the provisions of
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the acts
of January 27 and April 21, 1894. It appears from the
papers which you furnish me that the institution mentioned
was organized about 1856 as a volunteer association by Amos
Kendall and others. The constitution of the association
provided, among other things, that the institution should be
1ocated in the District of Columbia; that it should "be supported by donations, legacies, subscriptions of members and
others, and such aid as Congress may be pleased-to afford, aud
such other means as the board of directors may prescribe;"
and that the moneys of the association should be paid out
by the treasurer ·" on such vouchers as may be prescribed by
the board of directors." The association was subsequently
incorporated by Congress. (A.ct of February 16, 1857, chap.
46.) The act of incorporation recognized the right of the
institution to receive contributions and to take and bold real
and personal property, so far as might be necessary to its
maintenance and efficient managemeut (sec. 1); and that it
should be "managed as provided for in its present constitution and such additional regulations as may from time to
time be found necessary." (Sec. 2.) It provided for the
maintenance and tuition of indigent deaf, dumb, or blind
persons properly belonging to the District of Columbia;
m:tking the Secretary of the Interior the judge of the qualifications of such applicants, and provi<ling for their maintenance and tuition out of the Treasury of the United States.
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(Sec. 4.) It gave the_right to -receive and instruct other
deaf, dumb, and blind persons not at tbe expense of the
Treasury. (Sec. 5.) It provided that the president and
directors should report annual1y to the Secretary of the
Interior. (Sec. 6.) These provisions, with some which have
been subsequently added, are incorporated in the Revised
Statutes, sections 485V-48G8.
It is thus clear that the institution was originally intended
to be, on the one band, a corporation independent of the
United States Government, while on the other hand it should
be the means by which the Government should perform its
charitable duty to the indigent deaf, dumb, and blind of tbe
District of. Columbia and, as such, the recipient of contributions from the National Treasury. It was not a bureau of
the Interior Department, but the Government contributions
were to be made through the Secretary _o f the Interior and
accounted for to him.
Largeappropriationshavesinceannuallybeen made by Congress for the benefit of tllis institution, and they have always,
so far as I am aware, been paid through the medium of the
Secretary of the Interior. By the sundry civil appropriation
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28 Stat., 941), appropriations of $52,500 were made "for support of the institution,
including salaries and incidental expenses, for books and
illustrative apparatus, and for general repairs and improvements," and "for special repairs to the buildings and for the
improvement of the grounds," $1,000; also, $30,000 "for
additional building complete." It is not expressly provided
by the statute that these disbursements shall be in any way
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of tl1e Interior, but
this seems to have been always the practical coustruction of
the annual appropriations in pari materict, and I understand
that thee timates annually submitted by the Secretar,y of tlle
Tr a ury, which are the ba i of Oongres ioual action in this
regard, r pre ·e11t the e expen es as beiug uuder the juri die
tiou f th Interior Department. It may be a sumed, ther fore that the ougre ional ap1 ropriation for the ammal urf the in titution i properly 1 ayable tlJr u h
f b Int rior. The upport of iu li ·en
tb Di. tri t f olurnbfa ha alwa
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since 1857, been contributed through the Interior Department, as origfoally planned. To the appropriation for the
current :fiscal year h; added the qualification that '' all disbursemeuts for this object shall be accounted for through
the Department of the Interior." (District of Columbia
appropriation act of March 2·, 1895, chap.176, p. 761.)
The so-called Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174,
section 7, provided that the Auditor for the State and other
Departments should receive and examine all accounts relating to the District of Columbia, and also "accounts of all
boardH, commissions, and establishments of the Government
not within the jurisdiction of any of the Executive Departments." The same~ection provided that theAuditor for the
Interior Department should receive and examine all accounts
of all bureaus and offices under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and also "all accounts relating to army
and navy pensions, Geological Survey, public lands, Indians,
Architect of the Capitol, patents, census, and to all other
business within the jurisdiction of the Department of the
Iuterior." Tl.le Comptroller of the Treasury has held that
the appropriations relati11g to this institution constitute
"business within the j uris<liction of the Department of the
Interior"within the meaning of this s~ction. (1 Comp. Dec.,
19.) This decision appears to me to be clearly correct; and
the Government contributions toward the support of this
institution constitute '' business within the jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior." It so happens, as appeared
by the last annual report of that institution, that about
eight-ninths of its current expenses are paid by these appropriations. This condition might be changed at any moment,
however, by _a charitable bequest; ai1d I do not think that
the corporation itself is in any sense a bureau, office, or other
subdivision of your Department.
The precise question now presented is whether this corporation is in your Department within the meaning of
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, relating 1io "purchases
and contracts for supplies or servfoes in any of the Depart.
ments of the Government." 1'his provision has been on the
statute book for thirty-five years. (Act of March 2, 1861,
chap. 84, sec.10.) It is claimed in the correspondence which
"3513-VOL
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you submit, and it is nowhere denied, that this provision has
al ways received a practical construction, whereby this institution has been excluded from its terms. If this be the case,
that construction should receive great, if not controlling,
weight ( Unitecl States v. HealeJJ, 160 U. S., 136, 141, 145),
especially since the statutory language was not modified
when it was incorporated in the Revised Statutes. (20 Opin.,
721.) I think that this practical construction was the correct
one, and therefore that your question must be answered in
the negative. I have examined with care the able opinion of
Assistant Attorney-General Hall to the contrary, but am
unable to accept his conclusions.
Very respectfully,
IIOLMES 0ONRAD 7
Acting Attorney-General. ·
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

PENITENTIARIES.
The States of South Dakota and Montana having received grants for
the erection of penitentiaries, the enabling act under which the two
Dakotas, Montana, and w·ashington were admitted into the Union
provided that North Dakota and Washington should have like grants
for the same purpose. It appears that Washington already bas a
penitentiary. Held, that further legislation is required.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 23, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of 9th
iustant, and io say in reply that I think further legislation
i , required ill the matter of the penitentiary at Walla Walla,
Wash. For the reasons stated in my letter of 9th instant, I
think the situation is anomalous. The appropriation (27
Stat., 661) under which you purchased grounds and propo, e to erect a penitentiary in the State of Washington is
in t rm made " to carry into effect section 15" of the
uabling act uuder whi h the two Dakota , Montana, and
a ·hin t n wer ad mitt d into the
nio11. The act of
M r ·h 2 1 1 (- 1 tat., 37 ) had appropriated 30,000 for
th
r t"tion f a p nit n iar in t11e T rritory of Dakota.
·ti n 1:- f th n blin a t xrr ly granted to the tate
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of South Dakota the lands acquired under the act of 1881
and any unexpended balances of the moneys thereby appropriated, and, having also transferred to Montana the penitentiary and all lands connected therewith at Deer Lodge
City, provided:
''And the States of North Dakota.and Washington shall,
respectively, have like grants for the same purpose, and subject to like terms and conditions as provided in said act of
March second, eighteen hundred and eighty-one, for the
Territory of Dakota."
This was merely a promise to make the four States equal
by providing North Dakota and Washington with penitentiaries, as had been done with South Dakota and Montana,.
The act of 1893 (27 Stat., 661) was merely in the line of performing that promise. But as I am advised that Washington already has a penitentiary, it seems to me the attention
of Congress should be called to the matter before any further
expenditure of money is made. Certainly there is no authority at present for the transfer of the land you have already
bought with the money appropriated by the last-named act.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE IN·l 'ERIOR.

ABSENCE FROM DUTY.
The act of March 1., 1889, section 49, was not repealed or modified by the
act of March 3, 1893, section 5. The object of the former was to provide for the public defense and that of the latter to regulate leaves of
absence for private reasons or purposes. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the two acts.
Leaves of absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of
military duties are not to be charged to the thirty days allowed them
annually for rest and recreation.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May f:3, 1896.

Sm: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested in
your letter of the J 2th instant, on the question whether section 49 of ~he act of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 772), is repealed
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or modified by section 5 of the act of March 3, 1893 (27
Stat., 715).
The former act provides,, That all officers and employees of the United States and
of the District of Uolumbia who are members of the National
Guard shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties, without loss of pay or time, on all days of any
parade or encampment ordered or authorized under the provisions of this act."
The latter, which was the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act, makes it the duty of the heads of the
several Executive Departments, "in the interest of the public service, to require of all clerks and other employees of
whatever grade or class, in their respective Department~,
not less than seven hours of labor each day," except Sundays
and holidays, providing for thirty days annual and thirty
days sick leave with pay, discretion being given to extend
sick leave in certain cases.
This question had arisen in my own Department before
your letter came, and I had decided it in the same way as
the Solicitor of the Treasury, a copy of whose opinion yon
inclose. I approve that opinion, which states some of the
reasons which require the conclusion that the earlier law is
not affected by the later.
The objects of the two acts were different-that of the former being to provide for the public defense and that of the
latter being to regulate and limit leaves of absence for private reasons or purposes. There is, therefore, no inconsistency or conflict between the two acts, so that the general
repeali11g clause in section 6 of the act of 1893 doe not
apply to the part of the act of 1889 above quoted, or to any
other parts, as it must be held to do if it applies at all.
It is not to be presumed that Congress intended by the
later act to exclude from the militia of the District the large
proportion of it citizens in the public civil service, yet tbi
r ult would follow from any other con truction than that
wlli h I ha e given it. The earlier act requires that all ableb died mal re ident of the Di tri t b enrolled. (Sec. 1.)
Th
mption recit d ( e . 2) <lo not include civil employee
f the D partm nt .
ember of the militia are re uired
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not only to engage in active service when called upon (sec. 5),
but also to prepare themselves for such service by attending
drills, etc. (Sec. 40 et seq.) The latter duty is quite as important as the former, and there is no more reason for holding
that section 49 is repealed, which _exempts members from
civil duty without loss of pay or time, than for holding that
the sections are repealed which require obedience to calls for
active duty.
What I have already said applies to the direction to heads
of Departments in the act of 1893 (sec. 5) to require "not
less than seven hours labor" of all clerks and employees.
This is merely correlative to the limitation of ordinary leave
and does not apply when such persons are engaged in any
form of militia duty.
It is absurd to suppose that Congress intended by this
provision to empower or direct heads of Departments to neutralize the order of the President as Commander in Chief of
the Militia (sec. 6), or that of ·t he other commanding officers,
or to compel employees to put in the leave allowed them for
rest and recreation in the discharge of military duties.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DEPARTMENTAL CLERKS-DELEGATION OF POWER.
Departmental clerks, messengers, and laborers are to be appointed and
removed by the head of the Department, when not otherwise provided by statute. This power can not be delegated, but must be
exercised by the Secretary or Acting Secretary.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 26, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of May 14 asking my official opinion as to your power
to delegate authority to make" appointments, promotions,
reductions, and discharges of messengers and laborers" in
your Department.
Your powers in this regard are similar to those of the
heads of the other Executive Departments. (Act of Feb. 9,
1889, chap. 122, sec. 1.)
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The employment of messengers and laborers in the Executive Departments is based upon section 169 of the Revised
Statutes, which is as follows:
"Each head of a Department is authorized to employ in
his Department such number of clerks of the several classes
recognized by law, and such messengers, assistant messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other employes, and
at such rates of compensation, respectively, as may be
appropriated for by Congress from year to year."
I think that the word "employ" in this section is used as
the equivalent of" appoint" (see Rev.Stat., secs. 60,194); and
therefore that the sole responsibility of every appointment
in an Executive Department rests upon the head of that
Department, except where otherwise specially provided by
statute, as in Revised Statutes, section 476. This view is
confirmed by an examination of our early statutory law.
When the Executive Departments were originally established it was expressly provided that the appointment of
the clerks therein should be made by the beads of Departments. (Acts of July 27, 1789, chap. 4, sec. 2; Aug. 7, 1789,
chap. 7, sec. 2; Sept. 11, 1789, chap. 13, sec. 2; Sept. 22, 1789
chap. 16, sec. l; April 30, 1798, chap. 36, sec. 2; March 3,
1849, chap. 108, sec. 11.) Subsequent legislation indicated
that Congress regarded employment and appointment as
synomymous. (Acts of April 21, 1806, chap. 41, secs. 2, 4;
Aug. 26, 1842, chap. 202, secs. 1, 11.)
Since the power of appointment is confided to the head of
a Department, the· power of removal belongs also to him.
(Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet., 230; Blake v. United States, 103
U. S., 227; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S., 591, 594.) The
powers to promote and'' reduce" are merely species of the
power to appoint.
The power to appoint and remove being discretionary in
character, it is my opinion that they can not be delegated.
o far a I am aware, this bas always been the practical contruction of our legislation in this particular. It is true that
ou may inquire, inve tigate, and determine by the aid of
our ubordinate ; but the final determination must be your
a t and not their . (See 7 Opin., 594, 597.) I am of the
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opm10n, therefore, that all appointments and removals of
messengers and laborers in your Department must be made
by the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Department;
and that the power can be delegated neither to the Chief of
the Weather Bureau, nor to the chief clerk, nor to anyone
else.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

TREATIES-CHINESE.
The phrase "Chinese consul at the port of departure" used in Article
II of the convention between the United States and China, proclaimed
March 17, 1894, means the consul who represents the Chinese Government at the place where the laborer leaves the United States.
The words "port" and "land," used in said treaty, do not limit the
right to return to such Chinese ai; travel by sea.
It is necessary for Chinese laborers to leave this country at a place
which is a port and is within the jurisdiction of a Chinese consul,
and that t,h ey should return to it at a port of entry where there is a
collector, but as they have the right to go and return by land, these
places need not be seaports.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUS'.I.'ICE,

May 26, 1896.
SIR: I nave the honor to give my opinion, as requested in
your letter of the 22d instant, upon the proper construction
of Article II of the convention between the United States
and China, concerning the subject of emigration, proclaimed
March 17, 1894.
By Article I the coming of Chinese laborers to this country
is absolutely prohibited for a period of ten years. Article
II provides that such prohibition shall not apply to the
return to this country of registered Chinese laborers having
certain specified relatives here, or property, or debts of a
certain value, but requires, as a condition of the right of
such laborer to return, the deposit by him with the collector
of customs of the district from which he departs of a written
description of his family, propert1, or debts. The collector
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is required to furnish him with a c~rtificate of his right t.-0
return. Article II then proceeds as follows:
"And such right of return to the United States shall be
exercised within one year from the date of leaving the United
States; but such right of return to the United States may
be extended for an additional period, not to exceed one year,
in cases where, by reason of sickness or other cause of disability beyond his control, such Chinese laborer shall be rendered unable · sooner to return-which facts shall be fully
reported to the Chinese consul at the port of departure, and
by him certified to the satisfaction of the collector of the port
at which such Chinese subject sha11 landin the United States.
And no such Chinese laborer, shall be permitted to enter the
United States by land or sea without producing to the proper
officer of the customs the return certificate herein required."
Your letter with its inclosure presents the case of three
Chinese laborers, duly registered at Boston according to law
and Treasury regulations, and furnished with proper certificates in accordance with the treaty, who left the country
from the district of "Vermont, and, after visiting China, presented themselves for readmission at the same place in the
district of Vermont after an absence of almost thirteen
months. They were refused admission because the facts justifying the extension of the period ofreturn were not reported
"to the Chinese consul at the port of departure and by him
certified," etc., the collector holding such port of departure
to be Canton, China, at which place they left that country,
or Hongkong, a British port, at which they took ship. It
appears that there is, of course, no Chinese consul at Canton,
and that, for local and political reasons, the.British Government permits none at Hongkong.
Your inquiry is whether the" port of departure," at which
the facts of sickne s or disability are to be so reported, is
the port from which the laborer goes from this country or
that from which he tatts on his return.
It i a well-known fact that Chinese laborers who leave
thi country almost invariably return to their own. Thi
fact wa , of cour e w II known to the framers of the treaty.
The knew, al o, that no country has consuls at it own
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ports. It seems clear, therefore, that they could not have
meant the port of departure from China.
If this be true, it appears to follow that the framers of the
treaty must have meant the port from which the laborer
departs from this country. He is required to deposit a written description of his family, property, or debts '' with the
collector of customs of the district from which he departs."
While, at first glance, the phrase "port of departure" may
appear, from its use in connection with the phrase "port at
which such Chinese subject shall land in the United States,"
to indicate the point of beginning of the voyage of return,
this appearance must give way before the manifest necessity
of so construing the treaty, if possible, as to give it the
operation which the parties plainly intended it to have.
Besides, the two phrases may both fairly be construed as
referring to the United States, requiring the fact of unavoidable detention to be reported to the Chinese consul at the
port where the person desiring to return left this country,
and the certificate thereof to be sent to the collector of the
port at which he desires to reenter it.
As Chinese consuls in this country are _received by our
Government and subject to recall on their request, it was
naturally willing to trust to their good faith, and the Chinese
Government, one of the parties to the treaty, had the right
to require of them the service it imposes. The only other
possible construction is that the phrase "Chinese consul at
the port of departure" was intended to designate our consuls at Chinese ports, but such construction would require
an entire change of the language used. When that meaning was intended, .Article III shows that the makers of the
treaty knew how to express it. That article, in providing
for the rights of Chinese officials, students, merchants, etc.,
to come to and reside in the United States, authorizes '' a
certificate from their Government, or the Government where
they last resided, vised by the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States in the country or port whence
they depart."
While the language of the section you submit is not
explicit, and the question presented can riot, therefore, be
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answered with entire freedom from doubt, my opinion is that
the officer to whom the facts of sickness or disability are 1io
be reported is the consul who represents the Chinese Government at the place whence the laborer left the United
States. "While the words used, "port" and "land," usually
relate to a sea voyage, they were used because the Chinese
generaJly go . and come by sea, and not because it was the
intention to limit the right to return to such as travel in that
way. This is apparent from the last sentence of the section:
"And no such laborer shall be permitted to enter the.United
States by land or sea without producing to the proper officer
of the customs the return certificate herein required."
Instances where expressions suggested by the commonest
form of the subject dealt with have been held to apply to all
its forms, are not uncommon in judicial decisions.
Moreover, the word "port" does not always mean a seaport when it is used in connection with our customs officers,
and the word" land" is not necessarily limited to disembarkation from a ship.
It appears to be necessary for the laborer to leave this country at a place which is a port and is within the jurisdiction
of a Chinese consul, and that he should return to it at a port
of entry where there is a collector; but as his right to depart
and return by land as well as by sea is recognized by the
treaty, these places need not be seaports.
As the manifest object of this clause of the treaty was to
reliev_e returning Chinese laborers from the consequences of
sickness or casualty, the argument from inconvenience is not
without weight. Detentions from these causes are quite
likely to occur after the commencement of a long voyage
which, in their absence, would accomplish the return before
the expiration of the year. Sickness, storms, or the many
mi haps of ocean travel, may require the statement mentioned
in the treaty on arrival in the United States, although it
eemed unueces ary before starting. These facts must have
b en in the minds of the framers of the treaty; yet if any
o b r con truction be adopted than that which I have indi·
ted th unfortunate traveler would have to return to the
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place from which he started or undergo the long delay which
would be required to communicate the facts to the officer at
that point and receive his certificate thereof.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

AGENTS-COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY.
The ''agent" referred to in section 3469, Revised Statutes, is one who
has special charge of a claim for purposes of collection or enforcement
in the same way that a district or special attorney has, though he need
not possess their professional character.
While the Comptroller of the Treasury is an agent of the Government,
in the broad sense of the term, he is more properly called an officer,
and was not intended to be included within the word "agent" in the
statute.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 27, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested in
your letter of the 14th instant, upon the question whether
the Comptroller of the Treasury is an " agent" within the
meaning of section 3469 of the Revised Statutes, which is as
follows:
."Upon a report by a district attorney or any special attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim,
and the terms upon which the same may be compromised,
a,nd recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so
offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the
Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
compromise such claim accordingly."
I am inclined to think that '' special" qualifies both attorney and agent; but whether this be so or not, the agent
referred to in the statute is one who has special charge of a
claim for purposes of collection or enforcement in the same
way that the district or a special attorney has, though he
need not possess their professional character. While the
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Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury are agents of the
Government in the broad sense of the term, they are more
·properly called officers, and the fact that they were not
intended to be included within the word "agent" in the
statute is apparent from the mention of district and special
attorneys, who are also agents in the general sense. It is
fair to assume that the Comptroller would have been mentioned as well as the district attorney if it had been the intention of Congress to make the statute applicable to him.
While the Comptroller and Auditors may also be said to
have general charge of claims in favor of the Government,
they do not have charge of them in the same sense that a
district or special attorney or agent has, viz, for the express
purpose of directly enforcing them.
It is suggested that as the Comptroller and Auditors are
the only persons who can be said ever to !Jave charge of
some claims and who have charge of _all claims for a time, the
result of the construction I have given the statute is to prevent compromises until the claims have been pl[tced in the
hands of an attorney or collecting agent and a report is
received from him, no matter how advantageous to the
Government an immediate compromise might be. But the
manifest purpose of the statute was to require for your
information, before acting upon a proposed compromise, the
opinion and advice of a person who bas given special attention to the nature, proof, and collectibility of the claim-in
the locality where it arose or is to be enforced. You are presumed to have all the knowledge of fact and law which your
immediate subordinates possess, and the recommendation of
the Solicitor, which is also required, is intended to furnish
you with legal advice upon the general aspects of the claim,
but none of these officers can furnish you the direct and
r liable information and ad vice which come from special
attention to the claim or ontact with t he debtor.
For th e rea on my opinion i t hat the Comptroller of
the Tr a ury is not a u ' agent ' within t he meaning of the
·tatu .
ry r pe tfn11
J DO H RMON.
Th
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DEPARTMENT CLERKS-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE.
The chief clerk, chiefs of bureaus, and translator in the State Department are to be appointed by the Secretary of State.
These officers are all "clerks" within the meaning of the Revised
Statutes, section 169.
When departmental practice is not uniform it affords no guide to the
construction of the law.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 4, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of June 2, asking my opinion whether the chief clerk,
chiefs of bureaus, and translator in your Department are to
be appointed by you, or to be nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. The question is raised by the
new civil-service rules promulgated by the President on
May 6, 1896, which rules apply to the appointment of these
officials in case their appointment is vested in you by law.
The Constitution provides that all officers of the United
States shall be appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, except where, in case of
inferior officers, Congress shall otherwise provide by law.
If, therefore, you are vested with the appointing power in
these cases, it must be by virtue of some statutory provision.
(6 Opin., 1; 15 Opin., 3, 5.) If there be any such provision
it must be found in section 169 of the Revised Statutes,
which is as follows:
"Each head of a Department is authorized to employ in
his Department such number of clerks of the several classes
recognized by law * * * and at such rates of compensation respectively as may be appropriated for by Congress
from year to year."
The word "employ" in this section has always been
regarded as the equivalent of "appoint;" and I have approved this construction in an opiuion rendered to the Secretary of Agriculture on May 26 last. The question now to be
decided, therefore, is this: Are the officials mentioned in your
letter among the "clerks of the several classes recognized by
law" within the meaning of the section quoted f The effect
of this clause is not to be confined to the four main classes
of clerks mentioned in sections 163 and 167 of the revision.
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These sections are reenactments of provisions of the civil
and diplomatic appropriation act of March 3, 1853, chapter
97, section 3, which statute also provides separately for chief
clerks and disbursing clerks .of the various Departments,
who, by the uniform practice of the Departments, have always
been treated as clerks within the meaning of section 169.
They were expressly held to be such by .Attorney-General
Pierrepont. (15 Opin., 3, 6.)
I think that the chief clerk of each Department is clearly
a clerk within the meaning of section 169, and that the same
conclusion must also be reached as to the translator, an official whose existence is recognized only in the annual appropriation act, and whose duties are purely clerical.
It remains to consider the case of the so-called chiefs of
bureaus. While these officials have been recognized by
statute for over twenty years, the practice of your Department has not been uniform as to the manner of their appointment. It therefore affords no guide to the construction of
the law. (Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S., 542; United States
v. Healey, 160 U. S., 136, 141-145.) You call my attention,
however, to an interesting and exhaustive discussion of this
subject by Mr. E. I. Renick, chief clerk of your Department,
who states that while there are no officials in your Department styled chiefs of division, nevertheless your so-called
chiefs of bureaus "receive the compensatfon and exercise
the functions of chiefs of divisions> The chiefs of division
in various Departments have, I believe, always been regarded
as clerks, and this construction bas received the approval of
the Attorney-General. (15 Opin., 3, 6; 20 Opin., 728.)
I am unable to perceive any distinction between what are
called divisions of the Treasury Department and what are
called bureaus in your Department. Each were originally
establi bed by departmental regulations and presided over
by I er on who were nominally, as well as actually, Department clerk . Their being mentioned l>y Congress in appropriation a t , or otherwi e, as chiefs of bureaus or chief: of
di i ion do s not take them out of the operation of ection
1 . Tb chi fr in our Department are clearly ranked a
cl rk in tb Re i ed tatut , coming between the chief
1 rk nd be di bur ing 1 rk. ( ec. 201.) I do not think
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they are chiefs of bureaus within the meaning of section 178.
The word "bureau," like many others, is loosely used in the
revision, the terminology of the codified statutes not having
been made entirely definite and uniform. (See 21 Opin., 94.)
My conclusion, therefore, is that all of the officials mentioned in your communication are to be appointed by yourself, and come, therefore, within the new civil-service rules.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
The Treasury Department is obliged, under existing laws, to extend the
benefits of the Marine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers
and seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service . .

DEP.A.RTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

June 11, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of May
2, requesting my opinion "whether this Department is
obliged, under existing laws, to extend the benefits of the
Marine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers and
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service."
In my opinion of May 7, in response to a similar inquiry
from you, I reviewed the legislation on the subject of MarjneHospital Service at some length and reached the conclusion
expressed in that opinion, "that the sick seamen of the
Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit of the
Marine Hospital provided for sick and disabled seamen."
I have carefully reexamined the ground on which that
opinion rested, in the light of the additional doeuments
which accompany your present request.
The legislation on this subject is meager, fragmentary, and
disconnected. But as early as July 16, 1798, provision was
made by Congress (1 Stat., 605) for the relief of sick and disabled seamen. By that statute 20 cents per month was
deducted from the wages of seamen of every ship or vessel
of the United States arriving from a foreign port, and from
the seamen of vessels engaged in _the coasting trade. By
the fourth section of this statute it was provided that any
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surplus remaining of the moneys so collected should be invested in the stock of the United States, under the direction
of the President, until in his opinion a sufficient fund should
be accumulated for the purchase of ground and for buildings
"to be erected as hospitals for the accommodation of sick and
disabled seamen."
Section 5 provides for the appointment, by the President,
of'' directors of the marine hospital of the United States,"
whose duty it shall be "to provide for the accommodation of
sick and disabled seamen under such general instructions as
shall be given by the President of the United States for that
purpose."
By act of June 29, 1870 (16 Stat., 169), it was provided that
40 cents per month should be retained from the wages of
seamen of every vessel of the United States arriving from a
foreign port, or of registered vessels employed in the coasting trade.
By section 5: "That the fund thus obtained shall be
employed, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, for the care and relief of sick and disabled seamen
employed in registered; enrolled, and licensed vessels of the
United States."
,
By section 7: "That for the purposes of this act, the term
'vessel,' herein used, shall be held to include every description of water craft, raft, vehicle, and contrivance used or
capable of being used as a means or auxiliary of transportation on or by water."
By act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 485), it was provided
that "every vessel subject to hospital tax, except vessels
required by law to carry crew lists, shall have and keep on
board, subject to inspection and verification at all times by
any officer of the customs, a seaman's time book."
By section 3: "That term 'seaman,' wherever employed
in legislation relating to the Marine-Hospital Service, shall
be held to include any person employed on board in the care,
preservation, or navigation of any vessel, or in the service,
on board, of those eno-ao-ed in uch care preservation, or
navigation. '
By ction 6: ' That sick and di abled eamen of foreign
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ve~sels and of vessels not subject to hospital dues may be
cared for by the Marine-Hospital Service at such rates and
under such regulations as the Secretary of the TrP-asury
may prescribe."
By act of J uue 26, 1884 (23 Stat., 57):
"SEc.15. Sections forty-five hundred and eighty-five, fortyfive hundred and eighty-six, and forty-five hundred and eightyseven of the Revised Statutes, and all other acts and parts of
acts providing for the assessment and collection of a hospital
tax for seamen, are hereby repealed, and the expense of maintaining the Marine-Hospital Service shall hereafter be borne
by the United States out of the receipts for duties on tonnage provided for by this act; and so much thereof as may be
necessary is hereby appropriated for that purpose."
By act of August 4, 1894 (28 Stat., 229), the privileges of
the marine hospitals were extended to keepers and crews of _
the Life-Saving Service, who "shall be received in said hospitals and treated therein, and at the dispensaries thereof, as
are seamen of American registered vessels."
It will be observed from this course of legislation that in
the earliest act the marine hospitals were "for the accommodation of sick and disabled seamen, under such general
instructions as should be given by the President of the United
States."
That not until 1870 was the class of seamen to be accommodated limited to "seamen employed in registered, enrolled,
and licensed vessels of the United States."
That by the act of 1875 provision was made for the accommodation of seamen of vessels other than the "registered,
enrolled, and licensed vessels of the United States, under
such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe."
It is true that revenue cutters of the United States do not
fall within the class of "registered, enrolled, and licensed
vessels." It does appear, however, from an official letter of
Mr. Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, dated
June 1, 1812, addressed .to the collector of the port of New
Orleans, that an account presented for the payment of services rendered by a private physician to the officers or crew
of a revenue cutter was disallowed, '' inasmuch as the crew
3513-VOL 21, PT 2--11
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of the revenue cutter are to be assisted from the hoRpital
fund as other sailors."
It further appears from the records of the Treasury
Department "that the tax for the maintenance of a marinehospital fund was exacted and collected monthly from the
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service from January 1, 1833,
to 1884, when the tax was abolished by Congress."
It further appears from the Regulations for the Government of the United States Marine-Hospital Service,
approved May 20, 1889, by the Secretary of the Treasury
and by the President of the United States (p. 54), that the
following regulation was prescribed and yet remains in
force:
" Officers and seamen of the Revenne-Cutter Service will
be admitted to care and treatment at all stations of the first
class without reference to length of service and without
charge."
It thus appears that from a very early period in the history of the Government the right of the officers and crew of
the Revenue-Cutter Service to the privileges of the MarineHospital Service was recognized by the executive officers of
the Government; and that for more than fifty years immediately preceding the abolition by Congress of the tax on
eamen for the maintenance of the hospital fund, the seamen
of the Revenue-Cutter Service were regularly assessed and
taxed for this purpose.
Thus we have not only a regulation of the Department
acquiesced in for a long time, but also a contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those executive officers of the
Government on whom has devolved the duty and responsibility of carrying the statute into effect. And we have more
t.han thi in the enforced contributions from their wages by
eamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service for more than half a
en ury to the fund by which the hospital buildings were
r cted and from which the hospital ervice was maintained.
The regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury already
r ferred to, pr viding for the admission of officers and seam n f the e nue-Cutt r Service to the marine ho pital ,
tion 6 of the act of
mad in pur uan e of
1 75, whi h authorize th admi i n of the ick

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

369

Attorney-General-Immediate Transportation Act.

seamen of foreign vessels and of vessels not .subject to hospital duty to marine hospitals upon such terms as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.
These considerations compel me to the conclusion that the
Treasury Department is obliged, under existing laws, to
extend the benefits of the Marine-Hospital fund to the sick
and disabled officers and seamen of the Revenue-Cutter
Service.
Very res·pectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General. Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The. . SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION ACT.
Under the immediate transportation act, the Secretary of the Treasury
may require common carriers desiring to avail themselves of its privileges to file bonds to accept and transport within a definite fixed period
of time all merchandise offered under the act.
The Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon a judicial question.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 17, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of June 6, asking an opinion in relation to certain common
carriers who have been authorized by you to transport merchandise in bond under the provisions of the immediate transportation act of June 10, 1880, chapter 190. This act contemplates that merchandise imported at an exterior port shall be
"shipped immediately" to the port of destination (sec. 1);
that the collection of duties by the United States shall be
postponed until the arrival at the port of destination, the
goods meanwhile being regarded as in warehouse (sec. 2;
Seeberger v. Schweyer, 153 U. S., 609); and that to effectuate
the purpose of the act the carriers are required to give bond
to the United States, with such conditions, not inconsistent
with law, as you may require. (Sec. 3.) One of the conditions thus imposed by you is that the carrier "sh~ll without
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delay transport a nd make prompt report and safe delivery of
a ll mei·chandise described in each _and every entry." (Cust oms Reg ulations, 1892, art. 400.) It appears, however, that
bonded carriers sometimes refuse altogether to transport
imported merchandise, for the reason that it is inconvenient
or unprofitable to them. You ask mew hether they are bound
to do so.
I do not find that you are authorized by law to grant an
irrevocable license to any common carrier for any period of
time, or that you have attempted to do so. It is, tlierefore,
in your . power to require of every c_a rrier, as a condition to
the continuance of his privileges under the statute, the filing
of a new bond containing, in unmistakable language, an
agreement to accept and transport, within a definite fixed
period of time, all merchandise offored under the act.
Whether or not you have any remedy against carriers who
have refused transportation in the past is a judicial question. You have no power to collect damages except through
the courts. The question, therefore, is not one arising in
the administration of your Department within the meaning
of section 356 of the Revised Statutes, and not one upon
which it would be proper for me to give an official opinion.
(20 Opin., 702, 714; 21 Opin., 6.) ,
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASU R Y .

P UBLICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL USE-PUBLIC PRINTE R.
'.rhe h ead of a Dep artment h as n o right u nder section 90 of the p rint ing
biJl of Januar y 12, 1895, t o make a requisition upon th e P ublic P rinter
for a greater number of copies of p ublications other than "bills and
resolutions " t han the number of bureaus in the Department an d c1ivisions in the office of the J1ead thereof.
If he makes the requisition under t h e gener al authority vested in his
epartment, and with the understanding that th e cost is to be charged
ao-ainst the printing appropriation for hi Department, he Jrns t he
righ t to make uch r equi ition and the Public Printer ba no authorit to pa upon th e ·haract r of publications which be may deem
, n ial tr carr io out the work f his epartment.

TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

371

Publications for Official Use-Public Printer.

DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS1'ICE,

June 22, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of June 18, 1896, in which you ask whether or not you
have the right under section 90 of the printing bill of January 12, 1895, to make a requisition upon the Public Printer
for 1,000 copies of Report No. 1049 on Senate bill No. 1552.
Section 90 is as follows:
'' The heads of Executive Departments, and such executive
officers as are not connected with the Departments, respectively, shall cause daily examination of the Congressional
Record for the purpose of noting documents, reports, and
other publications of interest to their Departments, and shall
cause an immediate order to be sent to the Public Printer
for t.he number of copies of such publications required for
official use, not to exceed, however, the number of bureaus
in the Department and divisions in the office of the head
thereof. The Public Printer shall send to each Executive
Department and to each executive office not connected with
the Department, as soon as printed, five copies of all bills
and resolutions, except the State Department, to which shall
be sent ten copies. of bills and resolutions. When the head
of a Department desires a greater number of any class of
bills or resolutions for official use, they shall be furnished
by the Public Printer on requisition promptly made."
This section provides for furnishing to the heads of Executive Departments "documents, reports, and other publications of interest to their Departments," in a number of
copies required for official use not exceeding" the number of
bureaus in the Department and divisions in the office of the
head thereof." It also provides for furnishing to the head
of a Department '' a greater number of any class of bills or
resolutions for official use."
The document requested by you is not a bill or resolution,
and does not come in this latter class. Under the other provision the number is limited, as above stated. It is contemplated that the documents furnished under this section are
not to be charged to the printing appropriation made for
the respective Departments. If you contemplate having the
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reports furnished under section 90, and on this ba~is, then, in
my opinion, you have no right to make the requisition for
1,000 copies.
If, on the other hand, you make the requisition under the
general authority vested in your Department, and with the
understanding that the cost is to be charged against the
printing appropriation for your Department, then I am of
the opinion that you have a right to ma~e such requisition,
and that the Public Printer has no authority to pass upon
the character of publications which you may deem essential
for carrying out the work of your Department.
Respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
A. cting A. ttorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF .AGRICULTURE.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-SEEDS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The act making appropriations {or the Department of Agriculture for
the fisc al year ending June 30, 1897, authorizes the Department to pay
$130,000 for seed already put up in packages and labeled, ready for
distribution.
An act of Congress should not be treated as a nullity if it can by any
reasonable construction be made operative. In construing the act it
is proper to consider facts which have been known to Congress and
to assume that it legislated having them in view.

JUSTICE,
June 30, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of June 18, 1896, in which you ask for an opinion as to
whether the act making appropriations for the Department
of .Agriculture for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, can
be carried out in spirit and in letter.
The provi ion in question i as follows:
' Divi ion of seeds, purcha e and distribution of valuable
eed : F r the purcha e, propagation, and distribution of
v luable ed , bulbs, tree , shrubs, vines, cuttings, and
pl nt and expen e of labor, tran portation, paper, twine,
m printing po tal card , and all necessary material and
DEPARTMENT OF
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repairs for putting up and distributing the same, and to be
distributed in localities adapted to their culture, one hundred and :fifty thousand dollars. And the Secretary of
Agriculture is hereby authorized, empowered, directed, and
required to expend the said sum in the purchase, propagation, and distribution of such valuable seeds, bulbs, trees,
shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants, and is authorized, empowered, directed, and required to expend not less than tbe
sum of one hundred and thirty thousand dollars in the purchase at public or private sale of valuable seeds the best he
can obtain and such as shall be suitable for the respective
localities to which the same are to be apportioned and in
which the same are to be distributed, as hereinafter stated, ·
and such seeds so purchased shall include a variety of vegetable and flower seeds suitable for planting and culture in
the various sections of the United States.
"That section :five hundred and twenty-seven of the
Revised Statutes be amended so that it will read as follows:
'' 'SEC. 527. That purchase and· distribution of vegetable,
:field, and flower seeds, plants, shrubs, vines~ bulbs, and cuttings shall be of the freshest and best obtainable varieties
and adapted to general cultivation.'
"An equal proportion of two-thirds of all seeds, bulbs,
trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants shall, upon their
request, after due notification by the Secretary of Agriculture
that the allotment to their respective districts is ready for
distribution, be supplied to Senators, Representatives, and
Delegates in Congress for distribution among their constituents, or be directed and mailed by the Department upon
their request; and the person receiving such seeds shall
be requested to inform the Department of results of the
experiments therewith: Provided, That all seeds, bulbs,
plants, and cuttings herein allotted to Senators, Representatives, and Delegates in Congress for distribution remaining
uncalled for on the :first of May shall be distributed by the
Secretary of Agriculture, giving preference to those persons
whose names and addresses have been furnished by Senators
and Representatives in Congress, and who have not before,
during the same season, been supplied by tbe Department:
And provided also, That the Secretary shall report, as
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provided in this act, the place, quantity, and price of seeds
purchased, and the date of purchase; but nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of
.Agriculture from sending seeds to those who apply for the
same. .And the amount herein appropriated shall not be
diverted or used for any other purpose but for the purchase,
propagation, and distribution of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees,
shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants: Provided, however, That
the Secretary shall not distribute to any Senator, Representative, or Delegate seeds entirely unfit for the climate and
locality he represents, but shall distribute the same so that
each Member may have seeds of equal value, as near as may
·be, and the best adapted to the locality he represents: Provided also, That the seeds allotted to the Senators and Representatives for distribution, in the districts embraced within
the twenty-fifth and thirty-second parallels of latitude, shall
be ready for delivery on the tenth day of January or at the
earliest practicable time thereafter."
You say in your letter that:
"The act provides $150,000 for the purchase, propagation,
and distribution of valuable seeds, etc., including labor,
transportation, paper, twine, gum,printing, postal cards, etc.,
but at the same-time requires the Secretary to expend not less
than the sum of $130,000 in the purchase of valuable seeds
alone.
''Now, as a matter of fact, it is impossible to pay the necessary expenses of preparing and distributing $130,000 worth
of seed, paper bags, printing, transportation, labor, etc.,
with the $20,000 allowed by this act for the purpose, not to
speak of the' trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants' named
in the act. In support of this opinion I submit herewith a
statement from the disbursing officer of this Department,
ho wing the relative amounts expended by us during several
years for the purcha e of seed and for all other expense of
their preparation and distribution. It will be seen that an
amount oTeater than the amount paid for the eedis required
to prepar them for di tribution by Congre men.
" h
r tary of oTicultur declined to purcha e eed
thi
ar, in accordance with the advice of the Attorney-

TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

375

Department of Agriculture-Seeds-Statutory Construction.

General in letter dated April 20, 1895, a copy of which is
attached hereto, until Congress had, by resolution in effect
March 14, 1896, instructed him to do so. In view of the
lateness of the season, the Secretary then entered into contracts with two seed houses to prepare, pack, label, and
deliver the seeds to the mails on orders of Congressmen.
A lump sum was paid for the seed put up in papers and mail
packages, with the franks pasted upon them. This could be
done under the appropriation bill for 1896, but apparently
can not be done under that for 1897~ now under discussion.
In the bill for 1896 there was no limit upon the amount that
could be expended for other things than seed, such as paper
packages, or for any expense of preparing the seed for
distribution.
'' ' For this reason, it appears to be doubtful whether this
Department has the authority to pay $130,000 for seed
already put up in packages and labeled, ready for distribution, as was done this year. The act under consideration is
very positive in declaring that $130,000 shall be paid for
seed, to the exclusion of '' trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants," and the expenses of labor, transportation, paper,
twine, gum, printing, postal cards, and all necessary material and repairs for putting up and distributing the same."
It is certain that if $130,000 were paid for" valuable seeds"
alone, the remaining $20,000 of the appropriation would be
entirely inadequate to pay for putting up and distributing
them, so that nothing would be left for the purchase of
"trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants.'"
" This act is made still more difficult of execution by the
further requirement that the Secretary of Agriculture shall
direct and mail the seed upon requests from Congressmen,
and incur various other expenses, all of which must come
out of the $20,000 allowed for every other purpose except
the purchase of valuable seeds. And this is all made more
difficult still by the abolition of the statutory roll of the seed
division, hitherto provided in all the appropriation bills."
The question is not free from doubt. An act of Congress
should not be treated as a nullity if it can by any reasonable
construction be made operative. In construing the act it is
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proper to consider facts which must have been known to
Congress and to assume that it legislated having them in
view.
It must be supposed that Congress knew from the expenditures in former years that it would be entirely impossible to
pack and distribute $130,000 worth of seeds with the remaining $20,000 of the $150,000 appropriation, to say nothing of
other expenses which were to be met out of this balance,
and that for the year 1896 seeds had been purchased by
your Department, put up in packages, and labeled ready for
distribution. Congress had abolished the statutory roll of
the seed division, and knew that you had no regular facilities for packing such a large quantity of seeds.
A conclusion that Congress intended that $130,000 of the
appropriation should be expended for seeds in bulk and unprepared for distribution would carry with it the corollary
that Congress deliberately enacted a law with the purpose
that it should be a dead letter, intending either that the
seeds should not be purchased at all, or that after purchase
they should not be distributed. Such a purpose can not be
imputed to Congress.
The action of Congress in passing a joint resolution directing the purchase of seeds for 1896, and the mandatory
language of the act in question, entirely negative any such
idea.
It is clear beyond doubt that Congress intended the seeds to
be purchased and to be distributed out of this appropriation.
I am of the opinion that the designation of such a large
proportion of the entire appropriation for the purchase of
seeds, made with the knowledge that the remainder would
not be sufficient for packing seeds for distribution and for
carrying out the other purposes expressed, was made in cont emplation of the manner in which the purchase was made
for 1 96, and with the expect.eition that the $130,000 would be
expended for ed prepared for distribution in the same way.
e pectfully,
J UDSON HARMON.
The E '&ET.A.RY 0
GR ICUL'.I'URE.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-FOREIGN LAW.
The existence of a foreign law is a question of fact.
The Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon the law of a foreign
nation.
As to whether a discriminating duty should be imposed under the act of
1894 upon salt imported from Germany, which country imposes a duty
in the nature of an internal excise tax on salt exported from the United
States. Quawe.
DEPAR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 2, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of June 20, asking a further opinion in the matter of the .
duties upon German salt.
Paragraph 608 of the tariff act of 1894 puts salt in general
on the free list, but contains the following proviso:
"Provided, That if salt is imported from any country,
whether independent or a dependency, which imposes a duty
upon salt exported from the United States, then there shall
be levied, paid, and collected upon such salt the rate of duty
existing prior to the passage of this act."
·
The Empire of Germany imposes a duty upon salt exported
from the United States, and duties have up to this time
continued to be levied upon German salt. Germany, however, has always claimed that its salt is entitled to free entry,
for the reason that its own import duty merely countervails
an excise which it levies upon all salt produced in its own
territory; claiming that the exaction upon American salt,
while in form a duty, is really but an excise; that there is no
discrimination against American salt, and that paragraph
608, therefore, has no application. This question was submitted by you to Attorney-General Olney, who declined to
give an opinion upon it, because he was not supplied with
sufficient information, since the laws of Germany, "like other
foreign laws, are facts to be proved by competent evidence."
(21 Opin., 80.)
Your present communication contains no statement of the
facts as to the German salt excise, but states that "the data
necessary to a conclusion appear to be included in the papers
sent herewith."
You inclose a translation made at the State Department
of a communication recently received from the German
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ambassador upon this subject. This communication incloses
extracts from a law of the North German Confederation
(which no longer exists) bearing date October 12, 1867, relating to the excise on salt; an extract from an agreement of
May 8, 1867, between certain States, since included in the
German Empire, with relation to the same matter; some
comments upon the constitution of the German Empire; a
general statement as to laws of the Kingdoms of Bavaria
and Wiirtemberg and the Grand Duchies of Baden and
Hesse, copies of which laws are not inclosed, and a statement as to the budget of the German Empire for the fiscal
year 1895-96. This communication discloses great complication in the constitutional system of that Empire, and shows
that some degree of expertness is required for a correct
understanding of its fiscal system.
This communication is accompanied by a letter from the
Secretary of State addressed to you. This letter, however,
expresses no opinion upon the questions of German law and
practice which are argued by the ambassador. The Secretary of State merely says: ''You will observe that the
ambassador states that proof is presented by his note that
.American salt in Germany is placed on the same footing
with German salt in respect to duties and taxes."
It is apparent, therefore, that I can not advise upon the
point submitted hy you without first examining the constitution of the German Empire and the legislation .t o which
the ambassador refers, and deducing therefrom a conclusion
of German law. This, however, I am not authorized to do,
nor is the Department of Justice equipped for such investigation. Nothing is better settled than that the opinion of
the .Attorney-General can not be asked upon a question of
fact; and it is equa11y well settled that the existence of a
foreign law is a question of fact. (21 Opin., 80; Church v.
Hubbart, 2 Or., 187, 236; IJainese v. Hale, 91 U.S., 13, 20.)
I do not think tbat ongress, in providing for official opinion by the .Attorney-General, intended that he should be
all d upon to advi e concerning question of foreign law.
He i not pe ted to be conver ant with the variou languag in which for ign legislation must be read; nor i
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he, like the Secretary of State, provided with an official
translator for his assistance. Whether the statements of a
foreign ambassador as to the true construction of the legislation of his own Government and the practice thereunder
should be accepted as true, is, I think, a question to be
decided by the Secretary of State and not by the AttorneyGeneral. I do not think that you would be authorized to act
upon any statement of German law coming from me. If by
other means you ascertain positively that the duty upon American salt exacted by the Empire of Germany is in fact but a
method of subjecting it to an excise to which it contributes
equally with domestic salt, and if, upon such definite information, you are in doubt as to whether German salt is entitled
to be admitted into our ports free of duty, the question presented will be one which I shall be authorized to answer.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

PUBLIC WORKS-CONTRACTS.
Under section 5 of the river and harbor act a contractor on a continuing
contract work can be permitted to earn in one :fiscal year more than
$400,000, but he may not demand or receive from the Government in
any one year more than $400,000, and must be content to remain a
creditor of the Government until his money is paid as provided for in
his contract, of which this act is a part.
Said section 5 is not limited in its application to cases in which the total
amount authorized to be expended is more than $400,000.
Where the total amount authorized to be expended is less than$400,000,
contractors may be allowed to earn the amounts authorized to be
expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress for such work.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE,

July 21, 1896.

SIR: I have your letter of July 9, in which you direct
attention to certain sections and provisions of the river and
harbor act, in which authority is given the Secretary of War
for making '' continuiug contracts" for the construction and
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improvement of certain public works; and restrictions are
imposed as to the amount to be expended annually under
such contracts. You recite in your letter section 5 of the act,
and submit to me the questions:
'' 1. Whether, under the terms of the law which limits the
amount that the Secretary of War can obligate the Government for in any one :fiscal year to $400,000, and forbids him to
make any obligation to pay more, a contractor on one of these
continuing contract works can be permitted to earn more than
the specified amount in any one :fiscal year 1 · In other words,
can the amount of work done in any one fiscal year exceed in
value the amount of money which Congress has authorized to
be paid¥"
Under the generallaw (sec. 3679, Rev. Stat.) it is provided:
"No Department of the Government shall expend, in any
one :fiscal year, any sum in excess of the appropriations
made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any contract for the future payment of money in
excess of such appropriation."
Under the present statute, authority is expressly given to
the head of the War Department to contract for the construction of public works in certain cases which may require many
years to complete, and under the contracts so made the Government will be involved for the future payment of money
largely in excess of the amount already appropriated.
The contracts will doubtless prescribe the limits of time
within which the entire work, or certain specified stages
thereof, shall be completed; and penalties will doubtless be
prescribed for the failure on the part of the contractor to
complete the whole or such portions of said work within the
period prescribed.
The expenditures of money provided for in tbe appropriation acts of Congress are based upon the estimated annual
rev nues of the Government available for the o~ject of uch
appropriations.
It wa doubtle con idered in this particular appropriation act that how ver u ful the works therein provided for
mi h b , or h w
r d irable their early completion, yet a
due r (Yard to he annual revenue of the
ernment would
no c dmi f, Jar r annual exp nditure in any ca e than i
th r in pro id d for.
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A. contractor, allowed under a contract, say, three years for
the completion of a certain work, can in no case receive in
any one year more than $400,000 on his contract. But, suppose that by the application of newly discovered instruments
or devices he is able to accomplish in one year the work
which, at the date of his contract, it was reasonably supposed
would require three years for its completion, shall this contractor be permitted to economize the time to avail himself of
the newly discovered appliances, and earn in one year what
otherwise would have required three, I see nothing in the
spirit, the object, or the letter of the law to forbid it. He
may not demand or receive from the Government more than
$400,000 in any one year, and must be content to remain a
creditor of the Government until his money is paid as provided for in his contract, of which this act is a part.
I therefore say, in answer to this question, that the contractor may perform, under his contract, in one year the
work which the contract allows him three years to perform,
although he may not receive full payment therefor under
three years.
"2. Whether, in the case of restricted annual obligation,
or in cases of continuous contracts not subject to the provisions of section 5, because the total amount authorized to
be expended is less than $400,000 (as in the case of Dunkirk
Harbor, New York, on page 4 of the act), it is permissible to
allow the contractor to earn the amounts authorized to be
expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress for
such work'"
I do not understand section 5 as being limited in its application to cases in which "the total amount authorized to be
expended is more than $400,000." I understand the provisos
in that section to be applicable to any contract made under
the authority of this act.
I see no reason whatever why contractors under contracts
where the total amount authorized to be expended is less
than $400,000 should not be allowed to earn the amounts
authorized to be expended in advance of the appropriation
by Congress for such work. Certainly the language of the
act does not exclude such a construction.
In the case suggested in your letter as an illustration of
the appropriation for the improvement of the harbor at
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Dunkirk, N. Y., this is a "continuing improvement"; the
Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts for "such
materials and work as may be necessary to complete the
modified project for its improvement, to be paid for as appropriations may from time to time be made, not to exceed in
the· aggregate $398,258, exclusive of the amount herein and
heretofore appropriated."
Now, there it is not even stipulated that the appropriation
shall be annual. . The Secretary is empowered to contract
for the completion of the entire work; the contract will
doubtless prescribe a period within which, in "the opinion of
the engineer officers, such a work should be completed; but
the contractor may complete it in half the time allowed. Can
any reason be suggested why he should not be permitted to
do so, and thereby earn the full amount contracted for and
save the time that would be otherwise wasted, .A. contrary
view would require that he should hold himself in readiness
to prosecute such work only in those years and for such a
length of time as Congress may see proper to provide for by
appropriation.
I am of opinion that it is permissible to allow the contractor to earn the amounts authorized to be expended in
advance of the appropriation by Congress for such work.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

WORKS IN CONNECTION WITH FORT TAYLOR-RIGHT TO
POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE.
17 Opinions, 7, concurred in, except in so far as that opinion held that
proceedings to oui;t the United States from possession of the premi es
were not maintainable. Such proceedings, while not maintainable
directly against the nited tates, may yet be maintained against
the individual in pos ·e ion of the premises.
The nited tate had authority to take possession of and use real
e tate during the period of the war for war purposes, but had not the
authority to dive t the title of the owner. They had not the power
to retain po.
ion of real e ta.te originally taken for war purpo ~
beyond th period during which the occasion for the taking continued.
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The United States having taken possession and still retaining same,
such possession can not be surrendered by the officers of the Government w ithout authority from the Secretary of W ar.
If the United States, being in possession of such real estate, have been
forcibly ejected-even by the lawful owner-such possession is unlawful a nd should be r estored to the United States by a possessory action
in the courts.
If the United States ham abandoned such real estate and the lawful
owner has entered and taken possession, his possession is lawful and
should not be disturbed.
DEP .A.R'.l.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1896.

SIR: I have your letter of the 16th of July, in which you
state that in the summer of 1861 the Government desired to
construct works in connection with Fort Taylor, for the defense
of the harbor of Key West, Fla.; that the. sites needed for the
proposed works were owned by private individuals; that
negotiations were commenced for the purchase of these sites
by the Government, but the exigencies of the times and certain difficulties in procuring titles prevented the purchase
"and possession was taken of the two tracts by order of the
Secretary of War of September 21, 1861, reiterated December 18, 1861, and the construction of the works was commenced soon afterwards;" that the land has never been
purchased by the United States, but the works were constructed thereon by the United States at great cost and still
remain upon the land.
It appears that in January, 1881, the opinion of the .Attorney-General was asked by the Secretary of War "'if under
the circumstances the United States can hold possession of
tbe sites, exclude intruders, whether they claim to be owners
or not, and force the owners to enter claims for the land
either in Congress or before the Court of Claims, by which
means they can obtain proper compensation for their lands..''
The Attorney-General expressed the opinion at that time that
the United States could hold possession of the sites and
exclude intruders therefrom, whether they claimed to be
owners or not; and further, that no proceedings to oust the
United States from the premises were maintainable. He
advised that application be made to Congress for authority
to acquire the title, either by purchase or condemnation,
instead of forcing the owners to go to Congress for relief.
3513-VOL 21, PT 2--12
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I concur in the views expressed by my predecessor in that
opinion, except in so far as he held that proceedings to oust
the United States from possession of the premises were not
maintainable. Such proceedings, while not · maintainable
directly against the United States, may yet be maintained
against the individuals in possession of the premises.
The United States had authority to take possession ofand
use real estate during the period of the war for war purposes.
They had not the authority, or the power, by any summary
proceeding, to divest the title of the owner of such real
estate; nor had they the power to retain possession of real
estate originally taken for war purposes beyond the period
during which the occasion for the taking continued.
The United States having taken possessjon and sti11 retaining the same, such possession can not be surrendered by the
officers of the Government without authority from the Secretary of War.
If the United States, being in possession of these sites, or
either of them, have been forcibly ejected and ousted-even
by the lawful owner-such possession is unlawful and should
be restored to the United States by a possessory action in
the courts.
The course recommended by Attorney-General Devens
(17 Opin., 7) 1 that application be made to Congress for the
purchase or condemnation of this land, is, manifestly, the
wisest and most just course to be pursued.
If the United States have abandoned these sites, or either
of them, and the lawful owner has entered and taken possession, his possession is lawful and can not and should not be
disturbed.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECR E TARY OF WAR.
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ARMY OFFICERS-SECRETARY O_F WAR.
An examination by an examining board of a lieutenant of the Army to
determine his :fitness for promotion, by which it was found that he
was incapacitated for active service on account of certain physical
tlisabilities, which findings were approved by the Surgeon-General,
by the Major-General Commanding the Army, apd by the Acting
Secretary of War, but not by the President, was not such an examination as is required by law for the retirement of an officer from
active service.
·
He could not be retired without the approval of the President.
If he recovers from such disabilities, the Secretary of War may allow
him a reexamination for promotion.
Tho phrase "he shall ue retired with the rank to which his seniority
entitle(l him to be promoted," in the proviso to the act of October 1,
1890, is not a mandatory provision for the retirement of the disabled
officer, but is fur the purpose of :fixing the rank with which he should
be retired.
·
DEP .AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 31, 1896.

SIR: I have your communication of the 20th of July,
inclosing a request in writing, from the Hon. John H. Mitchell, United States Senator, with a number of other papers,
presenting the case upon which you request my opinion .
.Among these papers is a communication of October 24, 1895,
from Medorem Crawford, first lieutenant Second .Artillery,
Fort Schuyler, N. Y., to the .Adjutant-General, United States
.Army (through military channels). This communication submits a protest,, For the personal consideration of the honorable Secretary of War, against a reexamination as to his fitness for
promotion of First Lieut. Edwin S. Curtis, Second United
States .Artillery, who has been directed by Special Orders,
No. 247, paragraph 9, .Adjutant-General's Office, October 22,
1895, to appear before a board of officers 'for such reexamination; he having already been examined by an examining
board appointed by Special Orders, No. 251, Headquarters of
the .Army, .Adjutant-General's Office, October 28, 1891, by
which board he was found to be incapacitated for service by
reason of physical disability contracted in the line of duty,
and the proceedings of the board in his case having been
duly approved by the honorable Secretary of War, and his
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action promulgated by Special Orders, No. 102, Headquarters
of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, May 6, 1893, and the
officer ordered to proceed to bis home.
"I respectfully enter the above protest on the ground of
the illegality of ·a reopening of bis case by a second examination into his .fitness for p'r omotion."
It further appears, from the papers accompanying your
letter, that on December 8, 1891, Lieut. Edwin~- Curtis was
examined by an examining board to determine his fitness for
promotion and was found (incapacitated for active service on
account of certain physical disabilities; · that this finding
was approved by the Surgeon-General and by the MajorGeneral Commanding the Army and, on December 18, 1891,
by the then Acting Secretary of War; that on the lastnamed date Lieutenant Curtis was notified that he would be
retired at the proper time.
On May 6, 1893, he was ordered to his home, and on June
23, 1893, be was granted sick leave of absence until further
orders.
On May 16, 1895, he applied for reexamination and submitted a surgeon's certificate showing that he had recovered
his kealth and was then physically sound. On this application he was, with the approval of the Secretary of War,
assigned to duty at Fort Trumbull, Conn.
On October 21, 1895, the action of the Acting Secretary of
War, of December 18, 1891, approving the .finding of the
examining board, was cancelled ·by the Secretary of War.
The ground of the protest of Lieutenant Crawford against
the reexamination for promotion of Lieutenant Curtis appears
to be that the examination of December 8, 1891, when
approved by the Secretary of War, December 18, 1891,
became final and conclusive, and that no power or authority
existed in the Secretary of War to direct or permit a reexamination of Lieuteuant Curtis. He relies upon the proviso
to the act of October 1, 1890That hould he officer fail in his physical examination
and be found incapacitated for ervice by reason of physical
di bility contracted in line of duty he shall be retired
wi h b rank to wbi h hi eni rity entit1 d him to be prom
1.
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The correctness of this view must depend upon· the law as
it then stood, whether expressed by act of Oongress or by
authorized executive orders.
By act of October 1, 1890 (26 _Stat., 562), entitled "An
act to provide for the examination of certain officers of the
Army and to regulate promotions therein," it is provided in
section 3" That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to
prescribe a system of examination of all officers of the Army
below the rank of major to determine their fitness for promotion, such an examination to be conducted at such times
anterior to the accruing of the right to promotion as may be
best for the interests of the service: * * * And provided, That should the officer fail in his physical examination and be found incapacitated for service by reason of
physical disability contracted in line of duty he shall be
retired with the rank to which his seniority entitled him to
be promoted." * * *
This act was published in General Orders, No. 116, Headquarters of the Army, October 7, 1890.
On October 29, 1890, there was published in General
Orders, No. 128, Headquarters of the Army, certain rules
'' prescribed by the President in accordance with section 3
of the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890. Of these
Rule III is as follows:
"When the board finds an officer physically incapacitated
for service it shall conclude the examination by finding and
reporting the cause which, in its judgment, has produced his
disability, and whether such disability was contracted in the
line of duty. For the purpose of this inquiry the proceedings of the board shall conform to those of a retiring
board."
By a" Circular" of December, 18, 1890, issued by order of
the Secretary of War, from the Surgeon-General's Office,,' Physical incapacity' is defined as a condition, bodily or
mental, which unfits at present, or is likely to unfit in the
near future, the officer for the performance of his duties."
In General Orders, No. 80, October 5, 1891, Headquarters
of the Army, aud in General Orders, No. 6, January 26,
1893, Headquarters of the Army, certain rules, prescribed by
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the President in accordance with section 3 of the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890, were published for the
information of those concerned.
On January 31, 1893, thore were issued from the Headquarters of the .Army a certa.in "General instructions for
examining boards" for the guidance of examining boards in
the examination of commissioned officers for promotion .
.Among these instructions is the following:
".All questions relating to the physical condition of a candidate shall be determined by the full board; and if the
board finds an officer physically incapacitated the proceedings will be authenticated by the signature of the president
and the recorder only."
On September 15, 1893, certain other '' General instructions for examining boards" were issued from the Headquarters of the Army as follows:
"When the board finds it necessary...to act in the capacity
of a retiring board under paragraph 3 of General Orders,
No. 12_8, October 29, 1890, it will, before concluding the examination for retirement, apply to the .Adjutant-General for a
statement of tlrn officer's military service and any evidence
· which may be on file relating to the question of bis disability,
the same as furnished to a retiring board, and upon the
receipt of such statement and evidence will proceed to thoroughly examine into the merits of the case in accordance
with the requirements of sections 1248 and 1249, Revised
Statutes."
Construing together the statutes and regulations providiug for the promotion of officers of the Army, we find that
under the act of October 1, 1890, a physical, as well as a
professional, examination was provided for as a condition for
promotion; and that act expressly provides that" Should the officer fail in his physical examination and be
found incapacitated for service by reason of physical disability he hall be retired with the rank to which his seniority entitl d him to be promoted."
It houJ l be borne in mind that the title of this act is
" n a t to provide for the e 'amination of certain officers of
he
m and t regulate promoti n therein. ' That title
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correctly describes the object, purpose, and intent of the act
as appears from all of its provisions.
It was not an act to provide for the retirement of officers
from the Army, but merely to _fix the rank of officers and
"regulate promotions" in the Army.
The phrase to which Lieutenant Crawford directs attention in the third proviso to section 3 of the act," he shall be
retired with the rank to wh1ch his seniority entitled him to be
promoted," plainly is not a mandatory provision for the retirement of the disabled officer, but for the purpose of fixing the
rank with which he should be retired. _No authority was
given by law to the board of · examiners for promotion to
retire any officer from the Army; no such authority is anywhere given to the Secretary of War.
The law providing for the retirement of officers from the
Army will be found in sections 1243-1260 of the Revised
Statutes.
Section 1249 provides for the report to be made by the
Army retiring board.
Section 1250 provides:
"The proceedings and decision of the board shall be transmitted to the Secretary of War, and shall be laid by him
before the President for his approval or disapproval and
orders in the case."
Section 1251 provides:
"When a retiring board finds that an officer is incapacitated for active service, and that his incapacity is the result
of an incident of service, and such decision is approved by
the President, said officer shall be retired from active service
and placed on the list of retired officers."
So that no officer can be retired from the Army upon the
report of any board, evep. if such report be approved by the
Secretary of War, except it "is approved by the President."
It is true that the physical examination of an officer who
is under examination for promotion may be the same in its
character and extent as the physical examination of an officer
who is under examination for retirement. Indeed, section
3, General Orders, No. 128, of October 9, 1890, of the rules
prescribed ·by the President for the examination of officers
for promotion requires that "for the purpose of this inquiry

.
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the proceedings of · the board shall conform to those of a
retiring board." And this circular from the Surgeon-General
of Decern ber 18, 1890, and the " General instructions for
examining boards" of January 31, 1893, prescribe, with
minuteness and detail, the character of such examinations.
The "General instructions" of September 13, 1893, provide that" When the board finds it necessary to act in the capacity
of a retiring board, under paragraph 3 of General Orders,
N o.128, October 29, 1890, it will, before concluding the examination for retirement,' apply to the Adjutant-General for a
statement of the officer's military service and any evidence
which may be on file relating to the question of his disability,
the same as furnished to a retiring board, and upon the
receipt of such statement and evidence will proceed to thoroughly examine into the merits of the case, in accordance
with the requirements of sections 1248 and 1249, Revised
Statutes."
'11his order indicates the manner in which the examination
is to be conducted, and substantially directs that it sha11 be
the same in all respects as that provided for a retiring board.
It must be apparen~ then, that no such proceedings were
had in the case of Lieutenant Curtis as to effect his retirement from the Army.
The findings of the examining board of December 8, 1891,
were approved by the Surgeon-General, the Major-General
Commanding the Army, and by the Secretary of War; and
Lieutenant Curtis "was notified that he would be retired at
the proper time." But he could not be retired without the
approval of the President; and even if the action of the
examining board for promotion were to be regarded and
treated as that of a retiring 'board, still it would be inoperative to effect hi retirement until approved by the President.
ection 1246, Revi eel Statutes, provide that the Secretary
ar, und r the direction of the Pre ident, may a semble
c retiring board, to con i t of not mor
than nine, nor le '
than :five fficer two-fifth of whom hall be 'elected from
h 1 dicaJ or . Th board f xaminati n for the proid d for in the rule pr cribed b the
r1 r
o. 2 , 0 t b r 29, 1890, ball
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consist" of five members, two of whom shall be selected from
the Medical Corps, and a recorder."
So that it would seem that a board constituted as' a board
of examination for promotion, as required to be, can not be
invested with the· power of a retiring board, which the law
requires to be differently constituted.
On the whole, I am of opinion that tbe physical examiI1ation to which Lieutenant Curtis was subjected on December
8,189.1, was not such an examination as was required by law
for the retirement of an officer from active service; and that
no reason appears from the facts submitted to me, or from
the law as it then was, or as it ,now is, why-upon the facts
stated-the Secretary of War may not allow him a reexamination for promotion.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES OONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTlON-SECRETARY OF WAR.
The river and harbor act of June 3, 1893, making an appropriation
for the protection of the east bank of the Mississippi River opposite
the mouth of the Missouri River, leaves it to the discretion of the Secretary of War whether he s_h all make such expenditure or not.
Language whose ordinary meaning is permissive only is sometimes
held to be mandatory when other parts of the law make it plain that
it was intended to require and not merely authorize.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A. ugust 1, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of July 28, calling my attention to the folio wing clause
in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896: '' That of the
money herein :appropriated for the improvement of the
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Mississippi River between Cairo and the mouth of the Missouri River there may be expended, under the direction of
the Secretary of War, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,
or so much thereof as may be necessary, in order to improve
the channel of the river, and to protect the east bank of the
Mississippi river from caving in and being washed away at
or near a point opposite the mouth of the Missouri River
and extending south along said east bank, and thirty thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall
be expended in removing the bar in front of Chester, Illinois,
and protecting the west bank of the Mississippi opposite
Chester," and asking my opinion whether the expenditure
of the $50,000, provided in the item quoted, for protecting
the east bank of the Mississippi River at a point opposite
the mouth of the Missouri, is virtuaJly ordered by Congress,
or is the expenditure of the amount left to ·the discretion of
the Secretary of War.
While language whose ordinary meaning is permissive
only, like that in the clause in question, has sometimes been
held to be mandatory when other parts of the law made it
plain that it was intended to require, and not merely authorize, my opinion is that the permissive form was here used
with the deliberate intention of leaving to your judgment
the question whether any of the sum named should be
expended; and if so, how much. Your attention is called
by Uongress to the condition of the channel and the east
bank of the Mississippi at the point named, and it is made
your duty, if that condition be found to be as reported to
Congress, to proceed with the expenditure authorized if,
in your judgment, an improvement of that condition may
fairly be expected to result. Otherwise you are left at liberty to leave the appropriation unexpended.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The ECRE'.l'A.RY OF WAR.
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CIVIL SERVICE.
Section 4-415, Revised Statutes, so far as it prescribes the method by
which vacancies on the board of inspectors of hulls of steam vessels
shall be filled, was repealed by the civil-service act and the board provided by said section can not act as a board of examiners under the
civil-service act, unless the members of such board ar.e selected and
appointed as such board of e~aminers under section 5, Rule IV.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

August 10, 1896.

SIR: I have yours of the 6th instant, stating that a vacancy
exists in the Steamboat Inspection Service of inspector of
hulls of steam vessels at San Francisco, and submitting for
my opinion the question ''whether the ·Civil Service Commissfon can use the board provided by law, section 4415,
Revised Statutes, and make them a civil-service examini11g
board under its provisions, or whether the civil-service 'law
and rules abrogate that statute as far as these places are
concerned."
By act of January 16, 1883, entitled ''An act to regulate
and improve the civil service of the United States" (22 Stat.,
403):
"SEO. 7. That after the expiration of six months from tbe
passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed.,
and no person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in
either of the said classes now existing or that may be arranged
hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed au
examination, or is Hhowri to be specially exempted from such
examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein
contained shall be construed to take from those honorably
discharged from the military or naval service any preference
conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-fourth section
of the Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any
authority not inconsistent with this act conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-third section of said statutes; nor
shall any officer not in the executive branch of the Government or any person merely employed as a laborer or workman be required to be classified hereunder; nor, unless Ly
direction of the Senate, shall any person who has been nominated for confirmation by the Senate be required to be classified or to pass an examination."
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The rules here referred to are those provided for in section
2 of said act.
Pursuant to the authority and requirement of said act and
of section 1753, Revised Statutes, the President did, on May
G, 1896, approve certain rules which have been duly promulgated and all other rules revoked.
By Rule III the departmental service was made one of
the branches of the classified executive civil service of the
United States and includes therein the officers and employees
of the Steamboat Inspection Service.
By Rule IV, section 2~ it was provided:
"No person shall be appointed to, or be employed in, any
position which has been, or may hereafter be classified under
the civil-service act, until he shall have passed the examination provided therefor, or unless he is especially exempt
from examination by the provisions of said act or the rules
made in pursuance thereof."
Section 5 authorizes the Civil Service Commissioners to
"appoint from persons in the Government service such
boards of examiners as it may deem necessary."
I am of opinion, then, that section 4415, Revised Statutes,
so far as it prescribes the method by which vacancies on the
board of inspectors of hulls of steam vessP-ls shall be :filled,
is repealed by the civil-service act, and the board provided
by section 4415, Revised Statutes, can not act as a board of
examiners under the civil-service act unless the members
of such board are selected and appointed as such board of
examiners under section 5, Rule IV.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

LETTER

O T IDE F THE MAIL CARRIED BY RAILROAD
C IP IE -STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

ection 39 - and 39 3, Revised ' tatutes, are not in derogation of comm n right. They are r venne laws and are not to be strictly con trued,
thou rh they impo penalti .
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Railroad companies can not set up any" common right" against the
conditions which the law incorporates in their contracts with the
Government.
The public interest requires that the Government should have a monopoly of the business of carrying letters, etc.
Letters aud packets relating to the business of the railroad on which
they are carried may be carried by such railroad outside of the mails,
not in Government stamped envelopes. The right is to carry letters
written and sent by the officers and agents of the railroad company
which carries and delivers them, about its business, and these only.
They may be letters to others of its officers and agents, to those of connecting lines, or to anyone else, so long as no other carrier intervenes.
It has no right to transport letters for a third person.
Letters of a company addressed to officers or agents of a connecting
line on company business and delivered to an agent of the latter at
the point of connection may be carried by the latter to any point on
its line, because such letters become its own on receipt by any one of
its agents.
Any company, or any officer or employee thereof, carrying letters w,hich
are neither written by that company nor addressed to it, is liable to
the penalties imposecl by law.
Tbe officer or agent of the person or company sending letters to be
carried contrary to law is it seems also liable.
A company may not carry letters from _one of its connecting lines to
another when they relate to through business over the lines of all.
Such letters do not ,., relate to its business:, within the meaning of
the postal regulations.
The expression "private hands," in section 3992, Revised Statutes, was
intended to cover all except common carriers on post routes. Neither
the latter nor their employees can be considered as "private hands"
under this section, and if they could be, the express or implied obligation of railroads to carry letters for each other to remotely connecting lines would amount to "compensation" within the meaning
of the statute.
The denial of the right of railroad companies to carry letters between
other companies with whose lines their own connect applies also to
the carrying of letters by railroad companies for companies, corporations, or pdvate individuals, operating car lines, transportation lines,
hotels, restaurants, or any class of business that may either be connected with or not connected with the railroad proper.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 12, 1896.

Sm: Your letter of the 3d instant supplies the defects in
that of July 29, to which I called your attention, by submitting the specific questions on which you ask my opinion.
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I have the honor, therefore, now to comply with your request.
The delay has been chiefly due to the desire of counsel at a
distance to present their views, which I was glad to gratify
for my own benefit as well as in fairness to those whose
interests are involved.
You submit your order No. 422, dated July 2, 1896, relative to the sending and carrying by railway companies of
'' letters outside the mails and not inclosed in Government
stamped envelopes, and which do not relate to the cargo
being carried on the train." The order quotes sections 3985
and 3993 of the Revised Statutes, declares that "the carrying of such letters outside the mails is in direct violation" of
those sections, and threatens prosecution of all persons concerned therein. The sections cited are as follows:
"SEC. 3985. No stage coach, railway car, steamboat, or
other vehicle or vessel which regularly performs trips at
stated periods on any post route, or from any city, town, or
place to any other city, town, or place, between which the
mail is regularly carried, shall carry, otherwise than in the
mail, any letters or packets, except such as relate to some
part of the cargo of such steamboat or. other vessel, or to
some article carried at the same time by the same stage
coach, railway car, or other vehicle, except as provided in
section three tl10usand nine hundred and ninety-three; and
for every such offense the owner of the stage coach, railway car, steamboat, or other vehicle or vessel shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars; and the driver,
conductor, master, or other person having charge thereof,
and not at the time owner of the whole or any part thereof,
shall for every such offense be liable to a penalty of :fifty
dollars.
"SE . 3993. All letters enclosed in stamped envelopes, if
the po tage stamp i of a denomination sufficient to cover
he po tage that would be chargeable thereon if the ame
were ent by mail, may be ent, conveyed, and delivered
otherwi e than by mail, provided such envelope shall be
duly dire t d aud properly ealed, o that the letter can not
b taJ~ n therefrom wi bout d facing the nvelope, and the
d t of h 1
r of the tran mi ion or re eipt thereof
am1>ed upon the n el pe. But the
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Postmaster-General may suspend the operation of this section upon any mail route where the public interest may
require such suspension."
You refer me to section 3992 also, which is as follows:
"Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the conveyance or trausruission of letters or packets by private
hands without compensation, or by special messenger
employed for the particular occasion only."
You ask: (1) "Can the railroad companies carry, outside
of the mails, not in Government stamped envelopes, any firstclass mail matter except such as concerns the cargo carried
by the road?"
(2) "Is it proper for a railroad company to carry, outside
of the mails, not in Government stamped envelopes, firstclass mail matter intended for a connecting line?"
(3) "Is it proper for a railroad company to carry, outside
of the mails, first-class mail matter not in Government
stamped envelopes, for companies, corporations, or private
individuals operating car lines, transportation lines (either
passenger or freight), operating hotels, restaurants, or any
other class of business that may either be connected or not
connected with the railroad proper 1"
( 4) ''Can such companies as mentioned in the third question carry their own mail; and if so, under what circumstances?"
Section 1022 of the Postal Laws and Regulations of 1893,
after prohibiting the carriage of letters and packets according to sections 3985 and 3993, excepts such as relate " ·to the
business of the railroad on which they are carried." You
state that this clause bas been found in all the postal regulations for many years, until it has become the settled construction by your Department of the laws now embodied in
these sections; and that you are therefore not disposed to
iusist on the strict construction of your order, which would
reverse that construction, unless the law requires you to
do so.
You say, however~ that the railroad companies of the
country have given so broad a construction to the clause
just quoted that a system of railway l~tter service has grown
up of such proportions that it carries substantially all the
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correspondence of railway officers and employees~ and those
of kindred organizations, on all subjects connected with railroad business, and that n~gular offices for the distribution
and routing of this railway mail are established at all large
terminal points.
I do not think these statutes are in derogation of common
right, and therefore to be strictly construed as stated in
United States v. United States Express Oo. (5 Biss., 91). They
are revenue laws ( United States v. Bromley, 12 How., 96),
and are not to be strictly construed, though they impose
penalties. (4 Opin., 159; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall.,
406; United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S., 12.) Certainly railroad companies can set up no "common right," if such they
have, against the conditions which the law incorporates in
.their contracts with the Government. The intention of the
law was to secure to the Government a monopoly of the
business of carrying letters, etc., which the public interest
requires it to do in some regions at a loss, which might
become too great a burden if it should be deprived of any
portion of the business elsewhere. (See 9 Opin., 161, and 14
Opin., 152.)
But, whatever rule of construction be applied, I think the
long-settled rule of your Department, taken as meant, carries out the intention of the law. Read literally, section 3985
would forbid the carrying of any letters or · packets outside
the mails besides those covered by the express exceptions.
But your predecessors who adopted and have maintained the
rule above mentioned, looking to the object which Congress
manifestly had in view, construed the law as applying ouly
to carriage for other persons. This coustruction seems to be
sustained by the glimpse into the minds of the framers of the
law which the expressed exceptions afford, as well as by
other sections of the law relating to the same general subject. (See ec . 3982-3984 and 4 Opin., 159.) Section 3992
al o confirm thi view, both the exceptious it makes plainly
relating to carriage for third person , as appears from the
refer n e to · mpen ation in one ca e and employment in
h oh r.
idently had n thoucrht of int rfi ring with the
f rri r on po tr ute for communicating
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dirf>ctly with their own employees or with other persons. It
was dealing only with their public business of carrying for
others. Therefore no exception was required in this respect ·
and no argument is to be drawn from its omission from the
expression of exceptions.
In view of the language of the law and the plain right of
Congress to require all letters carried on post routes by pul;>lic carriers to go in the mails, the right of railroads to carry
their own letters must rest alone on the reason above given,
which also furnishes the limitation of the right by its very
definition. Even if the enjoyment of the right were deduced
from lack of authority in Congress to interfere with it, rather
than from absence of intention to do so, the same result
would follow. The right is to carry .letters written and sent
by the officers and agents of the railroad company which
carries and delivers them, about its business, and these only.
They may be letters to ot~ers of its officers and agents, to
those of connecting lines, or to anyone else, so long as no
other carrier intervenes. The moment this occurs, such other
carrier is transporting letters for a third person. It bas no
natural right to do this, as it is asserted to have with respect
to its own letters; and as to letters other than its own, no
exception is permissible beyond those expressed in the
statute.
The clause above quoted from the postal regulations was
manifestly not intended to do more than carry out the law.
Otherwise it would, of course, be invalid. But taken not to
refer to letters of others than the carrying company, it is consistent and proper. Such, I am confident, was the meaning
intended.
Of course, letters of a company addressed to officers or
agents of a connecting line on company business, and delivered to an agent of the latter at the point of connection may
be carried by the latter to any point on its line, because such
letters become its own on receipt by any one of its agents,
and transfer to another agent, without the intervention of
another carrier, comes within the principle already expressed.
But any company, or any officer or employee thereof, carrying letters which are neither written by that company nor
addressed to it, is liable to the penalties imposed by the law.
3513-VOL 21,
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The officer or agent of the person or company sending lettiers
to be carried contrary to the law is, it seems, also liable.
· (See United States v. Hall, 9 .Am. Law Reg., 232, and R. S.,
sec. 5440.)
I am unable to reconcile with this view of the law the
claim that a company may carry letters from one of its conll:ecting lines to another when they relate to through business over the lines of all. This claim proceeds on the theory
that the carrying company's interest, actual or possible, in
the subject of the correspondence makes the letter" relate
to its business," in the language of the postal regulations.
But, as I have said, this la.nguage was used with reference
to letters sent by or addressed to the carrying company, or
on its behalf, and the form of expression adopted was
doubtless merely intended to exclude private correspondence between persons in the employ of carriers. Otherwise
the regulation, like the claim based on it~ would be contrary
to the law. In United States v. Bromley (supra) an order for
goods to be brought by a steamboat on its return trip was
held to have been wrongfully carried, although the carrier
had a direct interest therein.
Congress certainly expected that the _postal authorities
would inspect letters, etc., transported by carriers not in
the mails nor in stamped envelopes, in order to prevent and
punish violations of law. (See secs. 3990 and 4026, and
Blackham v. Gresham, 16 Fed. Rep., 609.) It is difficult to
attribute to Congress an intention to •make the conduct of
these officers depend on so difficult an inquiry as that
involved in determining whether the carrier has an interest
in the subject of correspondence to which it is not a party.
While a somewhat similar inquiry may be required for the
detection of private correspondence between railway employees,. it can be readily conducted by mere inspection of
the letters, unlike investigation as to the carrier's interest
in subjects of correspondence between other companies.
Besides, such inquiry as to private correspongence is unavoidable; while mere inspection of the envelopes will generally enable in pector to decide whether letters are by or to
be arrier it If or it agents acting for H. It would be
e uall imp ible for a carrier to determine, a8 it must do
in rd r to a oid vi lation of the law, whether letters sent
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by one of its connecting lines to another relate wholly to
business in which it has a specific interest. The view
contended for seems to require the assumption that each
connecting carrier has such interest in all correspondence
between other companies about through business done or
expected. This assumption is unwarrantable in view of
United States v. Bromley (supra).
I do not think section 3992 has any bearing on this point.
'(The conveyance or transmission of letters or packets by
private hands without compensation" must, ofcourse, be held
to refer to something different from conveyance or transmission "by special messenger employed for the particular
occasion;" but "private hands" was evidently intended to
cover all except common carriers on post routes. Neither
the latter nor their employees, while engaged in their business, can be considered as "private hands" under this section, and, if they could be, my opinion is that the express or
implied obligation of railroads to carry letters for each other
to remotely connecting lines would amount to "compensation" within the meaning of the statute. I <l.o not understand it to be contended that the clause relating to special
messengers is relevant here.
The suggestion you make that the right of railroad companies to carry their own letters to connecting lines is liable
to abuses which are difficult to detect can not be considered.
It is not to be assumed that anyone will violate the law, when
it is clearly understood, and communications from one connecting line to another and communications from it to the
next, though on .the same subject, come clearly within the
right of carriage outside of the mails and without stamps.
Nor can I give weight to the inconvenience which, it is
alleged by some of the counsel who have been heard, will
result to the railways and their patrons from the abolition
of what may be termed "through railway mail," which this
opinion requires. Assuming the superior promptness and
efficiency of this service, which is asserted, it may be that
its abolition will result in the improvement of the public
mail service. At any rate, such considerations can not affect
wha,t I consider the evident meaning of the Jaw,
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It is manifest that what I have said in denying the right of
railroad companies to carry letters between other companies
with whose lines their own connect applies also to the carriage of letters by railroad companies for the class of persons,
associations, and companies . mentioned in your third question, and that the right of such persons, associations, and
companies to carry their own mail is defined and limited like
that of railroad companies.
Having answered all your questions generally, I deem it
unnecessary to answer them in detail.
Respectfully submitted.
JUDSON H.A.RMON.
The PoSTM.A.STER-GENER.A.L.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-DUTIES.

A question which was referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury, and
at his request referred to the Attorney-General, answered by the
Attorney-General, because it is an important one.
On an•application for an abandonment to the United States of dutiable
goods, in accordance with the provisions of section 23 <;>f the customs
administrative act of June 10, 1890, the decisions of the collector and
Board of General Appraisers, if it was i;be importers' duty to protest,
are conclusive, if the importers took no appeal, .and a refund, asked
by the importers on the ground that the rulings of the collector and
Board of General Appraisers were erroneous under a subsequent ruling
of the Treasury Department in another case and a still later opinion
of the Attorney-General, will not be allowed.
An application for an abandonment under section 23 of said customs
administrative act does not present an "administrative question" as
to which the decision of the collector is final.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF · JUSTICE,

A11,gust 18, 1896.

I have tbe honor to acknowledge your communication of A.ugu t 3, asking- an official opinion concerning the
application of tbe E. L. Goodsell Company for a refund of
duti . .
It appear that thi company imported.fifty boxes of lemons
pril 5 1 95, at tbe port of New York. On .April 11 an
, ppli ·a ion wa :filed with the collector of the port for an
IR:
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abandonment to the United States of these lemons in accordance with the provisions of section 23 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. At that time this section was
construed by your Department as permitting abandonment
only in the case of damaged . goods. The application was
therefore referred to an appraiser for the purpose of ascertaining w bether the goods were damaged. This official, upon
- taking up the case, found that the goods, which bad been
lying on a wharf in Jersey City, had been dumped by directions of the board of health of that city. The collector
declined to grant any relief to the importers in the premises.
The latter thereupon filed a protest under the provisions of
section 14 of the customs administrative act. The case thus
came before the General Appraisers, who sustained the collector's decision "in view of the fact that the importers bad
presented no evidence in support of their claim other than a
certificate of the board of health to the effect that the goods
had been condemned and sent to the dump." The importers
took no appeal.
It was subsequently ruled by your Department in another
case that such a certificate of the board of health would be
accepted as sufficient evidence; and still later, by an opinion
rendered April 10, 1896, the present Attorney-General has
held that the question of damage is altogether immaterial,
and that importers have a right to abandon goods, whether
damaged or not, if amounting to 10 per cent or over of the
total value or quantity of an invoice. It must, therefore,
now be assumed that the decisions of the collector and of
the Board of General Appraisers in the present case were
erroneous, and I assume, also, that the lemons were still in
existence on April 11, so that no question arises as to whether
an abandonment within the meaning of section 23 can be
made after the goods are already destroyed.
The importers having asked a refund, the question was
referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury; but as it is an
important one, it is now referred to this Department at his
request. (See opinion of September 21, 1895.)
The rulings of the collector and of the Board of General
Appraisers were plainly not due to any mutual mistake of
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fact. They must be assumed to have been due to "an erroneous view of the facts in the case" within the meaning of
the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, section 1; and hence,
if it was the importers' duty to protest, are conclusive; because
the protest taken by them at the time was not followed up
by an appeal. (Opinions of September 21 and November 8,
1895.)
It is suggested, however, that an application for abandonment under section 23 presents an '' administrative question,"
as to which the decision of the collector is final and not subject to review by the Board of General .Appraisers, and that
therefore there could be no protest in such a case. The collector's decision, however, clearly relates to the rate and
amount of duties chargeable. It is hence subject to review
by the General .Appraisers under sections 13 and 14 of the
customs administrative act as construed by .Attorney-General
Olney in 21 Opinion, 92, 95.
I do not think that United States v. Klingenberg (153 U.S.,
93), properly understood, is in conflict with this construction.
Notwithstanding some language in the opinion in that case,
I do not think that the court intended to hold the question
then presented to be a jurisdictional one in the strict sense
of that term. The court held a certain proclamation by the
Secretary of the Treasury to be conclusive as to the value
of the .Austrian florin; but had the collector's construction of
that proclamation been erroneous instead of correct, and bad
the collector thus disobeyed the proclamation instead of
obeying it, I do not understand it to be settled that the
Board of General .Appraisers would have been without jurisdiction to correct the error. ( Wood v. United States, 72 Fed.
Rep., 254,257; compare opinion of November 26, 1895.)
I therefore have the honor to advise you that the Board of
General Appraisers had jurisdiction to review the collector's
deci ion in the present case, and that the action of the Board
wa final for all purpo e , since the importers did not appeal.
Thi i ufficient to dispos~ of the case.
V ry re pectfully,
EDW.A.RD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney-General.
RY OF THE TREAS RY.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - PUBLIC PRINTER - COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that in cases of apparent
conflict the more specific provisions should govern, and this is especially the case when the specific proyisions follow the general one.
Under section 56 of the public printing and binding act of January 12,
1895, chapter 23, the Public Printer should print in slip form and distribute 760 copies of private laws, postal conventions, and treaties.
To what appropriation the expense of these copies is to be charged is a
question which may be asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury, and
should not be answered by the Attorney-General.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 31, 1896.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of July 18 relating to the questions in controversy between
your Department and the Public Printer respecting the
• proper construction of the public printing and binding act of
January 12, 1895, chapter 23. This act is long and complicated; but I am informed by the Public Printer that he does
not ·desire to submit an argument upon these questions,
so that I am obliged to pass upon them without knowing
the ground upon which he made the rulings of which you
complain.
Sectio'n 56 of the -act provides that there shall be printed
in slip form 460 copies of Private Laws, Postal Conventions,
and Treaties, which shall be distributed as follows: To the
House document room, 100 copies; to the Senate document
room, 100 copies; to the Department of State, 500 copies; to
the Treasury Department, 60 copies. Adding up these specifications gives a total of 760 copies, or 300 more than the total
as given in the statute. The Public Printer refuses to supply more than 460 copies all told; and he deducts the whole
shortage of 300 from the quota of your Department. I am
unable to perceive any justification for charging the whole
deficit to your Department and deducting nothing from the
quotas of the House and Senate document rooms or of the
1'reasury Department. This action seems to me purely arbitrary. I am further of the opinion that the Public Printer
should print and distribute ·760 copies. It is a general rule
of statutory interpretation that in cases of apparent conflict
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the more specific provision should govern; and this is especially the case when the specific provisions follow the general
one. ·(Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 183.) No
case can be clearer than the present for the application of
these rules.
Section 90 of the act gives you the right to call upon the
Public Printer for such copies as_you may require for official
use of Government publications, ''not to exceed, however,
the number of bureaus in the Department and divisions in
the office of the head thereof." The question arising upon
this section is, whether the expense of these copies is to be
charged_to the appropriation for your Department or to the
general fund for public printing.
This is a question which may be asked of the Comptroller
· of the Treasury. (Act of July 31, 1894, chap. 17 4, sec. 8.) It
belongs to a class of questions which require for their decision a special knowledge of our appropriation acts and the
course of decisions thereunder. "They are questions which
the Comptroller, by his great experience, is better qualified
to pass upon, and it is desirable to avoid any possible conflict of precedents. Therefore it seems to me inadvisable for
me to attempt to pass upon these inquiries." (21 Opin., 179.)
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

•

OPINIONS
OF

HoN. JUDSON HARMON, OF Omo,
AND

HoN. JOSEPH McKENNA, OF CALIFORNIA.
CIVIL SERVICE-SECRET AGEN'l'S.
The confidential agents formerly employed in the free-delivery division of the Post-Office Department, and designated secret agents, did
not become classified employees of the departmental service within
Rule III of the civil-service rules promulgated May 6, 1896.
This rule covers only those employees who are to be regarded as appointed
for service in the departments at the seat of Government (whether
for the time being actually employed there or detailed for service elsewhere), as distinquished from those appointed for service in the States
or Territories, or, as in the case of the Railway Mail Service, in the
cou'ntry at large.
DEPARTMEN'.l'

OF

JUSTIOE,

September 10, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of August 29, asking my opinion as to whether the confidential agents formerly employed in the free-delivery
division of your Department, and designated secret agents,
became classified employees of the departmental service
within Rule III of the civil-service rules promulgated May
6, 1896. These agents were employed at the rate of $5 per
diem and expenses under the general appropriation "for freedelivery service" for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1896.
(Post-Office appropriation act of February 28, 1895, ch. 140;
28 Stat., 691.)
This rule includes in the departmental service all employees
of whatever designation, "however or for whatever purpose
employed, whether compensated by a fixed salary or otherwise, who are serving in or on detail from the several executive departments, commissions, and offices in the District of
Columbia."
10892-VOL
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This clause does not cover all of the employees of your
Department, as is shown, among other things, by the fact
that the Railway Mail Service is separately mentioned. I
think that it covers only those who are to be regarded as
appointed for servic~ in the departments at the seat of Gove_rnment (whether for the time being actually employed there
or detailed for service elsewhere), as distinguished from those
appointed for service in the States or Territories, or, as in
the case of the Railway Mail Service, in the country at large,
I think that these secret agents, like the employees of the
Railway Mail Service, must be regarded as appointed for
the country at large; as I understand their occupation to
have been a roving one, inspecting the letter-carrier service
in different parts of the country, and not having any special
relation to the service in the District of Columbia. Otherwise the question might be raised whether their appointment
did not conflict with the act of August 5, 1882, chapter 389,
section 4.
I am therefore of the opinion that these agents were not
classified under the present civil-service rules.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The P0S'l'MASTER-GENERAL.

ARREARS OF PENSION-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The provision of section 4724 of the Revised Statutes "that no person
in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, shall be allowed to draw both a
pension as an invalid and the pay of his rank or station in the service" is not applicable to an officer upon the retired list.
If a statute is ambiguous, a long-established construction thereof by
the department charged with its execution, if continuous and consistent, will be regarded as conclusive.
Under the pension appropriation acts of 1890 and 1891 no pension moneys can be drawn by retired officers of the Army, Navy, or Marine
orps after August 29, 1890, but these two statutes are not to be given
a, retrosp<•ctive ffect so as to cut off arrears already due.
DEP ARTMEN'.r OF

JUSTICE,
September 11, 1896.
IR: I h
e the honor to acknowledge your communicau f ept m r 4, r lating to the opinion previously asked
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with rel~tion to the claim of Col. John Pulford, formerly o_f
the Fifth Michigan Volunfoer Infantry, for certain arrears
of pension.
It appears that Colonel Pulford, whiie in the volunteer .
service during the rebellion, received two severe gunshot
wounds, on July 1, 1862, and May 5, 1864, respec~ively; that ·
on account of the~e wounds he was placed upon the pension
list June 15, 1866, his pension dating from July 17, 1865;
that on February 23, 1866, he was appointed second lieutenant in the Regular .Army; that he has received his pension
from July 17, 1865, to February 23, 1866; that he did not
thereafter claim further pension payments until very recently,
apparently believing that he was disqualified from receiving
them by reason of section 4 724 of the Revised Statutes; that
he was retired from active service on December 15, 1870,
and that this retirement was based upon a medical examination which proved that he was incapacitated for active service through the result of the wounds for which he had theretofore been pensioned.
It is not questioned by anybody that during his service in
the Regular .Army from 1866 to 1870 Colonel Pulford was
disqualified from drawing any invalid pension by reason of
the final proviso to the pension appropriation act of April
30, 1844, chapter 15, which is as follows:
"That no person in the .Army, Navy, or Marine Corps
shall be allowed to draw both a pension as an invalid and
the pay of his rank or station in the service, unless the
alleged disability for which the pension was granted be such
as to have occasioned his employment in a lower grade or in
some civil branch of the service."
This section . was thereafter reenacted as section 4724 of
the Revised Statutes. The first question presented by Colonel Pulford's application is whether this statutory provision
was applicable to an officer upon the retired list, as he seems
then to have supposed. The .Assistant Secretary of the ·
Interior decided this question in the affirmative, and for this
reason, among others, has held that the present claim has
properly been rejected; but upon a motion for a reconsideration, you have asked me to review his decision, UJ•on the
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face of the statute I agree entirely with the Assistant Secretary; aiid if the question were res nova1 would be clearly of
the opinion that Colonel Pulford was a'' person in the army"
within the statutory meaning. ( United States v. Tyler, 105
U. S., 244; Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S., 439, 451. )
The construction of this provision, however, I think is governed by an element which seems not to have been brought
to the attention of the Assistant Secretary, namely, that of
long-established departmental practice. It appears that the
Pension Bureau always construed these provisions as not
applicable to retired officers; that in 1890, 300 of such officers
were thus actually upon the roll drawing invalid pensions, as
well as their retired pay, and that the practice continued
until stopped in that year by an act of Congress, hereinafter
mentioned.
If there be any ambiguity in a statute, a uniform practice
of this kind, continuing for a quarter of a century, ought to
be conclusive. (Robertsonv. Downing, 127 U.S., 607,613, and
cases cited; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S., 136, 145.)
Departmental practice under an act of Congress has an
effect similar in this respect to Congressional practice under
an ambiguous statutory provision. ( The Laura, 114 U. S.,
411, 416, and cases cited; McPherson v. Blackie, 146 U.S., 1,
27.) The weight to be given to departmental practice is
greatly increased when Congress, in reenacting the law, fails
to indicate in any way its disapproval of the settled construction, to which it is thus regarded as giving an implied
approval. (18 Opin., 532; 20 Opin., 721; 2 Comp. Dec., 100.)
The opinions just cited are those of executive officers only,
but the first of them has been referred to with apparent
approval by the Supreme Court. (Earnshaw v. Oadwalader,
145 u. s., 247, 258.)
There is, indeed, an exception to this rule when the statute
is not ambiguous and the departmental practice clearly
defeats its obvious purpose. ( United States v. Tanner, 147
. S., 661,663; United States v. Alger, 152 U.S., 384,397; Webter v. Luther, 163 . S., 331, 342; 20 Opin., 593.) I think,
however, that the tatute now under consideration is not
ufficien ly clear to bring it within this exception to the
rul , e pecially when the cause for which the pensioner was
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retired from active military service and reduced in pay
was the very same "disability for which the pension was
granted."
For the reasons above stated, I think that ColoLel Pulford
is entitled to his pension, unless he has been deprived thereof
by subsequent legislation. Two statutes have been referred
to as having this effect. The pension appropriation act of
August 29, 1890, chapter 820, section 2, provided as follows:
"Hereafter no officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps
on the ~etired list shall draw or receive any pension under
any law."
The pension appropriation act of March 3, 1891, chapter
548, contains the following proviso:
" That hereafter no pension shall be allowed or paid to any
officer, noncommissioned officer, or private in the .Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States, either on the
active or retired list."
It is incontestable that under this proviso no pension
moneys can be drawn which would otherwise have become
payable after August 29, 1890. These two statutes, however, are not necessarily to be construed as intended to cut
off arrears already due to persons who were already on the
pension roll. No principle of statutory construction is better settled than that words should not have a retrospective
operation'' unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative
that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the
intention of the legislature can not be otherwise satisfied."
(United States v.Heth,3 Cr.,314; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall.,
596, 598; Twenty Per Gent Oases, 20 Wall., 179, 187.) It
must be conceded that the language of these statutes of
1890 and 1891 is strong. The question is difficult. Still, I
do not think that I am required to give a retrospective effect
to the statute in this particular. The object of Congress
was to put a stop to the practice for the future. I do not
think that it was intended to cut off the few pensioners who
had not yet applied for the sums already due. The language
of the proviso above quoted is much like that of the statute
considered in Miles Planting Oo. v. Oar lisle (5 D. C. App.,
138); but that case related to sums not yet accrued at the
passage of the act.
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It is therefore my opinion that the applicant is entitled to
bis arrears of pension up to and including the last quarterly
payment falling due prior to August 29, 1890.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.
[NoTE.-For a reconsideration of the question involved in
this opinion, see 21 Opin., 453. E. C. B.]

ALIEN OFFICERS ON VESSELS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
If there be any ambiguity in a statute, a uniform departmental practice
should be regarded as having settled the law.
A tax on a vessel employing as mate an alien, imposed under section 4219
of the Revised Statutes, which provides that a "vessel any officer of
which shall not be a citizen of the United 8tates shall pay a tax of 50
cents p er ton," should not be remitted because such alien had duly
declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States and
had for more than three years continuously served on board American
merchant vessels, but has never actually been admitted to cit,izeusbip.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 15, 1896.
· SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of August 25, requesting an opinion with relation to the
case of one Joseph Sjo, an alien employed as mate upon
the American schooner Lucy, of San Francisco. It appears
that on February 26, 1892, this seaman duly declared his
intention of becoming a citizen of the United States, and
that from that date he has continually served on board
American merchant vessels; but apparently, for some reason,
he bas never actually been admitted to citizenship. On
account of his employment as mate, you have imposed upon
the schooner a tax of $147 under the final clause of section
4219 of the Revised St.atutes, which is as follows:
"And any vessel, any officer of which hall not be a citizen
of the uited States, shall pay a tax of fifty cents per ton."
The legality of this tax is contested under section 217 4,
whicb, among other thing , provides as follows:
''And ery eaman being a foreigner ball after his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United State ,
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and after he shall have served such three years, be deemed
a citizen of the United States for the purpose of manning
and serving on board any merchant vessel of the United
States, anything to the contrary in any any act of Congress
notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for all purposes of
protection as an .American citizen, be deemed such after the ·
filing of his declaration of intention to become such citizen."
In considering the case I shaU assume, without deciding,
that if section 2174 gave to Sjo the right to be an officer upon
an .American merchant vessel that vessel would be freed from
the tax above mentioned; but the words "manning aud serving on board any merchant vessel" do not necessarily give
the right to act as an officer. To the contrary, we have the
following express provision of section 4131:
".And officers of vessels of the United. States shall in all
cases be citizens of the United States."
This provision has been construed in an opinion of .Attorney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 534); and it is held not to
be qualified by section 2174. That- opinion was rendered
before 1883, and has, if I understand correctly, been the basis
of a uniform departmental practice since that time. · If there
be any ambiguity in the statute such a practice should at
this late date be regarded as having settled the law. ( United
States v. Jlfoore, 95 U. S., 763; United States v. Pugh, 99 U.S.,
265; United States v. Healey,160 U.S., 136,145; 20 Opin., 730.)
Were the question a new one I should have great difficulty
in reaching the same conclusion, because I can find no other
provision in the Revised Statutes upon which the first clause
quoted from section 2174 can operate. I do not feel justified,
however, in overruling it after thirteen years' acquiescence
in a c~tse arising within a month before Congress, in amend_
iug the act for the purpose of abolishing some exceptions
that had been granted (act of .AprH 17, 1874, ch. 107), has
expressed the rule even more emphatically than before.
(.Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 255, sec. 1.)
I am therefore of the opinion that the tax should not be
remitted.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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APPROPRIATION-CONTRACTS.
Where an appropriation is made by act of Congress for certain improvements and authority is given to the Secretary of War to make additional contracts not to exceed a given amount to carry on continuously
the work intended, and by a 1iroviso to the act certain portions of the
sum appropriated and authorized to be expended are to be expended
in a particular way, the latter sums are to be charged to the specific
sum appropriated.
If the appropriation should not be expended the work could at a subsequent time be contracted for under the authority to make additional
contracts.
If the appropriations are not used for the particular work designated
by Congress they can not be used for any other purpose.
The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso is not mandatory to the extent that the full amount must be expended if the
work can be done for less, or the work need not be proceeded with at
all if contrary to the recommendations of the Mississippi River Commission mentioned in the act, it being manifest that the recommendations of the Commission were to be looked to.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 29, 1896.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of September 18, 1896, in which you set out from the
river and harbor act of June 3, 1896 (29 Stat., 230), the fol·
lowing proviso:
"Provided further, That of the sum hereby appropriated
and authorized to be expended the sum of sixty-four thousand dollars shall be expended in the rectification of the
banks at Greenville, Mississippi, and sixty-four thousand
dollars in the rectification of the banks at Helena, Arkansas,
according to late plans submitted by Captain Graham D.
Fitch, Corps of Engineers, and sixteen thousand dollars in
the rectification of the banks at New Madrid, Missouri."
You state that the Mississippi River Commission propose
to limit operations at Greenville to an expenditure of $24,000
and to defer all operations at New Madrid and Helena until
fund authorized for expenditure in some later fiscal year are
made available by future appropriation.
·
You a. k my offi ial opinion on the following point :
"1.
hether, in view of the phraseology of the proviso
qu t d th ev ral sum mentioned therein are chargeable
nly t he p ific appropriation of 625,000 made by the
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act, or whether they are chargeable either to this appropriation or to any of the further sums pledged by Congress and
which may be subsequently appropriated.
"2. Whether the ·expenditure of the several sums mentioned in the proviso, if chargeable only to said appropriation
of $625,000, is mandatory; and, if so, whether the same must
be expended within this :fiscal year."
In my opinion the particular sums specified in the proviso
are chargeable to the specific appropriation of $625,000. It
is just as if $481,000 bad been appropriated in one sum for
all of tbe other purposes contemplated and the several sums
mentioned in the proviso had been separately appropriated
for the several specific purposes mentioned.
While this is true, I am further of the opinion that if for
any reason the appropriations made by this act should not
be expended the work could at a subsequent time be contracted for under the :first proviso, which is as follows:
'' That on and after the passage of this act additional contracts may be entered into by the Secretary of War for such
materials and work as may be necessary to carry on continuously the plans of the Mississippi River Commission, as aforesaid, or said materials may be purchased and work done
otherwise than by contract, to be paid for as appropriations
may from time t.o time be ma,de by law, not exceeding in the
aggregate eight million three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, exclusive of the amount herein appropriated.''
I am further of the opinion that these specific appropriations, if not used for the particular work designated by Congress, can not be used for any other purpose.
The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso
is, in my opinion, not mandatory to the extent that you are
bound to expend the full amount if the work can be done
for less or to proceed with it at all contrary to the recommendation of the Mississippi River Commission.
The section to which this proviso is added is as follows:
"Continuing improvement, · six hundred and twenty-five
thousand dollars, which sum shall be expended under the
direction of the Secretary of War, in accordance with the
plans, specifications, and recommendations of the Mississippi
River Commission."
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It is manifest that the recommendations of the commission
were to be looked to.
The whole question of plans for improving the Mississippi
River has been largely intrusted to them.
If, looking as they doubtless would to the enterprise as a
whole, or, if conditions having altered, they should recommend that special work should not be proceeded with, I do
not think that you are compelled to 'do so even when an appropriation has been made in the emphatic language in the proviso, for it is not necessarily in conflict with that portion
of the act above quoted, and should be construed in harmony
with it, if possible, looking to the purpose of Congress so long
manifested to have the work executed according to the plans
and recommendations of the commission.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'.l.'.A.RY OF W .A.R.

IMPORTATION OF CHROMOS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The importation of foreign-made chromos, which are copies of a foreign painting that has been copyrighted, bnt which are not themselves copyrighted, but are protected only by the copyright of the
original painting, is not prohibited by an act of Congress providing
the manner of obtaining a copyright for chromos, and forbidding,
during the existence of such copyright, the importation into the
United States of any chromos· so copyrighted.
·w here the language of an act of Congress is ambiguous, the probable
intention of the individual Members of Congress would be sought as'
a guide to construction, but a clear omission from the statute can
not be supplied upon any consideration of supposed oversight, inconsistency, or hardship.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 3, 1896.
1

ertain foreign-made chromos, which are copies of a
foreign painting, are being imported. The painting has been
copyright d under sections 4952 and 4956 of the Revised
ta ute , a amended by the act of March 3, 1891, chapter
h65.
ou do not inform me whether or not the importation
i a violation of the copyright; nor is this material to the
qu tion whi .h ha ari en in your Department.
SIR:
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These chromos are not made from drawings on stone made
within the limits of the United States; and in your communication of September 15 you ask to be advised whether their
importation is prohibited by the proviso to section 4956.
Under the enactments above referred to, by observing the
proper formalities, not only may a painting be copyrighted
but also a book, photograph, chromo, or lithograph. It is
not, however, profitable to copyright a chromo or other lithograph representing a · copyrighted painting; for the copyright of the painting protects all copies made by its owner
or persons authorized by him, while copies made by anybody else, whether by lithography or otherwise, are illegal.
Hence, chromos may be imported which are not themselves
copyrighted, but are protected only by the copyright of
the original painiing; and I understand from you that these
chromos are of such description.
To obtain a copyright for a painting under section 4956, a
photograph thereof must be delivered to the Librarian of
Congress, or else deposited in the mail within the United
States addressed to him. To obtain a copyright for the
chromo or lithograph, two copies thereof must be so delivered or deposited; provided-and this is the proviso to which
you refer-that "the two copies of the same required to be
delivered or deposited as above shall be printed from
* * * drawings on stone made within the limits of the
United States or from transfers made therefrom." The proviso relates also to books and photographs, but not to paintings. It continues as follows:
"During the existence of such copyright the importation
into the United States of any book, chromo, lithograph, or
photograph so copyrighted, or any edition or editions thereof,
or any plates of the same not made from type set, negatives,
or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United
States, shall be, and it is hereby, prohibited."
This proviso clearly applies only to books, chromos, lithographs, orphotographs,copyrighted as thereinbeforedirected,
namely, by delivering or depositing two copies with the
Librarian of Congress. It can not, without violation of its
language, be so read as to include in its application chromos
or photographs protected merely by the copyright of the
painting.
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It is urged that the individual Members of the Congress
which enacted the proviso intended to include all chromos
protected by copyright, whether the copyright was granted
for the chromo itself, or for the painting of which it is a
copy. Had they so intended, it would have been easy to
say so. Had their language been amb~guous, their probable
intent would have been sought for as a guide to construction. But their language is unambiguous; and to torture
the clear language of Congress, in order to fulfill a supposed
intent of its individual members, would be to legislate, not
to construe the law. '' A clear omission from a statute, like
this, can not be supplied upon any considerations of supposed
oversight, inconsistency, or hardship." (21 Opin., 292.)
I have therefore the honor to advise y()u that the importa...
. tion of the chromos is not prohibited.
Very respectfully,
EDWARD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.

REMISSION OF PEN.AL DUTIES.

A.s the Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to refund "additional" or penal duties imposed by the customs administrative act of
1890, when once in the Treasury, merely because not incurred by willful
negligence or fraud, and as the collectors of customs are obliged under
the law to require payment of so-called penal duties as a condition
precedent to delivery of the goods and must pay them at once into
the Treasury when received, without waiting for the result of an
application for remission, the power of the Secretary of the Treasury
to remit such duties may be unavailing in many cases, but not in the
case' of warehoused goods, nor where the penalties are first assessed
upon final liquidation after the delivery of the goods to the importer.
Wh n goods are entered or withdrawn for consumption, the Treasury
Department has no authority to suspend the collection of these penal
duti s pending an application for remission, "the goods in the meanwhile having been delivered from the custody of the Government."
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 3, 1 96.
It ha been held that the" additional" or penal duties
im o ed under ection 7 of the customs administrative act of
IR:
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June 10, 1890, chapter 407, may be remitted by you (20 Opin.,
660); but that you have no authority to refund them, when
once in the Treasury, merely because not incurred by willful
negligence or fraud (21 Opin., 320), and that the collectors of
customs must pay them at once into the Treasury when
received, without waiting for the result of an application for
remission (2_1 Opin., 345). Of course, like other duties, they
can be refunded in certain cases. (21 Opin., 224, 251.)
In your communication of September 14 you ask whether
your Department has authority to suspend the collection of
these penal duties pending such application, '' the goods in
the meanwhile having been delivered from the custody of the
Government." You suggest "that if collectors are obliged
under the law to require payment of so-called penal duties
as a condition precedent to delivery of the goods the power
of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit such penalties is
in effect abrogated." The power may be unavailing in many
cases, but not in the case of warehoused goods, nor where
the penalties are first assessed upon final liquidation, after
the delivery of the goods to the importer, as in Patton v.
United States (159 U. S., 500).
Prior to the Revised Statutes the estimated duties upon
imported goods had to be paid at once, or a warehouse bond
given. (Barneyv. Rickard,157U. S., 352, 357-359,andauthor. ities cited.) I am aware of no subsequent legislation relaxing these requirements. The warehouse bond is the security
referred to in section 2869 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended by the act of June 5, 1894, chapter 92. If the
goods are warehoused, and subsequently withdrawn for consumption before a decision upon the application for remission, the penal duties must be paid. (Customs administrative act, 'sec. 20.)
I therefore have the bonor to advise you that when goods
are entered or withdrawn for consumption all duties then
charged against them, including penal duties, must be paid
before they are released from Government custody.
Very respectfully,
EDWARD B. WHITNEY,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
While the word "may" in a statute is sometimes construed as imposing
a duty rather than conferring a discretion, yet this rule of construe. tion is by no means invariable, and its application depends on the
context of the statute, and whether it is fairly to be presumed that it
was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power
or to impose an imperative duty.
The ordinary meaning of the language in the enactment must be presumed to be intended unless it would manifestly defeat the object of
its provisions.
The Secretary of War is not required by the river and harbor act of
June 3, 1896, providing that contracts may be entered into by him for
the completion of improvements named, to make such contracts, but
he has a discret.ion to decline to make them in all cases where he is
convinced that the public interest would not be subserved by making
them.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 9, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of October 7, wherein, calling my attention to various provisos in
the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, that contracts may
be entered into by you for the completion of improvements
named, to be paid for out of future appropriations, you
inquire:
"ls it mandatory that the Secretary of War shall make
such contracts, estimate for and enter upon the improvement of such rivers and harbors as are provided for in this
act, or is it within bis discretion to decline to make such
contracts in any case where he is convinced that the proposed expenditure will not be for the public interest¥"
I have given the subject the serious consideration which
its importance requires, and beg to submit my opinion as
follows:
The enacting clause of the act named is :
'' That the following sums of money be, and are hereby,
appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, to be immediately available, and
to bee pended under the direction of the Secretary of War
and the upervi ion of the Chief of Engineers, for the conme ion, completion, repair, and preservation of the public
w rk h reinafter named."
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Then follow the recital of various improvements, with the
sums appropriated for each, to many of which are appended
the provisos to which your question relates. These appear
to be in the same form throughout, and ·the first will therefore serve as a sample. It is:
"Improving harbor at Rockland, Maine: Continuing improvement, including project recommended by Chief of
Engineers under· date of December fourteenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five, twenty-five thousand five hundred
dollars, of which one thousand five hundred dollars may be
expended for the removal of an old hulk, sunk in the harbor:
Provided, That contracts may be entered into by the Secretary of War for such materials and work as may be necessary for the completion of said projects for the improvement
of said harbor, to be paid for as appropriations may from
time to time be made by law, not to exceed in the aggregate
seven hundred and sixty thousand five hundred dollars,
exclusive of the amount herein and heretofore appropriated."
The appropriation of specific funds "to be immediately
available" ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them
for the purposes named in the act. In the item quoted tb:ere
is nothing indicating an intention to leave anything to your
discretion with respect to the expenditure of the sum appropriated.
But the authority given you to contract for work to be
paid from future appropriations is not only in the form of a
proviso, but is also expres8ed in the form usually adopted
for the granting of authority with discretion. It could be
held that you are required to enter into such contracts only
by construing the word "may" as imposing a duty rather
than conferring a discretion. While such construction is
sometimes given this word, especially where the power conferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public or that
of private persons, yet "this rule of construction is, however, by no means invariable. Its application depends on
the context of the statute, and on whether it is fairly to be
· presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power or to impose an imperative duty."
( U. S. v. Thornan, 156 U. S., 359.)
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From the various authorities cited in the opinion in that
case (see also 63 Md., 18; 121 N. Y., 569) it appears that the
true rule always is that stated by.Mr. Justice Story in Minor
v. Mechanics' Bank (1 Pet., 64), that "that exposition ought
to be adopted in this, as in other cases, which carries into
effect the true intent and object of the legislature in the
enactment. The ordinary meaning of the language must be
presumed to be intended unless it would manifestly defeat
the object of the provisions," and by Mr. Justice Grier in
Thompson v. Carroll's Lessee (22 Howard, 434), that "it is
only where it is necessary to give effect to the clear policy
and intention of the legislature that such a liberty can be
taken with the plain words of the statute." The intention of
Congress was, except in instances where a contrary intent is
manifested (see 21 Opi~., 391, with reference to the same act
now in question), that you should proceed with the projects
specified to the extent of the appropriations without inquiry
as to their wisdom. This, which is the main purpose of the
act, would not be affected by construing the provisos according to the ordinary meaning of their language, which is permissive and not mandatory. There is no necessity, therefore,
of resorting to a rule of construction to make the language of
the act conform to the intention of Congress. On the contrary, it is entirely reasonable, from the nature of the subject
and the usual mode of dealing with it by Congress, to assume
that the provisional and permissive forms were purposely
used in order to leave to your sound discretion the determination whether it would be better for the public interests
to make contracts covering the entire work, or, by confining
the expenditures to the sums appropriated, leave Congress
free to act upon new information, changes in the situation,
or different views of public necessity or policy which experi-.
ence may induce.
My an w r to your question, therefore, is that you are not
required to make such contracts, but have a discretion to
d ·line to make them in all ca e where you are convinced
th t tb public intere t would not be subservecl by making
ry r p ctfnlly,
,J{ ])
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PUBLIC PRINTER'S APPROPRIATION . .
The allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the different
Departments is not within the jurisdiction of the accounting officers
of the Treasury.
·
Copies of Congressional documents ordered from the Public Printer
under section 90 of the public printing and binding act of January
12, 1895, by the Secretary of State to a number not exceeding the
number of bureaus in his Department, should not be charged to the
allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation for such Department.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 12, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of October 8, referring to my opinion of August 31 (21 Opin.,
405) with relation to questions in controversy between your
Department and the Public Printer. For an answer to one
of these questions, which related to the construction of an
appropriation act, I referred you to the Comptroller of the
Treasury
an answer. I have since been furnished by
the Comptroller with a copy of the opinion which he rendered you on July 15, 1896 (3 Comp. Dec., 19), showing that
the allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among
the different Departments is not actually passed upon by the
accounting officers of the Treasury, and holding that it is
not within the jurisdiction of these officers. (See Rev. Stat.,
3802; sundry civil appropriation act of June 11, 1896, ch.
420, 29 Stat., 452.) I am informed that this ruling of the
Comptroller is in accordance with a uniform and well-established practice in the accounting offices under similar appropriation acts, which is enough to settle its correctness (20
Opin., 721; 21 Opin., 338, 349); and it appears to be well
grounded. Consequently, the Comptroller's opinion can not
be asked under the Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter
17 4, section 8, and it becomes necessary for me to answer
your question.
The question arises under the public printing and binding
act of January 12, 1895, chapter 23, section 90, which section
is set forth at 21 Opin., 371. You have ordered from the
Public Printer eleven copies of certain Congressional documents of interest to your Department 1 that number not exceeding the number of bureaus therein. The Public Printer
).0892-VOL 21, PT 3--2

for
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insists upon charging them to the allotment for your Department. He has informed me that he does not desire t o submit
an argument upon the question. I am unable to perceive
any reason for his ruling. It is my opinion that t he eleven
copies you desire should be furnished you without such
charge.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.
CHINESE-TREATY.
The Treasury Department has no authority to direct the admission of
Chinese laborers who fail to obtain before dep artur e from this country
the certificate required by the treaty with China, although t hey have
complied with all the requirements affecting Chin ese who leave the
United States, except the procuring of this certificate.
A Chinese laborer who proposes to leave the United St at es and return,
complies with the conditions necessary to demand a cer tificate if he
file the required papers "with the collector of customs of the district
from which he departs." Any rule directing him to file such papers
with the collector of any other district imposes a condition not warranted by the treaty.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 14, 1896.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
le_tter of October 10, 1896, in which you ask whether or not
your Department can direct the admission of returning
Chinese laborers who failed to obtain, before departure from
this country, the certificate prescribed by Article II of the
treaty between the United States and China of March 17,
1894, it appearing that such persons, before leaving this
country, complied with all of Fhe requirements affecting
Chinese laborers who leave the United States with the purpose of returning, except that of procuring from the collector
of customs of the district from which they departed certificate of their right to return.
The only provision for the return of Chinese laborers to
the United States is under said article, which is as follows:
"The preceding article shall not apply to the return to
the nited tates of any regi tered Chine8e laborer who bas
a lawful wi.£ , child, or parent in the United States or propert th r in of the value of one thou and dollars 'or debts
f lik m un du him and pending ettlement. Neverthe-
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less every such Chinese laborer shall, before leaving the
CTnited States, deposit, as a condition of his return, with the
collector customs of the district from which he departs, a
full description in writing of his family, or property, or debts
as aforesaid, and shall be furnished by said collector with
such certificate of his right to return under this treaty as
the laws of the United States may now or hereafter prescribe
and not inco·n sistent with the provisions (?f this treaty; and
should the written . description aforesaid be proved to be
false the right of return thereunder, or of continued residence
after return, shall in each case be forfeited. And such right
of return to the United States shall be exercised within one
year from thedateofleavingthe United States; but such right
of return to the United States may be extended for an additional period, not to exceed one year, in cases where by reason of sickness or other cause of disability beyond his con_trol such Chinese laborer shall be rendered unable sooner to
return, which facts shall be fully reported to the Chinese
consul at the port of departure, and by him certified, to the
satisfaction of the collector of the port at which such Chinese
subject shall land in the United States. And no such Chinese laborer shall be permitted to enter the United States
by land or sea without producing to the proper officer of the
customs the return certificate herein required."
It has for a long time been the policy of Congress to
exclude Chinese laborers from the United States.
Section 4 of the act approved July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 115),
provided for the return of Chinese laborers under certain
stringent conditions.
By section 2 of the act approved October 1, 1888, the right
of return given to Chinese laborers was entirely taken away.
The policy of the Government being against the admission
of Chinese laborers, treaty provisions making exMptions
should not be extended by construction to cases not falling
· within the plain scope of the language used.
I am of the opinion that the words" before leaving the
United States" qualify the words "shall be furnished by
said coUectoi' with such certificate of his right to return,"
and that it was the intent that each.Chinaman should, before
leaving, receive such certificate in order to entitle him to
return.

of
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If it be held that departing Chinese laborers can do what
is affirmatively imposed upon them, and leave the country
with the right to have certificates forwarded, it is manifest
that great confusion' may arise, the certificates may not get
to proper hands, and the burden of enforcing the exclusion
acts may be thereby rendered much more onerous.
The rule promulgated by your Department, and which was
in force when the case now present arose, provides that the
collector of customs, ''if he is satisfied that the person presenting the same is the Chinese laborer therein described, he
shall issue to him, on his departure from said port, a certificate in the following form." (Synopsis, Rulings and
Decisions, 181:l6, p. :31.)
This rule, which is consistent with the provisions of the
treaty, would, in effect, be destroyed if personal delivery be
dispensed with.
I answer the question in the negative.
You also call attention to a regulation of your Department
which requires that Chinese laborers who propose to leave
the U nitecl States and return shall file application, statement, etc., with the collector for the district within which
the laborer resides, which collector is to certify the papers
and forward the same to the collector of customs at the port
of exit; and you ask whether or not such papers may be filed
properly in the office of the collector of customs at the port
where the Chinese laborer resides, in view of the requirement of Article II of the treaty, that such papers shall be
placed by tlle laborer in the possession of the collector of
cu toms for the district from which he is to depart.
I understand your question to be, in substance, whether
or not your Department can require such papers to be filed
by ~he laborer with the collector for the district within which
he re id .
I am of the opinion that the departing laborer complies
with th conditions n cessary to demand a certificate if he
fil the r equired paper "with the collector of customs of the
di rict from whi h he departs," and that any rule directing
him to file uch pa pers with the collector of any other district im o e. a oudition not warranted by the tl'eaty.
J DSO HARMON.
e p ctfully,
OF THE TREA UR Y.
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LEA.VES OE' ABSENCE.
The provisions of the legislative appropriation act. of March 3, 1893, concerning annual and sick leaves of absence do not apply to employees
of the Department of Agriculture employed outside of the city of
Washington. (21 Opin., 338 followed.)
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 17, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of October 14, ar:;king my opinion whether the provisions
concerning annual leave and sick ]eave in the legislative
appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter . 211, section 5,
apply to employees of your Department employed outside of
this city. This question has already been settled in the
negative (21 Opin., 338), and I so advise yon.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.

PUBLIC PRINTING.
The word "order'' in section 80 of the public printing and binding act
of January 12, 1895, providing that "no order for public printing shall
be acted upon by the Public Printer after the expiration of one year
unless the entire copy an.cl illustrations for the work shall have been
furnished within that period," was not intended to include a joint
resolution of Congress like the resolution of April 2, 1894, providing
for printing '' a history of the international arbitrations to which the
United States was a party, together with a digest of the decisions
rendered in such arbitrations."
·
DEPA.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

October 19, 1896.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication ·of October 16, asking an opinion upon a question of law
raised by Mr. John B. Moore.
It appears that Congress, by a joint resolution approved
April 2, 1894, provided for printing "a history of the international arbitrations to which the United States was a party,
together with a digest of the decisions rendered in such arbitrations," * * * "said history and digest to be printed
under the editorial supervision of John Bassett Moore, and
the editing to be paid for out of any moneys in the Treasury

428

HON. HOLMES CONRAD.
Extradition Proceedings-Tr:inslation of Papers.

not otherwise appropriated." You do not state the facts further, but I assume that the history had not been prepared at
the time of the passage of the resolution, so that the intention was for Mr. Moore to write the history and digest, and
not simply to supervise their printing. The work was one
which would naturally be expected to involve a considerable
expenditure of time.
By the public printing and binding act of January 12,
1895, chapter 23, section 80, it was provided that'' no order
for public printing shall be acted upon by the Public Printer
after the expiration of one year unless the entire copy and
illustrations for the work shall have been furnished within
thflt period," with a proviso which does not seem to me to be
applicable here.
I think that the word "order" in the clause just quoted
wa not intended to include a joint resolution of Congress
like that now under consideration. · It is, therefore, my
opinion that this provision is no bar to the completion of
Mr. Moore's work.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The .SECRE'fARY OF STATE.

EX'l'I ADITION PROCEEDINGS-TRANSLATION OF PAPERS.
In an application by the Mexican Government to a United States commissioner for the extradition of a fugitive under the treaty with that
country, tho commissioner should decline to proceed with the inquiry
until a translation of the papers containing the charges are produced
hcfore him, but in such a case he should so advise that Government
:wcl make a liberal allowance of time for the production of such
translation before returning tho papers.
Whilr the treaty does not in terms provide for such translations, yet the
proce dino-s thereunder must accord with the rules and forms of the
tribunals of thatjnrisdiction to which i;econrse is had·; and inasmuch
a. the ommissioner is the sole judge of the weight and sufficiency of
the eviden e upon which extradition is sought, it follows that such
viclenc mu t be pre ented in a language that is intelligible to him.
DEPAR'.I'MENT OF JUSTICE,

October 24, 1896.
have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
mmuni ·ation of the 20th in t.ant, inclosing the translation
IR:
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of a note to you from the Mexican minister, stating that the
United States commissioner at El Paso, Tex., from whom
the Governor of the State of Chihuahua asked the extradition of Demetrio Cortes and his accomplices, returned the
papers in the case on account of their not being translated.
You ask my opinion as to ''whether the commissioner should
formally reject and return the papers to the country seeking
extradition because they, or some part of them, have not
been translated."
By article 1 of the treaty with Mexico of December 11,
1861, it is provided: .
"That this (the delivery of a person charged with crime)
shall be done only when the fact of the commission of the
crime shall be so established as that the laws of the country
in which the fugitive or the person so accused shall be found
would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for
trial if the crime had been there committed."
The act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the commissioner or other examining officer says that if he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the treaty he shall certify the same, together with
a copy of all the testimony, and issue his warrant for the
commitment of the person so charged.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of In
re Luis Oteiza y Cortes (136 U.S., 337), quotes with approval
the language of Judge Wallace in 21 Blatch., 300. When
referring to United States commissioners sitting in cases of
extradition, he said:
'' He is made the judge of the weight and effect of the evidence, and this court can not review his action, when there
was sufficient competent evidence before him to authorize
him to decide the merits of the case."
In order to the intelligent exercise of his judgment, the
mind of the commissioner must be informed as to the facts
of the case before him. He can be judicially informed only
by the evidence which may be laid before him, in language
and terms which are intelligible to him. If the evidence
adduced is couched in signs, symbols, or language which the
commissioner does not understand, it must be translated
into terms which are intelligible.
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It is objected on behalf of the Mexican Government that
the treaty under which this extradition was asked makes no
provision for the translation by that Government of such
writings. But it should be remembered that while the treaty
does secure to the parties to it the mutual right of extradition, yet the proceedings for the exercise of such right
must of necessity accord with the rules prescribed and the
forms observed in the tribunals of that jurisdiction to which
recourse may be had. In Mexico the proceedings would be
governed by the laws and forms which are in force there,
and so, when the application is made to the judicial tribunals
of this country, a like rule should be applied.
In every jurisdiction the person invoking its aid must
present his case in accordance with its rules. He is the
actor, the plaintiff, the petitioner, and must present his case
both in its allegata and probata fully and intelligibly. If the
testimony of an expert is needed to furnish the translation
of the documents offered in evidence, the party offering the
evidence must produce with it the translation.
I am of opinion that the commissioner should have declined to proceed with the inquiry upon which he was
engaged until the proper translations were produced before
· him, but be should have so advised the Mexican Government
and made a liberal allowance of time to enable that Government to produce such translations before returning the
papers.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting Attorney-Gener<!'l.
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

AVI ABLE WATER -DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS.
Under the provisions of an act providing that whenever tho Secretary
of War d termines that a bridge over a navigable waterway of the
Unit d tate is an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of
such wat rway, it hall be his duty, after giving th parties an
opportunity to be heard, to dir ct that the bridge be so altered as
to r nder n avigation rea onably unobstructed, and in giving such
notice he shall specify th changes requir u and the time within which
to b made.
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It is not an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative function for
Congress .to in trust to the Secretary of War the power to declare what
is an unreasonable obstruction to navigation.
Congress itself is not required to consider each .case of alleged obstruction to navigation and determine the facts ancl declare that an
obstruction exists, but it may generally define the offense and leave
the facts to be determined by a court or special tribunal.
Where a bridge was erected by authority of a State before Congress
assumed actual jurisdiction over the river for the purposes of navigation, and it is declared to be an obstruction to navigation, such
obstruction may be removed without compensation from the United
States, and such removal can not be regarded as a "taking of private
property," within the meaning of the Constitution.
The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme and grows
out of the power to regulate commerce.
The power of Congress to declare what is an obstruction and to remove
it from a navigable stream is well settled.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 24, 1896.
Srn: On January 28, 1896, the Department of Justice
·received your letter of January 27, 1896, in which you state
· the following:
".A.bout 3 miles above the mouth of Rock River, Illinois,
commence the Lower Rapids, at Milan, Ill., which extend
upstream about 1½ miles. Prior to the improvements hereinaner mentioned the depth of water at the head of these
rapids was 2 feet at low water, but at high water in the
MissisRippi River the rapids were entirely backed out, giving
a navigable depth of 11 foet. From 1836 to 1850 a very
considerable commerce was carried on this river by means of
steamboats, flatboats, and barges, but with the construction
of the Sterling dam in 1854, about 50 miles above the mouth
of the river, and of low fixed bridges at Colona and Milan,
near its mouth, all navigation of the river ceased.
'' In 1888 it was determined to use the lower portion of
this river as a part of the Illinois and Mississippi Canal
route, and since then the Government has built dams at the
head of these rapids and a canal around the rapids. A wagon
bridge, owned and controlled by the city of Moline, Ill., ·
spans the river, about 4 miles above this canal, over the
pool created by these dams. It is a fixed bridge with bottom chord only about 3 feet above high water and 11 feet
above the fixed level of the pool; and it is necessary that
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In a letter dated October 14, 1896, referring to former
correspondence, you renew your request for an opinion.
The que tion of whether or not Rock River is within the
term "navigable waters of the United States" is one of
mixed fact and law.
The facts stated in your letter, and the fact that Rock
River leads into the Mississippi River, bring it within the
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term: ( The Daniel B(l;ll, 10 Wall., 557; The Montello, 20
Wall., 430; Escanaba Go. v. Chicago, 107 U.S., 682.)
The question of law arises as to whether or not the parties
controlling the bridge can be _compelled to alter it withou-t
the Gopernment bearing the expense. This question is one of
very great gravity, and is not free from doubt.
Section 4 of the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 453),
is as follows:
'' That section nine of the river and harbor act of August
eleventh, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, be amended
and reelacted so as to read as follows:
" 'lhat whenever the Secretary of War shall have good
reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now constructed, or which may hereafter be constructed, over any of
the navigable ·w aterways of the United States is an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of such waters, on
account of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise,
or where there is difficulty in passing the draw opening or
the draw span of such bridge by rafts, steamboats, or other
water craft, it shall be the duty of the said Secretary, first
giving the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard, to
give notice to the persons or corporations owning or controlling such bridge so to alter the same as to render navigation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and unobstructed; and in giving such notice he shall specify the
changes required to be made, and shall prescribe in each case
a reasonable time in which to make them. If at the end of
such time the alteration has not been made, the Secretary
of War shall forthwith notify the United States district
attorney for the district in which such bridge is situated, to
the end that the criminal proceedings mentioned in the succeeding section may be taken.'"
Section 5 is as follows·:
'' That section ten of the river and harbor act of .August
eleventh, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, be amended
and reenacted so as to read as follows:
" 'That if the persons; corporation, or association owning
or controlling any railroad or other bridge shall, after: receiving notice to that effect as herein before required from the
Secretary of War, and within the time prescribed by him,
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willfully fail or refu ·e to remove the same, or to comply with
the lawful order of the Se retary of War in the premises,
such persons, corporation, or as ociation shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars;
and every month such persons, corporation, or association
shall remain in default in respect to the removal or alteration
of such bridge shall be deemed a new offense, and subject
the persons, corporation, or association so offending to the
penalties above prescribed.'"
The United States, as appears by your statement, bas
assumed jurisdiction over Rock River.
The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme,
aud grows out of the power to regulate commerce. (Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S., 335; Bridge
Co. v. United States, 105 U. S., 475.)
When Congress chooses to act, it is not concluded by anything that the States or that individuals by its authority
have done from assuming entire control of the matter and
abating any erections that may have been made, and preventing any others from being made except in conformity
with such regulations as it may impose. ( Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713; Bridge Go. v. United States, 105 U. S.,
479; Willamette Iron Bridge Go. v. Hatch, 125 U.S., 1, 12;
Ei:;canaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S., 683; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., 336.)
The power of Congress to declare what is an obstruction
and to remove it from a navigable stream is well settled.
(Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 731; Bridge Go. v. United
States, 105 U.S., 475; Escanaba Go. v. Chicago, 107 U.S., 683;
Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S., 385; Monongahela
avigation Go. v. United States, 148 U. S., 335.)
The que tion ariE-es whether or not the power intrusted to
the ecretary of War by sections 4 and 5 of the river and
harbor act of September 19, 1890, is a delegation of the leg-·
i lative function.
In nited tate v. Keolcuk and H. Bridge Go. (45 Fed. Rep.,
178) Judge hira held that" bridg having b en built and maintained in accordance
ith h r uirem nt of n act of Congress, the Secretary
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of War can not declare it an obstruction to navigation and
require it to be changed, remodeled, or rebuilt under the act
of Oongress of August 11, 1888 (25 U. S. Stat. L., p. 424,
secs. 9, 10), providing that when he shall have reason to
· believe that any bridge is an obstruction to free navigation,
or where there is difficulty in passing the draw opening or
raft span, the Secretary of War shall give notice requiring
the bridge to be altered so as to render navigation through
or under it free, easy, and unobstructed, and that the owner
of any such bridge shall be liable to a penalty for willfully
failing to remove the bridge or to cause the necessary alterations to be made."
The ground proceeded upon was that"The section in question confe!s upon the Secretary the
duty of determining whether a given bridge is an unreasonable obstruction, which in turn involves the duty of determining how much of an obstruction the public interests
require should be placed in the way of the free navigation
of the river, w.hich is a question which belongs to Congress
to determine and which can not be rightfully delegated to
any subordinate authority or person" (p .. 183).
Sections 9 and 10 of the act of 1888 were amended by sections 4 and 5 of the act of 1890.
Among other.material changes made by the amendments,
it is provided that the obstruction must be '' unreasonable,"
and that the parties shall have a "reasonable opportunity to
be heard," and that the Secretary of War shall" specify the
change required to be made."
Section 5 expressly makes a failure to comply with the
requirements of section 4 a misdemeanor.
In the Rider Case, United States District Judge Sage
followed Judge Shiras, extending the doctrine as laid down
by him to the sections as amended, saying "the question
to be here decided is whether Congress could delegate, as
it has undertaken to do, its authority in the premises to the
Secretary of War. My conclusion is that it could not."
( United States v. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 410.)
Congress bas passed a complete act, providing that it shall
b~ a misdemeanor to maintain an unreasonable obstruction
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to navigation after a notice and hearing and after the
special tribunal charged with the investigation of and finding of the fact has determined that there is an unreasonable
obstruction and a reasonable time for removing the obstruction has expired.
The party concerned has a hea~ing, and the offense is not
complete until after the hearing and a determination against
him, and an opportunity to abate the nuisance has been
given.
The whole inquiry seems to resolve itself into whether or
not Congress must itself consider each case of alleged
obstruction to navigation and determine the facts, and
declare that an obstruction exists, or whether it can generally define the offense and_ leave the facts to be determined
by a court or special tribunal.
Because Congress is vested with the power, as incidental
to the commerce clause, to protect navigation, and, therefore, can declare and remove an obstruction, it does not follow that it must itself examine into the details and facts of
each case. This would be impracticable and would almost
nullify the use of the power.
Between sessions obstructions to navigation, no matter how
outrageous, could not be dealt with. If Congress should
undertake, during the sessions, to investigate specific cases,
it is manifest that it would simply amount to a practical
abdication of the power; for in the nature of things it would
be impossible, within any reasonable time, to determine such
questions.·
It would be equally out of the question for Congress to
attempt to define ''unreasonable obstruction to navigation,"
so as to make the definition practically safe and useful. It
might as well be attempted to define" fraud" by a statute
and fix its limitations and characteristics.
If the power is to be exercised at all, it must be under a
general law declaring, as the law in question does, that the
maintenance of an unreasonable obstruction shall be a misdemeanor, and the determination of the facts must be left to
ome tribunal, either a regular court, or a commission, or an
cu tive officer. The determination of such a question in
th regular our e of judicial proceedings would be tedious.
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expensive, and the results would be variable, inasmuch as
separate juries could come to different conclusions upon
practically the same state of facts. In the interest of economy, promptness, and uniformity of decisions, it is manifest
that the best course to be adopted is the one that has been
pursued.
If the act, in general terms, made the maintenance of an
obstruction a misdemeanor, and if there could then be a
conviction upon the determination of the Secretary of War,
or any other tribunal, of the question as to whether or not
there had been an unreasonable obstruction, it could be
objected that persons would be committing a misdemeanor
without knowing at the time that there was a violation of
the law.
The act in question, however, is not open to this criticism.
There is first a hearing and a determination of the facts, and
then there is an opportunity to avoid committing the offense,
and the offense is only complete after the party is fully
·
apprised of all the conditions.
In this case the Secretary of War is made a special tribunal to adjudicate facts.
It is competent for the legislature to establish, independent
of the courts, special tribunals whose judgment shall b.e
final.
The taxing interests of this country involve by far the
largest question so far as value is concerned. The assessment of property is necessarily intrusted to special tribunals,
which operate constantly and upon a vast scale. They are
composed of nonjudicial officers, and if they pursue the law
their conclusions are final.
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States (142 U. S., 651) and
Fong You Ting v. United States (149 U. S., 698) and Lern
Moon Sing v. United States (158 U. S., 538), it was held that
Congress might intrust to executive officers the final determination of facts upon which foreigners might be sent out
of or excluded from this country, and that their conclusions
could not be reexamined by any court.
Congress has repeatedly passed laws committing the execution of acts in regard to the admission of aliens into the
United States to the Secretary of the Treasury, collectors of
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customs, and to inspectors acting under their authority.
(See acts of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat., 477; .Aug. 3, 1882,
ch. 376, 22 Stat., 214; Feb. 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat., 414;
Oct. 19,- 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat., 566.)
'
By section 3 (22 Stat., 214),· and in similar laws, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to establish rules and
regulations and to issue instructions to carry out these and
other immigration laws of the United States.
In Enterprise Saving Association v. Zumstein (67 Fed. Rep.,
1000), it was held by the circuit court of appeals of the sixth
circuit, in an opinion delivered by Judge Lurton, and concurred in by Judges Taft and Severens, that in enforcing
the postal laws against lotteries it was competent for Congress to intrust to the head of the Post-Office Department ·
the determination of the question as to what was a lottery.
Congress can only legislate in a general way, and large
powers are necessarily intrusted to the different departments, such, for instance, as the supervising power given to
the Secretary of the Interior over questions of patents and
relations to Indians and the public lands. It has been held
that he can set aside a survey and order another survey and
issue a patent thereon, which is the exercise of judicial
power. This right arises from the supervising power given
him under the statute, and the courts have invariably sustained it, and in speaking of this class of powers have said:
"It is obvious, it is common knowledge, that in the administration of such large aud varied interests as are intrusted
to the Land Department, matters not foreseen, equities not
anticipated, and which are therefore not provided for by
express statute, may sometimes arise, and therefore that the
Secretary of the Interior is given that superintending and
supervising power which will enable him, in the face of these
unexpected contingencies, to do justice." ( Williams v. United
States, 138 U. S., 524; Knight v. United States Land Assn.,
142 u. s., 181.)
In McOull.och v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 316, 421), Chief

Ju tice Mar hall said:
"The ound con truction of the Constitution must allow to
he ational Legi lature that discretion, with respect to the
m n y which the powers it ·on£ r are to be carried into
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execution, which_will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but con~ist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
It has now been established beyond controversy that Congress has the power to incorporate national banks and clothe
them with large discretionary powers, and for the purpose of
accomplishing what Congress itself might directly do.
This power was maintained in McCulloch v. Maryland (4
Wheat., 31.6) and in Osborn v. United States Bank (9 Wheat.,
738) mainly upon the ground .t hat it was an appropriate
means for carrying on the money transactions of the Government. (Legal Tender Gase, 110 U. S., 445.)
In re The Lriura (114 U.S., 411), although the pardoning
power is by the Constitution vested in the President, the
court held that an act authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to remit fines and penalties incurred by a steam
vessel was valid, and it held that to determine otherwise
would be to overthrow the practice which had been observed
and acquiesced in for nearly a century.
In Dorsheimer v. United States (7 Wall., 166) it was held
that such power intrusted to the Secretary of the Treasury
is one for the exercise of his discretion in a matter intrusted
to him alone, and that it admits of no appeal to any court.
In all those cases in which it is held that executive officers
of the Government will not be controlled by the court in
matters in which they have to exercise judgment or discretion, it is apparent that large powers are intrusted by Congress under the acts investing them with authority, and that
they really exercise in this way by delegation, and neces.
sarily so, for the purpose of carrying on the vast affairs of
the Government and its details, authority which in a strict
sense pertains to Congress. (See Decatur v. Paulding, 14
Pet., 497-514; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How., 284; United
States v. The Commissioners, 5 Wall., 563; Litchfield v. Register q,nd Receiver, 9 Wall., 575-577; Garrick v. Lamar, 116
u. s., 426.)
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--3
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In United States v. Breen (40 Fe<l. Rep., 402) it was h~ld that
Congress can authorize the Secretary of War to make rules
and regulations, and can make it a misdemeanor to violate
these rules when so made.
In United States v. Bailey (9 Pet., 238) it was held that the
crime of perjury, which was defined by statute, could be·
committed by taking an oath in conformity with a mere regulation of the Treasury Department.
In Oaha v. United States (152 U. S., 219), in commenting
upon this decision. the court said:
" It was held that the Secretary had power to establish
the regulation, and that the effect of it was to make·the false
affidavit before the justice of the peace pe:r:jury within the
scope of the statute, and this notwithstanding the fact that
such justice of the p~ace was not an officer of the United
. States."
In the Caha Case the court upheld an indictment for perjury, which grew out of proceedings instituted in accordance
with regulations of the Interior Department.
These cases and the case under consideration differ from
that of United States v. Eaton (144 U. S., 677), in which the
court held that a failure to comply with regulations made by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could not be punished.
The reason was that the statute had not made such refusal
an offense.
The court said:
" It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should
exist for declaring any act or omission a criminal offense;
and we do not think that the statutory authority in the
present case is sufficient. If Congress intended to make it
an offense for wholesale dealers in oleomargarine to omit to
keep books and render returns, as required by regulations to
be made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it would
have done so distinctly, in connection with an enactment such
as that above recited, made in section 41 of the act of October 1, 1 90.
" R gulations prescribed by the President and by the
heads of D I artments, under authority granted by Congress,
m y be regulation pre ribed by law, o a lawfully to supr a t done und r them ancl in accordance with them, and
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may thus have, in a proper sense, the force of law; but it
does not follow that a thing required by them is a thing so
required by law as to make the neglect to do the thing a
criminal offense in a citizen where a statute does not distinctly make the neglect in question a criminal offense" (p.
688).
The case under discussion has the element which was
lacking in the Eaton case, for a statute has distinctly made
the neglect in question a misdemeanor.
The act of July 5, 1884, section 3, makes the Commissioner
of Navigation's finding conclusive on all questions of interpretation growing out of the execution of the laws relating
to the collection of tonnage tax .. (N. G. L. S.S. Go. v. Hedden,
43 Fed. Rep., 17-25.)
Among the powers conferred upon 9ongress by the eighth
section of the first article of the Constitution are the following:
"To provide and maintain a navy.
" To make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces."
It was held in Dynes v. Hoover (18 How., 20), and the
decision has never been questioned, that under this provision
of the Constitution Congress has authority to establish
courts-martial.
It was further held that the decision of the court-martial
in a matter where it has jurisdiction is final and can not be
reviewed by the courts. ( 20 How., 83; Johnson v. Sayre, 158

u. s., 109.)

Congress, in establishing courts-martial, provided that the
Secretary of the Navy is authorized to establish "regulations
of the Navy," with the approval of the President. ( 12 Stat.
L., 565; Rev. Stat., sec.1547.)
Pursuant to this authority, "regulations for the administration of law and justice" were issued on the 15th o_f .April,
1870.
It has been held that such regulations have the force of
law. ( Gratiot v. United States, 4 How., 80; Ex parte Reed,
100

u. s., 22.)

Thus the legislative power is not exercised in detail, but a
court is established in pursuance of the power conferred
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upon Congress, and the Secretary of the Navy is clothed
with the power of making regulations to control the court.
This is one of the many instances in which it is essential
for the operations of a great government that matters of
detail be intrusted by the legislative department to executive
officers for the purpose of giving effect to legislative acts.
By article 34, Revised Statutes, section 1624, the proceedings of summary courts-martial are to be conducted under
such forms and rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Navy with the approval of the President.
Here Congress has constituted a court and it has delegated
to an executive officer authority to establish rules for its
procedure.
By section.1547, Revised Statutes, the regulations issued
by the Secretary of the Navy, and as they might thereafter
be altered by him, with the approval of the President, are
recognized as the regulations of the Navy.
In pursuance of these regulations, Sayre became "a person
in the naval service of the United States." He was tried by
a court-martial and the Supreme Court refused to review its
findings. (Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S., 117.)
By an act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 237, 240), an
appropriation was made to be expended under the direction
of the Secretary of War for the repairs, preservation, and
completion of certain public works and inter alia "for the
improvement of the harbor of Savannah."
A like appropriation was made by the act of March 3, 1875
(18 Stat., 459), "for the improvement of the harbor of
Savannah, Ga."
Neither of these acts directed the manner in which these
appropriations should be expended. The mode of improving
the harbor was left to the discretion of the Secretary of War.
The legislative department declared that the improvement
should be made, and devolved the determination of what
would or would not be an improvement upon the Secretary
of ar.
It wa contended that, while Congress had the power to
authoriz the on tructiou of a specific work, it could not
r tary of War with uch large discretion, anu
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that for t,h is reason the act was void. The Supreme Court
sustained the act in South Carolina v. Georgia (93 U. S., 13).
In that case, acting under the commerce clause, Congress
authorized an improvement. It empowered the Secretary of
War to determine what would or would not be an improve_
ment, and so the act could not be made effective without the
action of the Secretary of War. If he determined the character of the improvement, that was final and the act operated
upon it.
In this case Congress makes the obstruction to navigation
a misdemeanor. It devolves upon the Secretary of War to
determine when there is an obstruction and to give the party
a hearing upon the investigation. When this special tribunal
has determined that there is an obstruction, then the act
operates upon it as in the former case.
In Miller v. Mayor of New York (109 U. S., 385,393,395) it
appeared that Congress authorized the building of a bridge
over a river, but the particular bridge authorized was such
as should thereafter be approved by the Secretary of War.
After the Secretary of War fixed by bis approval the character of the bridge which was not an obstruction to navigation, then the act, operated upon it and authorized the
building of the bridge. Until then the legislative license did
not go into effect. Here was a complete act in the abstract,
but its operation in the concrete was dependent upon the
determination of facts by the special tribunal. It was contended that this was an unlawful delegation of the power
vested in Congress. The court held to the contrary, saying:
"By submitting the matter to the Secretary, Congress did
not abdicate any of its authority to determine what should
or should not be deemed an obstruction to the navigation of
the river. It simply declared that, upon a certain fact being
established, the bridge should be deemed a lawful structure
and employed the Secretary of War as an agent to ascertain'
that fact. Having power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States, and navigation being
a branch of that commerce, it bas the control of all navigable
waters between the States, or connecting with the ocean, so
as to preserve and protect their free navigation. Its power,
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therefore, to determine what shall not be deemed, so far as that
commerce is concerned, an obstruction, is necessarily paramount and conclusive. It may, in direct terms, declare absolutely or on conditions, that a bridge of a particular height
shall not be deemed such an obstruction; and, in the latter
case, make its declaration take effect when those conditions
are complied with . . The act in question, in requiring the
approval of the Secretary before the construction of the
bridge was permitted, was not essentially different from a
great mass of legislation directing certain measures to be
taken upon the happening of particular contingencies or the
ascertainment of particular information. The execution of a
vast number of measures authorized by Congress, and carried out under the direction of heads of Departments, would
be defeated if such were not the case. The efficjency of an
act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency
upon which the act shall take effect may be left to such
agencies- as it may designate." (South Carolina v. Georgia,
93 u. s., 13.)
By section 2380, Revised Statutes" The President is authorized to reserve from the public
lands, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, town sites on the
shores of harbors, at the junction of rivers, important portages, or any natural or prospective center·s of population."
Following strict construction, this would be a delegation
by Congress of its legislative power.
In Currier v. West Side Elevated Patent Ry. Company
(6 Blatch., 487), it was held that authority conferred upon
commissioners to approve an experimental elevated railroad
and making such approval essential to the continuance in
existence of the railroad was not a delegation of legislative
power.
The creation of a railroad commission to fix reasonable
toll for fr ight and pa senger tran portation is not an uncon titutional delegation of legislative powers. ( Georgia v.
rnith, 70 Ga., 694.)
ith r i giving power to the governor to make pilotage
r gnl tion ·. (Martin v. Wither poon, 135 Mass., 175.)
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The statute providing for the civil service authorizes the
Commissioners and the President to make rules for carrying
the act into effect, and the President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the
civil service of 'the United Sta.tes as may best promote the
efficiency thereof. (22 Stat., 403; sec. 1753, Rev. Stat.)
Under the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), power is
conferred upon the President, when he shall have determined
certain facts, to allot land in severalty to Indians on reservations.
In Field v. Clark (143 U. S., 649) it was held that Congress
might confer authority upon the President to suspend by
proclamation the operation of the law affecting the importation of certain articles, upon his determination that any
country producing such articles imposed duties upon the
agricultural or other products of the United States which in
bis opinion were reciprocally unequal or unreasonable.
The court said :
"Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared
that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What the President was required to do was simply
in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making
of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect" (p. 693)~
I am of the opinion that the sections in question are not
an unconstitutional delegation of the.legislative function.
Inasmuch as the bridge was erected by authority of the
State before Congress assumed actual jurisdictioh over the
river for the purposes of navigation, the question arises
whether or not the obstruction can be abated without compensation by the United States for the expenses incurred.
The power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to
the limitations of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
If property be taken for public use, compensation must be
made. (Monongahela Navigation Go. v. United States 148
u. s., 335.)
.
'
Here there is no taking of property by the Government.
The only requirement is that an obstruction be removed.
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In Bridge Company v. nited States (105 U . S., 479) the
court said:
"Tho e who act ou tate authority alone necessarily assume
all the risk of legitimate Congressional interference."
In Jj]scanaba C01npany v. Chicago (107 U. S., 683) the court,
speaking of the authority of the State, said:
"When its power is exercised, so as t o unnecessarily
obstruct the navigation of the river or its branches, Congress
may interfere and remove the obstruction."
. In Monongahela Navigation Company v. United States (148
U.S., 338, 341) the court draws the distinction between the
taking of property and the removal of an obstruction.
If States can authorize constructions in or over navigable
waters of the United States, and parties thereby can acquire
a right against the United States to compensation for their
destruction, or cost of change to meet the demands of navi.
gation whenever Congress shall assume actual jurisdiction
over such waters, then the power of Congress over the navL
gable waters of the United States is not supreme.
I am of the opinion that compensation can not be demanded
and that you can lawfully _proceed as provided for in section
4 of the act of September 19, 1890.
Respectfully, ·
J. M. DICKINSON,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR.

QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.
A r egulation with respect to quarantining against yellow fever, which

provides for an exception in the case of vessels bouD.cd for ports of the
nited States north of the yellow fever danger line, does not constitl~t~ a discrimination within the meaning of the quarantine law prov 1drng that '' all rules ancl r egulations made by the Secretary of th e
Treasury shall operate uniformly and in no manner discriminate
again t any port or place."
OF J STICE,
November 7 , 1896.
the honor to acknowledge your communication
!" Oct b r _1 a l ing my opinion with r lation to a quaranin r gul t1 n re p ting yellow fever.
The quarantine law
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of February 15, 1893, chapter 114, section 3, provides that
"all rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the .
Treasury shall operate uniformly and in no manner discriminate against any port or place." Your regulations with
respect to quarantining against yellow fever provide for an
exception in the case of "vessels bound for ports in the
United States north of the southern boundary of Maryland, with good sanitary condition and history, having had
no sickness on board at ports of departure en route or on
arrival, provided they have been five days from last infected
or suspected port." The Supervising Surgeon-General of the
Marine-Hospital Service, in his communication concerning
this regulation, says: " It is as absurd to disinfect a ship
from Havana at Portland, Me., as it is dangerous not to disinfect one from Havana at New Orleans."
Since our country contains such great variety iu climate
and sanitary conditions it is clear t_hat every regulation of
your Department with relation to quarantine can not with
wisdom be made applicable to the whole coast line. I do not
think that Congress intended unwisdom in this respect. I
do not think that this exception, which in effect covers that
part of our coast which is north of the yellow fever danger
line, constitutes a discrimination within the meaning of the
quarantine act. I therefore advise you that the regulation
is lawful.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF '.fHE TREASURY.
ACTIONS-GOVERNMENT RETENTION OF FUNDS IN DISPUTE . .
An appearance by parties to a suit in one jurisdiction does not operate
as an abandonment of proceedings instituted by them in another jurisdiction, the parties and cause of action being the same.
One may proceed on the same cause of action in as many jurisdictions
as he can have service of process executed upon the defendants.
One :final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be pleaded
in bar in all the others.
Where funds in the hands of the Secretary of War are involved in a
controversy between parties, pending under different forms of procedure in different jurisdictions, the funds should be retained by him
until a final adjudication of the whole matter by the tribunal to which
the parties may last resort.
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF J USTICE,

November 16, 1896.
SIR: I have th~ honor to acknowledge the r eceipt of your
communication of the 6th instant, reciting the facts of the
transaction and of the subsequent litigation b etween Hammond, Leonard, and Scofield on the one hand and Whaley and
Taylor on the other, as . to which you request my opinion
"whether the legal effect of the appearance by Leonar·d ap.d
Scofield in the supreme court of the District of Columbia,
as stated by Mr. Garland, is an abandonment of said proceedings in the supreme court of New York for Kings County
and in the United States circuit court for the eastern district
of New York."
Having written the opinion of November 2, 1894 (21 Op.,
75), called for by your inquiry as to the propriety of delivering to·the receiver of the New York court the Treasury draft
there referred to, and having had brought to my notice,
officially, certain of the subsequent developments of this
matter, I gave to your communication and the papers accompanying it careful consideration, and then called upon Mr. A.
S. Worthington, a member of the bar of this city, with whom I ·
had occasion heretofore to confer as the legal counsel of
Leonard and Scofield. In reply to my inquiries of him I have
received from him a written communication of the 13th
instant, inclosing a copy of a final judgment rendered on
October 24, 1896, at a special term of the supreme court of
New York for Kings County in favor of Leonard and Scofield
and against Whaley and Taylor, which letter and copy I herewith inclose.
On full consideration of the whole matter, and especially
of the briefs of Mr. Garland and the opinion of Judge Cox
and the decree rendered thereon, I am of the opinion that
the decree made by Judge Cox does not purport to be and
wa not a final decree on the merits of the controversy
b tween the partie , but was an interlocutory decree denying
an application for a temporary injunction and dissolving a
preliminary r training order theretofore awarded.
he r on. given by Judge Cox in bis opinion would
und bt dly bav upported a decree on the merit in favor
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of the- defendants if the cause had been brought on to be
finally heard on pleadings and proofs.
The appearance of Leonard and Scofield in the ·supreme
court of the District of Columbia did not, in my opinion,
operate as an abandonment of the proceedings instituted by
them in the supreme court of New York for Kings County.
One may proceed on the same cause of action against the
same defendants in as many different jurisdictions as he can
have service of process executed upon the defendants. One
final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be
pleaded in bar in all the others.
It appears here that final judgment on the merits has been
rendered in the New York court, which had obtained jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over all the part"ies.
From that judgment an appeal may be taken by the defendants.
So, too, the proceeding pending in the supreme court of
the District of Columbia may be pursued to final judgment or
decree, from which an appeal may be taken.
I venture to advise, therefore, on the whole case that the
fund in your hands be retained by you until the controversy
between these parties, now pendj_ng under different forms of
procedure and in several jurisdictions, be determined by a
final adjudication of the whole_matter by the tribunal to
which the parties may last resort.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

RETIREMENT 01? JUDGES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The expression" any judge of any court of the United States," in the
statute providing for the retirement of judges on full pay, applies to
the chief justice of the Court of Claims as well as to the other
judges of that court, and he may retire at the age·of 70 provided he
shall then have been ten years a duly qualified judge of that court,
although he may have held his commission as chief justice thereof
less than ten years.
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The expression "after having h eld his commission as such at least ten
years," in the ame statute, does not mean that the commjssion under
which the judge is serving at the time of bis retirement must have
been in force ten years, but means being in commission. The reference to the · commission was not intended to make the paper title to
the office held at the time of the retirement significant, but to make
the legal right to act as a :F ederal j ndge for ten years the test rather
than the actual discharge of the duties of that office.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 18, 1896.
· SIR: I have the honor to submit my opinion, as requested
in your letter of the 17th instant.
You state the question and the reason for submitting it as
follows:
"Judge Charles C. Nott having served as a judge of the
Court of Claims for more than thirty years, I am contemplating his promotion to the chief justiceship of that court, made
vacant by the death of Judge Richardson. I am impressed
with the belief that the selection of Judge Nott for that
place would subserve the public interest and be a just recognition of long and valuable service.
"I desire, however, before finally determining upon my
course in the matter, to have your opinion in answer to the
following question :
"Would the retirement of Mr. Nott as chief justice of
the Court of Claims upon his attaining the age of 70 and
before he had served ten years as chief justice deprive him
of the benefit of section 714 of the Revised Statutes, providing for the continuance of salary to a judge retiring at
the age of 70, after having held his commission as such at
least ten years~ "
As you desire an answer to this question for your guidance in filling an existing vacancy, the inquiry becomes a
present and practical one, which it is my duty, according
to the statute and the well-settled practice of the Department, to answer.
Th tatute involved is as follows:
" EC. 714.
hen any judge of any court of the United
tate r ign hi office, after having held his commission as
uch at lea t ten year , and having attained the age of 70
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years, he shall, during the residue of his natural life, receive
the same salary which was by law payable to him at the time
of his resignation."
The objects of this statute are not such as sometimes lead
to a strictness of construction which makes the turn of
every phrase a justification for reluctance to believe that a
meaning was intended, which has not been clearly and unequivocally expressed. On the contrary, there is no reason
why this statute should not be fairly construed, reading its
terms in the light of the manifest object and purpose of Congress.
The object was to further the good of the public service
by providing for the retirement, at full pay, of judges who
have reached the age of 70 and been ten years on the bench.
The expression "any judge of any court of the United
States" was certainly intended to have the widest application; although, if the meaning of this section is to turn ori
forms of expression, it would not apply to the chief justice
of the Court of Claims at all, because, by the act creating
the court (Rev. Stat., sec. 1049), '' It shall consist of a chief
justice and . four judges," etc. All five of these officers are
appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, hold
their offices during good behavior, take the same oath, have the same jurisdiction, and receive the same salary payable in
the same way. It is not open to doubt that the retirement
act was intended to apply to the chief justice as well as to
the judges of that court.
I understand that the doubt which led to your question
has been suggested by the phrase "after having held his
commission as such at least ten years." This, it bas been
thought, may mean that the commission under which the
judge is serving at the time of his retirement must have been
in force at least ten years. Certainly no such intention is to
be extracted from this language without resort to the same
technicality which would deny to the chfof justice of the
Court of Claims the right under this section which the other
judges of that court have. The simplest form of expression,
and therefore perhaps the most natural, would have been
"resigns after having served at least ten years." But it is
a matter of common knowledge that the object of this statute
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was not only to ofter an additional inducement to enter the
judicial service of the 'United States, but also to encourage
the retirement therefrom of men whom age or infirmity make
incapable of further service, some of whom, at the time of
the passage of the act, had already b~en for a considerable
time wholiy disabled. lf the form of expression I have
above suggested had been used, it might have been claimed
that actual service for ten years was required, so that the
period of past incapacity would be excluded. It was, in my
opinion, to avoid this result that the reference to holding
the commission was made instead of reference to holding the
office or discharging its duties. This intention seems to me
clearly to account for the language used, and at the same
time to exclude the idea that any significance was meant to
be given to the formal written expression of authority which
might, for the time being, be evidence of official character.
I am wholly unable to conceive any r_e ason which could have
led Congress to a-consideration of this feature of the subject,
especially with respect to judgeships which are exactly alike
in every particular except in name. It was being in commission and not holding a particular commission that Congress
meant to make a condition.
Some of the conclusions to which any other construction
would lead seem almost absurd. Thus a judge appointed
during a recess of Congress receives at once a commission
which is valid till the close of the next session. Under this
commission, therefore, he may hold office a year. Being confirmed at the close of the next session of the Senate, be
receives another commission during good behavior. I can
not believe it open to doubt that at the end of ten years
from his qualification under his original commission such
judge, if seventy years of age, would be entitled to retire on
full pay. He would not, however, have'-' beld his commission," i. e., that under which he was then entit.led to act as
judge for ten years; he would have held it only nine.
lu other words, the reference to the commission was not
intended to make the paper title to the office held at the time
of retirement . igriificant, but to make the lawful right to act
as a deral judge for ten y ars the test rather than tbe
actual di charge of the duties of that office.
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What the result would be in case of the transfer of a judge
from one Federal court to another with different jurisdiction
and salary, I need not now consider. But I am entirely
clear that, in the case submitted, Judge Nott, if appointed
cllief justice of the Court of Claims, will have the right to
avail himself of the privilege given by section 714 upon
reaching the age of 70, provided he shall theii have been for
ten years a duly qualified judge of that court, although he
may have held his .commission as chief justice thereof less
than ten years. So far as section 714 is concerned, the chief
justice of the Court of Claims is, as I have before shown,
one of the judges thereof, so that Judge Nott will, in case of
his proposed appointment, be really holding the same office
as before. He will simply have been designated to preside,
but the fact that this is done by naming him chief justice
and commissioning him as such makes no difference. In
many courts . the judge is made chief justice whose term
will first expire, but this does not change the nature of the
office. When he retires he will have "held his commission"
a8 a judge of the Court of Claims, no matter how often the
paper expressing his authority may have been rewritten or
renewed, from the time he was first entitled to act as a member
of that court.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
JUDSON HARMON.
The PRESIDENT.
INVALID PENSION TO RETIRED OFFICER-STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
A retired officer of the Army is not entitled to draw an invaliil. pension
nor arrears of pension.
The departmental construction of a statute followed.

DEP.A.RTMEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE,
November 20, 1896.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication asking reconsideration of my opinion of
September 11, 1896, with relation to the claim of Col. John
Pulford. That opinion, in holding that Colonel Pulford was
entitled to draw an invalid pension prior to 1890, notwithstanding his status as a retired officer of the Army, and
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notwithstanding the statute of April 30, 1844, chapter 15,
and section 4724 of the Revised Statutes was based upon
the assumption that these statutes had received a. departmental construction which makes them wholly inapplicable
to the case of officer6\ upon the retired list. You now inform
me that further investigation into the records of the Pension
Bureau show that this assumption (which was based upon the
correspondence between us with reference to this case ) was
incorrect. The Commissioner of Pensions, on October 13
last, reports to you that section 4724 was construed by the
Pension Bureau as applicable to officers upon the retired list
of the Army until September 3, 1888, when an exception was
recognized in the case of survivors of the Mexican war who
drew service pensions. On October 30 be further reports,
from an examination of the records of his bureau, "that
at no time since 1844_ has any pension claim been allowed in
behalf of a retired officer or soldier as an invalid pension."
The departmental construction thus appears to sustain the
true construction of the statute in question, as held by the
Assistant Secretary of the Interior and approved by me.
The general rules of statutory construction set forth in my
previous opinion thus require a reversal of its conclusion;
and I advise you that the applicant is not entitleu to the
arrears of pension claimed by him.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-REFUND OF DUTIES.
A mistake on the part of the Treasury Department in estimating the
equivalent of the Spanish pound, or libra, in the absence of due protest by the importers, is not sufficient to warrant a refund of the
ex ·ess of duties paid under such erroneous estimate.
Th Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make a refirnd of duties
where tb. re was an error due to a mutual mistake of fact.
pon a que tion of fact tho Attorney-General will not give an opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 3, 1896.
the honor to acknowledge your communication
0 a kin my opinion a to the claim of B. H.
n ·~ 'o. of ew York.
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It a,ppears that during the year 1895, and up to .April 9,
1896, the collectors of customs, under instructions from
your Department, estimated the Spanish pound, or libra, as
equivalent to 1.0143 pounds avoirdupois; and that on the latter date, upon a report from the Superintendent of the Coast
and Geodetic Survey, instructions were issued directing
them to estimate it at 1.0161 pounds avoirdupois. The claimants ask for refunds of duties exacted from them during this
p.e riod by reason of the erroneous instructions, and you
ask whether you have authority to reliquidate and refund
accordingly.
I think that your questions are answered, so far as they
can be answered by this Department, in 21 Opin., 226, 252.
Your power under the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, can .
be exercised in case the error was due to a mutual mistake
of fact. There was a mistake of fact on the Government's
part, but this alone would not' be sufficient in the absence of
due protest by the importers. Whether there was also a mistake of fact on the importers' part is a question of fact, and
it is well settled that upon questions of fact I can not advise
you.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,

ACQUISITION OF LAND BY THE UNITED STATES.
The Secretary of the Treasury without further authority than the act of
March 3, 1891, may accept a voluntary grant of land from the city of
Saginaw, Mich., to be used for the purposes of a public building.
No legislation of Congress is needed to enable the United States to take
and hold land by voluntary gift, devise, or grant.
The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to acquire
and hold real property wherever and whenever such property is
needed for the use of the Government in the execution of any of its
powers.
Such property may be acquired by any means by which natural or artificial persons may acquire property subject in certain cases to the
local laws of the States.
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DEP.A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

JJecember 11, 1896.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of November 25, requesting my opinion as
to whether further legislation by Congress is needed to
enable the United States to accept a voluntary grant of
land from the city of Saginaw, in the State of Michigan,
which has been tendered on the following state of facts, recited in your letter:
By act of Congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1094),
you were authorized and directed to acquire, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, a site and cause to be erected thereon
a suitable public building in the city of Saginaw, Mich.
Subsequently the city of Saginaw donated to the United
States the land needed for the purpose.
Still later, and at the request of the city of Saginaw, Congress by act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat., 590), directed you
to reconvey to the city of Saginaw that portion of the land
previously granted which it desired to repossess.
It now appears that the city of Saginaw has discovered
that it does not need the portion of land reconveyed to it
and desires to restore it to the United States.
It appears that the State of Michigan has by proper legislation authorized the United States to acquire land within
the limits of tbe State for public uses and has ceded to the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over all lands already
or thereafter to be acquired by them.
It appears tbat the portion of land which the city of Saginaw now proposes to reconvey to the United States can be
beneficially used in connection with the land on which the
Government building stands and will add to the comfort,
convenience, and enjoyment of the public buildings and
grounds.
The United States in their sovereign capacity have power
to acquire and hold real property wherever and whenever
such property is needed for the use of the Government in
the execution of any of its powers. Such property may be
acquired by any of the means by which natural or artificial
P r on may acquire property, ubject in certain cases to the
l cal law of the tates.
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No legislation by Congress is needed to enable the United
States to take and hold by voluntary gift, devise, or grant,
although such authority appears to have been expressly conferred in this case by the act of March 3, 1891, which
authorizes you to acquire land" by purchase, condemnation,
or otherwise.''
I have therefore to say that you may "without further
authority from Congress accept and use the additional land
referred to," and that no " additional act or cession by the
legislature of the State of Michigan will be necessary."
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

AT'rORNEY-GENERAL-PREMIUMS.
Where no occasion has arisen for the official action of the Secretary of
War, the Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a question
proposed by him.
The contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company
for the construction of a disappearing gun carriage, under the act of
August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment of a premium and
does not bind the Government beyond the amount appropriated.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 24, 1896.
Sm: I have the -honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of November 7, 1896, in which you state the following:
"In 1893 the United States entered into contract with the
Morgan Engineering Oompany, of Alliance, Ohio, for one
Gordon disappearing carriage for 10-inch B. L. rifle, the contract containing the plan of the carriage which was agreed
to be constructed, and also provisions and conditions relative to all matters pertaining to the construction, the price
to be paid therefor, the manner and times of payments of the
price, and many other matters.
"On February 22, 1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and
Power Company wrote a letter submitting a plan of a gun
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arriage which it d ired t construct for the United States,
and containing al the provisions and conditions of the
contract which it propo ed to enter into with the United
States.
'' The act making appropriations for fortifications, etc.,
approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), authorized and
directed the Secretary of War to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company for one 10-inch
pneumatic disappearing gun carriage 'which shall be constructed on the general plan submitted by the company to
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in its letter dated
February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
and shall be capable of being traversed and the gun elevated
and depressed by either pneumatic, electric, or hand power,
and the details of said plan may be modified, changed, and
improved in the discretion of the company.'
"The act appropriated for the purchase of the saicl pneumatic carriage the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as may
be necessary, and further provided that ' the same conditions
relative to the platform, ammuniUon, and payments, and s9
forth, embodied in the contract for the Gordon ten-inch counterpoise carriage shall apply to the pneumatic carriage, and
the same facilities for carrying out the contract for the counterpoise carriage shall be extended to the pneumatic carriage.'
''UnderdateofNovember 5, 1894, the United States entered
into a contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power
Company for the carriage authorized by said act of August
1, 1894, for the sum of $50,000, the full amount appropriated
for the cq,rriage. In view of the provisions of' section 3732,
Revised Statutes, and the doubt as to whether the said act
of August 1, 1894, authorized the Secretary of War to enter
into contract to pay premiums which would make the cost of
the carriage exceed the amount appropriated therefor, no
provi ion for the payment of premiums for rapidity of fire
was inserted in the contract. In the contract for the Gordon
carriage (in the advertisement and instructions attached
thereto) it is provided that 'the carriage should be such as
to P rmit of the firing of the ervice 10-inch rifle therefrom
t u (10) time in ne hour, u ing hand power only, and there
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shall be a deduction of $1,000 from the contract price agreed
upon for each round less than this number in said time, and
a bonus of $2,000 for each round greater than this number.'
''Under this provision in the contract for the Gordon carriage and the provision in said act of August 1, 1894, that
'the same conditions relative to the platform, ammunition,
and payments, and so forth; embodied in the contract for the
Gordon ten-inch counterpoise carriage shall apply to the
pneumatic carriage,' the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power
Company claims that it is entitled to a bonus of $2,000 for
each shot fired in one hour in excess of twelve shots, the
number required by the contract, although the contract price
is $50,000, the full amount appropriated for the carriage."
You ask for an opinion" As to whether under said act of Congress of August 1,
1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company is
entitled to a premium of $2,000 for each shot that may be
fired in an hour in excess of twelve shots,"
The act in quest,ion appropriated a specific sum, viz, $50,000,
to "procure and test one 10-inch pneumatic disappearing
gun carriage." The Secretary of War was "authorized and
directed to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and
Power Company, of Washington, District of Columbia, without advertising, for such carriage."
The full amount of the appropriation is absorbed in the
contract price for making and delivering the carriage.
The contract which was made between the parties does
not purport to bind the Government beyond the amount
·appropriated.
In view of these facts I do not see that any occasion has
arisen for your official action in regard to the payment of
premiums, and therefore, in accordance with the uniform
practice of this Department, I must decline to express an
opinion upon the question proposed by you.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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SLAUGllTER OF DI~EASED ANIMALS.
By the act of August 30, 1890, providing that the Secretary of Agriculture
may cau e to be slaughtered certain animals adjudged to be infected
with di ea , or to havo be n exposed to infection, and providing the
, manner in which the value of the animals so slaughtered as exposed,
but not infected, shall be ascertained and paid, but that no payment
shall be made for any animal imported in violation of the act, Congress intended that the exposed animals imported in violation of the
act are to be slaughtered, as well as the others.
The a uthority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and slaughter
the animals without compensation by the Government is doubtful.
The Secretary is to adopt and enforce regulations for adjudging whether
or not the animals are diseased or have been exposed to disease so as
to be dangerous and without ha-ving reo·ard to possible claims, to
'
' if, in his judgment,""such a measure is reqmred
.
resort to slaughtering
to prevent the spread of the disease among animals in this country.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE,

Janua,ry 4, 1897.
Sm: I have your letter of the 2d instant asking my opinion as to the right of your Department to slaughter sheep
imported by J. B. Manby, of Trinidad, Colo., quarantined at
Santa Fe stock yards, at El P~so, rrex., and foun d to be
affected with scab.
Section 6 of the act of August 30, 1890, makes it a penal
offense, with fine and imprisonment, to knowingly import
sheep, etc., affected with disease, or sheep, etc., which have
been exposed within sixty days to such disease. This provision is to be enforced, as any other criminal law, by court
and jury.
Section 7 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to quarantine all sheep, etc., imported.
Section 8 prohibits their importation except at quarantine
ports; and provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may
cause to be slaughtered such of the animals named in this
act as may be, under regulations prescribed by him, adjudged
to be infected, or to have been exposed to infection so as to
be dangerous to other animals; and that the value of animal o slaughtered as expo ed but not infected may be
a certained by agreement or appraisal by persons appointed
by th ecretary, ho deci ion to be final and paid out of
. th Trea ury not otberwi 'e appropriated;
an mon Y rn
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'' but no payment shall be made for any animal imported in
violation of the provisions of this act." This would seem to
mean that no payment shall be made for any exposed animal,
as well as none for any diseased animal, if imported in violation of the act; and to provide a summary method of
appraisal and payment in the case of animals exposed, but
not imported in violation of the act. Undoubtedly, however,
the _e xposed animals imported in violation of the act were
intended to be slaughtered, as well as the others, and this
slaughtering was to be of them and the others indiscriminately, without reg·ard to any question of illegal importation
and with a view to preventing the spread of disease, etc.
It is to be "adjudged" that the animals are diseased or
exposed so as to be dangerous; not that they were i11egally
imported. That question arises before the Secretary or at
the Treasury only for the purpose of passing upon claims
for payment under section 8 of the act.
I am not prepared to say that a wrong decision of such a
question by the ,Secretary of Agriculture, or at the Treasury,
would have any greater effect than a decision by the Comptroller of the · Treasury in matters of accounts and claims
generally; that no claims could be maintained in court for
compensation for the slaughtering of sheep '' adjudged" to
be diseased or to have been exposed to disease, and erroneously believed to have been imported in violation of the
law, or that no other claims could be made. I therefore
answer your question whether any doubt can be raised as to
the authority of your Department to seize and slaughter the
sheep in question without compensation by the Government,
by saying that there is such doubt.
As to what action it is necessary for you to take to guard
against such claims, I am clearly of opinion that you are
not expected to do more than adopt and enforce regulations
for adjudging whether or not the sheep are diseased or have
been exposed to disease so as to be dangerous, and, without
~aving regard to possible claims, to resort to slaughtering if,
m your judgment, such a measure is required by the purposes
of the law, e. g., to prevent the spread of disease among
animals in this country.
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An appraisement should be had, in order that, if any of
these sheep were not imported in violation of law, payment
may be made for those exposed to disease, as directed by
section 8 of the act referred to.
_ Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.

GRANTS TO ST.A.TES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
The provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, granting certain sections of
unappropriated public lands within the State of Colorado to the State
for penitentiary 1rnrposes, to be selected and located by direction of
the legislature with the approval of the President of the United
States on or before a specified date, are not directory, as Congress
had no right to give directions to the legislature of a State, but are
in the nature of conditions precedent, and ctm only be given effect
as conditions, and a failure by the designated authorities to select
and locate the lands within the time named, renders the grant
inoperative. After the expiration of said time the President is not
authorized to approve a selection and location of said lands.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 4, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to submit my opinion as requested
in your letter of September 1 last, with which you sent to
me a letter to you from the Secretary of the Interior, dated
August 20, 1896, asking your approval of a list of lands
selected by the State of Colorado for penitentiary purposes
under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 474).
The Secretary refers to the decision by one of his predecessors, of February 27, 1890 (10 L. D., 222), on the application
by said State for certain salt lands granted it by section 11
of that act, in which "it was held that the provisions of
that section requiring the State to make its selection of salt
lands within two years after the admission of the State is
directory only, and failure to select within the period specifi d doe not work a forfeiture of the grant."
ou r que t that I advise you '' as to the correctness of
th ruling f th Interior Department referred to * * *
nd wh th r under ecti n 9 of the law pass d March 3,
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1875 (18 Stat., 474), the President may approve selections of
land for penitentiary purposes made by the State of Colorado after the :first day of January, 1878."
The act referred to was the enabling act under which Colorado was admitted into the Union. Section 7 granted to the
State sections Nos. J..6 and 36 in every township for the support of common schools. Section 8 likewise granted ":fifty
entire sections of the unappropriated public lands within
said State to be selected and located by direction of the legislature thereof, and with the approval of the President, on or
before the first day of January, 1878, * * * in legal subdivisions of not less than one-quarter section, * * * for
the purpose of erecting public buildings at the capital of
said State for legislative and judicial purposes." Section 9
is as follows:
"That :fifty other entire sections of land as aforesaid, to be
selected and located and with the appronal as aforesaid, shall
be, and they are hereby, granted to said State for the purpose of erecting a suitable building fo~ a penitentiary or
State prison in the manner aforesaid."
The language of section 8 with refer~nce to time and manner of selection and location is plainly incorporated by reference in section 9, and the question is whether., the time
named having passed without any action looking to the
selection and locatfon of lands under section 9, the State
still bas the right to select and locate them.
Section 11, to which the decision of the Secretary of the
Interior above cited referred, provided'~That all salt springs within said State, not exceeding
twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining, and
as contiguous as may be to each, shall be granted to said
State for its use, the said land to be selected by the governor
of said State within two years after the admission of · the
State," etc.
I do not concur in the opinion of the Secretary. The
authorities which he cites to support his conclusion relate
to laws containing directions to public officers subject to
the control of the legislature which passed them, specifying
the time and manner in which public duties were to be performed. These provisions as to time and manner were, in
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the cases cited, held to be directory only, the intention having been manifest to require the duty to be performed and
nothing appearing to indicate that the action of the officer
was to fail in case, for any reason, the directions as to time
and manner should not be strictly followed. As stated in
one of the passages quoted (p. 225 ), such provisions "seem
to be generally understood to be merely instructions for the
guidance and government of those on whom the duty is
imposed, or directory only. The neglect of them may be
punishable, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the
act done in disregard of them."
To the same effect are the quotations (p. 224) from French v.
Edwards (13 Wall., 506) and those from other cases.
As the terms "directory" and "mandatory" import, this
rule of construction applies only to statutes giving directions
or commands to officers or bodies whose action is under the
control of the law-making power, and I think the error of the
Secretary was in applying this rule to a law making a grant.
Congress had no right to give directions to the legislature or
to the governor of the State of Colorado, and can not, by the
proper construction of the act, be held to have undertaken to
do so. On the contrary, the act simply granted various quantities of land for different State purposes. There was no condition with respect to the school lands, the sections being
designated by numbers; but the sections granted for the
erection of public buildings and those granted for a penitentiary building were to be selected and located by the legislature on or before a date named, while the salt springs and
adjoining sections were to be selected by the governor within
a fixed period after the admission of the State.
The propriety of treating the provisions of any statute as
directory only has been questioned, and although the right of
courts to do so in proper cases is established, they exercise it
only with reluctance and in extraordinary cases. (Dreyfus
v: J:$_rid~es, 45 Miss., 247; Best v. Gholson, 89 Ill., 465.) The
d1stmct10n between the class of cases to which this rule
applie and those to which it does not is well stated in
Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, section 433 :
"Where power or right are granted with a direction that
c rtain regulation or formalities shall be complied with. it
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seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous
observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the
right or authority conferred; and it is therefore probable
that such was the intention of the legislature. But when a
public duty is imposed, and the statute requires that it shall
be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time, or
under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well
be regarded as intended 'to be directory only when injustice
or inconvenience to others who have no control over those
exercising the duty would result if such requirements were
essential and imperative."
Whether the usual rule of strict construction which usually
applies to grants by the Government is to be adopted with
respect to a grant to a State, and whether the grant in question was one in presenti which, upon the selection and location
of the lands, with the approval of the President, would take
effect as of the date of the act, are questions which I think
immaterial, because the intention of Congress was manifest
to make the selection and location of the lands in the manner
and within the time named conditions of the grant. It is not
to be assumed that Congress had no purpose in designating
separate agencies and different periods for the selection and
location of the lands, nor is it necessary for officers intrusted
with the execution of the law to inquire what that purpose
was. It is sufficient that the statute plainly provides that
the selection and location shall be made within a time specifically named. .
As these provisions of the act can not be construed as directions to those whom Congress had no right to direct they
can only be given effect as conditions which, if not complied
with, prevent the grants from being effectual. They are
not, strictly speaking, conditions subsequent, even if the
grants be considered as in' presenti in the sense above mentioned, and therefore are not to be regarded with the disfavor
commonly shown to such conditions. They are rather in the
nature of conditions precedent. The various decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States (146 U. S., 593 and
cases cited) holding, for the protection of the grantees, that
grants of this nature, when the selection is made or the lands
otherwise defined relate back to the date of the grant, do
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not conflict with my view that failure by the designated
authorities of the State to select and locate the lands within
the times named renders the . grant inoperative. Properly
speaking, the grant is not forfeited or defeated after it has
taken effect. It merely failed to take effect because; being a
mere floating grant, the necessary steps to cause it to attach
to specific lands were not taken.
It will be noticed that the President's approval was required
with respect to the selection and location of the lands granted
by sections 8, 9, and 10, but not with respect to those granted
by section 11.
My opinion is that you are not now authorized to give your
approval to the proposed selection and location oflands under
section 9.
Very repectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The PRESIDENT.
MAKAR INDIANS-SEALS.

The Makah Indians are prohibited, as other persons generally, by the
· act of April 6, 1894, from killing seals at a time and in a certain part
of the Pacific Ocean named in the act, and the only right they can
claim is that of E>ealing in the particular manner and places permitted
in explicit terms by section 6 of the act to coast Indians generally.
While Indians are not commonly understood to be embraced by laws of
Congress, yet they may be and often are, and whether they are or
not is a question of intent.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 5, 1897.
SIR: I have received from you the following request for an
opinion:
"Replying to your letter of the 11th instant, in reply to
the letter of this Department, dated the 4th instant, concerning the kUling of certain seals by Makah Indians, I have
the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from the United
State attorney for the District of Washington, stating, in
reply to an inquiry of this Department, that the question
whether the Makab Indians came within the exemption of
ction G of the act of Congre s of April 6, 1894, was not
Ir nted or c n idered or determined by the court.
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"I have now the honor to ask your opinion whethAr the
said Indians are included within the prohibition of section 6
of the act of .A.pril 6, 18941"
The section of law referred to does not directly prohibit, .
but provides that the foregoing sections, which do contain
prohibitions, shall not apply to "Indians dwelling on the
coast of the United States and taking fur seals in canoes or
undecked boats propelled wholly by paddles, oars, or sails,
and not transported by or used in connection with other vessels, or manned by more than five persons, in the manner
practiced by said Indians." Sealing by these particular
coast Indians in the manner thus particularly described is
excepted from the prohibitions of the foregoing sections.
Section 6 then proceeds to say that "the exception made in
this section shall not apply to Indians in the employment of
other persons, or who shall kill, capture, or pursue seals outside of territorial waters under contract to deliver the skins
to other persons, nor to the waters of Bering Sea or of the
passes of the Aleutian Islands." Which means that not
even in the manner described in the section can Indians take
seals who are not acting for themselves, but are employees
of others, or are under contract to deliver the skins to
others, etc.
Section 6 is, therefore, permissive rather than prohibitory;
but I understand the question to be whether the Makah
Indians can take seals in a manner not the one particularly
described in section 6; in other words, whether the general
prohibitions of the act apply to the Makah Indians or do not
apply to them because they are Indians or Makah Indians,
and not white persons.
The two Governments of Great Britain and the United
States adopted a treaty of arbitration, which resulted in an
award. This award is to set out in full in the act of April
6, 1894, entitled "An act to give effect to the award," etc.
The award provides that the Governments "shall forbid
their citizens and subjects, respectively," to kill, etc., within
a certain zone, and "shall forbid their citizens and subjects,
respectively," to kill, etc., at a certain time, in a certain part
of the Pacific Ocean, inclusive of Bering Sea. .A.mong other
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articles of the award set forth in the law, article 8 contains
almost the identical words of section 6 of the law.
Now, whil~ the word "subjects" is used in treaties and
international awards chiefly because the inhabitants of monarchies are called subjects instead of citizens, and that word
alone would not indicate that Indians were in the minds of
the arbitrators; yet article 8 clearly shows that Indians were
intended to be included among subjects in this particular
award. That article expressly excepts or exempts coast
Indians sealing in the particular manner described in section 6 of the law, and the conclusion is irresistible that other
Indians or Indians sealing in other manners were intended
to be embraced among the subjects who were to be forbidden
to kill, etc.
So also, while Indians are not commonly understood to be
embraced by laws of Congress, yet they may be, and often
H,re, and whether they are or not is a question of intent. It
can not be doubted that the intent here was to carry out the
award, which we must presume Congress to have rightly
understood. When, therefore, Congress passes a law purporting to be for that purpose, using instead of the words
"citizens and subjects" the words "citizen of the United
States, or person owing the duty of obedience to the laws or
trea,ties of the United States," Congress, in my opinion, intended the same persons whom the award intended, including Indians.
There is nothing in the recent history of our Indians and
their treatment by the Government which makes it improbable that Congress would regard them as owing the duty of
obedience to a treaty between this country and Great Britain
concerning international affairs, or obedience to the laws of
the United States when intended to apply to them. On the
contrary, all recent dealings between the Government and
our Indians have been in accordance with the theory that
they owe obedience to our laws as subjects and many of them
a citizen .
therefor an wer your question whether the Makah Indian are included within the prohibition of ection 6 of the
a ·t f April 6, 1894, by saying that they are prohibited as
o her P r on by the act generally, and that the only right
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they can claim is tµat of sealing in the particular manner
and places permitted in explicit terms by section 6 of the law
to coast Indians generally.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

UNDATED BONDS.A bond accompanying a bid to build certain public works, duly signed,
sealed, and delivered, the separate proposals constituting the bid and
the bond being on printed blanks bound together and consecutively
paged in print, is not sufficiently defective to be regarded as invalid
because the date of the bid and bond are not inserted in .the blanks
left for that purpose in printing the instrument.
The date is no part of the substance of a sealed instrument, and need
not necessarily be inserted. The real date is the time of its delivery,
which may always be proved.
In specific cases the Secretary of War is authorized to ·waive formal
defects in bids and bonds in order to secure the public advantage
resulting from competitive bidding.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 9, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion as requested in
your indorsernent, dated December 30 last, on the letter
of John M. Wilson, colonel of Engineers, U.S. A., to Brig.
Gen. William P. Craighill, Chief Engineer, U.S. A., upon the
question '' whether the bond accompanying the bid inclosed
is, in view of the terms of the specifications, sufficiently
defective to reqmre me to regard the same as invalid."
The bid inclosed is that of Hughes Bros. & Bangs for
building "extension of breakwater and sand-catch pier at
Buffalo, N. Y." The bond is "guaranty to accompany proposal," signed and sealed by two persons, whose signatures
are duly witnessed and who have executed affidavits
indorsed thereon as to their property qualifications. The
plans and specifications on which proposals are invited,
the separate proposals constituting the bid, and the bond
are all on printed blanks bound together and consecutively
paged in pr.int, the bond being upon part of the same sheet
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with the signatures of Hughes Bros. and Bangs to the proposals, so that it is clear that the bid and guaranty were,
when executed and delivered, mechanically and inseparably
connected.
The objections suggested to the sufficiency of the bond, as
appears from the letter above mentioned, and from that of
Thomas W. Symons, major, Corps of Engineers, to General
Craighill, which you also send, are that the date of the bid
and that of the bond . are not inserted iu the blanks left for
that purpose in printing the instrument. The bond or guaranty undertakes "that if the bid of Hughes Bros. & Bangs,
herewith accompanying, dated - - - , 1896, for furnishing
material and labor for extension of breakwater and sandcatch pier at Buffalo, N. Y., be accepted * * * wj.thin
sixty days from the date of the opening of proposals therefor,
the said bidder will, within ten days after notice of such
acceptance, enter into a contract with the proper officer of
the United States," etc.
In my opinion this bond is not sufficiently defective to
require you to regard the same as invalid. On the contrary,
I think the 6bligation is valid and binding, notwithstanding
the failure to insert the dates above mentioned. The naming
of the bidders, the proper designation of the work to be done,
and the reference to the bid as accompanying the bond are
quite sufficient to connect the undertaking with its subject;
so that certainly, unless the same bidders during the year
1896 made more than one bid for this identical work, the
date of the bid, if inserted, would add nothing essential to
the instrument, and its omission deprives it of nothing.
It is well settled that the date is no part of the substance
of a sealed instrument and not necessary to be inserted. The
real date is the time of its delivery, which may always be
proved (2 Johnson, 234; 20 N'. Y., 333). The fact which the
letters mention, that the affidavits indorsed on the bond,
being dated November 24, 1896, show it was signed before
the bid it elf, which is dated November 28 1896 is therefore
.
' on
' the face of
entuely
immaterial. If November 24 appeared
the in trument a the date of its execution it would be perfeely valid.
ti often impracticable to p;ocure signatures
to such bond before or at the time the proposal is signed,
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and the mere dates of the bid and the bond are of no legal
consequence since both take effect only at the time of delivery, and there is no reason why such a bond may not be
exAcuted before the signing of the bid and entrusted to the
bidder with authority to deliver it together with the bid.
The Secretary of War is authorized (20 Stat., 36) to prescribe rules and regulations for the preparation, submission,
and opening of bids relating to his Department. He is
authorized (22 Stat., 487) to require a written guaranty with
each bid of the tenor and effect of the one now submitted.
But it is entirely within his authority to waive informalities,
and this has been done generally by Army Regulation, 639.
He i8 also authorized in specific cases to waive formal
defects in bids and bonds in order to secure the public
ad vantage resurting from competitive bidding which it was
the intention of Congress to secure, and which would often
be lost by exacting strict compliance with all the formalities
required (10 Opin., 140; 15 Opin., 226).
Therefore, notwithstanding section 17 of the general
instructions which accompany the invitations for proposals,
which requires that "all blank spaces in the proposal and
bond must be filled in," etc., you might disregard the failure
to do so, even without "the right to * * * · waive any
informality in the bids," reserved by section 22 of said
instructions.
I return herewith th_e papers submitted by you.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

CONTRACTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
An act of Congress authorizing the Secretary of War to contract for the
improvement of the Chicago River" as far as may be permitted by
existing docks and wharves," confines the improvements within existing docks and wharves.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 11, 1897.
Sm: I have your communication of January the 7th in
which you recite the provision in the river and harbor act of
10892-VOL 21, P'l' 3--5
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June 3, 1896, for the improvement of the Chicago River,
which is as follows:
"For improving the Chicago River, in Illinois, from its
mouth to the stock yards on the South Branch, and to Belmont avenue on the North Branch, as far as may be permitted by existing docks and wharves, to be dredged to
admit passage by vessels drawing sixteen feet of water,
according to the recommendation of Captain W. L. Marshall,
of the corps of Engineers of the United States Army, in his
_ report under date of August ninth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-three: Continuing improvement, fifty thousand dollars: Provided, That contracts may be entered into by the
Secretary of War for such materials and work as may be
necessary to complete the said project of improvement, to be
paid for as appropriations may from time to time be made by
law, not to exceed in the aggregate six hundred and :fifty
thousand dollars, exclusive of the amount herein and heretofore appropriated."
And also certain extracts from the report of Maj. ( then
Capt.) W. L. Marshall, Corps of Engineers, dated August
9, 1893.
You request my opinion "as to whether, under the above
quoted extract from the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896,
the authority of the Secretary of War to make contracts is
confined to improvements within existing docks and wharves,
or whether it also extends to making contracts for (1) dredging, for removing wharves and docks, and widening channel,
(2) rebuilding wharves and docks in widened places, and (3)
acquiring right of way in widened places."
The language of the act of June 3, 1896, appears to be free
from obscurity or ambiguity. It provides for improving the
Chicago River "as far as may be permitted by existing docks
and wharves."
This certainly does not contemplate the removal of wharves
or docks, or for the rebuilding of wharves or docks, or for
"acquiring the right of way."
The object of the act appears to be the improvement of the
Chicago Riv r by dredging the ame "to admit passage by
e 1 drawing ixteen feet of water."
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Whatever may be involved in dredging the river to admit
passage by vessels drawing sixteen feet of water, is embraced
within the authority granted by the act; but I do not understand the dredging of the river" so far as.may be permitted
by existing docks and wharves" involves the removal of
such docks and wharves, or the rebuilding of any docks and
wharves, or the acquisition of any right of way in widened
places.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Acting A. ttorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
REVOCABLE LICENSE-ELLIS ISLAND.

The Secretary of the Treasury may grant a license, revocable at his
will, to use a portion of Ellis Island, an immigrant station, for the ·
purpose of erecting and maintaining an exhibiting hall and conducting a land and labor bureau.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 11, 1897.

Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the opinion of
the Solicitor of the Treasury of June 4, 1896, which, by your
indorsement thereon, is ''referred to the .Attorney-General
for an expression of opinion as to the right of the Secretary
of the . Treasury to lease or license for a term of years the
use of a portion of Ellis Island, an immigrant station, for
the purpose of erecting and maintaining an exhibition hall
and conducting a land and labor bureau, as recommended in
the report of the Immigration Investigation Commission
(pp. 46, 47)."
I have carefully considered the opinion of the Solicitor of
the Treasury, together with the letter to you of May 4, 1896,
from Mr. Charles .A... Hess, arid the letter of May 4, 1896,
from Mr. Hess to the Bon. Herman Stump, Commissioner of
Immigration, with the indorsements thereon.
I concur entirely in the conclusion reached by the Solicitor
of the Treasury.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
.A.ctin_q Attorney- General.
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[N0TE.-The conclusion of the Solicitor of the Treasury
was as follows:
"I am of the opinion that he (Secretary of the Treasury)
may, without violating any law or statute of the United
States, grant to the company when organized a license to
erect and maintain a building for the purposes proposed on
Ellis Island, the license to be made revocable at the will of
the Secretary." (See 21 Opin., 476).-E. 0. B.]

BONDED WAREHOUSES FOR IMPORTED RICE-DUTIES.
The act of March 24, 1874, chapter 65, concerning bonded warehouses for
storag~ of imported rice is still in force.
Warehousemen of importers' bonded warehouses for the storage and
cleansing of imported rice intendecl for exportation to foreign countries may withdraw for consumption, instead of ·exporting, certain
by-products resulting from the manufacture, viz, rice meal and
broken rice.
The duty on these by-products should be assessed upori. the proportion
of uncleaned rice represented by these by-products, rather than on
the latter themselves, regarded as an independent importation.
DEP A.R'l'MEN'.r OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of December 14, asking an opinion with relation to the
act of March 24, 187 4, chapter 65, concerning bonded warehouses for the storage of imported rice. This statute is as
follows:
" That from and after the passage of this act importers'
bonded warehouses, to be used for the storage and cleasing
of imported rice intended for exportation to foreign countries, may be established at any port of entry in the United
States, under s.uch rules and regulations as the Secretary of
the Treasury may prescribe."
It appears that up to the present time no application has
been made for the establishment of such a warehouse. The
fir t que tion naturally arising i whether the statute is still
in fore . I find no statute directly repealing it, and I think
that it i not superseded by the tariff act of ugust 28, 1894,
ch pter 3 9, ection 9, providing for bonded warehouse for
manufacture iu whole or in part of imported materials. For

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

475

B o n d e d W are 11 o u s e s f o r I m p o rt e d R i c e-D u ti e s •

the cleasing of rice does not seem to be a process of manufacture within the meaning of our laws. (Junge v. Hedden,
146 U. S., 233, 239; Patton v. United States, 159 U. S., 500;
509, and cases cited.)
It appears, however, that, besides the cleaned rice which
is to be exported, there are certain by-products resulting
from the manufacture which are of some commercial value,
namely, rice meal and broken rice. The applicant desires
the privilege, in case he shall establish bis propm,ed warehouse, to withdraw these by-products for co'nsumption
instead of exporting them; and your first question is whether
thi~ may lawfully be done. I answer this question in the
affirmative. Your power to prescribe rules and regulations
for these warehouses is a wide one. It is certainly a very
reasonable regulation that the by-products, which apparently are not sufficiently valuable to warrant their exportation, should be utilized, and not wasted. If it had been
intended by Congress that the regulations should prohibit
the withdrawal for consumption of any such by-products, I
think that it would have said so, as in Revised Statutes, section 3433.
Your second question relates to the rate of duty which
should be assessed upon. these by-products. You say:
"Would the by-products, such as broken rice and rice
meal, withdrawn for consumption, be dutiable as such, or
should the duty be assessed on the quantity of imported
uncleaned rice consumed in the product.ion of the byproducts'"
I am supplied by the applicant with figures from which it
would appear that there is very little waste in this cleansing
process. From 1,000 pounds of uncleaned rice of average
quality there is a waste of 25 pounds, while there results
800 pounds of cleaned rice and 175 pounds of by-products.
The duty on the uncleaned rice imported is eight-tenths of a
cent a pound, while the duty on the by-products when
imported is one-fourth of a cent a pound.
Such analqgies as exist would indicate an intent in Congress that the duty exacted upon the by-products when
withdrawn for consumption u:~.der your proposed regulations
should be assessed upon the proportion of uncleaned rice
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represented by these by-products (rather than on the latter
themselves regarded as an independent importation). This
view is confirmed by an examination of the general provisions of law relating to warehoused goods. Section 2983
of the Revised Statutes provides that in no case shall there
be any abatement of the duties made for any deterioration
in the warehoused merchandise. From the Government's
point of view a change in condition from that of uncleaned
rice to that of one of these by-products is a deterioration.
Answering your second question, therefore, it is my opinion that the duties imposed should be at the rate of eighttenths of a cent per pound.
Very respectfully,
EDWARD B. WHITNEY,
.Acting .Att(!rney- General.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
LEASE OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY-ELLIS ISLAND.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to lease for a term of years,
or for any length of time, the property of the Government placed in
his charge without express authority of'law, though he may license
the use thereof.
He has no authority to lease any part of Ellis Island.
He has power under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893, to grant
exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island immigrant
station, after public competition, subject to such limitations and conclitions as he may prescribe.
There can not strictly be a lease of a use.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 25, 1897.
SIR: In response to a request made through the Hon.
Herman Stump, Commissioner-General of Immigration, of
J auuary 20, 1897, I beg to supplement the opinion of January 11, 1897, heretofore forwarded to you in response to your
indorsement of January 7 on the opinion of the Solicitor of
the Treasury. Thi indorsement referred the opinion of the
olicitor to me "for an expre sion of opinion as to the right
of the
er tary of the Treasury to lease or license, for a
t rm of Y r , tll u e of a portion of Ellis Island, an immigr nt tation, for the purpose of erecting and maintaining
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an exhibition hall and conducting a'i land and labor bureau, as
recommended in the report of the Immigration and InvestL
gation Committee (pp. 46 and 47)."
The Solicitor of the Treasury concludes his lengthy opinion
with the statement:
"I am of the opinion that he (Secretary of the Treasury)
may, without violating any law or statute of the United
States, grant to the company when organized a license to
erect and maintain a building for the purposes proposed on
Ellis Island, the license to be made revocable at the will of
the Secretary."
·
I confined the expression of my former opinion to a concurrence in the conclusions reached by the Solicitor of the
Treasury, which meant no more than that the Secretary of
the Treasury had the lawful authority to grant to any one a
license to use the property for the purpose indicated.
I purposely limited the expression of my opinion to the
matter of license, because the opinion of the Solicitor of the
~rreasu·r y went no further, and because the language of your
indorsement seemed necessarily to contemplate a license,
although the word "leased" was used. It speaks of the
right "to lease or license for a term of years the use of a
portion of Ellis Island."
There can not strictly be the lease of a use.
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the power to lease
for a term of years, or for any length of time, the property
of the Government placed in his charge without express
authority of law therefor; and no such authority exists
under which he can ]ease any part of Ellis Island.
Section 3749, Revised Statutes, authorizes the Solicitor of
the Treasury, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, to lease or sen a certain class of lands belonging to
the United States.
And section 3208, Revised Statutes, authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, to "sell and dispose of" another
class oflands belonging to the United States.
And paragraph 4 of the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 377,
Sup. Rev. Stat., p. 251), authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to lease, at his discretion, for a period not exceed-
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ing five years, "such unoccupied and unproductive property
of the United States under his · control for the leasing of
which there is no authority under existing laws."
But under none of these provisions of the statutes can
authority be found for the Secretary of the Treasury to
le~se any part of Ellis Island. which is both productive and
occupied.
Section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stats., 569), confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury the power to grant
exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island immigrant station, after public competition, subject to such conditions .a nd limitations as he may prescribe.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CO~RAD,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATE BONDS.
Under section 356 of the Revised Statutes the head of an executive
department is authorized to require the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral only on questions arising in the administration of his
department.
As a recourse to law on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury for
the settlement ·and collection of certain bonds made and issued by
certain States and owned by the United States would involve the
very grave act of suing States, and as Congress has had this question
repeatedly before it and has not directed such a course, the Secretary
of the Treasury should not institute any suit.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 25, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of December 16, 1896, in which, after setting out that
the United tates is the owner of certain bonds made and
i ued by the States of Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North
arolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, aggregating 2,07 ,466.66~, you request an opinion "as to what
legal pro e ding. may be taken, if any, by the Secretary of
th Trea ury, or the Trea ury Department, under existing
1 i 1 tion, for the ettlement or collection of these bond ;
and if ny u h pow r hould exi t, how the ame may be
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exercised; and if no such power or authority should be
found to belong to the Secretary of the Treasury, or the
Treasury Department, in whom, then, if in any, does such
power or authority reside, and how may the same be exercised'"
'
I shall confine my answer to that portion of your inquiry
which relate·s to the power of your Department and its exercise, inasmuch as under section 356 of the Revised Statutes
the head of an executive department is authorized to
require the opinion of the Attorney-General only on questions arising in the administration of his department.
There is no act authorizing you to compromise this _indebtedness.
The first step toward enforcing the payment or these
bonds would be a suit by the United States to recover judgment against the several States.
Assuming that such a suit .could be maintained in the
Supreme Court of the United States, under the authority of
United States v. Texas (143 U. S., 621), the inquiry arises
whether or not you have the authority, or having it, should
fastitute such a suit.
·
·
As appears by your letter, all of these bonds were formerly
in the Indian trust fund, except $538,000, bonds of the
State of Arkansas, which were received from the Smithsonian Institution.
The question of the collection of these bonds has been
repeatedly before the Interior and Treasury Departments
and Congress.
Jn December, 1867,Attorney-General Stanbery, in a report
made to Congress concerning certain of these bonds, said:
'' I am at a loss to suggest any specific measure for further
security in respect to these bondsA But it may happen that
the indebted States and corporations may offer propositions
for compromise favorable to the bondholders, and Congress
may deem it expedient to give the Secretary of the Interior
or the Secretary of the Treasury authority to entertain, and,
in the exercise of a proper discretion, to agree to such
propositions." (Ex. Doc. 59, H. R., 40th Cong., 2d sess.)
On May 28, 1885, the Treasurer of the United States
asked the Secretary of the Interior, the trustee of the
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Indian fund, for in tructions in reference to the collection of
the unpaid principal and interest of the bonds then belonging to the Indian trust fund. On August 7, 1885, Secretary
Lamar, reviewing the opinion of Attorney-General Stanbery, replied, saying that he did "not consider it necessary
or proper that any further means should be attempted with
reference to the collection of the unpaid principal and
interest of the bonds under consideration until appropriate
legislation therefor shall have been enacted by Congress."
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1886, calls attention to the necessity
for legislative action, as follows:
"The bonds held by this office should receive the serious
attention of the legislative power, the greater part of these
bonds having been lying in the vaults of the Treasury, paying no interest save such as may have been sequestered from
sums due the respective defaulting States, notwithstanding
that these States have in great part compromised with their creditors, and are now paying interest on a part of the whole
of their debt."
House bill 6913, Fifty-third Congress, page 59, contained
the following provision :
" The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed
to sell and dispose of said bonds, with the accumulated
interest thereon, at the best price that can be realized for
the same, and to that end he shall at once advertise for thirty
days, inviting sealed proposals, and shall accept only such
bids as may equal or exceed the face value of the principal
of such bonds as the bidder proposes to buy."
This was stricken from the bill as enacted.
Congress bas annually appropriated for the payment of
the interest on this trust fund.
In 1870 Congress passed an act which, as section 3481 of
the Revised Statutes, is as follows:
"Whenever any State is in default in the payment of
interest or principal on investments in stocks or bond
i ued or guaranteed by such State and held by the United
tate in tru t the Secretary of the Treasury shall retain the
whol , or o mu h thereof a may be nece sary, of any
mon Y du n any a ·count from the nited State to such
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State, and apply the same to the payment of such principal
and interest, or either, or to the reimbursement, with interest
thereon, of moneys advanced by the United States on account
of interest due on such stocks or bonds."
This is the only legislation that I know of looking to the
collection of these bonds. I :find no general statute making
it your duty to sue on this class of claims.
As a recourse to law on your part would involve the very
grave act of suing States, and as Congress has had this
question repeatedly before it and has not directed such a
proceeding, I am of the opinion that you should not institute any suit.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.
CHINESE CERTIFICATES.
Certificates presented by Chinese persons as evidence of their right to
E:nter this country for the first time, conformably to the provisions of
section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884, signed by a Chinese consul-general within the United States, are not entitled to be treated as made
by the Chinese Government within the meaning of the said act, notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese minister had by letter communicated to the Secretary of State the information that his Government had "authorized the consuls of China in foreign countries to
issue" such certificates.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 2, 1897.
SIR: I have your letter of the 16th~ultimo, asking my
opinion upon the following facts stated :
"On the 30th ultimo, the collector of customs at San Francisco transmitted to the Department certificates which had
been transmitted to him by three Chinese persons as evidence
of their right to enter this country for the first time, conformably to the provisions of section 6 of the act approved July
5, 1884. (Stat. L., vol. 23, p. 115.) The certificates were
signed by the Chinese consul-general at San Francisco, and
bore the seal and vise of the United States consul at Hongkong, as required by said act. The collector refused permission to land to the holders of the certificates, it being held
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by him that such papers, issued to residents of Ohina by a
Chinese consular officer in this country, did not constitute a
compliance with the requirements of the act cited above.
Exception to his action having been taken by the attorney
for the Chinese persons named in the certificates, the collector requests instructions in the premises."
It appears from the inclosures of your letter that the Chinese in question started from Canton to come to the United
States, going by way of the British island of Hongkong.
No explanation is afforded of the absence of a certificate
issued at Canton or Hongkong.
Your letter is accompanied by an opinion by the solicitor
of the Treasury to the effect that, the Chinese minister having, by letter of June 2, 1891, communicated to the Secretary
of State the information that his Government had "authorized the consuls of China in foreign countries to issue" such
certificates, and this being a "foreign country" (or '' other
country," as it is put by the Secretary of the Treasury in
acknowledging a copy of the minister's letter,) the consulgeneral at San Francisco has been authorized to issue them.
The communication from the minister is quoted, and makes
the general statement that Chinese consuls in foreign countries have been authorized to grant such certificates ; but if
the-authorization is so expressed, I can not attribute to the
Chinese Government ignorance or disregard of the very reasonable principle that what is within the letter is not within
the law if not within the intent. It could not well have been
intended by a decree of authorization so worded that the
Chinese consul in Japan should certify to the characteristics, etc., of a person about to depart from Siam for the United
States; still less that the Chinese consuls in the United
States should certify to the characteristics, etc., of persons
about to depart from any other country than the United
State to go to the United States. Neither is it necessary
to presume that the Chinese consul-general at San Franci co ha been authorized to act because he has acted. As
he i not a })lenipotentiary diplomatic representative of China,
but merely a con ul, and a the general laws and custom
r lating t con ul d not impo e upon him the duty of making u h r ificat , no pre umption arises that he bas
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authority to make them, and there is no evidence of such
authority with respect to persons leaving Ohina for the
United States.
It is not my province to inquire into matters of fact. So
far as you have presented the facts, they do not, in my opinion, show the certificates in question to be entitled to be
treated as made by the Chinese Government within the meaning of section 6 of the act of Congress of July 5, 1884.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

DESERTING SEAMEN.
Section 4598 of the Revised Statutes does not apply to a seaman, engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States, shipped before a
shipping commissioner, who may have signed a contract to perform a
voyage and then absented himself from the vessel without leave from
the proper officer, unless he contracted with a vessel of the burden of
fifty tons or upward, required by section 4520 of the Revised Statutes
to have formal contracts witµ their seamen.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 2, 1897.
Srn: I have your letter of the 21st ultimo, aski~g my
opinion upon the question whether section 4598 of the
Revised Statutes "applies to a seaman engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States, shipped before a shipping
commissioner, if he shall have signed a contract to perform
a voyage and shall absent himself from the vessel without
leave from the proper officer."
The section mentioned occurs under the general title of'
"merchant seamen," and is found to contain provisions concerning the summary treatment of a deserting seaman "who
shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage." He is to
be brought before any justice of the peace upon complaint
of the master, and ''if it then appears that he has signed a
contract within the intent and meaning of this Title, and that
the v9yage agreed for is not :finished or altered or the contract otherwise dissolved," etc., the justice shall commit him
to jail, to remain until the vessel shall be ready to proceed on
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her voyage or the master shall require his discharge, and
then to be delivered to the master.
This approaches the enforcement of "involuntary servitude," but has been held not to be unconstitutional. See
Robertson et a,l. v. U. S., and Barry Baldwin, U. S. Sup. Ct.;
not yet reported.
I do not find in "this Title" a definition of contract, and
therefore understand the words '' a contract within the intent
and meaning of this Title" to refer to the particular contracts
the forms and ceremonies of which are fully set forth in the
Title. (Rev. Stat., 4511, 4512, 4520.) This interpretation
seems to be the more reasonable because such a formal contract, "in writing or in print," containing certain particulars
about the nature and duration of ·the voyage, the time at
which the seaman is to be on board, etc., etc., might well be
used before the justice of the peace in a summary proceeding;
but that magistrate might find much difficulty in dealing
summarily with mere oral or informal agreements.
By the act of June 19, 1886, section 2, it is provided that
shipping commissioners may ship and discharge crews for
any vessel engaged in the coastwise trade, trade with Canada,
Newfoundland, Mexico, etc., at the request of the master or
owner, the fees to be one-half those prescribed by Rev. Stat.,
4612. It will be observed that, unlike the contracts required
by Rev. Stat., 4511, etc., these contracts are wholly optional.
From this section 2, and from the terms of Rev. Stat.,
4511, itself, it is clear that the contracts covered by the latter are required only of masters of vessels bound from a
port in the United States to any foreign port, except British
American, Mexican, etc., and not of masters of vessels
engaged in the coastwise trade.
By act of ugust 19, 1890, it is provided that when a crew
is shipped by a shipping commissioner for any vessel engaged
in the coastwise, British American, etc., trades, as authorized
by, ection 2 of the act of June 19, 1886, an agreement shall
be made in the same manner and form as is provided by
v. tat., 4511 and 4512, and the law makes the provisions
f Rev. tat., 522, an<l numerou other sections of Title
Iel' ·hant am n, including ection 4598, the one now in
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question, extend to and embrace such vessels in the coastwise trade, etc., where their crews have been shipped by a
shipping commissioner, '' to the same extent and with the
same effect as if said vessels had been mentioned and
embraced in the language and terms of said sections."
On February 18, 1895, an act was passed entitled an act
to amend the last-named act, providing that said act" is
hereby amended so as to read as follows:"
Then come the provisions that when a crew is shipped by
a shipping commissioner for any vessel in the coastwise trade,
etc., as authorized by the act of June 19, 1886, an agreement
shall be made as provided by Rev. Stat., 4511 and 4512,
except the sixth,- seventh, and eighth items of section 4511;
that such seamen shall be discharged and receive their
wages as provided in clause 1 of Rev·. Stat., 4529, and also by sections 4526, 4527, etc., etc., mentioning numerous sections of Title "Merchant seamen,'' but not mentioning section 4598, now in question; and the law further requires
that "in all other respects such shipment of seamen and
such shipping agreement shall be regarded as if both shipment .and agreement had been entered into between the master of a vessel and a seaman without going· before a shipping
commissioner."
The last clause above quoted seems to refer to the unwritten or informal agreements customary with such vessels, and
alluded to in Rev. Stat., 4513.
The form and manner of amendment here used leave no
doubt that the provision of the act extending section ·4593 to
coastwise vessels is repealed; that is to say, that the new
law is intended to be substituted for and wholly supplant
the old. Without the express extension, thus repealed, section 4598 seems not to have included coastwise vessels,
because, as already said, the masters of those vessels did
not enter into "a contract within the intent and meaning of
this Title."
Under the latest law contracts which may but are not
required to be made as provided in cases under " this Title"
of the Revised Statutes are not contracts of the same class,
but a new class made in part only under the provisions of
Rev. Stat., 4511.
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I have already suggested that · the phrase "a contract
within the intent and meaning of tbis Title" seems to refer to
contracts the formalities of which are fully prescribed under
the Title" Merchant seamen" in the Revised Statutes. There
are two kinds of such contracts, one concerning foreigngoing· vessels, and the other concerning vessels " of tlle burden of 50 tons or upward bound from a port in one State to a
port in any other than an adjoining State, except vessels of
the burden of 75 tons or upward bound from a port on the
Atlantic to a port on the Pacific, or vice versa." (Rev. Stat.,
4520-4523.) Other shipping contracts are mentioned under
"this rritle," so that the phrase "a contract within the intent
and meaning of this Title" is not clear and might possibly
mean any shipping contract; but I do not think it does, for
this reason, in addition to those already given, viz: That
section 4598, as originally enacted, July 20, 1790, did not
have that meaning, but the one which I now attribute to it.
An examination of the act of July 20, 1790, shows that what
is now Rev. Stat., 4598, referred to formal contracts in writing or in print, required by section 1 to be entered into by
every master of a ship bound "to any foreign port, or of
any ship or vessel of the burden of 50 tons or upward bound
from a port in one State to a port in any other than an
adjoining State.'' Voyages to and from the Pacific were not
considered at that date. The words" this Title" have been
substituted in the revision for "thh; act" in the original law.
I therefore answer yo~r question in the negative, with the
explanation that section 4598 does apply to vessels of the
burden of 50 tons or upward, required by Rev. Stat., 4520,
to have formal contracts with their seamen.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRE'.rARY OF THE TREASURY .

RTHER

PACIFIC RAILROAD LA~D GRANT .

The 1Torthnn Pacitic J ailroad 'ompany, having omplet d and put jn

P ra.tiou th railroad :lnd telerrraph lines authoriz d by the a ·t of
,July 2, 18 1 the condition of th grant to said ompany of · rtaiu
l: 11<18 111 ntion d ju saicl act ha. be n fully perfoTmed, and the right
t hav ' h la111l pt 11 t <l wits 11 rt •t i 11 sa,id ('Ompauy.
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By its consent to the issuing of bonds, secured by mortgage on the railway and telegraph lines, Congress necessarily consented to their
transfer to the purchaser in case of foreclosure, who, however, b y
operation of law, whether a natural or artificial person, and, if the
latter, no matter how or by what authority created, would take the
property subject to all the continuing rights of the Federal Government, just as the original company held it.
The mortg.ages issued by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company having
been foreclosed, and all of the property, rights, and franchises of the
company sold at judicial sale to the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin corporation, and the latter having asked for the
patenting to it, or to purchasers from it, of certain lands granted by
the act of 1864, the Secretary of the Interior is not justified in refusing
to issue such patentti, but should act upon applications of the railway
company for patents upon _the same considerations which would
govern in case there· had been no foreclosure and the applications
were made by the railroad company.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 6, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
29th ultimo, with which you transmitted, for my consideration, communications addressed to you, "with respect to the
propriety of issuing patents to the Northern Pacific Rail way
Oompany."
Following the settled practice of the Attorneys-General, I
might refuse the opinion requested, because you do not state
the points you· wish to submit, but leave them to be gathered
from the communications, which are somewhat voluminous.
As, however, your letter shows that you require my opinion
for your guidance in the discharge of official duties, and that
both public and private interests require that it should be
promptly given, I answer your question as it is put, which is
as follows:
"I, therefore, request that you will, at your earliest convenience, advise me whether or not I am justified in withholding patents from the Northern Pacific Railway Company
on the grounds urged in the communication."
The act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 365), created the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and authorized it to construct
a railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget
Sound. For the purpose of aiding the construction of such
railroad and telegraph line, and ''to secure· the safe and
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--6
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speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war,
and public stores over the route of said line of railway," certain lands were _granted to said company, its successors and
assigns (sec. 3). For these lands patents were to be issued as
the lines should be completed, in sections of twenty-five
miles each, "in a good, substantial, and workmanlike man-_
ner," as found and reported by commissioners (sec. 4). The
road was to be a post route and military road, subject to the
use of the United States, and also subject to such regulations as Congress may impose concerning charges for Government transportation (sec.11).
Section 10 forbade the issue of " mortgage or construction
bonds," except by the consent of Congress; but on March 1,
1869 (15 Stats., 346), such consent was given to the issue of
bonds, secured by mortgage upon the railroad and telegraph
lines, for the purpose of raising funds with which to construct
the same. On May 31, 1870 (16 Stats., 378), consent was again
given. Bonds were accordingly issued and secured by mortgage, with the proceeds of which the railroad and telegraph
lines were finally completed and put in operation.
The act of August 7, 1888 (25 Stats., 382), requiring all companies which the Government had aided to construct railroad
and telegraph lines thereafter to maintain and operate their
telegraph lines "and exercise by themselves alone all the
telegraph franchises conferred upon them and obligations
assumed by them," applied to the Northern Pacific as well as
to other companies, but it has no bearing on the present
question. Its only object was to prevent the transfer of the
telegraphic business of such companies to other companies.
Congress has by none of the acts or resolutions above
named in anywise waived or relinquished the rights reserved
by the original act, save in so far as such waiver or relinqui hment results from the consent to the issue of bonds and
the execution of mortgages.
In 1896 the mortgage so issued were foreclosed and all the
~ro~ .rty, right , and franchises of the company were sold at
Judicial ale to th
orthern Pacific Railway Company, a
n in orpor tion, which purcha er ha entered into
pm~se~;si n and ·1aim owner hip of the railroad and teleliu '· , land , anu prop rty of th
orth rn Pacific

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

489

·Nor t ll er n P a c if i c Ra i Ir o a cl L an cl Grant.

Railroad Company. It is ·stated that the real purchasers
were bondholders and creditors of the old company, who
have incorporated as the new company; but this, if true,
appears to me to have no legal effect whatever.
It is asserted that the new company, by taking possession
of the property of the old one and operating its lines under
the Wisconsin charter, has abandoned and repudiated the
act of July 2, 1864, by which the Government's rights were
reserved and secured and the grant of lands was made, and
has thereby forfeited all right to such lands.
A copy of Senate Resolution 124, Fifty-fourth Congress,
first session, is attached to one of the comm"(\nications, which
resolution, it is averred, was drawn and urged for passage
by the parties interested in the purchase at foreclosure as
aforesaid, but Congress refused to pass it. This merely
serves to show that the desire of the purchasers was to have
a Federal charter for the new company and that they resorted
to the State charter only upon their failure to secure one
from Congress. Although the joint resolution of 1870, supra,
authorized a1mortgage on all the property of the company.
'' including its franchise as a corporation," the counsel in
charge of the reorganization were certainly justified under
the decisions in ad vising a new act of incorporation, instead
of endeavoring to work out a transfer of the corporate existence of the old company to the new one through the foreclosure proceedings.
It is not suggested that the new company bas, iD: fact, in
anywise dehied or repudiated, or threatened to deny or repudiate, its obligations to perform all the duties and fulfill all
the obligations imposed by the original act. Such repudiation is charged only as legal consequence of the succession
of the new corporation to the old.
The new company ·having asked for the patenting to it, or
to purchasers from it, of certain lands granted by the act of
1864, objection is made by the communications aforesaid to
your issuing such patents. The reasons are, in a word, that,
as the Government has lost, as against the new company, the
rights which it reserved against the old one in consideration
of which the lands were granted, its obligation to patent the
remainder of the lands covered by the grant has also ceased.

a
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I deem it unnec sary t o follow in d etail the numerous and
highly technical arguments filed with you in support of the
above objection , because they appear to me to have no bearing on the que t.ion to be an swer ed. T he consideration for
the grant of lands was the con struction and maintenance of
a railroad anrl telegraph line across the continent, iD: which
enterprise the Government had au interest on its own behalf
as well as on that of its.citizens. These lines h ave long since
been completed and in operation. The condition of the grant,
therefore, has been fully performed and t he right to have
the lands patented was perfect in the old company. (See
section 4 of original act, above cited.) I find no further condition in any of the laws that the right to the lands, when
so perfected by the completion of the enterprise, would be
lost by denial or attempted denial to the Government of any
of its continuing rights in or to the property. Congress contented itself with reserving such rights without making their
unquestioned enjoyment a condition of forfeit ur e of the lands
granted.
By its consent to the issuing of bonds secured by mortgage
on the railway and telegraph lines Congress necessarily consented to their transfer to the purchaser in case of foreclosure,
who, however, by operation of faw, whether a natural or
artificial person, and, if tbe latter, no matter bow or by what
authority created, would take the property subject to all the
. continuing rights of the Federal Government just as the
· original company held it. · I know of no reason why the Government may not enforce all the rights reserved to it by the
particular laws in question, or those which it bas generally
with respect to post routes and interstate commerce, quite
as well against the State corporation which now owns and
operates the property as it could have done against the old
company. Certainly in its assent to the· mortgages Congress
made no conditions as to the corporate character of the purchaser in ca e of foreclosure.
In hort, the argument pre ented to you is that tlte company which now applie for the patents has no right to them,
b ·au: th ' overnment h , s lo t, a against it the right in
~011. id r, tion of whi ·hit ranted th lands.
The arg ument
1 uu, und f r t, o r a
u.· : ir,'t th premi i not true,
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and second, if it wer tm , tu re nlt
the reasons gi en ab v . The ri ht of th ol
m1 t n
the lands granted, which wa p rfe ted b th compl ti n
its lines, pa ed to the pur ha er under:£ r lo ur o , 11 it
property and right . The e land were alr ady full,
They were subject to no condition ub · q_uent.
My opinion is that you are not ju tified in refu inO' to
issue patents to the orthern Pacific Railway Company for
tlle reasons stated in the communications submitted to me,
but that you should act upon applications for patents by the
new company upon exactly the same considerations which
would govern you in case there had been no foreclosure and
tbe applications were made by the old company.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.
ARMY OFFICERS.
The President has authority to assign enlisted men of the Army, who
have. passed the examination as candidates for commissions, to vacancies that may exist in any corps or arm of the service in which they
have been commissioned, notwithstanding the fact that additional
lieutenants remain in other corps u·n assigned.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
5th instant, in which you request my opinion as to the
"authority of the President to assign enlisted men who
have passed tbe examination as candidates for commissions
to vacancies that may exist in any corps of the line of the
Army while additional second lieutenants· remain in other
corps unassigned."
You refer me to the opinion of Acting Attorney-General
Maury (20 Opin., 149), in which somewhat the same question
was considered.
Under existing statutes commissions as second lieutenants
are conferred upon graduates of the United States Military
Academy and upon such enlisted men as may satisfactorily
pass tbe examinations provided for in the act of July BO,
1892 (27 Stat., 336), which provides:
.
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' E . ' . That h
a an ie in the grade of second lieut nant, h r t fi r fill d by the promotion of meritorious
non mmi ion d ffi r of the Army, under the provisio~s
of ection
f the a t approved June 18, 1878, shall be filled
by th appointm nt of competitors favorably recommended
under tbi a t, in the order of merit established by the final
·
e, amination."
By act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562), it was provided:
"And hereafter all appointments in t.he line of the Army
shall be by commission in an arm of the service and not by
commis ion in any particular regiment."
A commission is not conferred upon one as a second lieutenant in the line of the Army generally, but only as a second
lieutenant in the infantry, cavalry, or artillery arm, or in the
engineer or ordnance, or other corps of the Army.
By act of May 17, 1886 (24 Stat., 50), a graduate of the
United States Military Academy" may be promoted and commissioned as a second lieutenant in any arm or corps of the
Army in which there may be a vacancy and the duties of
which he may have been judged competent to_ perforrn."
This act further provides that" In case there shall not, at the time, be a vacancy in such
arm or corps, he may, at the discretion of the President, be
promoted and commissioned in it as an additional second
lieutenant, with the usual pay and allowances of a second
lieutenant until a vacancy shall happen."
So that not only is the graduate commissioned in some
specific arm or corps of the Army, "tlle duties of which he
may have been judged competent to perform," but if at the
time of his graduation no vacancy exists in the arm or corps
for which he may have been judged competent, then the
President is authorized to commission him in such arm or
corp · as an additional second lieutenant.
No authority is given the President to assign an officer
wh~ ha been commissioned in one arm or corps of the_Army
t fi_ll a vacancy in any other arm or corps of the Army the
duti ,· of ':hich he has not been judged competent to perform.
The nh, t d men who, und r the provi ions of the act of
,July 30 1 92, have be n '' favorably recommend d" to fill
h '
. .
•
' au 1 • 111 tb Ta 1 of
ond 1i ut nant heretofore
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filled by the promotion of meritorious noncommissioned officers of the Army" are commissioned under the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 561), "in an arm of the service."
Non commissioned officers, under section 1214, Revised Stat~
utes, were "eligible for appointment as second lieutenants in
any corps of the line for which they may be found so qualified. If there be no vacancy in such corps, any noncommissioned officer so found qualified for a commission therein
may be attached to i_t by the President as a supernumerary
officer by brevet of second lieutenant, subject to the provisions of section 1215."
So that, as to both graduates of the United States Military
Academy and enlisted men favorably recommended for promotion, the like provision applied, i.e., they were each commissioned in the arm or corps of the Army for which they
were found to be severally qualified. And the President was
not authorized to assign them to any other arm or corps, but
was required to attach them to the arm or corps in which they
were commissioned as "additional" or "supernumerary"
lieutenants.
The law governing promotions in the Army (Rev. Stats.,
sec. 1204) provides:
"Promotions in the line shall be made through the whole
Army in its several lines of artillery, cavalry, and infantry,
respectively."
So, too, as to transfers. The act of October 1, 1890, provides:
"SEC. 2. That officers of grades in each arm of the service
shall be assigned to regiments and transferred from one regiment to another as the interests of the service may require
by order from the War Department."
It appears, then, that throughout the whole structure of
the Army and the scheme of its organization the principle
prevails of keeping separate and distinct the several arms
and corps of which the Army is constituted, of confining
promotions and transfers of officers to the arm or corps in
which such officer is commissioned. And while authority is
expressly given to the President to assign or attach candidates for commissions in the Army whether graduates of
the United States Military Academ; or enlisted men favorably recommended for commission, such authority is in every
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ca e limited to the assignment of t hese persons to the arm or
corps of the Army in which they have been found qualified
to serve.
Keeping in view, then, the language of the statutes, their
spirit, purpose, and intent, as manifested b y past legislation
and by the course of policy pursued since the foundation of
the Military Academy at West Point, I am of opinion that
the President has authority to assign enlisted men who have
passed the examination as candidates for commissions to
vacancies that may exist in any corps or arm of the service
in which they have been commissioned, notwithstanding the
fact that additional second lieutenants remain in other corps
unassigned.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.

REMITTANCE OF FORFEITURE OF RECOGNIZANCE.
Outsicle of the District of Columbia the President h as no power to remit
the forfeiture of a juugment on a recognizance.
The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States, which
includes judgments on recognizances, is vested b y la win the Secretary
of the Treasury with respect to all claims save those arising under the
postal laws.
DEP .A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

February 11, 1897.
Pursuant to the reference, dated the 8th instant,
indorsed on the application made to you for remittance of
forfeiture of judgment on recognizance iu United States v.
Neilcirlc et al., I have the honor to give my opinion on the
que tion whether you have the power in the premises.
In United Statesv. Ooolcendorfer (5 Cranch C. 0.,113), which
ha been ited to you, it was held that" after the term in
whi ha r cognizance has been forfeited in a criminal case
the court an 11ot remit the forfeiture but the President of
th nit d t t ·anund ra t f Co~gre sof June 17, 1812.'
SrR:
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But that case arose in the District of Columbia, to which the
operation of the act cited was expressly limited (2 Stats., p.
752). There is no statute giving the President power to
remit forfeitures elsewhere; and his power to pardon offenses
does not include the right to remit forfeitures (10 Opin.,
452; 11 Opin., 124).
The power to compromise claims in favor of the United
States, which include judgments on recognizance, is vested
by law in the Secretary of the Treasury, who may act upon
the report of the district attorney, special agent, or the
Solicitor of the Treasury with respect to all claims save those
arising under the postal laws (Rev. Stat., 3469). He may, of
course 1 compromise claims for a nominal consideration when
the circumstances justify such a course, but neither he nor
any other officer, save the President with respect to forfeited
recognizance in the District of Columbia only, bas power to
remit or waive judgments on forfeited bonds.
As the application before you relates to a judgment in the
district of Kentucky, my opinion is that you have no power
to act thereon.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The PRESIDENT.
CONTRACTS-PREMIUMS.
Where, by act of Congress, the Secretary of War was authorized and
directed to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power
Company for the purchase of a certain gun carriage, without advertising, and in the same act a specific sum of money was appropriated
for the purpose of procuring such gun, and no express or implied
authority was given by the act to bind the Government beyond the
amount appropriated, the Secretary of War, by making the contract
for the full amount appropriated, exhausted his authority and could
not make a supplemental contract binding the Government for further expenditures.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

_
February 20, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of February 18, 1897, in which you state the following:
"On February 22, 1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and
Power Company wrote a letter, submitting a plan of a gun
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carriage which it desired to construct for the United States
and containing al o the provisions and conditions of the
contract which it proposed to enter into with the United
States.
"The act making appropriations for fortifications, etc.,
approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), authorized and
directed the Secretary of War to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company for one 10-inch
pneumatic disappearing gun carriage, 'which shall be constructed on the general plan submitted by the company to
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in its letter, dated
February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
and shall be capable of being traversed and the gun elevated
and depressed by either pneumatic, electric, or hand power,
and the details of said plan may be modified, changed, and
improved in the discretion of the company.'
"The act appropriated for the purchase of the said pneumatic carriage the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as
may be necessary, and further provided that 'the same condit-ions relative to the plat/orm, ammunition, and payments, and
so forth, embodied in the contract for the Gordon ten-inch
counterpoise carriage shall apply to the pneumatic carriage,
and the same facilities for carrying out the contract for the
counterpoise carriage shall be extended to the pneumatic
carriage.'
"Under · date of November 5, 1894, the United States
entered into a contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage
and Power Company for the carriage authorized by said act
of August 1, 1894, for the sum of $50,000, the full amount
appropriated for the carriage. In view of the provisions of
section 3732, Revised Statutes, and the doubt as to whether
the said act of August 1; 1894, authorized the Secretary of
War to enter into contract to pay premiums which would
make the cost of the carriage exceed the amount appropriated therefor, uo provision for the payment of premiums for
rapidity of fire was inserted in the contract. In the contract
for the Gordon carriage (in the advertisement and instructi u attached thereto) it i provided that 'the carriage
h uld be u h a to permit of the firing of the service
10-in h rifle ther from ten (10) time in one hour, using
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hand-power only, and there shall be a deduction of $1,000
from the contract price agreed upon for each round less than
this number in said time, and a bonus of $2,000 for each
round greater than this number.'
" In view of this provision iu the Gordon contract the
Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company claimed, at
the time of entering into its said contract on November 5,
1894, that it was entitled to a bonus of $2,000 for each shot
fired in one hour in excess of twelve shots, the number
required by its contract, and to have a contract therefor to
bind the Government to pay the same out of future appropriations made by Congress, although the price fixed for the
purchase of the carriage by the contract entered into at that
time is $50,000, the full amount appropriated for the carriage.
And, as it is said, for the purpose of expediting matters the
contract was entered into at that time without the stipulation in regard to premiums, with the understanding between
the then Acting Secretary of War and the company that the
question of the authority of the Secretary of War under the
said act of August 1, 1894, to contract for premiums, as
requested, would be submitted to the law officers of the Government, and that if they held that the act gave the Secretary
of War such authority a supplemental contract would be
entered into to pay such premiums.
"The application for the Secretary of War to enter into
such a supplemental contract is now pending in this Department, and you are respectfully requested to render an opinion
as to whether he has authority to do so."
Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes provides that:
"No contract or purchase on behalf the United States
shall be made, unless the same is authorized by law or is
under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment, except
in the War and Navy Departments for clothing, subsistence,
forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however,
shall not exceed the necessities of the current year." ·
The act approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), appropriated a specific sum, viz., $50,000, to "procure and test one
10-inch pneumatic disappearing gun carriage."
The Secretary of War was "authorized and directed to
contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Com-
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pany, of Washington, District of Columbia, without advertising for such carriage."
The full amount of the appropriation was absorbed in the
contract price for making and delivering the carriage.
No express authority was given you by this act to bind
the Government beyond the amount appropriated. There is
no such implied authority from the provision that" The same conditions relative to the platform, ammunition, and payments, and so forth, embodied in the contract
for the Gordon 10-inch counterpoise carriage shall apply to
the pneumatic carriage, and the same facilities for carrying
out the contract for the counterpoise carriage s~all be
extended to the pneumatic.carriage."
The word "payments" refers to the time and manner of
payment, and was not intended to have the effect of increasing the appropriation or conferring power to contract for an
indefinite amount.
My opinion is that in making· the contract for the full
amount of the appropriation you exhausted your authority
under the act, and that you are not authorized to make any
supplemental contract binding the Government to further
expenditures.
Respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS BY SEAMEN.
Paymasters of the Navy may receive from enlisted men or petty officers,
for deposit, under the act of February 9, 1889, accumulated savings
of any amount, provided they represent the earnings of such a person
as an enlisted man or petty officer in the United States Navy.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

•
February 24, 1897.
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 11th instant, inclosing copies of a lett r, dated the 4th ultimo, from the commanding officer of the
U.
an Franci co, and the indorsements thereon relahe autbority of the paymaster of aid vessel to
a d po. it, und r the provi ions of the act entitled
t pr vid for th depo it of the aving of eamen
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of the United States Navy," approved February 9, 1889 (25
Stat., 657), the sum of $900 from the chief boatswain's mate
of the vessel.
You say"ln view of the practice in the Army and Navy, as stated
in the indorsement on said letter of the Chief of the Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts, I have the honor to request an
expression of your opinion as to whether the money offered
by the chief boatswain's mate may be received by the paymaster, subject to the provisions of the act of Congress above
mentioned."
The act referred to provides:
" That any enlisted man or appointed petty officer of the
Navy, may deposit bis savings in sums not less than :five
dollars with the paymaster, upon whose books bis account
is borne, and be shall be furnished with a deposit book in
which said paymaster shall note over bis signature the
amount, date, and place of such deposit."
The act further provides that the money so deposited
" shall be accounted for in the same manner as other public
funds"; and" SEC. 3. That the system of deposits herein established
shall be carried into execution under such regulations as
may be established by the Secretary of the Navy."
Article 1488 of the United States Navy Regulations, 1893,
provides:
'' Enlisted men of the Navy, and petty officers, may
deposit with the pay officer upon whose books their accounts
are borne, any portion of the savings accruing from their
pay, and with the approval of the commanding officer savings from other sources on board ship, in·sums not less than
:five dollars, the same to remain so deposited until :final payment on discharge: Provided, That the sum of at least
twenty-five dollars shall remain to the credit of such depositors on the rolls of the pay officers."
The statute authorizes the petty officer. or seaman to
deposit his savings.
'
The Navy Regulations provide for the deposit "of the
savings accruing from their pay" and also "savings from
other sources on board ship."
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The statute provides that the amount so deposited "shall
uot be permitted to be paid until :final payment on discharge," and the Navy Regulations make similar provision.
Enlistments for duty on board cruising vessels for the
Navy are for a term of three years general service; and
enlisted men in the naval service are only entitled to their
discharge upon the expiration of their term of service.
The doubt suggested in the letters accompanying your
communication is as to whether an enlisted man, or petty
officer, in the United States Navy may be permitted under
this statute to· deposit with the paymaster accumulated
savings frQm previous terms of enlistment, or only such savings as have accrued during the term of enlistment within
which the deposit is made.
The Paymaster-General of the Navy states in an indorsement on the letter accompanying your communication that" The practice of the service is to permit enlisted men to
make deposit in any amount desired. There are numerous
cases of large deposits, an instance being the deposit by one
man of $3,000 monthly for three consecutive months."
Manifestly, such a deposit could not be of savings of pay
earned during any one period of enlistment.
The statute provides that the deposit may be made "with
the paymaster upon whose books his account is borne."
But it does not in terms or by necessary implication limit
the amounts which may be deposited to savings earned during any single period of timP-.
The statute was evidently enacted in the interest of a
class of men whose improvidence and helplessness has long
been recognized and the consequences of which have been
guarded against by previous beneficent legislation.
It was intended to provide for this class a secure depositary, of which they might voluntarily avail themselves, but
subject always to the restrictions and ~onditions which the
tatute and the avy Regulations imposed.
I am of opinion then, that in the case stated by you the
payma ter of the . . S. San Francisco may receive from
the •l1i f boat wain' mate the sum of 000 as a deposit
und r th provi ion of the act referred to, provided the
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$900 represents the" savings" earned by the petty officer as
an enlisted man or petity officer in the United States Na,y.
Very respectfully.
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE N.A.VY.

DR.A.WBACKS-IMPORTED MATERIALS.
The exportation of alcohol with the intention of its reimportation, in
order to take advantage of the drawback privilege, is to be regarded
as colorable only, the alcohol is forfeitable, the persons engaged in
the transaction are punishable, and there is no right to drawback. If, however, the exportation was genuine, and with intent to dispose of
the alcohol abroad, so that upon its arrival there it is to be regarded
as absorbed in the general mass of foreign commodities, the subsequent importation of the goods in such cases is proper.
Imported articles of domestic origin are . to be regarded as " imported
materials" within the meaning of section 22 of the act of August 28,
1894, chapter 349, when their prior i~portation was not merely colorable.
DEPARTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of February 19, asking my opinion whether certain alcohol is entitled to a drawback under section 22 of the tariff
act of August 28, 1894, chapter 394, which provides" That where imported materials on which duties have been
paid are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured
or produced in the United States there shall be allowed on
the exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount
to the duties paid on the materials used, less one per centum
of such duties."
I assume, from the fact that this question is asked me,
that the case under consideration by you can be brought
within the first proviso to this section:
"That when the articles exported are made in part from
domestic materials the imported materials, or the parts of

502

HON. JUDSON HARMON.
D r 1t w b 1t c k s-1 m p o r t e cl M a t e ri 1t l s •

the articles made from such materials, shall so appear in the
completed articles that the quantity or measure thereof may
be ascertained."
You inform me that the alcohol was exported partly under
section 3329 and partly under section 3330 of the Revised
Statutes. In the former case it had paid internal taxes, but
had received a drawback upon exportation. In the latter
case it had paid no internal taxes. In either case certain
duties are paid upon reimportation, according to somewhat
awkward provisions of paragraph 387 and section 19 of the
tariff law, which it is not necessary for present purposes to
analyze.
Your question, in substance, is whether the alcohol is an
imported material within the meaning of section 22.
Before discussing this it is necessary to consider whether
the exportation was bona fide or merely colorable, w!th intent,
by reimportation, to evade some restriction or obtain some
advantage under our customs legislation. By section 3330
it is unlawful intentionally to reland, within the jurisdiction
of the United States, spirits which have been shipped for
exportation under the provisions above cited. This prohibition has very recently been construed by the circuit court of
appeals for the second circuit to prohibit the exportation of
spirits for the purpose of immediately reimporting the same
and thereby evading some provision of the law. (lflagler v.
Kidd, not yet reported.) This construction is in accordance
with previous opinions of this Department (17 Opin., 579;
18 Opin., 331; see also 21 Opin., 23). If, therefore, this alcohol was exported with the intention to reimport the same
for the purpose of taking advantage of the drawback privilege, the exportation is to be regarded as colorable only.
The alcohol is forfeitable and the persons engaged in the
tran_ action are punishable. In that case, of course, there is
no right to drawback.
If, however, the exportation was genuine and with intent
to di pose of the alcohol abroad, o that upon its arrival there
it i to be regarded a ab orbed in the general mass of fori
ommoditie , tbe opinions and decision cited are not
ppli abl . Th ubs quent importation of the good in
i · pr per.
beth r the provi ions of ection 22

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

503

Civil Service-Transfer of Cler.ks.

are applicable to such goods is not entirely clear. The proviso to that section contrasts "imported materials" with
"domestic materials," which would tend to exclude all
materials of domestic origin from the former of the two
classes. Moreover, section 9 of the same act contains a
series of provisions with a view to the exportation, free of
duties, of'' all articles manufactured in whole or in part of
imported materials or of materials subject to internal revenue tax." It may be argued with force that, as this section
expressly applies to materials subject to internal revenue
tax, it must have been the intent of Congress that all articles
made for export out of such materials must be made in
bonded warehouses according to its provisions. On the
other hand, it is difficult to understand why articles made of
imported materials should be given greater privileges than
those made of domestic materials; nor is it apparent why
any discrimination should be made among imported goods to
the disadvantage of those which are of American origin.
On the whole, it is my opinion that imported articles of
domestic origin are to be regarded as "imported materials,"
within the meaning· of section 22 of the act of 1894, when
their prior importation was not merely colorable within the
principle of Flager v. Kidd and the opinions above cited.
Very respectfully,
JUDSON HARMON.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
CIVIL SERVICE-TRANSFER OF CLERKS.
The Civil Service Commission is not authorized to transfer a naval
paymaster's clerk assigned to sea duty to a similar position in the
Navy Department, as paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty were
not classified by the President's order of May · 6, 1896, while such
clerks performing similar se1·vices in offices on shore were classified
by that order.
DEP.A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE,

February 27, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your

letter of the 25th instant, with inclosures, in which you
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the power
of the Civil Service Commission to authorize the transfer of
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--7
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Mason A. Posey, paymasters' clerk on the U.S. S. Marblehead, to a similar position in the Navy Department. It
appears that paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty were
not classified by the President's order of May 6, 1896, while
paymaster's clerks performing similar service in offices on
shore were classified by that order.
Rule IV, section 2, of the civil-service rules promulgated
by the President November 2, 1896, provides:
"No person shall be appointed to, or be employed in, any
position which has been, or may hereafter be, classified
under the civil-service act until he shall haye passed the
examination provided therefor, or unless he is especially
exempt from examination by the provisions of said act or
the rules made in pursuance thereof."
Rule X, section 5, provides:
''Transfer shall not be made from a position not classified
under the civil-service act to a classified position." * * *
The facts that paymasters' clerks on sea duty are not
classified, while paymasters' clerks on shore duty are classified; that it is desired to transfer Mr. Posey from the one
duty to the other, and not from the position he holds to
another involving a different character of employment, and
that if the transfer can not be made a hardship will be
imposed on such clerks assigned to sea duty, do not, in my
opinion, justify a different conclusion. The only way by
which such .transfer can be made is by the classification of
·paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty, or, if this is deemed
impracticable or inexpedient, by an amendment of the rules
so as to remove the hardship of such cases.
Respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
· Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE NA.VY.
AV AL OFFICER-ARREST.
As adequate power is possessed by the Secretary of the Navy to cause
th arr st of an of'fi · r for malappropriation of public funds, notwithstanding the f ct that he has b n arrested by the civil authorities
f~r tb ame off •nse and discharged on bail, it is improper to cause
lus arr t lly th • dvil office:i:s in ord r t his trial before a naval
c· 11rt-martial.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 9, 1897.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of March 8, in which you recite a telegram from the commandant of the naval station, Newport,
R. 1., to the effect that Paymaster John Corwine, U.S. N.,
had been arrested and discharged on bail; and you request
that "the United States attorney at Providence, R. I., be
instructed to take such steps as may be necessary to secure,
on behalf of this Department, the custody of Paymaster
Corwine, in order that he may be brought to trial before a
general court-martial for the offenses which be is alleged
to have committed."
And you request my opinion as to " the propriety of placing Paymaster Corwine in arrest and confinement at the
naval station, Newport, R. I., notwithstanding the fact that
he is under bond."
On the case presented by you it is clear that Mr. Corwine
is liable to indictment and prosecution in the courts of the
United States for malappropriation of the public funds in
his charge, and that he is liable to be proceeded against
before a general naval court-martial for violation of the
Naval Regulations.
But the methods of procedure in these two tribunals are
wholly distinct from the initiation of the prosecution to final
sentence, and the law does not contemplate or make provision for their being commingled at any stage.
The arrest of Mr. Corwine, at the instance of the United
States attorney, could be made only upon a warrant setting
forth the ground of complaint against him, issued by a civil
officer and executed by a United States marshal. Such an
arrest could be followed only by information, or indictment,
and the proceedings consequent thereon, in a United States
court.
Section 1624, Revised Statutes, prescribe8 the articles by
which the Wavy of the United States shall be governed.
Article 14 prescribes the punishment which may be imposed by a naval court-martial upon any person in the naval
service who willfully misappropriates money of the United
States.
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Article 8, section 20, authorizes punishment for the officer
violating the Naval Regulations; and
Articles 1040, 1041, and 1042 of the United States Naval
Regulations provide for the arrest and confinement, under
certain conditions, of officers charged with the commission
of offenses.
Full power is given to the Secretary of the Navy to cause
the arrest of any officer of the Navy charged with the commission of crime and have him brought before a naval courtmartial for trial.
It would then, in my opinion, be unnecessary, and indeed
improper, to cause the arrest of this naval officer by the
civil officers of the Government in order to his trial before a
naval court-martial while adequate power resides in the
Secretary of the Navy to arrest and confine him and bring
him before such court-martial for trial.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General is not permitted by statute to respond to a
request for an opinion by the head of a Department which does not
show what the facts are or that a case has presently arisen in the
administration of the Department.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 13, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of February 17, in which, after reciting
section 1223, Revised Statutes, and section 2 of the act of
Congress approved July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 205), you request
my opinion as to '' whether or not the provision quoted from
the latter act supersedes or modifies in any way the provision of ection 1223, Revi ed. Statutes, as to retired officers
of the rmy holding or accepting appointment in the
diplomatic or con ular rvice of the overnment."
It d e not app ar from y ur letter what the fact are or,
incl l th t , n
a all h presently ari en upon which
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my opinion is requested; but the inquiry submitted by you
appears to present but a moot case, to which I am not permitted by statute or precedent to respond.
Section 356, Revised Statutes, provides:
"The head of any executive department may require the
opinion of the Attorney-General on any question of law
arising in the administration of his Department."
"The Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an
important legal question when it is not practically presented
by an existing case before a Department." (9 Opin., 421;
10 Opin., 50; 13 Opin., 531; 19 Opin., 332.)
'' It must, I conceive, be _deemed settled that the AttorneyGeneral can only act upon a determinate statement of facts
furnished by the officer asking his opinion." (10 Opin., 267;
11 Opin., 189.)
_
Where an official opinion from.the head of this Department
is desired on questions of law arising on any case, the request
should be accompanied with a statement of the material
facts of the case, and also the precise questions on which
advice is wanted. (14 Opin., 367-368; 20 Opin., 220; 20
Opin., 383.)
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.ARY OF W .AR.

OFFICE-RETIRED OPFICER.

The Secretary of the Navy is not precluded by section 2 of the act of
July 31, 1894-, from employing one N., retired, under the act of February 19, 1897, to supervise the completion of certain tables of planets .
.An act of Congr~ss authorizing the expenditure of money for the
employment of a competent mathematician to supervise the completion of certain tables of planets, providing'.no permanency to the term,
no requirement that the person employed shall either take an official
oath or receive a commission, and no formalities in the selection of
such an employee, does not create an office.
The person to be employed may be designated either by order of the
Secretary of the Navy or the head of the bureau having charge of the
work to be done, which order need only designate the person selected
as a competent mathemati cian and the compensation he is to receive.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 23, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your
favor of March 13, 1897, asking for an opinion as to whether
you are prohibited by virtue of section 2 of the act of July
31, 1894, '' making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government," from employing Prof. Simon Newcomb, retired, under the provisions of
the act of February 19, 1897, ''making appropriations for the
legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year 1898," which provides:
"For services of a competent mathematician to supervise
the completion of the tables of the planets, two thousand five
hundr0d dollars, to be immediately available."
It is my opinion that you are not so precluded. The statute
authorizing the expenditure of the money clearly does not
create an office or contemplate any of the formalities in the
selection of such an employee as to distinguish his employment as an office. There is no permanency to the term, there
is no requirement that the person employed shall either take
an official oath or receive a commission.
Section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, has received construction twice at the hands of the Comptroller of the Treasury,
namely, in the cases of J;{,eynolds (reported in 2 Decisions of
theComptroller,271),and Fleming(Id.,467), where the authorities bearing upon the essential elements distinguishing an
office within the language of that statute from a mere employment are coll_a ted and dwelt upon. Certainly, the person to
be employed under the provisions of the a~t of February 19,
1897, is more remote from the essential characteristics of an
officer than were either of the employees mentioned by the
Comptroller.
In my opinion, the manner of designating the person to be
employed is immaterial, and may be either by an order of the
Secretary of the Navy or of the head of the bureau having
charge of the work to be done, which order need only designate the per on elected as a competent mathematician and
th ompen ation he j to receiv .
V ry r p ctfully,
JOSEPil MoKE
' ETA.RY OF TUE

.A.VY.
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General must not relate to a
mere moot question, but to one which requires immediate action, the
answer to which is necessary for the protection of the o~cer making
the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the action which be is
about to take.
The question whether or not to commence a civil action or criminal
prosecution must ordinarily be decided by some officer of the Department of Justice.
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give the head of another
Department a legal opinion upon such a question.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

llfarch 25, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of March 15, relating to proposed judicial proceedings in
relation to lands found to have been erroneously patented
under the Western Pacific Railroad grant in California.
The proceedings in contemplation are to be taken in conformity with the act of March 2, 1896, chapter 39.
You ask me whether any right of action remains in t~
United States, and, if so, upon what company demand should
be made for the value of the land.
fhe opinion of the Attorney-General may be asked by the
head of any other Executive Department "on any questions
of" law arising in the administration of his Department."
(Rev. Stat., 356.) The inquiry must relate, not to a mere
moot question, but to one which requires immediate action.
The answer must be necessary for the protection of the officer making the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the
action which be is about to take. The question whether or
not to commence a civil action or criminal prosecution is one
which must, ordinarily at least, be decided by some officer of
the Department of Justice. If any other Department of the
Government is informed of facts which seem to require such
action to be taken, its duty is to communicate them, together
with any suggestions which it desires to make, to the Department of Justice. The Attorney-General, therefore, is not
authorized to give a legal opinion under these circumstances,
but his duty is to consider the question (not always one of
pure law) whether it is advisable to commence litigation.
(See 20 Opin., 702, 714; 21 Opin., 6, ma, 369.)
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These reasons are sufficient to show that I am not permitted to give a legal opinion upon the first question asked
by you. I would suggest that you communicate to me fully
the facts as to each tract of land with relation to which no
claim of bona fide ownership under the act of 1896 is pending
and undecided. It will then be my duty to decide whether
proceedings shall be instituted, and, if so, against whom
demand should be made for the land.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENN.A..
The SECRETARY

OF

THE INTERIOR.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-RETIRED ARMY OFFICER.
The Attorney-General is not permitted to give an opinion as to the construction or interpretation of a statute except in an actual case which
has arisen before one of the Executive Departments calling for its
action in the regular course of its affairs.
The solution of the question whether an officer on the retired list of the
Army can accept a diplomatic or consular appointment and still hold
his position on the retired list with rank and pay is a matter of his
private concern only, and not a subject with which the United States
can be concerned until some action h as been taken by such officer.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 26, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 22d instant, in closing a copy of a letter
to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated February 9,
1897, Lexington Union Club, Lexington, Ky., from T. J. Olay,
first lieutenant, United States Army, retired, and a copy of
General Orders, No. 3, Headquarters of the Army, of January
11, 1895.
You acknowledge the receipt of my communication to you
of the 13th in tant, in reply to an inquiry submitted by you
to the ttorney-General '' as to the construction of a provision
of the act f July 31, 1894, re pectingthe eligibility of retired
ffi er of the Army to hold certain offices," as to which
inquiry I r pli d that it app ared to present but a moot case,
whi ·h I wa not permitted by statute or precedent to
r :p nd.
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You now renew your request for my opinion, and state that"A construction of the law of July 31, 1894, referred to, is
necessary to dispose of questions arising in the administration of the War Department;"
And conclude:
'' The question as to whether or not the prohibition
contained in section 1223, Revised Statutes, is set aside or
repealed by section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, is now
submitted to the Department by Lieutenant Clay, a retired
officer, a copy of whose letter is inclosed."
I have to regret that a sense of official duty, enlightened
by an unbroken line of decisions of my predecessors in office,
founded upon a course of reasoning which I am unable to
resist, but to which I heartily assent, forbids my compliance
with your request.
My duty is clearly defined in section 356, Revised Statutes,
which provides:
"The head of any executive department may request the
opinion of the Attorney-General on any questions of law
arising in the administration of his department,"
And section 357, which provides:
'' Whenever a question of law arises in the administration
of the Department of War, or the Department of the Navy,
the cognizance of which is not given by statute to some other
officer from whom the head of the Department may require
advice, it shall be sent to the Attorney-General," etc.
These sections have time and again received the construction of my predecessors, by which I am now guided.
They do not permit the Attorney-General to give an
opinion as to the construction or interpretation of a statute
except in an actual case which has arisen and is before one
of the Executive Departments calling for its action in the
regular course of ~dministration of its affairs.
Attorney-General Black in 1857, when a like request was
made to him by one of your predecessors, said (9 Opin., 82):
"It has always been the rule of this office to give advice
only in actual cases where the special facts are set forth by
the Department. It is impossible to reply to mere specula.
tive points or supposed cases. The Attorney-General is not
required to write abstract essays on any subject.
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"If there be a claim pending before you on which you
desire to have my advice, and you will be 12leased t o say how
it arises, what are the facts, and wh erein the law seems
doubtful, I shall with great pleasure give you my opinion." ·
In 1891 Attorney-General Miller said (20 Opin., 250):
'' My predecessors have frequently held that the opinion
of the Attorney-General can not be given upon a general
subject, but only on one or more specific questions of law
based on a case stated."
It may be, and doubtless is, a subject of reasonable interest, and perhaps of great anxiety, to officers of the United
States Army on the retired list to ascertain "if an officer on
the retired list of the Army can accept a diplomatic or consular appointment and still hold his position on the retired list
with rank and pay."
But, manifestly, the solution of that question by any
retired officer of the Army, and the course of conduct which
he may adopt in pursuance of such solution, is a matter of
his private concern only, and not a subject with which the
United States can be concerned until some action has been
taken by such officer.
I am unable to perceive how the mere abstract question
can arise in the administration of the War Department; aud
the opinion of the Attorney-General, if given in response to
your inquiry, would be given when no case had actually
arisen and when no case might ever arise.
If Lieutenant Clay, or any other retired officer, should be
called upon to determine such question in his own case, the
obvious course for him to pursue is that which is open to
every person inclined to pursue a course as to the legal consequences of which he is in ignorance or doubt. H e should seek
the advice of private counsel, learned in the law, and obtain
their opinion, for which, if given without due care, such counel can be held to a personal accountability.
The whole matter, as it seems to me, is one strictly of private concern and in no sense of public interest.
ery r e pectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
S olicitor-General.
ppr
d.
JOSEPH McKE
A.
RET

W AR.
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COLLISIONS AT SEA-NAVIGATION LAWS.
The amendments to section 4233 of the Revised Statutes are special ·
rules duly made by local anthority according to the provisions of article 30 of the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 802.
Those portions of the act of 1890 which do not,,, interfere" with the operation of special rules duly made by local authority according to the
provisions of article 30, as construed by the act of February 19, 1895,
chapter 102, are rules for the guidance of American vessels, not only on
the high seas, but also on "all waters connected therewith navigable
by seagoing vessels."
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 31, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communications of March 29 and March 30, asking my opinion with relation to the rules of navigation.
The internationa\ regulations for preventing collisions at
sea, prescribed by the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 802,
will go into effect by Executive proclamation on July 1, 189i.
These regulations, by tbe terms of the statute, '' shall be followed by all public and private vessels of the United States
upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith
navigable by seagoing vessels." Article 30, however, reads:
"Nothing in these rules shall interfere with the operation of
a special rule duly made by local authority relative to the
navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters." All laws
inconsistent with the act of 1890 are repealed by sectfon 2.
Acting probably upon suggestions of Attorney-General
Olney (21 Opin., 106), Congress passed the act of February
19, 1895, chapter 102, which provided, among other things,
that the provisions of section 4233 of the Revised Statutes
"are hereby declared special rules duly made by local
authority" within article 30 aforesaid. By the act of March
3, 1897, chapter 389, entitled "An act to amend the laws
relating to navigation," Congress has in sections 12 and 13
amended section 4233.
You first ask whether the amendments to section 4233 are
special rules duly made by local authority according to the
provisions of article 30 of the act of 1890. This question I
answer in the affirmative. You further ask whether those
portions of the act of 1890, which do not "interfere" with
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the operation of special rules duly made by local authority,
according to the provisions of article 30, as construed by the
act of 1895, are rules for the guidance of American vessels,
not only on the high .seas, but also on '' all waters connected
therewith navigable by seagoing vessels," instancing the
provisions of article 31 of the act of 1890. This question I
also answer in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
J"OSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

BUREAU OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS-PENALTY ENVELOPES.
The monthly bulletin published by the Bureau of American Republics,
although it contains advertisements of private firms or corporations,
is entitled to transmission though the mails free of postage under the
act of February 20, 1897.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 8, 1897.

Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 2d instant, with the accompanying "correspondence" in reference to the use of the penalty envelope
by the Bureau of American Republics for inclosing circulars
soliciting advertisements to be inserted in the Bulletin issued
by that Bureau and the mailing of the Bulletin containing
private advertisements.
You ask me to advise you "if it (the_Bulletin) should be
transmitted in the mails when it contains advertisements of
private firms or corporations, free of postage, under cover of
the penalty envelope."
Secretary Olney in his communication of December 11,
1896, addressed to your predecesRor, said :
"The Commercial Bureau of American Republics is the
agent or repre entat,i ve of an association called 'The International Union of American Republics for the Prompt Colle tion and Di tribution of Commercial Information.' The
nit d tat i a member of this international union-a
union n t ff cted by treaty, but by informal agreement
n ti n d by th 1 gi lative nd executive branches of the
nt.
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"Under the agreement the United States advances annually the amount of money necessary for the maintenallce of
the commercial bureau, which, by agreement is placed under
the supervision of the Secretary of State of the United
States, and by act of Congress (28 Stat., 419) is put under
his direction and control."
The act referred to provides:
''The Bureau of American Republics shall be placed under
the control and direction of the Secretary of State, who shall
report to Congress at its next regular session the propriety
of continuing said Bureau, or, if any obligation exists upon
the part of the United States requiring the continuance
thereof."
By act of February 26, 1896, it was provided:
"That any moneys received from sale of the Bureau publications, from rents, or other sources, shall be paid into the
Treasury as a credit in addition to the appropriation, and
may be drawn therefrom upon requisition of the Secretary
of State for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the
Bureau."
It appears, then, that the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau
of American Republics is a publication authorized by the
Government of the United States as a feature of the Bureau
of American Republics, which is "under the control and
direction of the Secretary of State; " that the expense of
this publication is primarily borne by the United States
alone; that the reimbursement of such expenses depends
on the voluntary contributions from the other members of
the International Union of American Republics, "from the
sales of the Bureau publications, from rents, or other sources."
By act of March 3, 1877, section 5 (19 Stat., 335), it was
provided,, That it shall be lawful to transmit through the mail, free
of postage, any letters, packages, or other matters, relating
exclusively to the business of the Government of the United
States.''
The appropriation act for the diplomatic and consular
service, approved February 20, 1897, provides:
'' Commercial Bureau of American Republics, $28,000.
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"Provided, That any money received from sale of the
Bureau publications, from rents, or other sources, shall be
paid into the Treasury as a credit in addition to the appropriation, and may be drawn therefrom upon requisitions of
the Secretary of State for the purpose of meeting the
expenses of the Bureau.
"Provided, That the provisions of the fifth and sixth sections of the act entitled 'An act establishing post routes and
for other purposes,' approved March 3, 1877, for the transmission of official mail matter, be, and they are hereby extended and made applicable to all official mail matter of the
Bureau of the American Republics established in Washington, by recommendation of the International American Conference representing the International Union of American
Republics."
It can hardly be doubted that among the "official mail
matter" referred to in the act must be embraced the
Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American Republics.
This was the official organ, by means of which whatever
beneficial results the Bureau produced were distributed
among the members of the International Union. This was
its sole organ of utterance. Without it, its labors would
be as unprofitable as a watch without hands.
It appears from the" correspondence" which accompanies
your letter that at the time of and long prior to the passage
of the act approved February 20, 1897, this Monthly Bulletin
contained advertisements of persons and corporations trading
and doing business on private account; that these advertisements were solicited by the Director of the Bureau of
American Republics, and were paid for by the persons for
whom they were published.
It is not unreasonable to impute to Cougress a reasonable
degree of knowledge of the subject-matter upon which it was
legi lating. In extending the provisions of sections 5 and u
of the act approved March 3, 1877, and making them applicable to all official matter of the Bureau of American Republic , it may be a sumed that the mind of Congre s was
clir cted to the Monthly Bullletin a it then appeared. It
wa.· the uly publi ation of the Bureau of American Republi · ·, publi h d, a. eh ve e n, at the expen e of the United
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States, by a Bureau which was subject to the direction.and
control of the Secretary of State, the proceeds of the sale of
which were to be paid into the Treasury of the United States,
· to be drawn therefrom only upon requ1sitions of tbe Secretary of State. It was recognized as "matter relating exclusively to the business of the Government of the United
States" and for that reason was authorized to be transmitted
through the mail free of postage, just as it was, covers, adver·
tisemen·t s, contents, and all.
As an original question, it can hardly be doubted that the
United States should not enter into competition with the
private publications of the country for the advertisements of
private enterprises; and as the Bureau of American Republics has been placed .by Congress under the control and
dire'ction of the Secretary of State, it is entirely competent
for the Secretary of State to prohibit the publication, in the
Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of .American Republics, of
such advertisements.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the fact that this Monthly
Bulletin contains advertisements of private firms or corporations does not deprive the Bureau of American Republics of
the privilege extended to it by the act approved February
20, 1897, of free postage for its official matter.
The'' correspondence" accompanying your communication
is herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
.Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The P0STMAS'l'ER-GENERAL.
CHINESE.
The number of Chinese to be admitted to this country as participants
in the Tennessee Centennial Exposition may be limited by the Secretary of the Treasury.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 19, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the .17th instant, inclosing a telegram of
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April 13, 1897, from A. M. Connor, collector, and an opinion ·
given to you by the Solicitor of the Treasury. You state
that" In view of statements which have been made to the
Department of the probable arrival at Seattle, Wash., of 150
Chinese persons, and at San Francisco of from 200 to 300
Chinese persons, claiming to be participants in the Tennessee Centennial Exposition, and of the information contained in the telegrams hereinbefore referred to from the
director-general of the said exposition"And you request an opinion from me"As to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to
limit the number of Chinese to be admitted to this country
as participants in the exposition mentioned,"
1 have examined the joint resolution of May 18, 1896, and
the inclosures submitted by you, and, upon full consideration
of the whole matter, I beg to say that I concur in the conclusion reached by the Solicitor of the Treasury that the Secretary of the Treasury has complete authority to limit the
number of Chinese to be admitted to this country as participants in the exposition to be held at Nash ville, Tenn.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF 'fHE TREASURY.

DAMS ACROSS THE RIO GRANDE.
The Secretary of the Interior had no power, under the act of March 3,
1891, providing for the location and selection of reservoir sites on the
public lands of the United States and rights of way for irrigating
ditches and canals, to grant a right to construct dams across the Rio
Grande for the purpoRe of ch ecking the flow of water and distributing it for irrigation purpo. es.
Tb ·ontrol and sup r vision of th navigable waters of the United
tat 'B is vest cl in the
r tary of \.Var.
Th r medy of the nit d tates in case of the erection of a dam across
na.vig. bl wat rs i hy injunction, nnder e tion 10 of the act of ept mh ·r 10 1 , nd if the clam ha b en onstru ted, also by criminal
pr . ·ution.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 24, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of April 8 referring to a previous correspondence
between the Mexican Minister at this capital and the Department of State with reference to the attempted construct.ion by the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company of
dams across the Rio Grande River and to a request made by
you February- for an opinion from this Department on the
question submitted, and you" renew the request for an opinion on the question presented and invite attention to the
pressing need of early action by your Department."
I regret that compliance with your request for an opinion
has been delayed by the resignation of officers of this Department since the request was received.
Your letter of February - was as follows:
"Under what purports to be authority for it to do so,
granted in 1895 by the Secretary of the Interior under sections 18 to 21, pages 1101 and 1102, volume 26, Statutes at
Large, The Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company claims
the right to construct a dam across the Rio Grande River at
Elephant Butte, in New Mexico, 125 miles above El Paso, and
are about to do it.
'' The Secretary of State has requested the Secretary of
War to 'adopt such measures as are most effective to open
the river and to keep it open to such navigation as it is naturally capable of affording for commercial traffic between
the States or between any portion of the United States and
Mexico.'
"Permission to construct the dam has not been given by
the Secretary of War, nor has he approved or authorized
the same. The mouth of the Concho River (which empties
into the Rio Grande) is 325 miles below the site of the pro.
posed dam, and this river is the first material addition to
the Rio Grande's volume of water below that point. From
the mouth of the Concho up to El Paso, a distance of 200
miles, the Rio Grande has been demonstrated to be a navigable water, and used as such in interstate commerce, and
it has been recognized by Congress to be a navigable water
10892-VOL 21~PT 3--8
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at El Paso. Above El Paso it does not appear to be used
now for the purpose of navigation. But from El Paso to
and including the site of the proposed dam, and a good many
miles beyond that point, it has been used to float logs for
commercial and business purposes, and in this part of the
river i.t carries a slightly greater quantity of water than it
does at El Paso and for 200 miles below El Paso, the volume
of water being decreased on this part of the river by evaporation and agricultural uses. And also in this part of the
river above El Paso, and including the site of the proposed
dam, the conformation of the bed and banks of the river is
such -as to make navigation, by reason of the deepe~ and
more confined channel, more feasible than at El Paso.
".The proposed dam is to be such a one as will check the
flow of water in the river at Elephant Butte entirely for a
great portion, if not all, of the year, and impound it, and also
distribute it from that point for purposes of irrigation, so
that the Rio Grande will be practically destroyed as a stream
for many miles below Elephant Butte, and its volume of
water so diminished as to materially affect its navigability
throughout its entire course to the Gulf of Mexico.
"Your opinion is, therefore, req nested as to whether,
under the existing state of the law, there is any way for the
United States authorities to prevent the construction of
the said dam, and if so, what the remedy is."
As I understand, the only authority which the Secretary
of the Interior possessed is claimed to have been conferred
by sections 18 to 21 of the act of March 3, 1891, entitled " An
act to repeal timber culture laws and for other purposes."
The sections referred to-and section 17-provide only for
the location and selection of reservoir sites on the public
lands of the Unjted States and rights of way for irrigating
ditches and canals. There is nothing in the act or its purpo es which was intended to affect the control or supervision
of the navigable rivers of the country. That, by other and
ind ed later legislation, is put in the Secretary of War.
ction 10 of the river and harbor act approved September 1 , 1 90 (26 tat., 454), i as follows:
'That the er a ion of any ob truction not affirmatively
authoriz d by law to th navigable capacity of any waters
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in respect to which the United States has jurisdiction is
is hereby prohibited. The continuance of any such obstruction, except bridges, piers, docks, and wharves, and similar
structures erected for business purposes, whether heretofore
or hereafter created, shall constitute an offense, and each
week's continuance of any such obstruction shall be deemed
a separate offense. Every person and every corporation
which shall be guilty of creating or continuing any such
unlawful obstruction in this act mentioned, or who shall violate the provisions of the last four preceding sections of this
act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) not exceeding one year, or by both such punishments, in the discretion of the court. The creating or
continuing of any unlawful obstruction in this act mentioned may be prevented and such obstruction may be
caused to be removed by the injunction of any circuit court
exercising jurisdiction i~ any district in which such obstruction may be threatened or may exist; and proper proceedings in equity to . this end may be instituted under the
direction of the Attorney-General oi the United States."
Section 7 of that approved July 13, 1892, is as follows:
"That section seven of the river and harbor act of September nineteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, be amended
and reenacted so as to read as follows:
''' SEC. 7. That it shall not be lawful to build any wharf,
pier, dolphin, boom, dam, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty,
or structure of any kind outside established lines, or in any
navigable waters of the United States where no harbor lines
are or may be established, without the permission of the Secretary of War, in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river, or other waters of the United States, in such
manner as shall obstruct or impair navigation, commerce,
or anchorage of said waters; and it shall not be lawful hereafter to commence the construction of any bridge, bridge draw,
bridge piers and abutments, causeway, or other works over or
in any port, road, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river,
or navigable waters of the United States, under any act of the
legislative assembly of a11y State, until the location and plap.

522

HON. JOSEPH MCKENNA.
D a n1 s A c r o s s t lt e R i o G r a n d e •

of such bridge or other works have been submitted to and
approved by the Secretary of War or to excavate or fill, or
in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of any port, roadstead, haven , harbor,
harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United
States, unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of
Vvar:
"'Provided, That . this section shall not apply to any
bridge, bridge draw, bridge piers and abutments the construction of which has been heretofore duly authorized by
law, or be so construed as to authorize the construction of any
bridge, drawbridge, bridge piers and abutments, or other
works under an act of the legislature of any State · over or
in a.ny stream, port, roadstead, haven, or l1arbor, or other
navigable water not wholly within the limits of such State.'"
These provisions are very definifa~, and the answer to your
inquiry is obvious if the stream be a navigable one. This
you assert, and I assume it.
You say:
"The proposed dam is to be such a one as will check the
flow of water in the river at Elephant Butte entirely for a
great portion, if not all, of the year and empound. it; and also
distribute it from that point for purposes of irrigation, so
that the Rio Grande will be practically destroyed as a stream
for many miles below Elephant Butte, and its volume of
water so diminished as to materially affect its navigability
tllroughout its entire course to the Gulf of Mexico."
The purposes of the company do not seem to be ambiguous. In its prospectus (and, by the way, it is a foreign company, chartered by England) it proclaims its purposes to be" 1. To create the largest artificial lake in the world.
"2. To obtain control of the entire fl.ow of the Rio Grande
in southern New Mexico, the only practical means of irrigating what i now considered the finest fruit and vine country
in the nited State , and, by controlling the water, to control to a great extent the irrigable lands.
"3. To compel the owners of irrigable lands in the valley
f th
i
rande to convey one-half of their lands to the
mp ny iu r turn fi r water right to the other ha,lf, and to
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pay in addition a perpetual water rent of one dollar and
:fifty cents per acre for every acre irrigated, or else to purchase water rights, at the ruling rate, from the company.
~, 4. To supply water to cities and towns for domestic and
municipal purposes, and for milling and mechanical power,
for which (they say) there is a large and constantly increasing demand."
The answer to your inquiry therefore is(1) That the Secretary of the Interior had no power,
under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891 (supra), to
grant the rights claimed.
(2) That the remedy of the United States is by injunction
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890 (supra);
and if the dam has been constructed, also by criminal
prosecution.
Upon being advised that the obstruction has been or is
about to be erected, I shall at once order proper proceedings
to be instituted by the United States district attorney
under section 10 of the act approved September 19, 1890.
(26 Stat., 454.)
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG.
The claim of Samuel C. Reid, junior, against the Unitec:i. States, growing
out of the destruction of the brig Geneml Arrnstrong, fully considered
ancl the conclusion expressed in the opinion of April 9, 1895 (21 Opin.,
154 ), that said Reid was not entitled to the amount demanded. Held
to be erroneous.
Under the act of March 2, 1895, the unexpended balance of the appropriation made to satisfy the claims growing out of the destruction of the
brig General Armstrong should be used to reimburse S. C. Reid, junior,
to the extent that the vouchers on file in the State Department show
that he has made expenditures or disbursements on this account.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 28, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of_ the 17th instant, in response to my letter
of the 7th, in which I expressed my willingness, for reasons
stated therein, to review · the opinion given by me April 9,
1895, as to the authority of the Secretary of State "to apply
any part of the unexpended b.alance to the payment of the
expenses and charges or to the reimbursement of Mr. Samuel
0. Reid, junior, or anyone else who may have paid them," etc.
The reports of the Committees on the Judiciary of the
Senate and House, respectively, on a bill introduced in the
Fifty-fourth Congress for the relief of Samuel C. Reid, junior,
induced me to make a thorough examination of all the papers
on file in this Department, as well as of the report of the
.Court of Claims to the Thirty-fifth Congress, relating to this
matter, and in the light of these to reexamine the grounds
upon which the conclusions expressed in the opinion of April
9, 1895, to the Secretary of State rested, the result of which
was a decided conviction that the conclusions there expressed
were not responsive to the case submitted by the Secretary.
of State and did injustice to the rights of the parties concerned.
In that opinion I stated:
"It appears, however, that Samuel C. Reid, junfor, now
insists that the unexpended balance shall be applied t~
reimbursing him the amounts which have been paid to bis
assignees on the ground that such amounts were so expended
by him in the expenses necessarily incurred in securing the
appropriation.
"But the objection to this is obvious and twofold.
"First. The as ignment of 12th of September, 1835, from
the owners of the vessel to Captain Reid is subject to the
xpre s condition that he shall ''bear all the expenses and
charges and perform all necessary services for the collection
of the demand hereafter mentioned.
" e ond. That the act of Congre s approved, March 2,
1 5 un er , hich alone the ecretary of State has authority
t di.1 ur
h un xp nded balance, expre sly provides tbat
• h 111
ppli d £ r th liquidati n and ettlemeut of tlle
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claims of Samuel 0. Reid according to the vouchers now on
file in said Department.'"
The view there expressed fails to recognize and to discriminate between two distinct and wholly dissimilar claims, growing out of the destruction of the brig General Armstrong,
which have been asserted and prosecuted since ;1815.
One was the claim prosecuted by Capt. Samuel C. Reid as
the assignee and the attorney in fact for the owners and the
officers and crew of the brig_General Armstrong against the
Kingdom of Portugal.
The other was the claim prosecuted by Samuel C. Reid,
junior, on behalf of the owners and the officers and crew of
said brig against the United States.
The assignment of September 12, 1835, referred to in said
opinion _related altogether to the claim which Captain Reid
was prosecuting against the Kingdom of Portugal.
The act of Congress approved March 2, 1895, directing
that the unexpended balance "shall be applied to the liquidation and settlement of the claims of Samuel C. Reid
according to the vouchers now on file in said Department,"
relates altogether to the claim which Samuel C. Reid, junior,
had prosecuted agaiust the United States.
A brief and succinct review of the principal features of
the history of this matter as disclosed in the public records
and in the files of this Department will serve to clearly
demonstrate the difference between the two claims and to
show that their confusion has resulted from a partial examination of the records and files, and has led to the error
which should be repaired.
THE CLAIM AG.A.INST PORTUGAL.

The brig General Armstrong was destroyed by English menof-war in the harbor of Fayal, within the dominions of the
King of Portugal, with whom the United States were at
peace; and a claim was believed to have accrued to the
owners of the property destroyed against the Kingdom of
Portugal.
From 1814 to 1840 the claims of the owners and of the officers and crew of the brig were prosecuted against Portugal
through Captain Reid, as their attorney in fact and on hi~
own account.
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In 1835 the owners of the vessel assigned to Captain Reid
all their right, title, and interest in the vessel and in the
claim in consideration of his prosecuting the claim against
Portugal at his own expense and charges.
In 1837 Mr. Kavanagh, our charge at Lisbon, under
instructions from this Government, demanded from Portugal satisfaction for said injury. From 1837 to 1844 it was a
subject of correspondence between the two Governments.
In April, 1850, on demand being again made by the United
States, Portugal offered to refer . the matter to arbitration,
and in July, 1850, renewed the proposition to that effect.
Under a treaty•of 26th of February, 1851, between the two
Governments, the matter was referred to the arbitramen,
and award of Louis Napoleon, who, on 11th of December,
1852, publiBhed his award in favor of Portugal and against
the United States.
This :finally determined the claim which Capt. Samuel C.
Reid was prosecuting, and with it fell all the assignments,
powers of attorney, contracts, and conditions growing out
of it.
THE CL.A.IM .A.GA.INST THE UNITED ST.A.TES.

In January, 1854, the memorial of Samuel C. Reid, junior,
"in behalf of the claimants in the case of the brig General
Armstrong, praying indemnity," was presented to Congress
and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate. It asked that $131,600 be appropriated for the
indemnity of the claimants.
This claim appears to have been referred by a resolution
of the House of Representatives to the Court of Claims
(Reports of Court of Claims, 1st sess. 35th Cong.).
In February, 1858, the Court of Claims reported adversely
to the claimant .
In 1859 a bill for the relief of the claimants passed the
enate, but was lost in the ITouse for want of a quorum.
Here the matter appears to have been suspended for nearly
t, nty years, when . . Reid, junior, renewed his efforts
£r
ongr , which r sulted in the pas age of the act of
2 t t., 697), by which the Secretary of State
1 Y ,1
.r.J

(
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was authorized and directed "to examine and adjust the
claims of the captain, owners, officers, and crew of the late
private armed brig General Armstrong, growing out of the
destruction of said brig by a British force in the neutral port
of Fayal in September, 1814, upon the evidence established
before the Court of Claims, and to settle the same upon principles of justice and equity, etc."
On June 15, 1883,. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of' State,
in a lett~r to Attorney-General Brewster, recited the act of
Congress of May 1, 1882, the assignment of September 12, 1835,
by the owners of the vessel to Samuel C. Reid, his heirs and
assigns, the assignment of 31st of October, 1851, by Samuel
C. Reid to Samuel C. Reid, junior; and he showed that, under
the authority vested in him by the act of Congress, he had
ascertained the losses and apportioned the fund among the
owners and officers and crew of the vessel. He decided that
the assignment of the owners to Reid, senior, was, in effect,
a power of attorney to collect the total sum upon a contingent fee of 50 per cent of the amount collected, he to pay all
expenses, the balance to be paid over to the owners, their
heirs or representatives, and that Samuel C. Reid, junior,
stood in the shoes of his father in relation to this fund. He
further decided that S. C. Reid, junior, under the assignments from his father, was entitled to receive, as attorney
for the owners, one-half the amount awarded, and also the
value of his father's share, less the 50 per cent received by
him as attorney. He states -that Mr. S. C. Reid, junior,
claims "to be indemnified for the time, labor, and disbursements made as said attorney, agent, and assignee for the
benefit of the claimants in the case," and he submitted to
the Attorney-General, for his opinion, the question whether
S. C. Reid, junior, was entitled to be so indemnified and
reimbursed.
On July 7, 1883, Mr. Brewster, Attorney-General, gave his
opinion, in which he denied the right of S. C. Reid, junior,
but said: "The utmost that Reid, junior, can claim as to
them is to be compensated out of their part of the fund on
the principle that no man shall enrich himself at the co;t of
another-the principle on which courts of equity proceed in
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charging a fund in which a number are interested, with a
reasonable allowance to the counsel, for the energetic few
who have produced the fund." (17 Opins., 590.)
On July 31, 1883, Mr. Brewster, on reconsideration, held
that Captain Reid had no assignab]e interest in the fund,
and that S. C. Reid, junior's, claim for reimbursement was
covered by his former opinion.
On June 6, 1887, Mr. Bayard, Secretar:y of State, requested
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the claim of S. C.
Reid, junior, to be reimbursed the amount of the expenses
incurred by him in the prosecution of this claim.
Attorney-General Garland, in an opinion of June 9, 1887
(19 Opins., 32), held that this claim of Mr. Reid's "could
not, for obvious reasons, be seriously entertained, much less
adopted," but added, "if any good ground exists for reopening Mr. Frelinghuysen's adjudication of this question-and
I express no opinion upon this subject--a claim by Mr. Reid,
junior, for pro rata payment out of the bala.nce in your
hands, or any increase in the allowance to him, might be
considered."
It is apparent that Mr. Frelinghuysen, in ascertaining the
losses and in making distribution of the amount appropriated by Congress, did not advert to the fact that the claim
for which Congress by that act made provision was not the
claim which Capt. S. C. Reid had prosecuted under the
assignments and contracts with the owners and officers and
crew .of the vessel. It was doubtless to this that AttorneyGeneral Garland referred in declining to express any opinion
as to whether good ground existed for reopening Mr. Frelinghuysen's adjudication.
It was after these persistent and oft-repeated demands by
S. C. Reid, junior, for reimbursement of the amount expended
by him in the prosecution of the claim against the United
States, which had resulted after thirty years of labor in the
appropriation by qongress in the act of May 1, 1882, after
many opinion, by Attorneys-General in response to inquiries
fr m ecretarie of State, that Congress finally, on March
2 1 95, provided, That th unexp nded balance of the appropriation made
Y h a t f th 1 ·t of a , 1 82, * * • now under the
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control of the Department of State, shall be applied for the
liquidation and settlement of the claim of Samuel C. Reid,
according to the vouchers now on file in said Department."
"The claim of Samuel C. Reid" was the claim which, since
1883, he had with undaunted pertinacity been urging upon
the Secretary of State, to wit, his reimbursement for the
amounts expended by him in procuring the appropriation for
the benefit of the owners, the officers, and crew of the lost
vessel.
"The vouchers now on file in said Department" were the
receipts which evidenced the amounts expended by S. C.
Reid, junior, in obtaining such appropriation.
It is impossible, in the light afforded by the records and
papers on file, to conceive that any other claim was referred
to or provided for by the act of March 2, 1895. It was not the
claim against Portugal that had been disposed of by the final
award of Louis Napoleon; it was not the ~laim against the
United States that had been provided for by the act of May
1, 1882. The only claim remaining was the claim recited by
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Mr. Brewster, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gresham,
and Mr. Garland; that was the claim for reimbursement.
On April 3, 1895, Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in a
letter to the Attorney-General, reciting the act of Congress
of March 2, 1895, and referring to the ruling of Mr. Frelinghuysen, inclosed copies of c9rrespondence between Mr. Reid,
junior, and the State Department, and also copies of assignments by Mr. Reid and of receipts from the assignees to
the State Department, and asked: '' What amount, if any, I
am required by the above-quoted extract from the act of
March 2, 1895, to pay Mr. Reid out of the balance above
referred to."
On April 9, 1895, an opinion was given by me, in response
to this request, in which the history of this matter is to some
extent reviewed, but in which the claim of S. C. Reid, junior,
is treated throughout as but a continuation of the claim
originally prosecuted by his father, Capt. S. C. Reid, and the
conclusions reached in that opinion were in accordance with
the conclusions stated in the opinions of former AttorneysGeneral prior to the act of March 2, 1895, that S. C. Reid
'
junior, was not entitled to the amount demanded.
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I am satisfied that the conclusion then stated by me was
erroneous, in failing to discern what was the real claim
asserted by S. C. Reid, junior. This was not the fault of the
letter in which the request of the Secretary of State was conveyed. It was the result, perhaps, of giving too partial attention to the case as stated in the former opinions.
I am of the opinion that the act of March 2, 1895, was an
absolute appropriation of so much of "the unexpended bal. ance in tbe hands of the Secretary of State" as might be
required toreimburseS.C.Reid,junior, the amounts expended
by him as far as such amounts were evidenced and could be
ascertained from the vouchers on file in the State Department; and by such vouchers were meant the assignments
and receipts, copies of which were exhibited in the letter of
April 3, 1895, from Secretary Gresham. ·
The effect of the act of March 2, 1895, was to put an end to
all questions as to the moral or legal rights of S. C. Reid,
junior, to be reimbursed out of this fund. Congress, in the
exercise of its unquestioned power, bas by this act disposed
of all such questions by directing that the fund shall be paid
over to S. C. Reid, junior, to the extent that the vouchers on
file in the State Department show be has made expenditures
or disbursements on this account.
I am of opinion that the course of the Secretary of State
is plain, and that the fund should be by him applied to the
reimbursement of Mr. Reid as herein indicated.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRE'l'..A.RY OF ST.A.TE.

OMPTROLLER OF 1'HE TREASURY-ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
If a claim for pay is presented to the Treasury Department, the question
of th 1 ality of it. paym nt i s one ex ·lusively for the Comptroller,
who e ded ion thereon i final as to all executive officers.
n questi n of di bur ments of money and payment of claims which
bav(' b n r 1 gat cl b y law to the 'omptroll r, the Attorney-General
110111<1 not r nd r opinions.
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

JJfay 6, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt oi -your
communication of May 4, requesting an opinion whethe:r or
not Samuel G. Fairchild is entitled to receive, in addition to
the salary be bas received as local inspector of hulls, pay as
special inspector of foreign steam vessels, notwithstanding
bis waiver of claim therefor by accepting the additional
appointment which, on its face, contained the statement
"without additional compensation."
It seems to me that the question .Presented by your communication and the inclosed correspondence is not a proper
one for an opinion.
First, the correspondence is quite ambiguous as to whether
a claim is or is not presented. If no claim is presented, then
no matter is pending in your Department as to which your
action is called for. If a claim is presented the question of the legality of payment is one exclusively for the Comptroller, whose decision
thereon is, by statute, made final as to all executive officers.
It has been repeatedly held by Attorneys-General that on
questions of disbursement of money or payment of claims,
so by law relegated to the Comptroller, the Attorney-General should not render opinions, especially in view of the
fact that, if the matter is doubtful, it can be referred to the
Court of Claims for authoritative decision. (Opinion of May
22, 1895, 21 Opin., 178; opinion of June 8, 1895, 21 Opin., 188.)
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
If a canal is one of the works provided for in section 7 of the act of

July 13, 1892, making it unlawful, without the authority and permission of the Secretary of War, for anyone to build or construct any of
the works therein mentioned in or over any of the navigabl~ waters
of_ the United States that would obstruct or impair the navigation of
said waters, the Secretary of War has the authority to authorize and
permit its construction.
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DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTIOE,

May 11, 1897.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of April 24, in which you state that,, Application is made to the War Department by a private
company known as the Port Arthur Channel and Dock Company to excavate a ship canal or channel from Sabine Pass
to Port Arthur, in the State of Texas, a distance of about
8 miles. Sabine Pass has been improved at the expense of
the Government to · the extent of about $3,000,000, and a
very fine harbor, with 25 feet of water between the Jetties,
has thus been created. This harbor is made up by the distance between the jetties and a channel of perhaps six or
seven miles long, upon the west bank of which is situated
the town of Sabine Pass. The Port Arthur Company, however, controlling the Kansas City, Pittsburg and Gulf Railway, extending from Kansas City, Mo., to the town of Port
Arthur, desires to construct a canal from Sabine Pass below
the town across a neck of land on the southwesterly side of
Sabine Lake for a distance, and thence along the shore of
the lake, and in that way up to or near the town of Port
Arthur."
You request that I will, at the earliest possible date, give
you my "opinion as to whether the Secretary of War bas
authority to permit the construction of this canal-of course
under the direction of the Engineer of the Department."
In complying with your request I will confine myself to an
expression of opinion as to your legal power only. I express
no opinion as to the expediency of its exercise in the case
submitted, or as to its present or future consequenc.es, or, in
view of them, how it should be guarded.
Your authority to permit the construction of the proposed
work is asserted under section 7 of the act of July 13, 1892
(27 Stats., 88), which is as follows:
" EC. 7. That it shall not be lawful to build any wharf,
pier, dolphin, boom, dam, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty,
or true ure of any kind out ide established harbor lines or
. ny navigable
.
'
m
water of the nited States where no baror line are or may be e tabli hed, without the permission
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of the Secretary of War, in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river, or other waters of the United States, in
such manner as shall obstruct or impair navigation, commerce, or anchorage of said waters. * * *
"And it shall not be lawful hereafter to commence the
construction of any bridge, bridge draw, bridge piers and
abutments, causeway, or other works, over or in any port,
road, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river, or navigable
waters of the United States, under any act of the legislative
assembly of any State, until the location and plan of such
bridge and other work have been submitted to and approved
by the Secretary of War. lE< * *
'' Or to excavate, or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of the channel of
said navigable water of the United States, unless approved
and authorized by the Secretary of War.
"Provided, That this section shall not apply to any bridge,
bridge draw, bridge piers and abutments, the construction of
which has been heretofore duly authorized by law, or be so
construed as to authorize the construction of any bridge,
drawbridge, bridge piers and abutments, or other works,
under any act of the legislature of any State, over or in any
stream, port, roadstead, haven or harbor, or other navigable
water not wholly within the limits of such State."
I have distributed this section so as to malrn it apparent
that it embraces three distinct classes of subjects, into one
or more of which the present case must be brought.
The first clause refers to structures, such as wharves, piers,
dams, breakwaters, jetties, etc.
The third clause refers to excavations or fills in the channel
of any navigable waters of the United States.
The second clause refers to a distinct class of works constructed under the "act of the legislative assembly of any
State." As to this class, it had been held in a long line of
decisions of the Supreme Court, beginning with Willson v.
Blaclcbird Oreelc Marsh Company (2 Pet., 245), that until Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, had
actually entered upon the improvement of the navigable
waters within the territorial limits of a State it was competent for the State to adopt and execute such plan of improve-
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ment as to those navigable waters as it might see proper. The
effect of this clause being to provide that notwithstanding
the adoption by a State of any plan of improvement as to its
navigable waters, such plan should not be executed until it
had been submitted to and approved by the Secretary of War.
The first and third clauses of the section were plainly
intended to embrace all kinds of the work therein indicated
that might be constructed in the navigable waters, whether
structures of wood, stone, or iron, having their foundations
in the soil beneath with superstructures above the surface
of the water, or excavations or fills in the channel of such
navigable water, which might alter or modify its course,
location, condition, or capacity.
As to all such works, section 7 provides that they shall
not be constructed-as to the one class, without the permission, and as to the other, without the approval and authority, of the Secretary of War.
The only question submitted to me, and which it is at all
proper that I should answer, is "whether the Secretary of
War has authority to permit the construction of this canal."
Without assuming to decide whether or not a "canal" is
one of the works provided for fo section 7, I am of the opinion that if it is the Secretary of War has the authority under
section 7 of the act of July 13, 1892, to authorize and permit
its construction.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

CIVIL SERVICE.
A person appointed to a position not in the classified service at the time
of hi. appointm nt, but which was sub equently classified by tho
xecutiv order of fay 6, 1 96, wa r tained in the service absolutely
and no sul j ct t a probati n of six months, is ntitled to all the
right and b n fit of per. onH of the sam •lass or grade und r the
civil-

rvic a· , nd ma,y b tran f rr d.
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DEPAR'J'MENT OF JUSTICE,

May 19, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt by reference
from you of the communication of Messrs. Procter and Harlow, Civil Service Commissioners, and your request for my
opinion on certain questions propounded by them.
The fact.s essential to the question are as follows:
Mr. William H. Michaels was appointed to a clerkship in
the office of the Interstate Commerce Commission on .April
28, 1896; took the oath of office on that day, and from thence
was in actual service to the 15th of May, at which time he
was furloughed without pay, but continued on the rolls.
The position was not a classified one at the time of his
appointment, but was subsequently classified by the Executive order of May 6, 1896.
The Secretary of State requested the issuance of the necessary certificate by the Civil Service Commission for his
transfer to the Department of State.
The commission raises a doubt of its legal ability to
give the certificate, and attempts to sustain it by certain provisions of the Civil Service Rules and the fourth paragraph
of section 2 of the civil-service act of January 16, 1883.
This paragraph is as follows:
"Fourth. That there shall be a period of probation before
any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid."
Rule 2, section 7, of the rules provides that".A person holding a position on the date said position is
classified under the civil-service act shall be entitled to all
the rights and benefits possessed by persons of the same
class or grade appointed upon examination under the provisions of said act."
Rule 8, section 3, provides that"A person selected for appointment shall be notified of his
selection by the appointing or nominating officer, and upon
his acceptance shall receive from the appointing officer a
certificate of appointment for a probationary period of six
months, at the end of which period, if the conduct and
capacity o~ the probationer are satisfactory to the appointing officer, his retention in tile service shall be equivalent to
10892-VOL 21, PT 3-·- 9
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his absolute appointment; but if his conduct or capacity be
not satisfactory, he shall be notified by the appointing officer
that he will not receive absolute appointment because of such
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity; and such notification shall discharge him from the service: Provided, That
the probation of an employee in the Indian school service
shall terminate at the end of the school year in which he is
appointed: And provided further, That the time which an
employee has actually served as substitute in parts of the
service where substitutes are authorized shall be counted as
part of the probationary period of his regular appointment;
but that time served under a temporary appointment shall
not be so counted."
Section 2 of rule 10 provides that'' A person who has received absolute appointment may be
transferred."
It is inferred from these provisions that a person holding
a position on the date it is classified is subject to a probation
of six months, or, in other words, has not an absolute
appointment until the expiration of six mouths of actual
employment, and until then can not be transferred. The
inference is not justified, and proceeds from an incorrect
interpretation of section 7 of rule 2. That section gives to
"a person holding a position on the date said position is
classified under the civil-service act" all the rights and benefits of persons of the same class or grade appointed under
the civil-service act. The language is, the" rights and benefits." That is, " rights and benefits" after appointment-not
burdens or conditions before appointment and limitations of
it. Those in the service were retained in it, not probationally,
but as approved; not conditionally, but absolutely. The rule
accepted them, and if it had not intended it fully there
would have been a careful discrimination as to service, and
not an indistinguishable comprehension and putting on trial
of tho e who may have been in the service for years with
tho e of, maybe, a few months. A careful discrimination of
P r on by ervice might or might not have been wise, but,
if intended it would have been explicitly made and not left
di utabl interpr tation. But the ection is so plain
f it · lf th t onfu i n come from inquiry to make it more
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so, and I will conclude by saying that the Secretary of State's
request for the transfer of Mr. Michaels is entirely legal.
Respectfully,
· JOSEPH McKENNA.
· The PRESIDENT.
ERECTION _O F CATHOLIC CHAPEL AT WEST POINT.
Sections 161 and 217 of the Revised Statutes do not authorize the granting of licenses for the occupation of parts of military reservations for
the erection of hotels, church edifices, etc.
Section 1331 has a special and partial purpose and gives no authority to
dispose of the use of property.
From the act of July 5, 1884, it may be regarded as certain that it was
the view of Congress that an explicit authority was necessary for even
a transient occupation of a military reservation for other than its
special purpose.
The act of July 28, 1892, authorizing the Secretary of War to lease such
property of the United States under his control as may not for the
time be required for the public use, forbids an occupation which
contemplates permanency or duration longer than five years.
The Secretary of War has no power to accept a donation of property for
the Government for use in perpetuity of Roman Catholics.
A revocable license, without limitation as to time, b y the Secretary of
War to a Roman Catholic archbishop, to erect and maintain a chapel
on the military reservation at West Point, transcends the statute.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
May 19, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of May 17, 1897.
You state that the Rev. C. G. O'Keefe petitioned Col. O. H.
Ernst, Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point for permission to erect a Roman Catholic
chapel there for the use of the Roman Catholic cadets, etc.
The petition you inclose.
You further state that on the 3d of March of this year
Secretary of War Lamont issued to the Right Rev. M. A.
Corrigan, Roman Catholic archbishop of the archdiocese of
New York, a revocable license to erect and maintain a chapel
on the military reservation at West Point and that said
license was on the 2d of April revoked by you and a new
license granted in its place. The licenses you inclose.
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A question being raised as to the legality of this action,
you ask "whether granting licenses of this character is or
is not legal."
I reply as follows:
West Point is Government property, and hence conveyances of it or uses of it can only be authorized by Congress.
Has Congress so authorized 1 The only direct provision as
to it is section 1331, wbich reads as follows :
"The supervision and charge of the Academy shall be in
the War Department, under such offi~er or officers as the
Secretary of War may assign to that duty."
This section has a special and partial purpose and gives
no authority to dispose of the use of property.
There are other provisions more general, and in a report
made to Congress by the Secretary of War there is an
enumeration of cases in which there were granted licenses
for the occupation (of more or less duration) of parts of other
military reservations. Some of these cases were of trifling
moment, but others were important. Hotels were authorized and the erection of church edifices for particular denominations. Of the latter one was to the Episcopalians at
Governors Island, New York; one to the Catholics at Fort
Leavenworth, Kans., and one also at Fortress Monroe to
the same denomination.
The privileges were denominated revocable licenses and
came to be based on sections 161 and 217 of the Revised
Statutes.
The sections are as follows :
" SEC. 161. The head of each Department is authorized to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of bis Department, the conduct of its officers and
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers,
and property appertaining to it."
"SEC. 217. The Secretary of War shall have the custody
and charge of all the books, records, papers, furniture, fixture , and other property appertaining to the Department."
It is manife t that they do not authorize the practice
exercised.
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Ou July 5, 1884, Congress passed an act of which section 6
is as follows:
'·The Secretary of War shall have the authority, in his
discretion, to permit the extension of State, county, and
Territorial roads across military reservations. to permit the
landing of ferries, the erection of bridges thereon, and permit cattle, sheep, or other stock animals to be driven across
such reservation whenever in his judgment the same can be
done without injury to the reservation or inconvenience to
the military forces stationed thereon."
This section is special and needs no comment except that
at least part of it was unnecessary if the practice of the
War Department was legal. To permit the temporary trespass of passing cattle was surely within a power which could
grant a license to build a church or a h9tel. It therefore
may be regarded as certain that it was the view of Congress
that an explicit authority was necessary for even a transient
occupation or a military reservation for other than its special
purpose, and it was natural when more durable interests
were authorized by the act of July 28, 1892, they were precisely guarded and limited.
The act of July 28 is as follows:
"That authority be, and is hereby, given to the Secretary
of War, when in his discretion it will be for the public good,
to lease, for a period not exceeding five years and revocable
at any time, such property of the United States under his
control as may not for the time be required for public use
and for the leasing of which there is no authority under
existing law, and such leases shall be reported annually to
Congress: Provided, That nothing in this act contained
shall be held to apply to mineral or phosphate lands."
It is not necessary to determine the character of estate
which can be created under this section, whether one strictly
at will and revocable by both parties or whether in the
nature of an estate upon condition. It seems certain that
permanence of right is forbidden by it, and hence it would
seem that· an occupation which contemplates permanency
or contemplates duration longer than five years is forbidden
by it. A church edifice would seem to contemplate such
occupation. In the instance case the character of structure
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which is desired to be erected certainly does. As a structure-with integrity preserved-it can not be removed upon
revocation or at the end of the term.
It is proposed that the church shall be the property of the
Government. The reverend gentleman who makes the offer
says:
"If this permission be granted, I propose to build a neat
stone chapel to cost about $20,000; the money to be provided
by me and the plans of the building to be submitted to the
superintendent of the Military Academy for his approval or
modification. On its completion, the chapel will be handed
over to the United States Government for use in perpetuity
of the Roman Catholics who may reside at West Point."
This condition can not be complied with. It is very clear
that the Secretary of War has no power to accept a donation
of property for the Government, certainly not to accept it
with the limitation proposed-its use in perpetuity to Roman
Catholics.
The action of Mr. Secretary Lamont did not respond to the
offer-maybe excludes it. Nevertheless, there are serious
objections to it. It gives, not a lease having a specified duration, but a license without limitation of time.
It is provided by the license that ''the chapel will be
erected and maintained at the cost of the licensee and his
successors, and used for the religious worship of the Roman
Catholics at West Point. During construction and thereafter the chapel shall be in the local custody of Rev. C. G.
O'Keefe, rector, and his successors, under the general military control and supervision of .the superintendent of the
United States Military Academy. The site for the chapel
and its dimensions will be designated by the superintendent,
and before any work of building construction is commenced
the plans and specifications of the structure will be submitted
to and rece,ive his approval, and he will also assure himself
that funds adequate to the completion of the chapel are
available. In case of revocation of this license, the building
will be removed within sixty days, and any sum which may
have to be expended in putting any premises or property
hereby authorized to be occupied or used in as good condition for u se by the United States as it is at this date shall
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be repaid by said the Right Rev. M. A. Corrigan or his
successors, archbishops of the archdiocese of New York, on
demand."
By order of April 2, 1897, the license was revoked and
another granted by you which has the same general provisions, but specifically requires the chapel to be of stone and of
dimensions indicated upon a blue-print plau attached to the
license and made a part of it. By this the dimensions of the
chapel will be 37 feet wide in its narrowest part ; 58 feet at
its widest part, with a length of over 75 feet. It is to be
removed within six months after notice of revocation.
That these licenses transcend the statute is plain. The
statute provides for a definite term, with a power of even
revoking that. ·The licenses provide for no term, and really
commit the Government to a practical perpetuity. It would
be idle to deny this-idle to deny that you do not expect to
exercise, nor is it expected that you will exercise, the power
of revocation except in emergency. Indeed a contention, not
without some authority, could be raised that you could not.
( Veghte v. Rantan, 19 N. J., 142; Willia,mson, etc., R.R. v. Battle, 68 N. C., 546.) At ·any rate the Government would find
itself embarrassed either to endure a perpetuity of right in
the license or exercise an invidious power.
The license should therefore be revoked and the petitioner
remitted to Congress.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
'rhe SECRETARY OF' WAR.

DUTIES-FEATHERS. ·
An importation of bird of paradise feathers, being composed of natural
feathers which are neither dressed, colored, nor manufactured, is not
within paragraph 328 of the tariff act of August 28, 1894.
ff a special meaning has been attached to certain words in a prior tariff
act, it is presumed that Congress intended that they should have the
same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the
same subject-matter.
A sure method of interpreting a provision in a tariff law is bv its past
history.
•
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jun e 7, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of June 4, asking my opinion as to the dutiable classification of certain bird of paradise feathers, which have been
classified by the collector as ornamental feathers suitable for
millinery use under paragraph 328 of the tariff a.ct of August
28, 1894, which is as follows:
"Feathers and downs of all kinds, when dressed, colored,
or manufactured, including quilts of down and other manufactures of down, and also including dressed and :finished
birds suitable for millinery ornaments, and artificial and
ornamental feathers, fruits, grains, leaves, :flowers, and stems,
or parts thereof, of whatever material composed, suitable for
millinery use, not specially provided for in this act, thirtyfive per centum ad valorem."
You do not submit to me any statement of the precise
condition of these feathers, or any specific question of law,
but ask in general my opinion as to the proper construction
of the paragraph. Under these circumstances a long line
of precedents would justify my returning the papers for
revision.
If, however, I am to understand from your letter that these
feathers, taken from the bird of paradise, have been neither
dressed, colored, nor manufactured, enough information is
given me to dispose of the present case. The language of
the paragraph in question and of the corresponding paragraphs in immediately prior tariff acts is somewhat obscure;
but a satisfactory interpretation may be reached by tracing
the language back to the act of June 30, 1864, chapter 171.
By section 11 of that act a rate of duty was provided for
'' ostrich, vulture, cock, and other ornamental feathers,
crude or not dressed, colored or manufactured," and a higher
rate for such feathers "when dressed, colored, or manufactured." Section 12 provided separately for "artificial
and ornamental feather and fi<?wers, or parts thereof, of
whatever material composed, not otherwise provided for."
Clearly section 11 covered all natural ornamental feathers,
while ection 12 was intended only for artificial feathers; the
phra e "artificial and ornamental" in the latter section being
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construed as if the conjunction " and" had been omitted.
But "if a special meaning were attached to certain words in
a pri_or tariff act," there is a presumption of some force " that
Congress intended that they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same
subject-matter.'' (Mq,ddock v. Magone, 152 U. S., 368, 371372.) I find no sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption
in the present instance.
I think, therefore, that paragraph 328 of the present act
(which really contains two independent categories, the former
ending with the words "millinery ornaments") should be read
as if the word" .and" were
. omitted after the word" artificial."
Hence the importation under consideration, being composed of natural feathers which are neither dressed, colored,
nor manufactured, is not within it.
In construin_g the phrase "artificial and ornamental" I do
not base my ruling upon any analogy drawn from the provision concerning "embroidered and hemstitched handkerchiefs.'' It is sufficient to dispose of the present paragraph
by its past history, which is one of the surest methods of interpretation in dealing with our complicated tariff laws.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

TAX ON PASSENGERS.

The passengers on whom the tax provided by the acts of August 3, 1882,.
and August 18, 18!:l4, is imposed, are those who make the United States
their place of destination, and not those who touch at our ports en
route to some other country.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 15, 1897.
Sm: I have the h~:mor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of June 8, transmitting a copy of a letter of
19th of May, from the collector of customs at San Francisco
"relative to an application by the Occidental and Oriental'
Steamship Company for a refund of certain per capita tax
paid by said company on 35 Japanese passengers who arrived
at ..San Francisco per steamer Gaelic, April 10, 1897."

544

HON. JOSEPH M0 JCE NA.

It appears from your lett r and the letter accompanying
it that these Japane e pa s ng rs bought their tickets at
Yokohama, in Japan, for transportation from t.hat point to
San Benito, Mexico. That they arrived in San Francisco
en route and were there tran ferred, under the supervision
and direction of the officers of the United Stat es Customs
Service, to the steamship City of Para, to be transported to
San Benito.
You ask for my opinion "whether the tax accrued on t he
35 Japanese passengers arriving per Gaelic, as mentioned
above."
The act of August 3, 1882, entitled "An act to regulate
immigration," provides:
'' That there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of
fifty cents for each and every passenger, not a citizen of the
United States, who shall come by steam or sail vessel from
a foreign port to any port within the United States."
It further provides that this duty shall be paid "within
twenty-four hours after the entry thereof into such port;"
and still further; that the money thus collected "shall be
paid into the United States Treasury and shall constitute a
fund to be called the immigrant fund."
By act of August 18, 1894: (28 Stat., 372), this head money
duty was increased from 50 cents to $1.
From the whole course of legislation on this subject, as
well as from the expressions of opinion of the judges in the
ca~es which have come before the Supreme Court, it is quite
plain that the passengers on whom the capitation tax is laid
are those who make the United States their place of destination and not those who merely touch at our ports en route to
some other country.
In Henderson et al. v. The Mayor of New York (92 U.S.,
274:) the main question was as to the right of the State of
New York to impose such a duty. But Mr. Justice Miller,
in delivering the opinion of the court, has defined the nature
of this tax:
"It is, as we have already said, in effect a tax on the passenger which he pays for the right to make the voyage-a
voyage only completed when he lands on the American
shore."
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The. landing is not a casual, transient halt-a mere coming
ashore while the vessel is in port delivering or receiving passengers and freight-but a final and permanent landing, so
far as that voyage is concerned,- at a port within the United
States which was the "desired haven" which the passenger
set out to reach.
I have no doubt that the 35 Japanese passengers were not
such as within the meaning and intent of the statute the
$1 head tax could be levied for, and as to them it should not
be exacted.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor-General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF TiIE TREASURY.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-PARKS .A.ND RESERVATIONS.
Under the act of March 3, 1897, making appropriations for the District
of Columbia, the laying of conduits or erection of overhead wires for
electric lighting in any park or reservation for the purpose of lighting the park or reservation is prohibited.
DEP..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 16, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
letter of Colonel Bingham, of June 2, 1897, to Gen. John M.
Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U.S. A., with the indorsements
thereon of the Acting Chief of Engineers and of the .Acting
Secretary of War, in which my opinion is requested "as to
whether either the Commissioners of the District of Columbia or the officer in charge of public buildings and grounds,
under the terms of the act approved March 3, 1897, making
appropriations for the government of the District of Columbia, can authorize the laying of conduits or erection of over- .
head wires, for electric lighting purposes, in any park or
reservation for the purpose of lighting the park or reservation."
By act approved March 3, 1897 (29 Stat., 673), it was provided:
''Until Congress shall provide for a conduit system, it shall
be unlawful to lay conduits, or erect overhead wires for elec-
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tric lighting purpo es, in any road, str et, avenue, highway,
park or reservation, exc pt as hereafter pecifically authorized by law. Provided, however, that the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia are her by authorized to issue permits for house connections with conduit and overhead wires
now existing adjacent to the premises with which such connection is to be made, and also permits for public lighting
connections with conduits already in the portions of the
street proposed to be lighted; * * * nor t.o prevent the
United States Electric Lighting Company from extending
its conduits into Columbia Heights and Mount Pleasant
within the fire limits, as specifically provided in the act of
June 11, 1896, making appropriations for the expenses of the
government of the District of Columbia."
I am of opinion that under this act, the laying of conduits,
or erection of overhead wires, for electric lighting purposes,
in any park or reservation for the purpose of lighting the
park or reservation is prohibited.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor-General .
.Approved.
JOSEPH McKENN.!_.
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.

OPENING OF BIDS.
There is nothing in the acts of Ja~uary 27 and April 21, 1894, amending
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, inconsistent with the legal right
of the board of award of the Department of Agriculture to consider
any bid received by them through the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock
p.m.
The designation of 2 o'clock p. m. '' for the opening of all such proposals
in each Department" means only that such proposals shall not be
opened before 2 o'clock p. m.
A proposal received after that hour, under circumstances which warraute(l the belief that it had been prepared and submitted in the light
of the proposals submitted by other bidders, which had been already
opened and made known, should not be received or entertained; but
a proposal received under conditions which precluded the possibility
of such unfairness should not be rejected because it happens to be
received by the board of award a few minutes after 2 o'clock p. m.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 16, i897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letters of May 17 and May 21, 1897, inclosing a letter of
W. B. Dodson, postmaster at Akron, Ohio.
Referring to the act approved January 27, 1894, amending
section 3709, Revised Statutes, you ask" In view of the above, if the board of award of this Department, appointed for the purpose of opening and considering
bids under section 3709, has the legal right to consider any
bid received by them through the mail after the hour of 2
o'clock p. m."
The act of January 27, 1894 (28 Stat., 33), providing for
advertisements for proposals for supplies for the Executive
Departments of the Government, provides that they" Shall continue to bffadvertised for and purchased as now
provided by law, on the same days and shall each designate
~ o'clock postmeridian of such days for the opening of all
such proposals in each department and other Government
establishment in the city of Washing ton.
"And the Secretary of the Treasury shall designate the
day or days in each year for the opening of such proposals
and give due notice thereof to the other departments and
Government establishments."
Your letters do not disclose the kind of supplies for which
bids were invited, and I venture to call your attention to the
subsequent act of April 21, 1894 (28 Stat., 58),in which the act
of January 27, 1894, is amended in very important particulars.
I :find nothing in the legislation referred to which is inconsistent with the legal right of the board of award of the
Department of Agriculture to consider any bid received by
them through the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock p. m.
The designation of 2 o'clock p. m. ·' for the opening of all
such proposals in each department" means only that such
proposals shall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m. Certainly cases may and doubtless frequently do occur where
the number of bids or proposals is so great as to occupy many
minutes and perhaps hours in opening and considering them.
All can not be opened _exactly at 2 o'clock.
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The fact that one bid may arrive by mail after 2 o'clock p. m.
and reach the hands of the board of award before they have
opened all the bids which were received before 2 o'clock p.
m. can hardly be accepted as sufficient ground for discarding altogether the belated bid; and especially, as in the
present case, where it appears from the letter of the postmaster that "the special delivery package mailed by' Werner Company' at .A.kron, Ohio, should by due course of mail
have reached Washington at 1.25 p. m."
The object .o f the statute is to secure fairness and impartiality in awarding Government contracts; and where proper
notice has been given by advertisement and the time and
the place for opening such proposals designated and pub·
lished, one submitting his bid or proposal and forwarding
the same by due course of mail, by which it should have
been delivered before 2 o'clock p. m., should not be deprived
of his right to participate in the competitive bidding because
his letter containing his bid did not reach the board of award
until a few minutes after 2 p. m.
The statute should receive a reasonable construction and
one in consonance with its manifest object and intent.
The interests of the Government are best secured by the
larger number of competitive bids from which selection may
be made.
By designating a certain hour on a fixed day "for the
opening of all such proposals," both the Government and
the bidders have secured to them the advantage of a prescribed moment prior to whfoh no bids can be opened.
The statute does not say that all proposals must be received
prior to 2 o'clock p. m., but it designates that hour for the
opening of the proposals.
To be sure, a proposal received after that hour, under circumstance~ which warranted the belief that it had been prepared and submitted in the light of the proposals submitted
by other bidders, which had been already opened and made
known, should not be received or entertained; but a proposal received under conditions which precluded the possibility of such unfairness should not be rejected because it
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happens to be received by the board of award a few minutes after 2 o'clock p. m.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- Gene·ro,l.
Approved.
JOSEPH MCKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE.
REMISSION OF PENALTIES.
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the right, in case of an application for a remisson of penalty under section 17 of the act of June 22,
1874, to prosecute a further inquiry into the facts after the United
States commissioner has reported his :findings in the case under section 18 of said act.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 22, 1897.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of May 17, inclosing a copy of a letter from you to the
Solicitor of the Treasury, and his reply thereto, conveying
his opinion upon the question submitted to him in your letter and a written brief from Messrs. Curie, Smith & Mackie,
attorneys for petitioners.
You submit for my opinion the question whether the Secretary of tlie Treasury, in case of an application for remission
of penalty under section 17 of the act of June 22, 1874, has
the right, after the United States commissioner has reported
his findings in the case under section 18 of said act, "to prosecute a further inquiry into the facts."
Section 17 provides that thP. person seeking remission of
the penalty* * * "Shall present his petition to the judge of the
district in which the alleged violation occurred, or in which
the property is situated, setting- forth truly and particularly
the facts and circumstances of the case and praying for relief,
such judge shall, if the case in his judgment requires, proceed
to inquire in a summary manner into the circumstances of the
case at such reasonable time as may be fixed by him for that
purpose, of which the district attorney and the collector
shall be notified by the petitioner in order that they may
attend and show cause why the petition should be refused.
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" EC. 1 .
in
i ation hereby provided for ma b h
h jud to whom the petition
is pre ented, or, if he h, 11
lir t, b fore any United States
commi ion r for u h di tri , aud the facts appearing
thereon hall b t, t d ml ann
d to the petition, and,
together with a certifi d 1\ of h vidence, transmitted to
the ecretar oftbeTrea ury,, ho hall thereupon have power
to mitigate or remit uch :flu , penalty, or forfeiture, or remove
such disability, or any part thereof, if in his opinion the same
shall have been incurred without willful negligence or any
intention of fraud in the person or persons incurring the
same, and to direct the prosecution, if any shall have been
instituted for the recovery thereof, to cease and be discontinued upon such terms or conditions as he may deem reasonable and just."
Under these t.wo sections the judge or commissioner is invested with the power and charged with the duty of ascertaining the facts of the case presented in the petition and of
stating the facts so ascertained, and of transmitting such
statement, together with the petition and a certified copy of
the evidence, to the Secretary of the Treasury, ~, who shall
thereupon have power to mitigate or remit," etc.
Plainly the responsibility is not laid upon the Secretary of
the Treasury of ascertaining the facts; but upon the case
stated in the petition and upon the statement of the facts
ascertained by the judge or commissioner and upon the certified copy of the evidence, the Secretary of the Treasury
must form his opinion; and if in his opinion the penalty has
been incurred "without willful negligence or any intention of
fraud," he may direct the prosecution to be discontinued upon
such terms as to him may seem proper.
Nowhere in the letter or reason of the statute does it
appear to have been contemplated that after the judge or
commissioner has conducted his investigation inter partes
that the Secretary of the Treasury should have the power by
an ex parte and secret investigation to supplement the facts
already ascertained.
It was the opinion of Attorney-General Harmon (21 Opin.,
289) that in the case presented to him by your predecessor
in office it was within the discretion of the Secretary "in
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remission proceedings under the antimoiety act of June 2:2,
187 4, chapter 391, sections 17 and 18, to return the findings
to the United States commissioner for a further hearing
before him upon a claim of newly discovered evidence."
I am of the opinion that you have not the right, in case of
an application for a remission of penalty under section 17 of
the act of June 22, 1874, to prosecute a further inquiry into
the facts after the United States commissioner has reported
his findings in the case under section 18 of said act.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
The provision of the act of June 4, 1897, "that any chief engineer of the
Revenue-Cutter Service who has held the office of engineer in chief
shall hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of said
service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the office of captain
of engineers in said service, with the pay and emoluments of such
captain," creates the office of captain of engineers; the pay is that of
a captain of the revenue service, and the appointment is to be made
from the chief engineers who have held the office of engineer in chief,
and by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The word "such" ordinarily refers to the next immediate antecedent,
but not necessarily; never when the purpose of the section in which
it is used would thereby be impaired.

DEPA.RTMEN'.I.'

JUSTICE,
June 25, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of June 14, in which you recite from the
act approved June 4, 1897, making appropriations for sundry
civil expenses for the Government for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1898, and for other purposes, the following provision:
'' Provided, That any chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter
Service who has held the office of engineer in chief shall
10892-V0L 21, PT 3--10
OF
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hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the
office of captain of engineers in said service, with the pay
and emoluments of such captain."
You request my opinion on the following points:
"1. As there is not now and never has been any such
,grade' or 'title' as 'captain of engineers' in the revenue
service, and as a consequence no salary for such 'captain of
engineers' has been fixed by law, does the provision cited
create the office of 'captain of engineers 1'
"2. If the grade of 'captain of engineers' is created by
the provision cited, and it is filled by appointment, what
would be the 'pay and emoluments' of such 'captain of engineers 1'"
You transmit with your letter a copy of an opinion of the
Solicitor of the Treasury.
The legislation on tbe subject of the Revenue-Cutter
Service which preceded the provision, the interpretation of
which is solicited, is as follows:
"SEC. 27 49, R. S. The officers for each revenue vessel shall
be one captain and one first, one second, and one third lieutenant, and for each steam vessel, in addition, one engineer
and one assistant engineer, etc.
"SEC. 2750. The grades of engineers shall be chief engineer and first and second assistant engineer, with the pay
and relative rank of first, second, and third lieutenant
respectively.
"SEC. 2751. The commissioned officers of the Revenue-Cutter Service shall be appointed by the President, by and with
tbe advice and consent of the Senate.
"SEC. 2752. No person shall be appointed to the office of
captain, first, second, or third lieutenant of any revenue
cutter who does not adduce competent proof of proficiency
and skill in navigation and seamanship.
~, SEC. 2753. The compensation of the officers of the Revenue-Cutter ServicA shall be at the following rates while on
duty:
"Captains, twenty-five hundred dollars a year each.
'' First lieutenants and chief engineers, eighteen hundred
dollars a year each."
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By act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 172), it is provided" That the Secretary of the Treasury shall detail a captain of the Revenue-Cutter Service, who shall be chief of the
division of Revenue-Cutter Service; and a chief engineer,
who shall be ~ngineer in chief of said service; but no additional pay or emoluments shall be allowed on account of such
detail."
By the appropriation act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat., 149), it
is provided'' That the chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter Service
detailed as engineer in chief of said service under the provisions of the legislative appropriation act of July 31, 1894,
shall hereafter receive the duty pay and have the relative
rank of a captain of the Revenue-Cutter Service."
This was the state of legislation when the provision of
June 30, 1898, was enacted, and which I reveat here for convenient connection:
"Provided, That any cp.ief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter
, Service who has held the office of engineer in chief shall
hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the
office of captain of engineers in said service with the pay .
and emoluments of such captain."
This provision is certainly not clear, but it may be assumed
that it was intended to be an addition to then existing law,
and I think, notwithstanding its obscurity, the intention of
Congress may be discerned.
·
It will be observed that rank by detail and the pay thereof
had been provided for by previous legislation. Fixity of
rank was evidently intended to be made by the new provision. .A. new grade was therefore to be created, and (as
accessory to it) the pay of it and a class of officers eligible
to it were to be provided. In providing for these, confus.ion
of expression occurred, but keeping to intention it is easily
resolvable by the application of well-known rules of interpretation.
- The legislation was to have a present operation. It could
not have unless it created a new grade-an eligible class
and pay were but accessories to that, as we have seen. If
this is so, and the words of the statute be not inconsistent

554

HON. JOSEPH M°KENNA.
Revenue-Cutter Service.

with it, they must be so construed. The important inquiry
always is the legislative intent.
The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Clifford, in Kohlsaat
v. Murphy (96 U. S., 160), said:
''Rules and maxims of interpretation are ordained as aids
in discovering the true intent and meaning of any particular
enactment; bnt the ~ontrolling rule of decision in applying
the statute in any particular case is that whenever the
intention of the legislature can be discovered from the words
employed, in view of the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, it ought to prevail, unless it leads to
absurd and irrational conclusions, which should never be
imputed to the legislature, except when the lan guage
employed will admit of no other signification."
See also Neal v. Clark (95 U. S., 704).
In Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold, etc., Oo. (93 U. S., 634), the
Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Davis, said:
"If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate
unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be
rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true
. meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by
their connection with other clauses, than by considering
the necessity for it, and the causes which induced its
enactment."
The causes which induced the enactment of the cited provision were, as we have seen, to make a new grade in the
revenue service, and the language employed, though not as
direct or as apt as it might be, is nevertheless sufficient, "in
view of the subject-matter and surrounding circumstances."
There is no defect. The name or title of the grade is given,
the qualifications necessary to attain it are prescribed, and
also the method of appointment, and from what class of
officers.
The assumption of the existence of a grade or the recognition of it is enough for its creation. A striking example
of this kind, and especially applicable, is the case of Postmaster-General v. Early (12 Wheat., 135). In March, 1815,
Congress pa sed "An act to vest more effectually in the State
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courts and in the district courts of the United States jurisdiction in the cases therein mentioned." The fourth section
contained this clause: "And be it further enacted, That the
district court of the United States shall have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts and magistrates of the several
States, and the circuit courts of the United States, of all
suits at common law, where the United States, or any officer
thereof, under the authority of any act of Oongress, shall
sue, although the debt, claim, or other matter in dispute
shall not amount to one hundred dollars."
The question arose, did this clause give jurisdiction to the
circuit court of the United States as well as the district
court, The court, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said:
"The language of the act is, that the district court shall
have cognizance, concurrent with the courts and magistrates
of the several States and the circuit courts of the United
States, of all suits, etc. What is the meaning and purport
of the words '.concurrent with' the circuit courts of the
United States, Are they entirely senseless, Are they to
be excluded from the clause in which the legislature has
inserted them, or are they to be taken into view and allowed
the effect of which they are capable¥ The words are certainly not senseless. They have a plain and obvious meaning. And it is, we think, a rule that words which have a
meaning are not to be entirely disregarded in construing a
statute. We can not understand this clause as if these words
were excluded from it. They, perhaps, manifest the opinion
of the legislature that the jurisdiction was in the . circuit
courts; but ought, we think, to be construed to give it, if it
did not previously exist. * * * It has been said, and perhaps truly, that this section was not framed with the intention of vesting jurisdiction in the circuit courts. The title of
the act, and the language of the sentence, are supposed to
concur in sustaining this proposition. The title speaks only
of State courts. But it is well settled that the title can not
restrain the enacting clause. It is true that the language of
the section indicates the opinion that jurisdiction existed in
the circuit courts, rather than an intention to give it; and
a mistaken opinion of the legislature concerning the law
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does not make the law. But if this mistake be manifested
in words competent to make the Jaw in future, we know of
no principle which can deny them this effect. The legislature may pass a declaratory act, which, though inoperative
on the past, may act in future. This Jaw expresses the sense
oft.be legislature on the existing law as plainly as a declaratory act, and expresses it in terms capable of conferring the
jurisdiction. We think, therefore, that in a case plainly
within the judicial power of the Federal courts, as prescribed
in the Constitution, and plainly within the general policy of
the legislature, the words ought to receive this construction."
See also State v. 111.iller (23 Wis., 634).
Another difficulty is urged in your second proposition.
You ask:
" If the grade of captain of engineers is created by the
provision cited, and it is filled by the appointment, what
would be the 'pay and emoluments' of such 'captain of
engineers'1"
To appreciate the reason of the inquiry, we must agah1
quote the "cited provision:"
"Provided, That any chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter
Service, who has held the office of engineer in chief, shall
hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the
office of captain of engineers in said service, with the p ay
and emoluments of such captain."
The ambiguity is in the relation of the words " such captain." It is easily resolved. Ordinarily the word "such"
refers to the next immediate antecedent, but not necessarily;
never when the purpose of the section would thereby be
impaired. (Summerman v. Knowles, 33 N. J., 205.)
Broom, in his Legal Maxims, after- quoting the maxim
"Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, msi impediatur sententia," says :
" Relative words must ordinarily be referred to the next
antecedent, where the intent upon the whole deed or instrument does not appear to the contrary, and where the matter
itself doth not hinder it; the 'last antecedent ' being the
la t word which can be made an antecedent so as to have a
m aning.
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"But although the above general proposition is true in
strict grammatical construction, yet there are numerous
examples in the best writers to show that the context may
often require a deviation from this rule, and tllat the relative may be connected with nouns which go before the last
antecedent, and either take from it or give to it some
qualification."
The learned author cites numerous authorities to sustain
his text.
Applying the rule to the "cited provision," the words
"such captain" must be held to refer to the captain of the
revenue service. That office had defined emoluments. It
was naturally made a measure, and, so regarding it, meaning
and completeness is given to the language used. It would
be defective else, and hence an exception to the maxim of
relation is necessarily indicated.
From these views it follows that the ' 4 cited provision,"
creates (1) the office of captain of engineers; (2) the pay is
that of the captain of the revenue service, to wit, $2,500 per
annum (Rev. Stat., 2753); (3) the appointment is to be made
from the chief engineers who have held the office of engineerin-chief, and (4) by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate (sec. 2751 ).
Respectfully, yours,
JOSEPH McKENNA.

The SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.

TAX ON CIRCULATING NOTES-ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMPROMISE.

Banks of the United States are liable for the tax of 10 per cent on the
circulating notes issued by banks in Canada, for circulation in Canada,
which have passed over the line and been received by such United
States banks and paid out by them within the United States.
The intent and meaning of the twentieth section of the act of February
8, 1875, was to apply the tax to the amount of the circulating notes
issued by any of the persons or corporations named in the statute, and
used by the banks and other persons therein named.
Whether the statute of limitations does or does not bar a claim on behalf
of the Government is a judicial question to be determined by the
courts and not by the Attorney-General.
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It does not appear to be necessary that resort should be had by the
Government to a "suit or prosecution" in order to a recovery of the
penalty of 5 per cent and the interest of 1 per cent per month for
which the banks are liable.
This is a case which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the
advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, may compromise
under section 3229, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jiine 25, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of May 12, presenting for my opinion the
questions arising out of the use by the Calais National Bank
and the Calais S~vings Bank, in common with other banks
of Calais, Me., of circulating notes issued by banks in Canada
for circulation in Canada, which had passed over the line
and been received by banks of the United States and paid
out by them within the United States.
It appears from the recitals in your letter that upon the
returns made by the banks of Calais, Me., an assessment was
made by the Treasury Department of 10 p·e r cent upon the
circulating notes of Canada banks, which had been received
and paid out within the United States by the banks in
Calais, under and in pursuance of section 20 of the act of
February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 311).
You request an opinion upon the following points hereinafter stated:
·
You call my attention to the opinion of Solicitor-General
Aldrich (20 Opin., 534), and state that in view of certain
questions presented to you in the printed brief, which do
not appear to have been considered by Solicitor-General
Aldrich, and in view of the brevity of his opinion, you "deem
it advisable to obtain a further opinion on the points argued
by counsel in their brief."
The delay in replying to your request has been occasioned
by frequent oral arguments submitted to me, in the interval,
by counsel on behalf of the banks.
I have considered fully and attentively the case as presented in your letter, in the light of the law bearing upon it
and the argument of counsel.
To the first point, "Are the banks liable for the tax of
10 -per cent on tbe circulating bank notes of the banks of
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St. Stephens, received and paid out as current funds, upon
the facts stated below, under the act of February 8, 1875,"
I reply that they are.
The act of February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 307), provides:
" SEC. rn. That every person, firm, association, other than
national banking associations, and every corporation, State
bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten
per centum on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them.
" SEC. 20. That every such person, firm, association, corporation, State bank, or State banking association, and also
every national banking association, shall pay a like tax of
ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person, firm,
association, other than a national banking association, or of
any town, city, or municipal corporation, used for circulation
and paid out by them."
It is insisted that the words "used for circulation," which
were added to section 20 by the act of February 8, 1875, were
intended :to restrict the meaning and effect of the ·words
"paid out by them," which occur in the previous statutes.
Perhaps a recurrence to the antecedent legislation will
afford the safest interpretation of the intent and purpose of
Congress as we find it declared in the varying forms of
expression employed in successive acts.
On the 17th day of July, 1862, Congress enacted:
'' No private corporation, banking association, firm, or
individual, shall make, issue, circulate, or pay any note,
check, memorandum, token, or other obligation, for a less
sum than one dollar:, intended to circulate as money, or to
be received and used in lieu of lawful money of the United
States."
March 3, 1863, Congress enacted" That all banks, associations, corporations, or individuals
issuing notes or bills for circulation as currency shall be
subject to and pay a duty * * * upon the average
amount of circulation of notes or bills as currency issuing
beyond the amount hereinafter named." * * "'
June 30, 1864, an act was passed imposing a duty upon
the average amount of circulation issued by" Circulation issued by any bank, association, corporation,
company, or person, including as circulation all certified
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caecks, and all notes and other obligations calculated or
intended to circulate or to be used as money." * * *
March 3, 1865, it was further enacted" That every national banking association, State bank, or
State banking association shall pay a tax of ten per centum
on the amount of notes of any State bank or State banking
association paid out by them after the :first day of July, 1866."
On the 13th of July, 1866, it was enacted, by amendment"That every national banking association, State bank, or
State banking association shall pay a tax of ten per centum
on the amount of notes of any person, State bank, or State
banking association used for circulation and paid out by
them after the :first day of August, 1866."
March 26, 1867, it was enacted" That every national banking association, State bank, or
banker, or association shall pay a tax of ten per centum on
the amount of notes of any town, city, or municipal corporation paid out by them after the first day of May." * * *
February 8, 1875, the act of which sections 19 and 20 are
a part was enacted, and is the law under which these assessments complained of were made.
It is quite evident from this that the words "used for circulation" and "paid out by them," were understood and
intended to mean very different things.
A. bank might pay out notes, such as notes " payable in
merchandise," not intending that they should be "used for
circulation." On the other hand, they might have in their
possession notes to be used for circulation, but as to which
they would not be liable to tbe tax unless such notes were
actually '' paid out" by them. An illustration of this is presented in the opinion of Attorney-General Olney (20 Opin.,
695), in which he held that notes of a national bank, properly
executed and ready to be issued, are not liable to the tax
while they remain in the vaults of the bank.
The main object of all the Federal legislation on this subject
was to secure for the national currency the exclusive use in
the United States as a circulating medium; and this object
was sought to be effected by imposing upon all competitive
paper money such a tax as would make its issue unprofitable.
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In National Bank v. United States, decided October term,
1879 (101 U. S., 1), the question of the constitutionality of
section 3413, Revised Statutes, imposing a tax of 10 per
centum "on the amount of notes of any town, city, or municipal corporation" paid out by any bank or. banker, Chief
Justice Waite said :
" The tax is' on the notes paid out; that is, made use of as
a circulating medium. Such a use is against the policy of
the United States. Therefore, the banker who helps to keep
up the use by paying them out-that is, employing them as
the equivalent of money iu discharging his obligations-is
taxed for what he does. The taxation was no doubt intended
to destroy the use; but that, as has just been seen, Congress
had the power to do."
Had this decision been made before the passage of the act
of February 8, 1875, Congress might have deemed it unnecessary to amend section 3413, Revised Statutes, by adding the
words" used for circulation," for .the Supreme Court, in that
opinion, very clearly indicated that the banker who pays out
notes thereby helps to keep up their use as a circulating
medium.
We have seen that from the earliest act of Congress-that
of July, 1862-down to the latest, the prohibition has been
laid upon the use of notes ''intended to circulate as money,"
''for circulation as currency," "intended to circulate, or to
be used as money," and "used for circulation."
By the act of March 3, 1863, a duty was imposed upon
banks or individuals "issuing notes or bills for circulation
as currency."
On March 3, 1865, a tax was imposed upon banks of 10 per
cent on the amount of notes of any State bank paid out by
them.
Up to that time banks had been required to pay the duty
or tax only on the average amount of notes issued by themthat is, made by them. But it was discovered that this was
not sufficient to_effect the principal object of destroying all
competition with national currency. That, for one bank of
circulation which paid a tax on notes issued by it, there
might be a hundred banks of discount and deposit which
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had no circulation of their own but which received t heir
deposits and paid out their discounts in the notes of the
bank of circu1ation, thereby giving· to them extensive circulation; and if such notes were issued by a national bank,
their extended use by the banks having no circulation of
their own took away inducement to the cre~tion of additional national banks; and if the circulation was that of a
State bank, it offered dangerous competition to the national
currency, and was enabled to pay the tax on the circulation
issued by it by reason of the untaxed use of that circulation
by other banks having no circulation of their own.
It was doubtless to meet this contingency that the act of
March 3, 1865, was passed, which by a process of evolution
bas taken on the form it now wears under the act of February 8, 1875.
Some of the inferior Federal courts have l1eld that the mere
paying out of notes by a bank was evidence of the intent to
use them for circulation. But in many parts of the country
individuals, partnerships, and corporations engaged in mining or manufacturing enterprises, for the convenient conduct
of their own business, issued certificates or promises to p ay
in merchandise, designed originally for use between t he
employer and the employees alone, but which gradually
acquired neighborhood circulation. And in 1884 the question
came before the Supreme Court in Hollister v. Merca,ntile
Institution (111 U.S., 62), whether notes payable "to bearer
for a gi-ven sum in merchandise at retail, paid out and used
as circulation, were subject to the 10 per cent tax imposed
by the statute of February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 311)." Chief
Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"From this review of the legislation on the general subject, and the apparently studied use by Congress of words
of appropriate signification whenever it was intended to
cover anything else than promissory notes, in the commercial sense of that term, we are led to the conclusion that
only such notes as are in law negotiable, so as to carry title
in their circulation from hand to hand, are the subjects of
taxation under the statute. It was, no doubt, the purpose
of Congress, in imposing this tax, to provide against compe-
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tition with the established national currency for circulation
as money, but as it was not likely that obligations payable
in anything else than money would pass beyond a limited
neighborhood, no attention was given to such issues as
affecting the volume•of the currency or its circulating value."
Such notes, therefore, although "paid out" by the banks,
were not regarded as" used for circulation."
A distinction is sought to be taken between '' notes used
for circulation" and '' notes used as current funds."
The distinction, if any exists, is too impalpable to form a
difference. And if, indeed, such difference existed, it would
be difficult to understand the necessity for and meaning of
section ZO of the act of February 8, 1875.
The paper circulating medium of the country consists of
the notes issued directly by the United States, the national
bank notes, and the State bank notes-if any exist.
The notes paid out and used for circulation by the banks
are the notes issued by the bank which first pays them out
and the notes of the United States and of the other banks.
Section 19 provides that every person and corporation,
other than a national banking association, shall pay a tax of
10 per cent on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them.
Section 20 provides that every such person or corporation
and "also every national banking association" shall pay a
tax of 10 per cent on the amount of the notes of any person,
firm, or corporation, other than a national banking association,
used for circulation and paid out by them.
What effect section 20 could possibly have except to impose a tax on the amount of other notes than its own, paid
out by a bank as circulation, is difficult to see.
A vague notion has been suggested that section 20 was
intended to apply to cases in which one bank ''adopted" the
notes issued by another bank as its own and used such notes
for circulation.
But if any such case has actually occurred I have been
unable to discover evidence of it, and certainly it can not be
said that they have been of such frequent occurrence as to
have induced the enactment of a legislative remedy to meet .
them.
'
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The tax is not upon the creation of the notes, but upon
their use as circulation; and if the view contended for on
behalf of the Calais National Bank was sound, that bank, by
its use as circulation of the notes of the Canadian banks,
would be in the enjoyment of an immunity from the 10 per
cent tax imposed by the Government to prevent competition with the national currency, from which all other banks
in the United States would be excluded.
If the tax is only that imposed by section 19 "on the
amount of their own notes used for circulation," and does not
reach the use of the notes issued by other persons and corporations, although used for the same purpose, is it not a
premium offered to the banks of the United States to dispense with their own issue of notes and employ as a circulating medium the notes of Canadian banks, and thereby get
rid of the 10 per cent tax¥
I have no doubt that the intent and meaning of the twentieth section was to apply the tax to the amount of the circulating notes issued by any of the persons or corporations
named in the statute and used by the banks and other persons therein named.
Second. "If the banks are liable, whether the penalty of
5 per cent and the interest of 1 per cent per month, or any
part thereof, is barred by the limitation in section 1047, Revised Statutes."
Statutes of limitations apply to the legal remedies and not
to the rights of the parties. Whether the statute of limitations does or does not bar a claim on behalf of the Government is, therefore, a judicial question to be determined by
the courts and not by the Attorney-General.
Section 3415, Revised Statutes, imposes "a penalty of
$200, besides the additional penalties of forfeitures provided
in other cases," for any refusal or neglect to make return
and payment of the amount of circulation and tax thereon.
It may be true that section 1047, Revised Statutes, does
afford a bar to the maintenance of any" suit or prosecution
for any pen"alty or forfeiture," etc., instituted more than five
years from the time when the same accrued, but it does not
appear to be necessary that resort should be had by the
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Government to "suit or prosecution" in order to a recovery
of the penalty here.
Third. ''Whether the matter, as it now stands, is a contested matter that can be compromised by and with the
consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the provisions of section 3229, Revised Statutes."
I think this is a case which the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the advice and consent of the Secretary of
the Treasury, may compromise under section 3229, Revised
Statutes.
Very respectfully,
HOLMES CONRAD,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

ERECTION OF BETHEL, READING ROOM, AND LIBRARY ON
SHIP ISLAND.
The Secretary of War has no authority to grant permission for the
erection of a bethel, reading room, and library within the army reservation on Ship Island. (21 Opin., 537, followed).
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 7, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge tue receipt of your
communication of July 1, in which you transmit a letter
addressed to yourself by the Rev. Ebenezer Thompson,
dated Biloxi, Miss., June 1, 1897, and stating in part as follows:
"Ever since I left Lansing, eight years ago, I have been
stationed as rector of this parish and dean of the coast.
·' Directly opposite and in plain sight, 12 miles away, is
the harbor of Ship Island, with 25 large vessels loading lum.ber. About 500 men are employed.
" Except for Fort Massachusetts at the extreme west end,
the light-house next, and quarantine station 2· miles east,
there are 110 habitations on the island. It is mostly a desert,
barren waste. The officers and men on these ships the
light-house keeper, the stevedores, and others have ~ften
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applied to me to do something for them, as being mor e completely shut off from civilizing and christianizing influences
than almost any port of its size in the world; and at last I
have undertaken to write to you in their behalf.
' 1 What we want is a bethel, and a reading room and
library, with living rooms for the keeper.
" Money for such a building will be furnished freely. We
have abundant offe.r s of books, newspapers, and magazines.
"What we ask is for permission to erect ~his building on
the army reservation. In any other port this building
would be erected on private or purchased ground, but this
island belongs entirely to the Government."
You request to be advised whether this case falls wit hin
my opinion of May 19, 1897, in the matter of the petition
for the erection of a Catholic chapel at West Point, N. Y.
. I answer in the affirmative, and that the War Department
does not possess authority to grant the permission applied
for. The applicant, as in the West Point case, must be
remitted to Congress.
I return the papers herewith, as you request.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA .
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR.
ROCK CREEK PARK.
The board of control of Rock Creek Park has not the power t~ authorize
the water department of the District of Columbia to construct a r eservoir, for the use of the District, within the limits of said p ar k .
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Julys, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours
of the 1st instant, inclosing letter of Edward Burr, captain,
Corps of Engineers, to Brig. Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of
Engineers, United States Army, and asking my opinion as
to whether the board created by section 7 of the act of Sept ember 27, 1890, chapter 1001 (26 Stat., 492), has the power to
authorize the water department of the District of Columbia
to con truct a reservoir, for the use of the District, within
the limits of Rock Creek Park.
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Rock Creek Park was created by the act referred to, and
the purposes for which it was created are described as follows: "That a tract of land * * * shall be secured, as
hereinafter set out, and be perpetually dedicated and set
apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people of the United States, to be known
by the name of Rock Creek Park."
Section 7 of the act provides that the park thus established
"shall be under the joint control of the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia and the Chief of Engineers of the United
States Army, whose duty it shall be, as soon as practicable,
to lay out and prepare roadways and bridle paths, to be
used for driving and for horseback riding, respectively, and
footways for pedestrians; and whose dltty it shall also be to
make and publish such regulations as they deem necessary
or proper for the care and management of the same. Such
regulations shall provide for the preservation from injury or
spoliation of all timber, animals, or curiosities within said
park, and their retention in their natural condition, as nearly
as possible."
The question submitted is whether this board of control of
lands thus designated and set apart as a public park or
pleasure ground, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people
of the United States, has any power or dominion over the
park save those conferred by section 7.
In considering this statute and the powers of the board
of control we must not, of course, restrict it to limits
which would preclude the objects which are plainly intended
by the statute; that is, the creation of a public park or
pleasure ground where people of the United States could
resort and find place of enjoyment. In order to constitute
a par_k of this sort it is necessary for the board of control to
have the power to make it a place of enjoyment and of pleasure by the improvement of the scenery, the opening of roadways, bridle paths, footways, the construction of fountains,
rustic seats, arbors, and such other conveniences as are
required in a park which is set apart for the pleasure and
enjoyment of people. It is no doubt also within their power,
if they see proper, to plant trees, shrubbery, cultivate flower
10892-VOL 21. PT 3--11
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f , lik n t ur which wou1 d tend to
adorn and make th plc e m r t ractive. But here t he
que tion pre ent d i wheth r r n t they can devote this.
property thu set apart for t h purpo of the erection of a
re ervoir to be u d a a p r t of t he water system of the
District of olumbia. In other words, h a t he board of con.
trol the power to take this property, designated aud set
apart by the act of Con-gre as a pleasure resort for all t he
people of the United State who de ire t o come and enjoy it,
and devote it, in part, to the municipal uses of the District
of Columbia by the erection of a reservoir to be used in connection with the water system of the aid District , The
question does not seem to admit of argumeut, and I unhesitatingly say that there is no such power vested in the board
of control. It would, in my opinion, be an entire perversion
of the purposes of the dedication.
If the board of control has the power, under t he act, to
authorize the water department of the District of Columbia
to construct a reservoir within the limits of the park for the
use of the District, then it would follow that the board has
the right to authorize the use of the park for any other public
purpose demanded by the District authorities, and thus this
tract of land, which was condemned under an act of Congress
and dedicated as a public park for the benefit of the whole
people of the United States, might eventually be devoted
entirely to the necessities of the District of Columbia and
the object of the dedication defeated.
Y ery respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-DESER'fER FROM THE .A.RMY.
The cases in which the Attorney-General is authorized to give opinions to
the heads of E xecutiv e _D epartments are such as are actually pending
in such D ep artment s an d involving the l egal questions submitted .
.A. conv ict ed deserter from the Army, undergoing sentence, must b ecome
the r ecipient of E xecutive clemency and must make application for
r eenlistment b efore the question of the effect of the President's pardon
upon his ri ght t o r eenlist can arise,
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 9, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
comn;nmication of May 25, 1897, in re Thomas Buchanan, a
convicted deserter now undergoing a sentence and who has
on file an application for a pardon.
The facts in this case, as set forth in your letter, are as
follows: Thomas Buchanan is now a general prisoner at Fort
Columbus, N. Y. He enlisted in Company H, Tenth Infantry, United States Army, October 5, 1891, and was discharged
October 4, 1896, by expiration of service. He reenlisted
October 8, 1896, in Battery H, Fifth Artillery; deserted at
Fort Hamilton November 2, 1896; surrendered at that post
February 1, 1897; was tried by court-martial, convicted of
desertion, and sentenced to be dishonorably discharged, with
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and to be confined at
Fort Columbus, N. Y., for eighteen months. Nine months of
this sentence were remitted by the reviewing authority, and
the prisoner is now serving sentence, which will expire
November 16, 1897. He bas recently applied to the President, through military channels, for a pardon.
In your letter you say: "To assist the Depa1·tment in
making a recommendation in forwarding the application to
the President, I have the honor to request your opinion on
the following point:
"In the event of a pardon being granted this man by the
President, has the Secretary of War authority to permit
him to enlist again in the Army under the present law,"
I do not deem this a case in which I am authorized to give
an opinion. Cases in which the Attorney-General is authorized to give opinions to the heads of Executive Departments
are such as are actually pending in such Departments and
involving the legal questions submitted. Two very important contingencies must occur before the question of the
effect of the President's pardon to Buchanan upon his right
to reenlist can arise. In the first place, he must become the
recipient of the Executive clemency, and in the second place
he must make application for reenlistment. If the President should pardon Buchanan, and Buchanan in turn should
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make application to reenli t, then the question as t o the
legal effect of the pardon upon Bu b a nan's disability
incurred unuer the statute ·ov rning the r eenlistment of
solcliers would be directly pre ented, and not until then .
I am supported in my declination to give an opinion in
this ~atter in jts pre ' ent tatus by ~umerous opinions h eretofore rendered, and I cite particularly 9 Opin., 421 : " The
Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an important
legal question when it is not practically presented by an
existing case before a Department."
20 Opin., 536: ''The Attorney-General is neither required
nor authorized to give an opinion to the head of a Depart.
ment except in cases actually pending for decision by him
in such Department."
21 Opin., 109: The authority of the Attorney-General to
advise the head of a Department "officially is confined to
cases actually and presently arising in the administ ration"
of his Department.
Opinion .of March 25, 1897 (21 Opin., 509): "The opinion
of the Attorney-General may be asked by the head of any
other Executive Department ~ on any question of law arising
in the administration or his Department.' (Rev. Stat., 356).
The inquiry must relate not to a mere moot question, but to
one which requires immediate action. The answer must
be necessary for the protection of the officer making the
inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the action which be
is about to take."
These citations are sufficient to indicate that this is not a
case in which I am authorized to give an opinion.
There is no legal principle involved in the course which
you may take in forwarding Buchanan's application for a
pardon to the President. You can recommend the . pardon
or refuse to recommend it, as you may deem consistent with
the facts in the case. An opinion upon the legal effect of a
pardon could have no possible bearing upon the lawfulness
of the official action to be taken in forwarding B uohanan's
application to the President.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The
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DECLARATIONS TO INVOICES.
Tho person making the declara,t ion to an invoice of goods intended for
shipment from a foreign country to the United States under sections
2 and 3 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, is not
required to be actually present before the consul, vice-consul, or
commercial agent of the United States in order to authorize such
consular officer to certify such invoice.
All that is necessary in order to authorize such consular officer to certify
the invoice produced, with the declaration indorsed thereon signed,
and with the oath attached, is that he shall be satisfied that the person making the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to be;
that he is a credible person, and that the statements made under
such oath' are true.
If he should have doubts as to the identity of the person making the
declaration, as to his credibility, or as to the truthfulness of the statements set forth in the declaration, he would have the right to require
the declarant to come personally before him.
Under section 249, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the Treasury has
power to prescribe rules and regulations for the collection of duties
on imports, and the question as to where and in what m anner the
oaths to the declarations indorsed on invoices shall be taken is more a
matter of regulation or instruction for the government or" the consular
officers than of construction of the statute.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 15, 1897.

Sm: I find among the matters in this Department not
acted upon by my predecessor a communication from you
under date of December 17, 1896, asking an opinion upon
section 3 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890,
chapter 407.
You say that it has been represented to the Treasury Department that houses which maintain branches in Manchester,
England, for the purpose of collecting and forwarding to the
United States shipments purchased in various places in Great
Britain are put to serious inconvenience by the requirement
that declarations to invoices under the above section shall be
made in the respective consular districts in which such purchases are made, and it is proposed that such declarations
shall be made before any officer who has been duly authorized
under the laws of the respective countries to administer oaths,
or before any United States consul, and that the invoice, containing the declaration duly indorsed thereon, shall be produced for authentication to the United States consul in the
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district from. which the goods are to be exported. You cite
sections 1715, 2855, and 2862 of the Revised Statutes, and
request an opinion as to whether there is any legal obj ection
to a consul issuing a certificate to an invoice when the person
who ·makes the declaration and takes the oath does not in
person present it to him for authentication.
Section 2 of the act under consideration prescribes the
manner of making the invoice of goods intended for shipment
from a foreign country to the United States. Section 3 of
the act provides that the invoice thus prepared shall be produced to the consul, vice-consul, or commercial agent of the
United States of the consular district in which the merchandise was manufactured or purchased, as the case may be, for
export, and the invoice shall have indorsed on it, when so
produced, a declaration signed by the purchaser, manufac- .
turer, owner, or agent, setting forth that the invoice is in all
respects correct and true, and was made at the place from
which the merchandise is to be exported to the United States,
and that it contains, if the merchandise was obtained by
purchase, a true and full statement of the time when, the
place where, the person from whom the same was purchased,
and the actual cost thereof, and of all charges thereon as
provided by this act.
Section 1715 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows:
"No consular officer shall certify any invoice unless he is
satisfied that the person making oath thereto is the person
he represents himself to be, that he is a credible person, and
that the statements made under such oath are true, and he
shall thereupon, by his certificate, state that he was so satisfied."
These three sections seem to be easily construed and the
meaning readily arrived at; that is, that the invoice, prepared
as required by section 2, shall be produced to the officer or
agent of the United States 11amed in section 3, of the consular district in which the merchandise described in the
invoice was manufactured or purchased, and at the time of
the production of the invoice to the officer or agent named
it must have indorsed on it a declaration signed by the
purchaser, manufacturer, or owner of the merchandise, or
the agent of such purchaser,manufacturer, or owner, that the
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invoice is in all respects correct and true and was made at
the place from which the merchandise is to be exported to the
United States, etc. In addition to being signed, the declaration must be sworn to, anc~ all that is necessary in order to
authorize the consular officer to certify the invoice produced,
with the declaration indorsed thereon signed, and with the
oath attached, is that he shall be satisfied that the personm~king the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to be,
that he is a credible person, and that the statements made
under such oath are true. I see no reason why the consular
officer could not issue a certificate to the invoice when the
person who makes the declaration and takes the oath is not
personally present before such officer. I see nothing in the
law which requires that the person making the declaration
should be actually present before the consul, vice-consul, or
commercial agent, nor is there anything in the statutes that
indicates that the oath to the declaration should be administered only by such consular officer. The only requirement
seems to be that the invoice, with the declaration, in proper
form as required by the act, shall be produced to the consul,
vice-consul, or commercial agent of the United States of the
consular district in which the merchandise was manufactured
or purchased, as the case may be. But if the consular officer
before whom the invoice is produced with a declaration
indorsed should have doubts as to the identity of the person
making the declaration, as to his credibility, or as to the
truthfulness of the statements set forth in the declaration, he
would have the right, if necessary, to require the declarant
to come personally before him. The law, as set forth in the
sections cited, vests in the officers of the United States who
are required to certify invoices a large discretion as to what
will be required in order to place them in a position to certify such invoices. This power is derived from section 2862
of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:
"All consul;:tr officers are hereby authorized to require,
before certifying any in voices under the provisions of the
preceding sections (being sections 2853 and 2854 of the
Revised Statutes, which sections are now repealed, and sections 2 and 3 of the act of June 10, 1890, substituted therefor), satisfactory evidence, either by the oath of the person
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presenting such invoice or oth rwi e, that such invoices are
correct and true. In the · rci e of the discret ion hereby
given the consular officer hall be governed by such general
or special regulations or in tructions as may be fro m time to
time established or given by the Secretary of State.''
It will be observed in this section that the oath of the person presenting an invoice to the consular officer is not indispensable, but the power is conferred upon such officer to
ascertain that the invoice is correct and true, either by t he
oath of the person presenting it or otherwise, thus confiding
to the consular officer the authority to ascertain t he facts
upon which to base his certification of an invoice in any feasible and proper manner, subject, however, in the exercise of
this discretion, to general or special regulations or instructions established or given by the SP-cretary of State.
The power is also conferred upon the President to prescribe regulations and to make and issue orders and instructions for the government of the ·diplomatic and consular
officers, under section 1752 of the Revised Stat,utes, which
reads as follows :
'' The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations and make and issue such orders and instructions, not
inconsistent with the Constitution or any law of the United
Sta,tes, in relation to the duties of all diplomatic and consular
officers, the transaction of their business, etc. * * *
from time to time as he may think conducive to the public
interest."
·
I call attention also to section 249 of the Revised Statutes:
'' The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the superintendence of the collection of duties on imports and tonnage
as he shall judge best."
Under this sect.ion the Secretary of the Treasury undoubtedly is authorized to prescribe reasonable rules and such as
are necessary to secure the collection of the duties on imports
and to protect the United States from irregular or fraudulent
proceedings.
Upon the whole, the statute is clear, and the question as
to where and in what manner the oaths to the declarations
indorsed on invoices shall be taken is more a matter of reg-
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ulation or instruction for the government of the consular
officers than of construction of the statute.
Respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CHINESE.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to permit the r eturn to
the United States of Chinese laborers who left for China after having
received the necessary certificates entitling them to return, and availed
themselves of the extension of one year provided by the treaty of
1894, and who, although they left China in sufficient time to reach the
United States within the extended year, were delayed in quarantine
by the Canadian authorities, so that in fact they did not reach this
country until three days late.
In the extension of one year the treaty has made the sole provision for
delay, and in any event the laborer must return to the United States
within the additional year. .
Neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor the collector has discretion to
inquire into causes of further delay or grant an additional extension.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 16, 1897.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communica ion of the 21st ultimo, requesting my opinion as
to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the
treaty of 1894 between the United States and China, to allow
the admission to this country of two Chinese laborers, Dang
Tip and Dang Ng, who apply for permission to return under
the following circumstances:
The treaty of 1894 (Art. I) ab_solutely prohibits the coming
of Chinese laborers fo the United States, except under specified conditions. Article II, prescribing these conditions,
permits a registered Chinese laborer, having certain interests
here in the way of kin or property, to leave the United States
and come back, upon complying with certain regulations.
The laborer must deposit with the collector of customs of the
district he departs· from a statement identifying and bring- \
ing himself within the article. Thereupon the collector furnishes him a certificate of his right to return . . '' Such right
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"But uch right of r turn to the nited States may be
e tended for an additi n l period, not toe ceed one year, in
cases where, by rea on of i kne or other cau e of disability
beyond his control, such Chin e laborer shall be r endered
unable sooner to return, which facts shall be fully r eported
to the Chinese consul at the port of departure and by him
certified, to the satisfaction of the collector of the port at
which such Chinese subject shall land in the United States."
Such being the law, Dang Tip and Dang Ng left the United
States at the Vermont district on l\Iay 28, 1895, each having,
after compliance with the regulations, received a certificate
from the collector at St. Albans assuring him of his right to
return within twelve months from that date.
Before the twelve months expired each of the laborers
availed himself of the extension of one year, Dang Tip on the
ground of sickness and Dang Ng because ~f the death of his
wife.
Knowing their certificates, as extended, would expire May
28, 1897, the two left Hongkong on April 7, 1897, and, being
detained in quarantine by the Canadian authorities at Van-.
couver, did not reach the United States until three days after
their certificates had expired. They apply for admission on
the ground that they left China in time to get here before
their certificates expired, and were prevented by a cause beyond their control, namely, the Canadian quarantine. For
this they say they ought not to suffer.
It might be suggested that a quarantine is not "actus
Dei," but an ordinary incident of travel by sea, to be contemplated by one undertaking a voyage• but aside from this
consideration, it is apparent that in' the ~xtension of one
year the treaty has made the sole provision for delay,
whether "by reason of sickness or other cause of disability
beyond the control" of the laborer desiring to return. Mode

TO 'l'HE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

577

Contracts for Na v 111 Supplies-Advertisements.

of proof of such course of delay is provided and a limit put
on the period of extension; in any event the laborer must
return to the United States within the additional year. In
the case of an extension the date of the original certificate
and the date of the return must control. Neither the collector
nor the Secretary of the Treasury has discretion to inquire
into causes of further delay, or grant additional extensions.
The impracticability of enforcing the treaty if such inquiries
are permitted is apparent.
My opinion, therefore, is that the Secretary of the Treasury
has no authority to permit the return to this country of the
laborers mentioned.
Very respectfully,
JOHN K. RICHARDS,
Solicitor-General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACTS FOR NAVAL SUPPLIES-ADVERTISEMENTS.
A contract with a gun company for the manufacture and delivery to the
Navy Department of a number of guns, the manufacture of materials
to be subject to the inspection and approval of the Department, supplemented by an agreement providing for the manufacture of the
guns at a particular place, and for keeping an account of the cost of
labor involved., in order to arrive at the remuneration ultimately to be
paid to said gun company, is a contmct for supplies to the Navy
Department, and not for services, and a contract with another company for the manufacture of any of said guns may be made by the
Navy Department as a coµtract for ordnance without submitting the
subject-matter thereof to competition by public advertisement.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1897.

Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of July 15, in which you inclose copies of a
contract dated February 5, 1897, between the Navy Department and the Maxim-Nordenfelt Company, of London, England, and of an agreement supplemental thereto, dated April
14, 1897, for the manufacture and delivery of 100 1-pounder
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Maxim- orden:£ lt gun with a ·ce ory parts. You state
that the avy Department, in view of the importance of
maintaining in th
nited tate factories for the manufacture of guns of thi' type, i willing to bave a certain number of Ma ·im-Nordenfelt gun o contracted for made by the
American Ordnance Company, of Bridgeport, Conn., and
has the consent thereto of tbe Maxim-N ordenfelt Company,
and you request an expression of my opinion whether a contract made by the Navy Department with the American
Ordnance Company for the construction of any of the guns
embraced in the contract and agreement above described
could be made as a contract for "ordnance" under section
3721 of the Revised Statutes, without submitting tbe subjectmatter thereof to competition by public advertisement, or
whether such contract would fall within the meaning of
section 3709 as a contract for services requiring advertisement "a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting
the same."
Section 3709 provides that "all purchases and contracts
for supplies or services in any of the Departments of the
Government, except for personal services, shall be made by
advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same, when the publ1c exigencies do not require the
immediate delivery of the articles or performance of the service." Section 3721 provides that '' the provisions which
require that supplies shail be purchased by the Secretary of
the Navy from the lowest· bidder, after advertisement, shall
uot apply to ordnance, gunpowder," etc.
The contract ~ith the Maxim Company of February 5, 1897,
contempiates that they shall manufacture and deliver or
furnish to the Navy Department 100 guns, the manufacture
of materials to be subject to the inspection and approval of
the Department. The agreement of April 14, 1897, supplements and modifies the contract, chiefly by providing for the
manufacture of the guns at the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, and by certain provisions for keeping account of the
cost of labor involved, in order to arrive at the remuneration
ultimately to be paid to the Maxim Compa~y. In view of
these facts it is my opinion that this is a contract for sup-
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plies to the Navy Department, and not for services, and as
such is excepted by section 3721, relating, among other articles, to ordnance, from the provisions of section 3709 respecting advertisements for proposals.
I therefore answer your question by stating that a contract made by the Navy Department with the American
Ordnance Company for the manufacture and delivery of any
of said 100 guns under the terms and conditions of the contract and agreement with the Maxim-Nordenfelt Company
would be a contract for "ordnance," which could be made
without submitting the subject-matter thereof to competition by public advertisement.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH MCKENNA.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF 'l'HE NAVY.

ARMY OFFICERS-VOLUNTEER SERVICE.

Persons who served during the rebellion in the Army of the United
States as officers in the volunteer service and have been honorably ·
mustered out of such service, are entitled to bear the official title, and
upon occasions of ceremony to wear the uniform of the highest grade
they have held in the volunteer service.
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

July 23, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 14th ultimo, requesting tlin opinion
whether section 1226 of the Revised Statutes is applicable
to persons who were officers in the volunteer service during
the late war, but are not now officers in the Regular Army.
The request for the opinion grows out of the application
of James F. Farrell, late a captain of the Fifth New York
Heavy Artillery, and brevetted major of United States Volunteers, to your Department for instructions as to the kind
of uniform he is entitled to wear under this section.
. I am not altogether satisfied that the application of this
private citizen raises a question of law in the administration
of your Department which properly calls for an opinion from
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ction in u tion r ad a follows:
" E . L26.
11 offic r \ ho have served during the rebellion as volunte rs in the Army of the United States, and
have b en honorably mu tered out of the volunteer service,
shall be entitled to bear the official title, and upon occasions
of ceremony to wear the uniform, of the highest grade they
have held, by brevet or other commissions, in the volunteer
service. The highest volunteer rank which has been held
by officers of the Regular Army shall be entered, with their
names, respectively, upon the Army Register. But these
privileges shall not entitle any officer to command, pay, or
emoluments."
This section speaks for itself; the language is plain; it
requires no construction. ln its leading features-the bearing of an official title and the wearing of a uniform upon
occasions of ceremony-the section applies only to ex-officers
who have served during the rebellion as volunteeri:;, and have
been honorably mustered out of that service, and are not now
in the Regular Army. The only privilege granted to officers
of the Regular Army who acquired rank in the volunteer
service is the entry of their highest volunteer rank upon
the Army Register.
Both departmental and legislative construction confirm
the accuracy of the above conclusions. (War Department,
General Orders, No. 78, August 24, 1867; act of February 4,
1897, 29 Stat., 511.)
Your question is therefore answered in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
JOHN K. RICHARDS,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R.
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CHINESE-CERTIFICATES AS TO CITIZENSHIP.
The certificate of a, United States commissioner states that a Chinaman
charged with •unlawfully coming within the United States, after a
:full hearing, was adjudged to have the lawful right to remain in the
United States, and was accordingly discharged, it appearing that h e
is a citizen of the United States: Held, that certificates of this character should not be accepted as sufficient evidence of the right of the
holders to enter this country.
Since the act of May 6, 1882, no court has jurisdiction to admit Chinese
to citizenship.
Whether or not children born in this country of subjects of the Chinese
Empire are to be recognized as citizens of the United States: Qumre.
:0EP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 4, 1897.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of July 30, 1897, transmitting a copy of a report,
dated July 26, 1897, with its original inclosure, from the
collector of customs at Burlington, Vt., relating to the
admission into this country of Chinese -persons who present
certificates (in the form of the said inclosure) issued by
F. W. McGettrick, United States commissioner for the district of Vermont. You request my opinion whether, under
existing laws, certificates of the character referred to should
be accepted as sufficient evidence of the right of the holders
to enter this country.
The certificate states, under the hand and seal of the commissioner, that on complaint of the United States attorney
for said district, one Chu Lock did, on or about March 16,
1896, unlawfully come within the United States, and that
said defendant was on said date brought before the commissioner, and after a full hearing it was adjudged that the
defendant had the lawful right to remai.n in the United
States, and he was accordingly discharged, it appearing
that he was a citizen of the United States.
The third section of the act of May 5, 1892 (Chines'e
exclusion act, 27 Stat., 25), provides" That any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent
arrested under the provisions of this act, or the acts
hereby extended, shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within
the United States unless such person shall establish by
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affirmative proof, to the sati faction of such justice, judge,
or commissioner, his lawful right to remain in the United
States."
It is to be presumed that in the case in hand, and in similar cases, the defendant has established by affirmative
proof, to the satisfaction of the commissioner, his lawful
right to remain in the United States; but whether or not
the character and measure of the proof has met the requirements of the act, it appears from the face of the certificate
that the ground of defendant's right to remain in the U nited
Statts is his alleged citizenship. Is he or can he be a citizen of the United States, being a Chinese person or person
of Chinese descent,
·
The fourteenth section of the act of May 6, 1882 (1 Supp.
Rev. Stat., 342) provides" That hereafter no State court or court of the United
States shall admit Chinese to citizenship, and all laws in
conflict with this act are hereby repealed."
It is therefore clear that since the date of this act no court
has had jurisdiction to admit Chinese to citizenship. It has
been held that a :iiative of China is not entitled to become a
citizen of the United States under the Revised Statutes as
amended in 1875 (in re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155; 21 Opin., 37),
and it is not yet finally decided whether or not children born
in this country of subjects of the Chin-e se Emperor ·are to be
recognized as citizens of the United States. A case is pending in the Supreme Uourt in which that question is raised,
but an opinion bas not yet been handed down. A different
question would be presented in the case of a child of Chinese
parents born in this country, and whose father had been
legally naturalized, but this state of facts is not presented
on the papers submitted.
I am therefore of the opinion that certificates of the character referred to should not be accepted as sufficient evidence
of the right of the holuers to enter this country.
I return herewith the original certificate, as you request.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The ~E 'RETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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FUR SEALS-ATTORNEY-GEr ER.A.L.
A request for au opinion failing to state definite facts showing by what
persons, in what manner: ancl during what period of the year fur seals
arc being killed in the passes of the Aleutian Islands, it is impossible
to determine whether the administrative duty imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section 1956, Revised Statutes, is or is not
qualified by the provisions of the act of April 6, 1894.
In the absence of facts presenting a case actually or presently arising
ancl pending in the administration of a department, calling for action,
which can not be determined by the Attorney-General without usurping judicial functions, his official :opinion can not be required.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE,

Aitg'llst 6, 1897.

Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of July 19, 1897, in which you express the view that
the opinion of my predecessor, under date of January 5, 1897,
regarding fur seals, to which I have referred you in my letter
of July 10, is limited to questions affecting the Macah Indians,
and leaves undetermined the question whether or not the
act of April 6, 1894, which was passed to carry into effect
the provisions of the Paris award, repeals in whole or in
part the provisions of section 1056, Revised Statutes; and
you ask whether, in the event s~ction 1956 is repealed by the
said act, it is lawful for any person to take fur seals in the
passes of the Aleutian Islands, provided, in so doing, they
comply with the requirements of sections 1 to 5 of said act of
April 6, 1894.
In your previous letter of July 8, 1897, to which the foregoing correspondence related, you stated that you had been
informed by the lessee of the sealing right on the Pribilof
Islands that seals are being caught and killed by unauthorized persons in the passes of the Aleutian Islands, and that
the lessee has requested that steps be taken to prevent such
kil1ing, and you then ask the following questions:
'' First. Does the act of April 6, 1894, repeal the provisions
of section 1956, Revised Statutes, in whole or in part,
"Second. If said section 1956 ii-; not affected by said act of
April 6, 1894, is it lawful for Indians or others to kill fur
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--12
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, provid d th y comply with the
provision of se tion 1 to r- f aid , t of April G, 1894. ,,,
ou do not tate, for m c n id ration, any definite facts
showing by what per on ·, in what manner, and during what
period of the year fur eal are b ing caught and kill~d in
the pa e of the leutian I land a alleged. It is neces;
sary to have this information in order to determine properly
whether the admini trative duty imposed upon you by section 1956 to prevent the killing of fur seals is or is not qualified, in any special case ubmitted, by the provisions of the
act of April 6, 1894. In the absence of such facts presenting
a case actually or presently arising and pendin g in the
administration of your Department, calling for action, this
question can not be determined by me without usurping
judicial functions and construing generally the effect produced upon section 1956 by the act of April 6, 1894, apart
from reference to a specific case demanding the exercise of
your administrative duty. Nor is it proper for me to give a
list in advance of the persons, places, and times embraced
in the prohibitions of the said section and the permissive
provisions of the act of April 6, 1894. I can only answer as
to each case as it arises.
It has been held by my predecessors from a very early date
that an official opinion can not be required and is not authorized, except. in accordance with these principles. I direct
your attention to the following recent opinions among others:
(18 Opin., 487; 19 Opin., 414,696; 20 Opin., 383,440, 526, 602,
614, 618; 21 Opin., 106).
For these reasons I am precluded from responding to your
request until I receive such statement of facts as is herein
indicated, with such new formulation of the legal questions
arising as may seem to you to be required in view of the facts
presented.
Respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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REVOCATION 01!' CONTRACT-FERRY SERVICE.
In the contract for ferry service between Ellis Island immigrant station
and the barge office, New York, to continue for three years, and thereafter from year to year, until terminated by notice from either party,
given sixty days before the end of the original period or any one year
thereafter, and in which it was also covenanted that the contract
might be annulled and terminated at any time hy the Secretary of the
Treasury for good and sufficient cause: Held, that the burning of the
buildings on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant station from
that place, and the discontinuance of the ferry service, supplied a
good and sufficient cause to the Secretary oft.he Treasury for the termination of the contract.
·
What one party to a contract may have personally understood a provision to mean at the time the contract was made can not avail.
What both parties understood controls, and that is to be ascertain~d
from the language of the contract itself.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 11, 1897.

SIR: On July 1, 1896, Daniel Butterfield, doing business
as "The Brooklyn Annex," entered into a contract with the
Becretary of the Treasury" to perform and carry on the ferry
service" between the Ellis Island immigrant station and th e
barge office in New York for a stipulated price per day "for
each and every day during the said time that the said ferry
service shall so be performed," agreeing, for the purpose, to
build a new ferry boat, subject to approval by the Commissioner-General of Immigration.
The contract provides that it shall continue in full force
for the peri~d of three years ending June 30, 1899, and thereafter from year to year until terminated by notice from either
party, given sixty days before the end of the original period
or any one year thereafter. ~hen follows this paragraph:
'' Ninth. It is further covenanted and agreed that this contract may be annulled and terminated at any time by the
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for good and
sufficient cause."
After inviting my attention to the contract, and more particularly to the provision quoted, you state that, in view of
the recent :fire at Ellis Island, there is no further necessity
for · this ferry service, and you request my opinion whether
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und r thi par. TaI h ou b av authority to t erminate the
contra t.
The cont ntion of t h c ntr actor is that th e words "good
and uffi ient an e in th paragr aph mean a cause good
and ufficient in law; that t h e con tractor so un derstood at
the time he entered int the outract, otherwise he would
not have e pend d th money b e did to build and equip a
boat ve uliarly adapt ed to t h e service, and uufit for any
other u e, without large addition al out lay.
What one party to a contract may have personally understood a provision to mean at the time t he contract was made
can not avail. What both parties understood controls, and
that is to be ascertained from the lan guage of the contract
itself.
While it is possible the termination of t he contract may
work some hardship to the contractor, it is certain that its
continuance, under the circumstances, results in daily needless expense to the Government.
The contract provides for a period of three years, and for
an extension from year to year thereafter , with power on
either side to terminate it after sixty days' notice. A failme
or refusal by either party to perform. the cont ract during its
continuance w·o uld be cause in law for its termination, without any special provision to that end. What, th en, was the
object of insertiug the ninth paragraph ! Obviously to provide for .a contingency like that which has occurred, the
happening of some event which would put a stop to the
necessity for the ferry service. The Secretary of the Treasury entered into the contract to serve a public purpose. Be
agreed to pay for a ferry service because it was n eeded by
the Government. Appreciating the fact that something
might occur to terminate the need for the service, he reserved
the right to abrogate the contract when the service it provided for should no longer be required in the public interest-in other words, to terminate it "for good and sufficient
cause."
I do not understand that the words,, good and sufficient
cau se " are so vague and indefinite as to lack meaning and
effect. Similar word s were construed by the Court of Claims,
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speaking by Judge Weldon, in the case of Starin v. United
States (31 C. Cls., 66, 88) ::
"It is not necessary, as insisted by the defendants, to go
to the extent of holding that the words '' good and sufficient
cause" are ine~ective. We hold that in this case they are
effective to the extent that they circumscribe the power of
the defendants to the limits of good faith, and change the
power of cancellation from an arbitrary and absolute power
to a power regulated by good faith on the part of the party
exercising it."
·
There can l:;le no question but that the burning of the
buildings on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant
station from that place, and the absolute discontinuance of
the ferry service supply a cause "good and sufficient" for
the termination of the contract by the Secretary of the
Treasury. In the light of these facts it could scarcely be
urged subsequently that the Secretary in abrogating the
contract acted otherwise than in good faith, and upon reasonable grounds, such as would induce a prudent public officer
to annul the contract in the protection of the interests confided to him.
It is t)lerefore my opinion that, in view of the circumstances mentioned, you have authority, under the ninth
paragraph, to terminate the contract.
Very respectfully,
JOHN K. RICHARDS,
Solicitor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY.
SAN PRDRO HARBOR, &c.-RIVER AND HARBOR ACT.
The river and harbor act of 1896, provided for a deep water harbor of
commerce and of refuge at either San Pedro Harbor or Port Los Angeles
and the appointment of a board to select the place and determine the
plans of improvement.
The decision of the board as to iocation of the harbor is final.
The report of the board considered and the conclusion reached that the
project reported by t,hem is a breakwater, and that it fulfills the
provision of the law and will make within its meaning a harbor for
commerce and refuge.
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August 9, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge th e receipt of your
communic tion of ugu. t 3, in relation to San Pedro Harbor.
Th inquiry you propound (which will be stated hereafter)
grow out of the provi ion of the river and harbor act of
1896 and a r port of a board of engineers provided to be
appointed by it.
You expres doubts of your duty and power under the
act and report of the board as to whether the appropriation
is sufficient to provide for a harbor both of commerce and
refuge. After some discussion you say" It is possible, however, that in order to complet e this
harbor for commerce and of refuge there may be private
subscription by those who are financially interested in the
matter, to enable the building of the breakwater, and also
to create or deepen the inner harbor and approach to the
same. The opiu~on of the Attorney-General is therefore
respectfully requested as to whether the War Department
would be justified in advertising for the whole work, and in
making a depth of 25 feet instead of 30 feet as suggested in
my communication of May 18, heretofore referred to (which
would be ample, in my opinion, for the present commerce of
the Pacific centering there), and also for an inner harbor
(harbor of commerce of, say, half the dimensions named in
my letter of May 18)."
This inquiry, may be, should be answered in the negative,
but I think the law and your powers under it and as determined by the report of the board may be considered more
broadly.
The provision of the river and harbor act is as follows:
"For a deep-water harbor for commerce and of refuge at
Port Los Angeles, in Santa Monica Bay, California, or at San
Pedro, in said State, the location of said harbor to be determined by an officer of the Navy, to be detailed by the Secretary of the Nav·y, an officer of the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
to be detailed by the Superintendent of said Survey, and three
e perienced civil engineers, skilled in riparian work, to be
apI)oint d by tbe Pre ident, wbo shall constitute a board,
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and who shall personally examine said harbors, the decision
of a majority of which shall be final as to the location of said
harbor. It shall be the duty of said board to make plans,
specifications, and estimates for said improvement. Whenever said board shall have settled the location and made
report to the Secretary of War of the same, with said plans,
specifications, and estimates, then the Secretary of War may
make contracts for the completion of the improvement of the
harbor so selected by said -board, according to the project
reported by them, at a cost not ~xceeding in the aggregate
two million nine hundred thousand dollars, and fifty thousand dollars is hereby appropriated, so much thereof as may
be necessary, to be used for the expenses of the board and
payment of the civil engineers for their services, the amount
to be determined by the Secretary of War: Provided, however, That if the board hereby constituted, as in this section
provided, shall determine in favor of the construction of a
breakwater at Port Los Angeles, no expenditure of any part
of the money hereby appropriated shall be made, nor shall
any contract for the construction of such breakwater be
entered into, until the Southern Pacific Company, or the
owner or owners thereof, shall execute an agreement and file
the same with the Secretary of War, that any railroad company or any corporation engaged in the business of transportation, may share in t.he use of the pier now constructed
at Port Los Angeles, and the approaches and tracks leading
thereto, situate westerly of the easterly entrance to the Santa
Monica tunnel, upon such just and equitable terms as may
· be agreed upon between the parties, and if they fail to agree
then to be determined by the Secretary of War; and before
any ~xpeuditure of the money hereby appropriated is made
for the construction of a breakwater at Port Los Angeles
said Southern Pacific Company, or the owner of the tracks
and approaches leading to said pier, shall execute an agreement and file the same with the Secretary of War, that any ·
railroad or transportation company or corporation desiring
to construct a wharf or pier in Santa Monica Bay may, for
the purpose of approaching such wharf or pier, and for the
purpose of constructing and operating the same, cross the
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trac1 r track • 1 p' ach , and riO'ht of way now used by
the outb rn P citi '
mp, ny nnd r uch r egnlations as
ma b pr rib d b y th
·r tary of War, alHl upon the
payment of nch ompeu , ti 11 a that otlicer may find to be
rea OU ble: Pro? i4e(7, further, Tha,t in vent said harbor is
located at Port Lo
no- 1 no greater rnyalty 011 the rock
u ed for the con ~truction of the breakwater tha11 twelve and
· a half cents a cubic yard shall b charged, and the Southern
Pacific Company shall charge no more than one ha1f a cent a
ton mile for freight on rock tram:;ported over its road ."
The statute therefore I rovided for a deep-water harbor
for commerce and of refuge at one of two places-San Pedro
or Port Los Angeles-and the appointment of a, board to
select the place and determine the plans of improvement.
It will be observed that the powers of the board are large.
There is a limitation of the amount to be expended; in all
else the judgment of the board is free. They decide between
the places, and the contracts of the Secretary of War are to
be "according to the project reported by them." The decision of the board is final as to location, and it shall be their
'' duty to make plans, specifications, aud e8timates for said
improvement," and upon their report "the Secretary of War
may make contract8 for the completion of the improvement
* * * according to the project reported by them." The law
itself besides indicates the project. Both the places mentioned are open roadsteads ; in both, therefore, a breakwater
is necessary to make protected water-a harbor of refugeand this may be a harbor of commerce as well. Obviously
so at Port Los Angeles, as we shall see.
'fhe report is voluminous, too much so to be quoted, and yet
it can hardly be understood any other way. The double function of the board to select, and hence compare sites and
report plans for both, led them into comments and comparisons and an intermingling of considerations somewhat confusing; nor did they accurately discriminate that which was to
be Government work from that which was to be the work of
private enterprise or that which was necessary now and that
which might become so with the advance of time and trade.
I do not think, however, that the quays or pier or wharves or
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the excavation of the docks formed by them are a part of the
project reported. They are the means by which private enterprise may avail itself of the project. Some piers were already
so erected at Port Los Angeles. They were the property of
the Southern Pacific Company and were to remain so. The
law only required that other transportation companies should
be allowed to use them, but,.however, '' upon such just and
equitable terms" as should be agreed on, or, if agreement fail,
"then to be determined by the Secretary of War."
From a careful consideration of the report of the board, I
am of the opinion that the project reported by them is a
breakwater and that it fulfills the provision of the law and
will make within its meaning a harbor for commerce and
refuge.
Respectfully, yours,
JOSEPH Mi:KENNA.

The

SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR.

DISCRIMINATING DU'l'Y-DINGLEY TARIFF ACT.
Diamonds imported into the United States from Canada, not in the
usual course of strictly retail trade, which were the productions of a
foreign country not contiguous to the United States, are subject to
a discriminating duty of 10 per cent under section 22 of the tariff act
of July 24, 1897.
In determining the liability of the diamonds to the discriminating duty,
it is not necessary to ascertain the mode of conveyance used in transporting them into the United States from Canada.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 11, 1897.
SIR: In your communication of the 6th instant you state
that recently, since the tariff act of ,July 24, 1897, went into
effect, certain diamonds have been imported into the United
States from the Dominion of Canada, a foreign country contiguous to the United States. These diamonds were the
production of a foreign country not contiguous to the United
States, and were worth $90,000, so they can not be regarded
as imported in the usual course of strictly retail trade. The
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m thod of tran p rtation f h diamond from Canada into
th
nited Stat e' , b th r by ve el, rail, or otherwise, is
not tated.
Aft.er calling at t nti n to t h e pr ovisions of section 22 of
the tariff act of July 24, 1 97, you inquire''First. Whether a di criminating duty of 10 per cent under
section 22, hould be levied on the diamonds described;
" Second. Whether, in determinin g t h e liability of the diamonds to the discriminating duty, it is material to ascertain
tbe mode of conveyance u ed in transp orting them into the
United States from Canada."
Section 14: of the tariff act of August 28, 1894, provided a
discriminating duty of 10 per cent on goods imported in
foreign vessels, with certain exceptions, the section reading
as follows:
4 ' SEC. 14. That a discriminating duty of ten per centum
ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall
belevied,collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or merchandise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United
States; but this discriminating duty shall not apply t o goods,
wares, and merchandise which shall be imported in vessels
not of the United States, entitled, by treaty or any act of
Congress, to be entered in the ports of the United States on
payment of tbe same duties as shall be paid on goods, wares,
and merchandise imported in vessels of the United States."
Section 22 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, continued the
discriminating duty imposed by section 14 of the former law,
and added a discriminating duty of 10 per cent on all goods
which," being the production or manufacture of any foreign
country not contiguous to the United States, shall come into
the United States" from a contiguous country, without being
imported "in the usual course of strictly retail trade." The
full text of the section is as follows:
"SEC. 22. That a discriminating duty of ten per centum
ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall
be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or merchandise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United
States, or which, being the production or manufacture of any
foreign country not contiguous to the United States, sh all

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

593

Discriminating Duty-Dingley Tariff Act,

come into the United States from such contiguous country;
but this discriminating duty shall not apply to go.ods, wares,
or merchandise which shaJl be imported in vessels not of the
United States, entitled at the time of such importation by
treaty or convention to be entered in the ports of the United
States on payment of the same duties as shall then be payable on goods, wares, and merchandise imported in vessels
of the United States, nor to such foreign products or manufactures as shall be imported from such contiguous countries
in the usual course of strictly retail trade."
The former law imposed a discriminating duty only on
goods imported in certain foreign vessels. The present law
imposes a discriminating duty also on goods which come into
the United States from a contiguous country and are the
product of a foreign noncontiguous country and are not
imported "in the usual course of strictly retail trade."
It will be observed that the word ''imported" is not used
in connection with goods which "come into"the United States
from a contiguous country, save in the exception exempting
goods ''imported in the usual course of strictly retail trad~ ;"
but for the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary to
consider the precise effect of the words "come into," as distinguished from the word "imported," if indeed there be any
difference in meaning.
In determining whether the goods under consideration are
subjAct to the discriminating duty, it is not material to ascertain th A ruode of transportation or method of importation; it
is sufficient to know that they "come into" the United States
from a contiguous country, and are within a class subject to
duty, namely, are the "production or manufacture of a foreign country not contiguous to the United States," and are
not "imported in the usual course of strictly retail trade."
Your first question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative; your second in the negative.
Very respectfully,
JOHN K. RIOHARDS,
Solic-itor- General.
Approved.
JOSEPH MCKENNA.

The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
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n t d t rmine, wit,hout considering
t a bar in Flnshin g Creek, formed
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,
g the attention of the town authorities
of 1'.,lnsbing to the matter, a may b advisable.
The Attorney- eneral i preclucl d from answering questions of fact or
from onsidering que tions of fact on evidence submitted.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A1igust 19, 1897.

SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of August 4,
1897, with its inclosures, relating to a complaint of certain
citizens of the town of Flushing, N. Y., that soiid matter discharged through a sewer of said town into Flushing Creek
is forming a bar in the creek and thereby injuring the navigable capacity of the same.
It ~ppears from your statement that this sewer drains about
one-half of the town and receives the storm waters from several streets, and that there is a bar of very hard, fine sand in
Flushing Creek opposite the mouth of the sewer extending
nearly halfway across the creek and thereby offering obstruction to navigation; and it also appears that the available
depth of water at high tide in the remainder of the channel
opposite the bar is as much as prevails in the bay. Certain
action in the premises having been recommended to you, you
request my opinion whether this case comes within the
exception provided in section 6 of the act of August 17, 1894.
(28 Stat., 363).
The said section provides, among other things, as follows:
"That it shall not be lawful to place, discharge, or deposit,
by any process or in any manner, ballast, refuse, dirt, ashes,
cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other
matter of any kind other than that · flowing from streets,
sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the waters
of any harbor or river of the United Stat.es, for the improvement of which money has been appropriated by Congress,
el ewbere than within the limits defined and permitted by
tbe ecretary of War."
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It is evident that before the legal questions arising can be
properly considered by me certain questions of fact should
be determined or agreed upon, viz: Whether or not the bar
complained of is formed by discha,rg~ from the sewer, which,
so far as appears, is left to inference; and whether the sand
or other material is discharged merely in suspension and is
then deposited upon the bar by the ordinary prompt action
of gravity, or passes out in solution and is then precipitated.
The facts on these points are necessary to determine the
question whether the sand or sewage passes from the sewer
in a liquid state within the meaning of the above act.
As I am precluded from answering questions of fact or
from considering questions of fact on evidence submitted, I
am obliged to decline at present to answer your question
(19 Opin., 672; 20 Opin., 253). I reach this conclusion without prejudice to your right to take such action, inviting the
attention of the town authorities to the matter, as may seem
to you advisable. I return the papers herewith.
Respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.

The

SECRET.A.RY OF

W .A.R.

ADVERTISEMENTS FOR PROPOSALS-DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Advertisements, such as those for proposals for the interior finish of a
public building in the District of Columbia, need not be made in six
newspapers published in said rnstrict.
The selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements of this
character in the District of Columbia is in the discretion of the heads ·
of the departments.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 24, 1897.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of August 20 relating to previous correspondence concerning public· advertising in the District of Columbia, and
advising me that the Treasury Department contemplates at
an early date advertising for proposals for the interior :finish
of the new post-office building in this city, and stating your
views that unless it is incumbent under the law to advertise
SIR:
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in six new papers publi hed in the District of Columbia, in
accordance with the provi ions of the act of January 21,
1 81 (21 Stat., 17), the intere ts of the Government would
be better sub-erv d by the u
of a less number of news11ap rs.
ou th refore a k to be advi 'ed if it is necessary,
und r the exi ting law, to ad erti 'e the matter referred to in
six newspapers published in the District of Columbia.
The act referred to provides that all advertising required
by existing laws to be done in the District of Columbia by
any of the departments of the Government shall be given
to one daily and one weekly newspaper of each of the two
principal political parties, and to one daily and one weekly
neutral newspaper.
By section 1 of the a~t of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 342), so
much of section 3836 of the Revised Statutes as required all
advertisements, notices, and proposals for contracts for "all
of the Executive Departments of the Government " among
other matter to be advertised by publication in the District
of Columbia, was repealed. Section 3709 of the Revised
Statutes (amended by the act of January 27, 1894, 28 Stat.,
33, and by the act of April 21, 1894, 28 Stat., 58 ), which
requires advertisements for proposals for all purchases and
contracts for supplies and services in any of the departments
of the Government, except for personal services, does not
require the advertising to be done in the District of Columbia.
There appears to be no law now in force requiring the
publication of advertisements of this character in the District of Columbia, and it is therefore my opinion that the
selection of newspapers in which to publish such advertisements of the Treasury Department in the District is in your
discretion as head of the department, and I therefore conclude that it is not necessary for you under the existing law
to advertise the matter referred to in six newspapers published in the District of Columbia. (See 14 Opin., 577.)
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRET.A.RY OF 'I.'HE TREASURY.
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DINGLEY TARIFF ACT-DISCRIMINATING DUTY.
Certain goods came from Japan via Vancouver, B. C., and thence per
railroad through Canada to Chicago in cars sealed at Vancouver by a
United State!'! consular officer: Held, not to be subject to a discriminating duty, as section 4228 Revised Statutes is noti repealed by section·
22 of the Dingley tariff act.
The J>urpose of this section was to secure to United States vessels the
transportation of goods by sea by discriminating against transportation in other vessels to ~he United States, and also to prevent evasion
to a contiguous country.
To hold that there should be a discrimination by different duties upon
importations, direct or indirect, under section 22 of the above act,
would be to put a new purpose in the law and destroy its unity.
This is not compelled by its language or any mischief intended to be
remedied.
Section 22 of this act and section 4228 Revised Statutes, as amended, are
not coextensive in scope, therefore are complements of each other.
Section 4228 Revised Statutes is in effect made a proviso to section 22 of
the Dingley tariff ac't by the act of July 24, 1897, and as such is not
repugnant to section 22.
,
The opera.tion of section 22 commences with its passage and continues
until it is suspended according to section 4228 Revised Statutes, and
again takes effect if the reciprocal exemptions of foreign nations be
withdrawn.
Savings and exceptions are often introduced in a statute from excessive
caution. It would sometimes pervert the intentions of an author of
a writing if every other thing of the same general tenor as that
excepted should be regarded as embraced in the general words.
Where two acts are passed on the same day, the order of their passage
is not important if they can be reconciled.
Two acts under legislative consideration at the same time should be
construed as contemporaneous acts in arriving at the intent of the
legislature.
Irreconcila,ble conflict is necessary for an implied repeal of a statute,
and the presumption is stronger against implied repeals where provisions supposed to conflict are in the same act or were passed at nearly
the same time.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 20, 1897.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of August 10. It is not necessary to quote
all of it. You say:
"On the 6th instant I had the honor to submit for your
consideration a copy of a letter received by me from the
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pecial a nt at Ogden burg, N. Y., which in
v lv d the que tion whether, und r ection 22 of the new
tariff' act, a di criminatin g duty of 10 per cent should be
a e sed upon certain diamond br ought into the United
tate from the contiguou territory of Canada.
· '' Since the date f my letter above referred to, I have
received from the collector of customs at Chicago a requestfor instructions as to the as essment of discriminating duty,
under the above provision of law, upon certain goods which
came from Japan via Vancouver, British Columbia, and
thence per railroad through Canada to Chicago. These
goods arrived in Ohicago in cars, sealed at Vancouver,
British Columbia, by a United States consular officer, under
regulations of the Department which are based upon the
treaty of Washington, and upon section 3102 of the Revised
Statutes."
You inquire, shall these goods be subject ed to a special
discriminating duty of 10 per cent!
An answer to your inquiry depends upon the interpretation of section 22 of the Dingley tariff bill and its effect on
section 4228 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 22 is as follows:
"That a discriminating duty of ten per centum ad valorem,
in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall be levied,
collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or merchandise which
shall be imported in vessels not of the United States, or
which being the production or manufacture of any foreign
country not contiguous to the United States, shall come into the
United States from such contiguous country; but this discriminating duty shall not apply to goods, wares, or merchandise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United
States, entitled at the time of such importation by treaty or
convention to be entered in the ports of the United States
on payment of the same duties as shall then be payable on
goods, wares, a.nd merchandise imported in vessels of the
United States, nor to such foreign products or manufactures
as shall be imported from such contiguous countries in the usual
course of strictly retail trade."
The italics are mine and indicate the affirmative changes
made in preexi ting laws.
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Three plausible contentions are based upon this section
which, as to strength, only differ in degree.
(1) That the duty is a discrimination upon importatious
in vessels not of the United States, whether directly to the
United States or to a contiguous country and thence to
the United States.
(2) A discrimination against importations of goods (not in
the usual course of strictly retail trade) from a contiguous
country, they not being the products thereof. In this the
character of the vessel is not important.
(3) A discrimination against goods, being the productions
of a foreign country not contiguous to the United States,
which shall come into the United States fro~ a contiguous
country.
In this contention the words "come into the United
States" are used as designating movement only.
Under the first and second contentions the duty would
not be imposed. Under the third it would be-I hence select
it as a basis for consideration.
To support it it is said that the section imposes the duty
in two cases: (a) when the goods are imported in vessels
not of the United States and to the United States; ( b) when
they are the production of a country not contiguous and
come into the United States from a ·contiguous country,
the character of the vessel in which they were transported
to the contiguous country being indifferent.
The first case we are not now concerned with and the second is attempted to be established by the following reasoning. The goods (which are the subject of inquiry) are
Chinese or Japanese production, hence the production of a
foreign country "not contiguous to the United States."
They come into the United States from Canada, a contiguous
country, and so it is urged that by the letter as well as by
the spirit of the statute they are subject to the duty.
It is conceded that the importation is to the United Statespassage through Cana,da , being mere movement only toward
destination-the latter being the United States. This being
so, it would seem that there was no reason to distinguish
between that importation and what may be called in distinc10892-VOL 21,
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tion a dire •t ne-, b one hould b burdened and. the other
n t burdened- h n he di rirnination was not necessary ·
to the main purp se f the law. It i said that the purpose
of th amendm nt wa to r lieve the American transcoutiuental railroad again t the competition of the Canadian
Pacific I ailroad. It may be admitted that this is a strong
consideration, but, on the other hand, it is urged that this
competition is a benefit, and other American railroads claim
that the Canadian Pacific is a direct advantage to them.
How Congress regarded this conflict we have no means of
knowing. There was certainly no avowal, and the only
expressions of Members which we have indicate a different
purpose than one which might or might not have been entertained, and which if it had been entertained it would seem
the natural thing to have explicitly declared.
As there was no reason, therefore, why the importationsindirect or direct-should be discriminated by different
duties, I am not disposed to think that it was intended. To
so hold would be to put a new purpose in the law-destroying its unity-which is not compelled by its language or any
mischief which we may say was in the contemplation of the
lawmakers to be remedied.
'.rhe section therefore regards, as the law which preceded
it regarded, the transportation of goods by sea. Its purpose
was to secure this to vessels of the United States by discriminating against transportation not in them primarily to
the United States, secondarily and to prevent evasion, to a
contiguous country-Canada or Mexico. The necessity of it
to the effectiveness of the law is obvious. Mere distance
from the port of Vancouver to an American custom-house
was as accidental to an importation that way as mere distance from the port of San Francisco to a New York customhouse was to an importation that way. The essential fact
to be regarded was that Vancouver was not in the United
States and that Canada was a contiguous country. That
could be a means of evasion. It would have been useless to
have imposed a discriminating duty on goods brought to San
Francisco in foreign vessels and leave them free to go to
Vancouver in foreign vessels and thence across the intervening land to the D nited States.
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The amendment of the law which is made by section 22
therefore continues its object while it strengthens and better
secures it. It does this in two ways, if I may repeat-by
taking away the means of its evasion through the contiguity
of Canada and Mexico and by repealing the statutory
exemptions from the 10 per cent duty: The special effect of
this repeal I will consider hereafter.
I have considered your inquiry so far as if the section only
regarded mere transportation through Canada. We shall
see hereafter that it has a broader scope.
In the second contention the words'' come into the United
States" are used as synonymous to imported. The language
"being the production or manufacture of any foreign country
not contiguous to the United States" is urged only as
descriptive of the goods to which the duty applies. The
goods themselves, it is contended, must take their departure .
from the contiguous country in the strict sense of importation as distinguished from coming through it as an importation from some other country. I do not consider it necessary
to detail the reasoning advanced to support this view. I
have already given my interpretation of the words "come
into" and that of the provision in which they are contained,
and it would serve no purpose to make a circumstantial dissent from any other. I may say, however, that this view is
given plausibility to by the exception that the duty shall" not
apply to such foreign products or manufactures as shall be
imported from such contiguoµs countries in the usual course
of retail trade." It is said that the words "imported in the
course of strictly retail trade" indicate the rule. They are
claimed to be the opposite of importation in the course of
wholesale trade and that the latter must be direct, as those
by retail could be no other way. But this does not follow.
Such construction would confine the rule strictly to the
exception, whereas it may be broader-including importations strictly so called-those which take their departure
from a contiguous country if the other conditions of the rule
exist. If so, the exception has an adequate and proper office.
But it is not even necessary to go this far. '' It is a matter
of common experience that savings and exceptions are often
introduced from abundant and excessive caution. And it

602

HON. JOSEPH M°KENNA.
Din gley Tariff Act-Dis crimin ati u g Duty.

would sometimes pervert the intention of the author of a
writing if every other thing of the same general tenor as.that
excepted should be regarded as embraced in the general
· words." (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 222.)
It follows, therefore, that the answer to your inquiry so
far as section 22 is concerned depends (1) upon the character
of the vessel in which the goods were carried to Vancouver;
(2) if in foreign vessels, whether the goods were entitled by
treaty or convention to be entered in the ports of the U nited
States upon the payment of the same duties as if imported
in American vessels.
-I assume the vessels were not of the United States, but
British vessels, and this brings me to your communication
of August 1~, in which you inquire whether section 22
repeals sections 4228 to 4232 of the Revised Statutes, and
your communication of September 2, asking whether manganese ore, imported from Chile in the British bark Lurlie
to Philadelphia, is also subject to a discriminating duty.
A law imposing discriminating duties has been on the
statute books in some form from the time of the enactment
of the first tariff bill.
In the form (substantially) it maintained until section 22
was passed it was inserted in the act of May 22, 1824. Section 2 of that act was as follows:
'' SEO. 2. And be it further enacted, That an addition of ten
per centum shall be made to the several rates of duties
hereby imposed upon the several articles aforesaid, which,
after the said respective times for the commencement of the
duties hereby imposed, shall be imported in ships or vessels
not of the United States : Provided, That this addition shall
not be applied to articles imported in ships or vessels not of
the United States entitled by treaty, or by any act of Congress, to be admitted on payment of the same duties that
are paid on like articles imported in ships or vessels of the
United States."
This section, with unimportant verbal changes, became
section 14 of the act of 1890 and section 2502 of the Revised
Statutes.
In section 22 there is a change. There is omitted from it
the words "by any act of CongTess." Does this repeal sec-
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tion 42281 It will be observed that there are no words of ·
express repeal. The effects of · the acts of Congress are
avoided, and this may not be the same as to section 4228 as
to sections 4229 and 4230, which grant exemption directly to
Prussian vessels. However, consideration will be simplified
by a reference to contemporaneous legislation.
On the same day the Dingley bill was approved an act
entitled "An act to authorize the President to suspend discriminating duties imposed on foreign vessels and commerce"
was approved. I shall hereafter, for convenience, call it the
suspension act. It is as follows:
"That section forty-two hundred and twenty-eight of the
Revised Statutes is amended by adding to the same the following, to wit: 'Provided, That the President is authorized
to suspend in part the operation of sections forty-two hundred and nineteen and twenty-five hundred and two, so that
foreign vessels from a country imposing partial discriminating tonnage duties upon American vessels, or partial discriminating import duties upon American merchandise, may
enjoy in our ports the identical privileges which the same
class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in said
foreign country.'"
It will be observed that it recognizes the existence of section 4228 and amends it and enlarges the President's power.
By 4228 that could only be exercised w1en no discriminating
duties were imposed or laid on American vessels. The
amendment provides that the power may be exercised to
meet and respond to partial discriminating duties as well,
reciprocating th~ exact privilege though less than total exemptions.
This act is somewhat confused by its Teferences. It refers
to section 2502 of the Revised Statutes. That is the same
in words as section 14 of the act of 1890 (the Wilson bill), and
this is expressly r~pealed by section 34 of the Dingley bill,
while section 2502 is not mentioned, but its provisions in
exact words are carried into section 22. But notwithstanding this confusion, the act does recognize the existence of
and extends section 4228, and it also recognizes section 2502.
What is the effect of this l The act and the Dingley bill
were passed on the same day, and I do not think the order
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of passage is important if they can be reconciled. ( Crane
v. Reeder, 22 Mich., 331.) If either repeals the other, it is
only by implication. There are no words of express repeal.
The rule of implied repeals is well established by a long line
of cases. There must be more than difference-ther e must
be irreconcilable conflict (Red Rocle v. Henry, 106 U. S., 596,
and cases cited), and " the presumption is stronger against
implied repeals where provisions supposed to conflict are in
the same actor were passed at nearly the same time." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, section 153; see also E ndlich
ou the Interpretation of Statutes, section 45.)
Let us apply this rule.
Section 22 and section 4228 are both commercial r egulations, and what the effect of section 22 would be on the ot her
if subsequent in time and not accompanied by legislative interpretation is easily perceived to be different when contemporaneous in time and so accompanied. In Crane v. R eeder
(supra) two acts passed at the same session of the legislature
were under consideration. The court said, speaking by
Christiancy, J.: * * * ' 4 It is not possible to ascertain wit h
certainty which was first passed by that body [senate], nor
which was first approved by the governor, though a loose
inference may be drawn that the governor's approval of the
special act was communicated to the senate prior to his
approval of the revision. * * * Both the revised statutes,
as a whole, and the special act in question were, however,
approved by the governor on the same day, May 18, 1846; and
which was first actually passed by the legislature or first
approved by the governor we do not deem at all material to
the discovery of the legislative intent. It is sufficiently certain that both were practically under the legislative consideration at the same time, and were, properly speaking, contemporaneous acts, and should be construed as such in arriving at the intention of the legislature."
In the case of Payton v. Moseley (3 Monroe), the court of
appeals of Kentucky, speaking by Judge Mills, of two acts
said:
"lt is true, as observed by the court below, the expression of this latter act are very broad, and ifit had not passed
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at the same session with the former, it might, by the ordinary rules of construction, be held to be a repeal of the former, pro tanto.
"But with regard to acts of the same session, we apprehend that the rules of construction are somewhat different.
When they are compared together, they ought to be construed as one act on the same subject ; and the presumption
of so sudden a change or revolution in the minds of the legislature ought not to be indulged. There ought to be an
express repeal, or an absolute inconsistency between the two
provisions, to authorize a court to say that the latter had
repealed the former."
And the supreme court of the State of California, by Judge
Sanderson, in People v. Jackson, said of two acts claimed to
conflict : "Both acts were passed upon the same day, and
relate to the same subject-matter. They are, therefore,
according to a well-settled rule of interpretation, to be read
together, as if parts of the same act."
Section 22 and section 4228 and amendments are not coextensive in scope; in purpose, therefore, they may be the complements of each other. One prescribes a rule, the other the
condition upon which, and the agency by which, it may be
suspen<led. Each, therefore, has its purpose-definite and
consil:3tent. Section 4228 might be a proviso to section 22
and is in effect made so by the suspension act, and as such
proviso it is certainly not repugnant to section 22. The latter has its operation-commencing with its passage, continuing until the conditions of section 4228 occur, and the
President acts on account of them, resuming again if the
reciprocal exemptions of foreign nations be withdrawn.
Examples of this are familiar in our legislation. The provision in the Dingley bill for reciprocity of trade is such an
example. Under that the duties of the act may be changed.
An example not so direct, but of the same principle, is found
in the case of Russel v. Williams (106 U.S.). It would seem
from the import of language that a statute imposing duties
on articles was exclusive of prior ones, regular or discriminating, whether they were imported from or were the product of one country or another. It was held, nevertheless, -in
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Russel' v. Williams that a discriminating duty on the products of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, when
imported from places west of it, was not repealed by subsequent acts, though not repeated in them or mentioned by
them. In this case it is true there was the distinction
between a commercial regulation and provisions for revenue
duties, but the principle of the case is that where there is
difference in purpose legislative provisions may be independent. But the rule of repeal by implication does not
require us to find independence. If there is n ot irreconcilable conflict, the laws may exist together. A.s we have
already seen, there is certainly no irrecoucilable conflict.
Even if there was more conflict in their language-more in
their purpose-this would have to yield to the interpretation
of the time and manner of their passage. The su spension
act was reported to the House of Representatives by the
same committee which reported the Dingley bill; was considered and passed while that act was in memory. I t passed
the Senate while the Dingley bill was pending in consideration, and was approved by the President on the same day
the Dingley bill .was. A. knowledge of its relations to that
bill and its effect on it must, therefore, be attributed t o the
legislature. It may be it was the later bill, for the Congr essional Record shows that the President's approval of it was
communicated to the Congress subsequently to tha1, of the
other.
Even a more extreme position might be taken. It was
held in Mead v. Bagnall and others (15 Wis., 156) that
'' Where the provisions of a statute which relates to a particular class of cases are repugnant to those of another
statute approved the same day, which is of a more general
character, the former must prevail as to the particular class
of cases therein referred to." (S(,e also Endlich on the
Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 216, and cases cited.)
It follows, therefore, that section 4228 was not repealed by
section 22, and that the merchandise of both inquiries is not
to be subjected to a discriminating duty.
Respectfully,
JOSEPH MCKENNA..
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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GALVESTON HARBOR.
Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor, the railway to be built upon trestlew~rk following the line of the jetty
must be at the expense of the Government, whether it is the case of
original construction or extension.
The Government must bear the expense of maintaining the r ailway
upon the original work and upon the extension, after the suspension
of operations upon these respectively.
DEP A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

November 15, 1897.
Sm: On May 12, 1891, the Government entered into a
contract with O'Connor, Laing & Smoot for improving the
entranc_e to Galveston Harbor, Texas, wherein it was agreed:
"That the said O'Connor, Laing & Smoot shall construct
the railway and trestle and furnish and place the sandstone,
riprap, and granite blocks required for the construction and
maintenance of the north and south jetties for improving
the entrance to Galveston Harbor, Texas, and also for the
extension of the same to any required distance beyond the
outer crest of the bar, but not beyond the contour of thirtyfoot depth in the Gulf of Mexico."
Among the specifications which are attached to and form
a part of the contract are the following:
"1. General outline of work.-The plan of the works contemplates the construction of two jetties, one on the south
side and one on the north side of the entrance to Galveston
Harbor. The south jetty has been partially constructed by
the Government, taking 1ts origin near the junction of Ninth
street and Avenue A, at the east end of the city of Galveston, and extending out to the crest of the bar in the
Gulf of Mexico, which obstructs the entrance to Galveston
Harbor. This jetty has a present total length of about six
miles. It has been completed for a length of nearly four
miles, of which nearly two miles constitute the shore branch,
commencing near the junction of Avenue A and Ninth street,
as noted above, and the remainder being the jetty proper,
extending out into the Gulf. * * * It is proposed to
complete this jetty, * * * and to build the north jetty
* * * and to maintain both jetties for a period of five
years after construction * * *
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"2. General method of construction.-A railway of standard
guage will first be constructed upon trestlework following
the line of the jetty. The material will then be deposited
aboi1t and between the piles." * * *
"5. Railway.-The railway is to be of standard guage, its
axis to coincide in plan with the axis of the jetty. * * *
They (the rails) are to be carried upon trestlework constructed as follows: Bents of piling will be driven fifteen
feet from centre to centre; each bent capped with a piece of
12-inch by 12-inch timber, ten (10) feet long. * * * Upon
the caps will be placed two twelve-inch by fourteen-inch
stringers, upon which the rails will be laid. * * * Additional strength will be given to the trestle when required,
the additional amount paid therefor to be the actual additional cost to the contractor."
"9. Use of railicay.-During the period of the contract
the contractor will be allowed the use of the railway now
existing upon the completed portion of the southjetty, and of
that built under this contract, for the purpose of transporting the material to be delivered by him, and he wm be
required to keep the track and trestle in good repair, but
should extraordinary damage occur from storms the repairs
will be the subject of special adjudication; and the decision
of the engineer officer in charge as to what constitutes
~xtraordinary damage, and what portion thereof should be
borne by the contractor, shall be final. All temporary side
tracks and switches must be provided by the contractor at
his own expense."
"14. Extent of the worlcs.-The exact distance out in the
Gulf to which it will be necessary to carry the jetties can not
be determined in advance, but it will not fall short of the
outer crest of the bar, nor will it extend beyond the contour
of the thirty-foot depth outside the bar. The United States
re erves the right to suspend operations upon either or both
of the jetties at any point between these two limits, and the
work shall then, for the purpose of releasing the percentage
referred to in specification 21, be considered complete, and
further operations shall then consist in maintaining the
work in good condition and in extending them further into
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the Gulf, should the engineer officer in charge think proper
to make such extension at any time withiu five years after
this suspension of work." * * *
Specification 15 required prices to be given separately for
each of the thirteen items, twelve being for blocks of stone
or concrete, of different weights and locations per ton, and
the thirteenth for the" railway, including trestles and rails
complete and ready for service, per linear foot." Under each
item the price bid was to cover the cost of all labor required
to put the material in place.
'' 18. Maintenance.-The works will not be considered completed until they shall have been maintained a period of five
years aner their construction. Whenever repairs become
necessary, the engineer officer in charge shall notify the contractor of the character and approximate quantity of the
materials required, and the contractor shall, within thirty
days from the date of such notification, begin the delivery
of the materials, and shall push the work of repair with diligence. The prices paid for materials used in maintenance
will be the same as those for the original work and the terms
of payment will be the same, except that there shall be no
retained percentage.
"19. Extension of jetties.-Should it be necessary, in the
opinion of the engineer officer in charge, at any time within
the five years after the original construction of the jetties,
to extend them further into the Gulf, the contractor shall
begin such extension within sixty days from the date of notification, and all of the terms and conditions which governed
the original work shall apply to such extension, but the contractor will not be required to maintain such extensions for
a period beyond the termination of the five years during
which he is required to maintain the original works."
"21. Payments.-At the end of each ~alendar month, or as
soon thereafter as the necessary formalities can be complied
with, payment will be made for work accomplished during
the month, less ten per cent of its contract price. The
retained per cent does not become due until the completion
of the works." * * *
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After inviting my a tention to the above contract, in your
communication of August 10, you submit the follo wing question for my opinion:
'' There is a proposition pending in the War Department
to enter into supplementary contract to relieve the contractors from the maintenance for five years of the jetties as
originally constructed. It is said that, if it is the duty of
the United States to pay for the necessary repairs that are
to be made on the railroad situated on the works during the
five years the works are to be maintained after being completed, it would be to the interest of the United States to
enter into the supplementary contract referred to, but that
if under the contract it is the duty of the contractors to make
said repairs at their own expense, it would not be to the
interest of the United States to enter into such supplementary contract, and in this way the question bas arisen,
and as before stated is now pending, which it is necessary
to have decided before further action can be taken on the
proposition to enter into the proposed supplementary co11tract. This question is, whether under the said contract of
May 12, 1891, the United States or the contractors should
bear the cost of maintaining the railway upon the original
work, and upon its extension, after the suspension upon these,
respectively."
At the time the contract was entered into, the south jetty
had been partially constructed by the Government, having
then a total length of 6 miles, of which 4 miles had been
completed, 2 miles constituting the shore branch and the
remainder being the jetty proper extending out into the Gulf.
It was proposed by the contract to complete this jetty, to
build the north jetty, and to maintain both jetties for a period
of five years after construction (spec.1). In building the jetties, the Government reserved the right to suspend work
after the jetties should reach a certain point, and _then, if
thought necessary, to direct their extension at any time
within five years after such suspension (spec. 14). So the
contract provided for three things: First, the work of original
con truction to a point between the outer crest of the bar and
th 30-foot depth outside the bar (spec. 14); second, the maintenance of the e works for a period of five years after the
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work of original construction should be suspended (spec. 18);
third, the extension of the jetties farther into the Gulf,
should that be deemed necessary (spec. 19).
In constructing the works provided for, the contractor was
required, first, to build a railway of standard gauge upon
trestlework following the line· of the jetty. The material
was then to be deposited about and between the piles (spec.
2), the railway becoming, as it were, the backbone of the
jetty. For the railway in place the contractor was to receive
so much a linear foot; for the stone and concrete blocks so
much a ton. Of the contract price for both railway and
stone work 10 per cent was to be retained until the completion of the works. (Spec. 21.)
There is no dispute that, in the case of original construction, and in the case of extension, the Government must
bear the expense of building the railway as a part of the
works which become the property of the United States. Is
this true with respect to maintenance under specification 181
Specification 14, wherein the Government reserves the right,
after the jetties shall have been carried a certain distance
out in the Gulf, to suspend operations, provides that, for the
purpose of releasing the retained 10 per cent under specification 21, the work shall be considered complete, " and further operations shall then consist in maintaining the works
in good condition and in extending them farther into the
Gulf," should the Government so require. What was to be
extended farther into the Gulf, should the Government so
reqnire1 Unquestionably, the railway and the jetty built
under and about it, constituting " the works." What was
to be maintained, should the Government not require any
extension 1 Obviously the same thing-"the works," both
railway and jetty, or, if you please to put it so, the jetty, in_
eluding the railway. In specification 19, providing for the
extension of the jetties, the works required to be maintained
are described as '' such extensions;" the thing extended is
railway and jetty, and the same thing, the extension, must
be maintained under this specification.
At whose expense is this to be done1 In specification 18
it is provided that" the worlcs will not be considered completed until they shall have been maintained a period of five
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years after their construction." These are not different from
"the works" referred to in specification 14-works which
have been constructed, and might be extended, and must
be maintained. For maintenance, the contractor is to be
paid the same prices as for original construction, the language of the contract being', "The prices paid for materials
used in maintenance will be the same as those for the original work." In the case of original work materials in place
alone were paid for-completed railway at so much a foot,
stone and concrete in place at so much a ton, these prices
covering all labor required. (Spec. 15.) If in maintaining
the rail way it does not become necessary to rebuild any part
of it, there is provision for giving additional strength at a
price to be measured by the actual additional cost to the
contractor. (Spec. 5.)
The doubt as to the proper construction of the contract
referred to in your question is evidently due largely to the
apparent requirement in·specification 9, that the contractor
shall keep the railway in repair "during the period of the
contract," but what this specification really provides, as a
careful reading shows, is that the contractor will be allowed
the use of the railway during said period. He is allowed the
use, not only of the railway built by him under the contract,
but of that "now existing upon the completed part of the
south jetty," and this privilege is granted upon the condition
that he "keep the track and trestle in good repair," extraordinary damage from storms excepted. The obligation to
keep in repair is not therefore consequent to the construction
of the railway, but accompanies and flows from its use.
The railway, that already constructed and that to be constructed, becomes a part of the permanent works belonging
to the United States; so the Government permits its use on
condition that the contractor shall keep it in good repair.
The exception of extraordinary damage from storms strengthens the conclusion that the damage to be made good by the
contractor is that which occurs while the railway is being
used by him, attributable to causes for. which he may fairly
be held responsible.
The railway and trestle were to be built first, the stone
and concrete placed under and about it to complete the jetty.
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The railway thus built is incorporated into and becomes a
part of the jetty. The provision for maintenance at the
expense of the Government takes cognizance of the fact
that the action of the elements will probably damage and
partially destroy the work of the contractor. The same
causes which damage and partially destroy the stonework
will, in all likelihood, at the same time damage and partially
destroy the railway. Why pay the contractor for maintaining the stonework and not pay him for maintaining the
railway¥ In neither case is he responsible for the damage;
in each the elements alone are to blame. The prices for
maintenance are those provided for original construction.
The price for stonework in original construction was not put
at a figure to cover the cost of building a railway to deliver
it in place. The .railway was paid for separately. If the
price for stone in original work did not cover the cost of
building the railway, neither will the price of stone in maintenance cover the cost of rebuilding and maintaining it.
Answering your question, I am therefore of the opinion
that the railway built under this contract becomes a part of
the works belonging to the United States, and that the Government must bear the expense of maintaining it upon the
original work and upon the extension after the suspension of
operations upon these respectively.
It appears that early in 1895, about two years after work
had been suspended on the south jetty, the War Department
ordered an extension of the jetty further into the gulf. To
enable the contractor to proceed with the work of extension,
the Government paid him for repairing and in part rebuilding
the railway on the south jetty. There was no authority for
this expenditure, if the contract requires the contractor to
bear the expense of maintaining the railway for five years
after the suspension of the original work. The action
amounted to a departmental construction of the contract in
line with the conclusions reached in this opinion.
Very respectfully,
JOHN K. RICHARDS,
Solicitor-General.
Approved.
JOSEPH McKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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CIII ESE.
Certain Chinese persons of alleged American birth who entered the
United States were deported to Canada, but subsequently returned
to the United States: Held, the Collector of Customs h as the right to
enforce his exclusion by again returning them to Canada .

DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE,

November 19, 1897.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of November 11, in which you transmit a copy of a
letter dated November 5, with its in closures, received by you
from the collector of customs for the port of Burlingt on , Vt.,
in relation to the admission of Chinese persons to th is country. From the collector's letter it appears that ten Chinese
persons of alleged American birth entered bis district and
were at once returned by him to Canada, and that these ten
Chinese have again presented themselves in bis district.
The collector questions his authority to again deport them,
and before answering the collector's letter you desire an
expression of my views upon the subject.
By the act of August 18, 1894, chapter 301, paragraph 6
(2 Supp. R. S., 253), it is provided that"ln every case where an alien is excluded from admission
into the United States under any law or treaty now existing
or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such
alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. "
Iu the case of Lem JJ1oon Sing v. United States (158 U. S.,
538,548) the Supreme Court, in commenting upon this act,
say:
"But by the act of 1894 the decision of the appropriate
immigration or c:ustoms officers excluding an alien 'from
admission into the United States under any law or treaty'
is made final in every case, unless, on appeal to the Secretary
of the Treasury, it be reversed."
And the court add that they do not express any opinion
on the question whether in the case before them the applicant wa entitled of right under some law or treaty to reenfor the nited States, but decide that that question has been
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constitutionally committed by Congress to the named officers
of an executive department of the Government for final
determination. There is no reason to doubt that this decision is applicable to an applicant seeking to enter the United
States under claim of right, as well as to reenter.
To hold that Chinese persons, after being excluded by a
collector of customs at a frontier port under the authority
of the above act and decision, may again return to this country and appear in the collector's district, claiming that he
has no further jurisdiction over them, will be to set at
naught the plain provision of the act of August 18, 1894, and
the determination of the Supreme Court regarding it. I am
therefore of the opinion that the collector of customs at Burlington has the right to enforce his exclusion as to the Chinese
persons in question, being in his district, by returning them
to Canada.
Very respectfully,
JOSEPH l\1cKENNA.
The SECRETARY OF '.l'HE TREASURY.
10892-V0L 21, P'.l' 3-14

*INDEX-DIGEST OF OPINIONS.
-A.BANDONMENT.
SEE CUSTOMi?_ LAWS AND REGULATIONS,

8-10.

ABSENCE, LEAVES OF.
1. The operation of the act of March 3, 1893, with reference to leaves
of absence in the Treasury Department, is confined to clerks
and employees in the city of Washington. 338.
2. Employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing are entitled
to leaves of absence under the act of July 6, 1892, notwithstanding the act of March 3, 1893. Ib.
3. Section 41 of the act of March 1, 1889, providing for leaves of
absence, in case of an authorized encampment or parade, for
members of the National Guard employed by the United States
and the District of Columbia, is not repealed or modified by
section 5 of the act of March 3, 1893, which regulates and limit~
leaves of absence for private reasons or purposes. 353.
4. Absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of military duties is not to be charged to the thirty days' leave allowed
them for rest and recreation. lb .
5. The provisions in the legislative appropriation act of March 3,
1893, relative to annual and sick leaves of absence, does not
apply to employees of the Department of Agriculture outside of
the city of Washington. 427.
ACCOUNTS.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not required under the act of
July 31, 1894, to report to Congress the balances due on postal
accounts for the prior fiscal year. 296.
2. The methods adopted in the settlement of accounts for the transportation of the Army under the act of March 3, 1879, are not
applicable to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of
the Navy and Marine Corps. ~ 297.
3. Where Congress has omitted some accounts from an act covering
certain accounts for transportation, it is evident that the inte11tion was that it should not apply to all accounts for transportation furnished under preceding acts. Ib.
ACTIONS.
1. Third persons claiming title to the land patented under the act of
March 3, 1851, may bring a suit to declare a trust in said lands.
Such suit may be brought in the State courts and without the
aid of the Attorney-General. The decision of a State court
upon snch a suit unappealed from binds the parties thereto,
wltether righteous or erroneous. 13.

· * See Inclex to Subjects, p. xvii.
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ACTIO S-Continued.
2. ·when such thircl person fail to sue uutil the period of the statute
of limitations of the State has expired, they are barred by their
laches from suing th reafter. That they had meanwhile been
applying to Congress for relief is immaterial. Ib.
3. The Attorney-G neral should not institute for the ben efit of private
parties a suit to vacate or reform a United States land patent
unless there is a reasonable ground to believe that it w ill be
sustainecl by the court, or except for a wrong which private
litigation could not remedy. Ib.
4. The United States does not suffer itself to be suetl without its
consent. 18.
5. Public property can be subject to claims against it only when it
is in the possession of the courts by act of the Government seeking to have its rights established. Ib.
6. As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain
bonds issuecl by certain States and owned by the United States
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478.
7. One may proceed on the same cause of action against the same
defendants in as many different jurisdictions as be can have
service of process executed upon the defendants. 447.
8. One final judgment on the merits rend~red in one action can be
pleaded in bar in all others upon the same cause of action. lb.
9. The appearance of parties to a suit in one jurisdiction does not
operate as an abandonment of proceedings instituted by them
in another jurisdiction, the parties to the cause of action being
the same. lb.
ADVERTISEMENTS.
1. All purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the departments
of the Government mnst be made after advertisement, unless
immediate delivery of the articles is necessary. 59.
2. The first two sentences of section 3709, Revised Statutes, as
amended apply to purchases anywhere in the United States,
while the remaining three sentences apply only to purchases in
the city of Washington. Ib.
3. Revised Statutes, section 3709, prohibiting the purchase of supplies except after advertisement, does not apply to paper and
materials for the Government Printing Office, and the acts
amendatory thereof enlarge it in respect to this office only so
as to apply to fnel, ice, stationery, and miscellaneous supplies.
137.
4. The purchases to be made by the Public Printer as contemplated
by the act of January 12, 1895, are paper and materials for
printing and binding public documents and such as do not come
within section 3709, Revised Statutes. Ib.
5. nd r sections 3709 and 3718, supplies of every n~me and nature
for the avy are to be purchased by contract upon advertisem~nt, xcept in ca e wb 11 the pnl.,li • exigency will not permit
of delay, anll theu by optJu p,m.: lrn- o ash tween individualA. 181.
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6. The act of January 12, 1895, transfers the authority to contract
for envelopes to the Postmaster-General; and this act must be
construed in pari materia with sections 3709 and 37..3, Revised
Statutes. lb.
7. Contracts for the purchase of seals by the United States, used to
secure packages while being transported in bond, must be
awarded upon advertisement. 304.
8. Advertisements for proposals in accordance with the provisions of
section 3709, Revised 8tatutes, are not required for supplies or
services for the Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb.
349.
9. The Maxim-Nordenfelt Company contracts to furnish the Navy
Department 100 guns. By a supplemental agreement provision
is made for the manufacture of the guns at the Naval Gun
Factory in "\Vashington and for ascertaining the remuneration
ultimately to be paid the Maxim Company: Held, That this is
a contract for ordnance and another contract may be made by
the Department with the American Ordnance Company for .the
manufacture and delivery of any of said guns under the contract and agreement with the Maxim- N ordenfelt Company
without submitting the matter to competition by public adver.tisement. 577.
·
10. It is competent for the Secretary of State to prohibit the publication in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American
Republics of advertisements of private :firms or corporations.
514.
11. The bulletins containing such advertisements may be sent through
the mail free of postage. lb.
12. It is not necessary under existing law for the Secretary of the
Treasury to advertise in six newspapers published in the District of Columbia for proposals for the interior finish of the
post-office building in the city of Washington. 595.
13. 'l'he selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements
of this character in the District of Columbia is in the discretion
of the head of the Department. lb.
14. The advertisements in Le Petit Journal, a French publication,
considered and held to fall within the prohibited class defined
in section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, and therefore unmailable. 171.
See Brns, 6.
AGENT.
The authority t,o collect drawbacks may be delegated by a manufacturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law,
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed
broker unless he obtains himself a license. 255.
See WORDS AND PHRASES.
ALIENS.
See CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRANTS; VESSELS, 4.
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AMERICAN REGISTRY.
1. The British steamship Southery was wrecked outside of the limits
of the United States, abandoned, turned over to the underwriters, and finally towed to New York, where she sank in or nea.:
Erie Basin. She was repaired and purchased by an American
citizen at three times the cost of the wreck: Held, The vessel
was wrecked in the "Cnited States within the meaning of Reviseu
Statutes, section 4136. 143.
2. The word "cost" in said section is to be construed liberally, and
if the actual cost of the repairs is three times the actual purchase price of the wreck, then she is entitled to registry. Ib.
3. The Secretary of the Treasury was justified in denying the application for registry of the vessel Southery under this section,
in view of the narrow construction placed upou the clause
"wrecked in the United States." 198.
4. If any of the injuries which have made a vessel a wreck were
received in the United States, in the absence of bad faith.she
should be held to come within the clause " wrecked in the
United States," although others h ad b een received elsewhere.
Ib.
5. The word "wreck" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, must be
taken in a very comprehensive sense as applicable to a vessel
which is disabled and rendered nnfit for navigation, whet.her
this state of the vessel ha,s been caused by the winds or the ·
waves, by stranding 1 fire, explosion of boilers, or by any other
casualty. Ib.
AMERICAN REPUBLICS.
See BUREAU OF AMERICA.,.""i REPUBLICS.
ANIMALS, DISEASED.
See CATTLE.
APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS.
1. The President can appoint to office only those who are eligible
under the Constitution. His appointment of one not eligible is
a nullity. 211.
2. The sole responsibility of every appointment in an executive
department rests upon the head of that department, except
where otherwise specially provided by statute. 355.
3. The power of appointment and removal in an executive department being discretionary in character, they can not be delegated.
lb.

See CIVIL, ElWICE; NAVAL ACADEMY, 1-4.
A.PPROPRIATIONS.
1. The ques_tion out of which appropriation certain expenses of the
Department of Agriculture should be paid is one which should
be addressed to the Comptroller of the Treasury. 221.
2· • 0 should the question whether or not the appropriation act of
1 , 96 authorizes the ~ecretary of the Treasury to purcliase newspapers and other articles for use outside of Washington. 178.
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APPROPRIATIONS-Continued.
3. The allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the
different departments is not actually passed upou by the accounting officers of the Treasury, and is not within their jurisdiction. 423.
4. No authority exists in the Secretary of the Navy to incur obligations for the completion of a dry dock where the appropriation
has become exhausted, although it would result in a great
saving to the Government. 288.
5. The object of sections 3732, 3733, and 5503 is to prevent executive
officers from involving the Government in expenditures or liabilities beyond those contemplated and authorized by the lawmaking' power. 244-.
6. N. notified the Secretary of War that it elects to carry on the work
of dredging in the Mobile Harbor under its contract, if the
appropriation is exhausted, without waiting for an appropriation by Congress to pay for it, and asks the Secretary of War
to supervise the same: Held, That he is without authority to
continue the employment of the contractors, and that the w.ork
which they propose to do does not come within their contract
and that he can not supervise it. lb.
7. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of
July 26, 1894, is not limited in its application to premiums
earned prior to January 1, 1894. 84.
8. Un:der section 5 of the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, which
limits the amount that the Secretary of War can obligate the
Government for in any fisc al year to $400,000, the con.tractor may
perform in one year the work for which the contract allows him
three years, and although he may earn a larger sum than this
amount he may not receive full payment therefor under three
years. 379.
9. Where the total amount authorized to he expended is less than
$400,000, contractors may be allowed to earn the amounts '
authorized to be expended in advance of the appropriation by
Congress for such work. lb.
10. The river and harbor act of June 3, 1893, making an appropria tion. for the protection of the east bank of the Mississippi River
opposite the mouth of the Missouri River, leaves it to the discretion of the Secretary of War whether he shall make such
expenditure or not. 391.
·
11. The river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, made a lump appropriation for certain improvements on the Mississippi River, while
the proviso thereto specified '' that the sum hereby appropriated'' shall be expended for improvements at Greenville, Helena,
and New Madrid: Held, That the sums specified in the proviso
are chargeable to the specific appropriation set forth in the body
of the act. 4-14.
12. The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso to
this act is not mandatory to the extent that the full amount
must be expended if the work can be done for less, or to pro-
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ceed with it at all contrary to the recommendation of the Mississippi River Commission, whose recommendations are to be
considered. lb.
13. If the appropriation made for river and harbor improvements by
the act of June. 3, 1896, should not be expended, the work could
at a subsequent time be contracted for by the Secretary of War
under a provision in said act for such additional contracts as
may be necessary to carry on continuously the plans for the
work. lb.
14. The specific appropriations in this act, if not used for the particular work designatecl by Congress, can not be used for any other
purpose. lb.
15. The various provisions in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896,
that contracts "may be" entered into by the Secretary of War
for the completion of certain improvements, to be paid for out
of future appropriations, are not mandatory, but discretionary ;
and he may decline to make contracts in all cases where he is
convinced that the public interests will not be subserved by
making them. 420.
See CLAIMS, 3, 4; DAMAGES; SEEDS, 1-3, 5, 6.
ARBITRATOR.
See CONSULAR OFFICERS, 2.
ARKANSAS.
Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not
to bear interest after maturity. 135.
ARMS.
See NATIONAL GUARD.
ARMY.
1. The troops of the United $tates can not be employed in thb Indian

Territory for the purpose of assisting in the preservation of
peace and the arrest of bandits and outlaws unless they are
trespassing upon Indian country, or absconding offenders within
the provisions of section 2152, Revised Statutes. 72.
2. A "municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws of
the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a soldier
violating such an ordinance and escaping to a military reservation should be surrendered to the civil authorities for trial
upon demand. 38.
3. A soldier should not be held accountable for money paid him in
excess of the amount to which he was entitled where such payment was made through a mistake of law on the part of the
executive officers of the Government. 323.
4. A convicted deserter from the Army undergoing sentence must
become the recipient of Executive clemency and make applicacation for reenli tment before the question of the effect of the
President's p ardon upon his right to reenlist can arise. 568.
See Ace NT , 2, 3; ARMY OFFICERS.
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ARMY OFFICERS.
1. The E'ifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in the
military service of the United States in such sense as to entitle
Capt. Frederick Huidekoper to a certificate of discharge from
the United States. 130.
2. The phrase "he shall be retired with the rank to which his seniority entitled him to be promoted," under section 3 of the act of
October 1, 1890, is not a mandatory provision for the retirement
of the disabled officer, but for the purpose of fixing the rank
with which he should be retired. 385.
3. No officer can be retired from the Army upon the report of any
board, even if approved by the Secretary of War, except it is
also approved by the President. Ib.
4. An examination of a lieutenant of the Army for promotion, which
results in a finding by the examining board of incapacity for
act,ive service on account of physical disabilities, and which is
approved by the proper military authorities but not by tlie President, was not such an examination as is required by law for the
retirement of an offir.er from the active service. Ib.
5. Upon the removal of such physical disability a reexamination may
be allowed by the Secretary of War. Ib.
6. The President has authority to assign enlisted men of the Army
who have passed the examination as candidates for commission
to vacancies tliat may exist in any corps or arm of the service
in which they have been commissioned, notwithstanding the
fact that additional second lieutenants remained in other corps
unassigned. 491.
7. The question as to whether a retired officer is eligible to hold
certain diplomatic or consular appointments without affecting
his position on the retired list, with rank and pay, is one of
private concern only and not a subject with which the United
States can be interested until some action has been taken by
such officer. 510.
8. Officers who served during the rebellion as volunteers in the
Army of the United States and have been honorably mustered
out are entitled to bear the official title and upon occasions of
ceremony wear the uniform of the highest grade they have held
in the volunteer service. 579.
See ARMY; PENSIONS, 1, 2; TAXATION, 8, 9.
ARREST.
See ARMY, 1.
ASSIGNMENTS.
An assignment of an indebtedness admittedly due bv the United
Statee is not prohibited by section 3177, Rev.ised Statutes. 75.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
1. A question once fully considered and answered by one AttorneyGeneral can not with propriety be reconsidered by his successor,
unless in some extraordinary case. 23, 264.
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2. Upon a question of fact the Attorney-General will not give an
opinion. 174, 240,454.
3. Nor is it his province to inquire into matters of fact. 481.
4. He is precluded from considering questions of fact on evidence
submitted. 594.
5. The existence of a foreign law is a question of fact upo n which t he
opinion of the Attorney-General can not be requested . 80, 377.
6. The Attorney-General is not authcrized to give an official opinion
upon the course to b e pursu ed by an executive department, as
that involves a question of fact and considerations of expediency. 73.
7. As to whether one patent infringes upon others is a matter of
fact upon which the Attorney-General will not express an official
opinion. 96.
8. Questions of fraud or intent or colorable transactions are questions
of fact, and not within the authority of the Attorney-General
to determine. 129.
9. As to whether or not the Official Gazette, including the indexes
therefor, is as a whole ''printing for the Patent Office, making
use of lithography or photography, together with the plates
for the same," being a question of fact, the Attorney-General
will not give an opinion thereon. 174.
10. The question of whether one trade-mark simulates another is a
question of fact upon which the Attorney-General can not
express an official opinion. 260.
11. Whether a term has a settled technical meaning is a question of
fact upon which the Attorney-General is not authorized to
pass. 179;
12. The Attorney-General will not give an official opinion except upon
questions of law, nor without a definite statement of the facts
upon which the question is submitted. 36,179, 201, .506.
13. And he can not investigate the papers for the purpose of ascertaining such facts. 220.
14. An opinion required for the guidance of the head of an executive
department in the discharge of official duties, and both public
and private interests requiring that it should be acted upon
promptly, is given by the Attorney-General, although he migllt
refuse it for the reason that the points to be submitted are not
stated but are to be gathered from the communications submitted. 486.
15. A request for an opinion failing to state definite facts showing by
what persons, in what manner, and during what period of the
year fur seals are being killed in the passes of the Aleutian
Islands, it is impossible to determine whether the administrative duty imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section
1956, Revised tatutes, is or is not qualified by the act of April
6, 1894. 583.
16. The rule of the Department which forbids the expression of an
official opinion upon any qu stion of law which has not arisen
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-Continued.
in an existing case, and presented upon a definite statement of
facts, would prevail, but for the fact that it is a quest.ion of the
legality of a provision of long standing in contracts of the War
and Navy Departments. 207.
17. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion on a matter not
pending before the department requesting it. 167,240,531.
18. Nor where it does not appear that some question exists calling for
the action of the department requesting it. 201.
19. An opinion can not be give~ by the Attorney-General upon a case
not actually arising in the department, the head of which requests the opinion. 178,219,478.
20. The Attorney-General can only render opinions in cases which
are actually pending and involving the legal questions submitted. 568.
21. The Attorney-General will not express an official opinion upon a
question not presently arising in the administration of an executive department. 106, 109, 186, 506.
22. The Attorney-General is not permitted to give opinions as to tho
construction or interpretation of a statute, except in an actual
case which has arisen and is before an executive department
calling for its action in the regular course of administering its
affairs. 510.
23. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a question
presented where no occasion has arisen for official action of the
head of the department requesting it. 174,457.
24. The Attorney-General is not required or authorized to give an
official opinion except when needed for the guidance of the
head of a department, and when relating to .some matter calling for action or decision on his part. 174.
25. In the absence of facts presenting a case actually or presently
arising and pending in the administration of a department, calling, for action, which can not be determined by the AttorneyGeneral witliout usurping judicial functions, his official opinion
can not be required. 583.
26. The rule of the Attorney-General in declining to give an opinion
in a case where it is doubtful whether a question of law is raised
in the administration of the department requesting it is disregarded, as proper cases raising such a question are pending in
several of the other Executive Departments. 579.
27. The Attorney-General will not give au opinion upon an inquiry
which appears to present but a moot case. 506.
28. A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General must relate, not
to a mere moot question, but one which requires immediate
action. The answer must be necessary for the protection of the
officer making the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the
action which he is about to take. 509.
29. An opinion is given upon a mere moot question, although in
accordance with custom it might with propriety be declined,
320.
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30. The question whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorizecl by tlle appropriation act for the fiscal yea,r 1896 to
purchase newspapers and other articles for use outside of Washing-ton, in view of sections 192 and 3683, Revised Statues, belongs
to a class of questions which should be submitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury, except in matters of great importance,
as under the act of .July 31, 1894, his opinion is a complete
protection. 178.
31. A question affecting all the Executive Departments is answered
by the Attorney-General, as it falls within the exception to the
rule that his opinion should not be rendered upon questions
which, under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894, can be referred
to the co"mptroller for decision, except in matters of great
importance, inasmuch as a conflict of precedents might arise.
181.
32. An opinion which could have been asked of the Comptroller of
the Treasury is, notwithstanding, given by the Attorney-General,
it appearing that the question is one of importance and the
Comptroller joins in requesting it. 224.
33. The question as to the right to refund certain duties claimed to
have been collected through mistake of law should be asked
of the Comptroller of the Treasury. 188.
34. A request for an opinion of the Compt11oller of the Treasury is
referred by him to the Attorney-General and is furnished by
the latter, as the question is an important one. 402.
35. The Attorney-General will not pass upon the question to what
appropriation a certain expenditure should be charged, as it is
one which should more properly be submitted to the Comptroller
of the Treasury. 405.
36. On questions of disbursement of money or payment of clairus,
which are by law relegated to the Comptroller, the AttorneyGeneral should not render an opinion. 530.
37. An expression in an opinion of the Attorney-General which is
merely obiter does not have the force and effect of au official
opinion. 25.
38. ,veight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are not questions
to be considered in rendering an opinion. 58.
·
39. The Attorney-General is not at liberty to comply with a request
for a further consideration and opinion upon the residence of
M., a civil-service employee, as it would involve consideration
ancl decision upon conflicting evidence. lb.
.
40. Certain-steamship companies dispute the validity of the regulations of the Treasury Department holding them liable for the
maintenance and transportation to the seaboard, under the act
of March 3, 1891, of certain alien immigrants who had reached
the interior of the country: Held, That the enforcement of the
regulation is the duty of the Department of Justice and the
opinion of the Attorney-General can not be required thereon. 6.
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41. The Attorney-General should not institute, for the benefit of private parties, a suit to vacate or reform a United States land patent unless there is reasonable ground to believe that it will be
sustained by the court or where it is for a wrong which private
litigation could not remedy. 13.
42. Third . persons claiming title to land patented in California under
the act of March 3, 1851, may bring a suit to declare a tri1st in
said lands. Such suit may be brought in the State courts and
without the aid of the Attorney-General. The decisions of a
State court upon such a suit unappealed from binds the parties
thereto, whether righteous or erroneous. Ib.
- 43. The question of how far the judgment of a court is void for want
of jurisdiction should be deferred until actually presented for
decision in the case in which one of the parties to such judgment shall be a party. 37.
·
44. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a judicial
question not arising in the admil}istration of a dep_a rtment
within the meaning of section 356, Revised Stat_u tes. 369.
45. The question whether or not a civil action or criminal prosecution could be commenced relative to lands found to have been
erroneously patented under the Western Pacific Railroad grant
in California is not one upon which the Attorney-General
can give a legal opinion to the head of another department.
509.
46. As to whether or not the statute of limitations did or did not
bar a claim on behalf of the Government is a judicial question
to be determined by the courts and not by the AttorneyGeneral. 557.
47. The Attorney-General will not give an official opinion upon the
question whether certain plates and cuts used for making
sketches and pictures .of foreign postage stamps come within
the terms of the act of May 16, 1884, and the act of February
10, 1891 ( except section 4), prohibiting counterfeiting, because
· they relate only to criminal proceedings. 133.
48. Whether or not an act constitutes a crime is a question that in
but rare instances can ·arise except in the Department of Justice. lb.
49. Whether or not certain material or apparatus come within the
scope of section 4 of the act of 1891 is a question of fact, and
an opinion can not be given thereon, lb.
50. A question involving the construction or application of a customs
regulation which is subject to modification at any time is not
a proper one upon which the Attorney-General should give an
opinion. 255.
51. The existence of a usage affecting the legal definition of a statutory term is a question of fact upon which the Attorney-General will not give an opinion. lb.
52. The Attorney-General can not undertake to give a general definition of the words applicable to all cases arising. 109.
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AUDITORS 01!., THE TREASURY.
They are agents of the Government in the broad sense of the term
but are more properly called officers, and were not intended to
be included within the meaning of the word " agent" in section
3469, Revised Statutes. 361.

BALTIMORE POST-OFFICE.
Certain removals of superintendents and .clerks in the Baltimore
post-office and the appointment of their successors held to be
legal. 140.

BANKS AND BANKING LAWS.
The proposed issue of interest-oearing bonds by the county commissioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with
the banking laws of the United States. 70.
See TAXATION, 3-6.

BERING SEA AWARD ACT.
See SEAL FISHERIES,. 2-9.
BIDS.
1. The Secretary of the Navy is obliged to award contracts for supplies to the lowest bidder who complies with the requirements
as to security, etc., although the Secretary is the person charged
with the duty of ascertaining the facts in this regard, and bis
decision is not reviewable by any court. 56.
2. In the al>sence of any special statutory provision, a bidder may
withdraw his bid at any moment until notice of acceptance
thereof. lb.
3. In case of a failure to accept the lowest bidder in a contract for
naval supplies, it is not necessarily the duty of the Secretary
to award the contract to the next lowest bidder. lb.
4. If a bid for the construction of public works bas been accepted,
it can not be withdrawn by the contractor l>ecause be made a
clerical error in preparing his estimates, as the mistake was not
mutual, but was due to negligence. 18fi.
5. It is within the authority of the Secretary of War to waive informalities in the submission of bids and the written guaranty
accompanying the same, and in specific cases to waive formal
defects, both in the bids and bonds. 469.
purpose. 1 b.
6. There is nothing in section 3709, Revised Statutes, providing for
adverti ements for public supplies, as amended, inconsistent
with the legal right of the board of award of the Department
of Agriculture to consider any bid received by them through
the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock p. m. 546.
7. Th statutory designation of 2 o'clock p. m. for the opening of
all proposals in each department means only that such proposal hall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m. thus securing
to both the Government and the bidders the advantage of the
prescribed moment priortowhich no bids can be opened. lb.
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8. A proposal .received after 2 o'clock p. m. under circumstances
which warrant the belief that it had been prepared and submitted in the light of the proposals submitted by other bidders,
which had already been opened and made known, should not
be received or entertained; but a proposal received under conditions which precluded the possibility of such inference should
not be rejected because it happens to be received by the board
of award a few minutes after 2 o'clock p. m. Ib.
See ADVERTISEMENTS; BONDS, 4; CONTRACTS, 7; MILITARY ACADEMY, ETC., 1.
BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 11-14.
BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS OF STEAM VESSELS.
See NAVIGATION, RULES, 3.
BONDED WAREHOUSES.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 15-25.
BONDS.
1. The proposed issue of interest- bearing bonds by the county commissioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with
the banking laws of the United States. 70.
2. Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not
to bear interest after maturity. 135.
3. United States district attorneys are not required or authorized to
make the examination into the sufficiency of the sureties on
official bonds required by section 5 of the act of March 2,
1895. 154.
4. A bond accompanying a bid for certain public works which is on
printed blanks bound together and consecutively paged in print
is not sufficiently defective to make it invalid because the
date of the bid and that of the bond were not inserted in the
blanks left for that purpose. Ib.
5. As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain
bonds issued by certain States and owned by the United States
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478.
See Brns, 5.
BRIDGES.
The action of a State with reference to the rights of parties
among themselves concerning the construction of a bridge does
not affect the interests of the United States so long as the
directions of the Secretary of War concerning the location and
plan of the bridge are respected. 293.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1, 3, 9, 10.
BRIG ''GENERAL ARMSTRONG."
See CLAIMS, 3, 4.
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BUREAU OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS.
1. 'fhe Monthly Bulletin, containing a dvertisement!:J of private firms
or corporations, published b y the Bureau of American Republics, is entitled to transmission through the mails free of postage, under the act of February 20, 1897. 514.
2. It is competent for the Secreta1·y of State to prohibit the publication in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of Amer ican Republics of advertisements of private firms or corporat ions. Ib.
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING.
See ABSENCE, LEAVES OF, 2.
CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION.
1. The California Debris Commission may take the necessary steps to
prevent injury to the navigability of a river by operation of
hydraulic mining within the t erritory of the jurisdiction of the
commission and resort to the remedy of injunction on a bill in
equity in the name of the United States. 10.
2. The North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company is w ithin the jurisdiction of the California Debris Commission. 62.
3. The California Debris Commission may resort to a court of equity
for the purpose of obtaining authority to make an inspection of
the premises where hydraulic mining is being or supposed t o be
unlawfully conducted, and pray for an injunction to r es tr ain
the mining during the time the commission is excluded. I b.
CANNED MEAT.
See MEA'l' INSPECTION, 1.
CAPITATION TAX.
See TAXATION, 2.
CARTAGE CHARGES.
See CUSTOMS LAws AND REGULATIONS, 14.
CATTLE.
1. The act of August 30, 1890, provides a summary method of appraisal
and payment in case of the slaughter of animals exposed to
infection, but no payment is provided where they are imported
in violation of the act. The evident intent of the act was that
exposed animals imported in violation thereof were to b e
slaughtered indiscriminately, without regard to the question of
the legality of the importation. 460.
2. The aut hority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and
slaughter imported sheep affected with scab under that act is
doubtful. Ib.
Seo MEAT INSPECTION; QUARANTINE, ETC.
CE TRAL PACIF IC RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. The l anguage of t he Thurman Act, section 8, with reierence to
t he Pacific Railr oad companies, does n ot create a lien on t h e
sinking fund pr ior to t hat of the United States in favor of
t he fi r t-mortgag b ondholders. 104.
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CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY-Continued.
2. The entire sinking fund belonging to the Central Pacific, or its
proceeds, may, if necessary, be used to pay the indebtedness of
the Central Pacific to the United Statea maturing in January,
1885. lb.
3. A demand upon the railroad companies is not necessary to fix its
liability to reimburse the United States for all sums paid by the
latter on account of principal and interest of subsidy bonds. Ib.
4. The acts of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864, with reference to the
Central Pacific Railroad Company, construed in the light of the
act of May 7, 1878, and sundry decisions of the Supreme Court:
Held, That the one-half of the earnings of the company on
Government business and its yearly paymants of 5 per cent of
its net profits can not be treated as having liquidated the whole
or any part of the company's indebtedness on account of the
principal of the subsidy bonds maturing January 16, 1895; but,
on the other hand, must be regarded as paying interest debts
exclusively. Held further, Applying the familiar rule that in
case of payments by a debtor to a creditor upon distinct transactions for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an
~propriation at the time, the payments are applied by law to
the liabilities of earliest date; that the sums applicable in any
one yeartothe payment of the company's interest debts forthat
year must be applied in the order in which such debts arise, and
the fact that bonds have been issued at various times is of no
consequence. 145.
CHICAGO RIVER.
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 4.
CHINESE.
1. A Chinese person is not a merchant within the meaning of section
2 of the act of March 3, 1893, unless he conducts his business
either in his own name or in a firm name of which his own is a
part. 5.
2. The requirements of tho act of July 5, 1884, with reference to the
admission of Chinese to this country should be strictly complied with by the applicants for admission. 6.
3. The Secretary of the Treasury, under the act of May 5, 1892, may
authorize the landing and detention at a port within the United
States of Chinese sentenced to deportation, until the vessel
returns to such port and is ready to proceed to China. 18.
4. The third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893, is to
be regarded as wholly prospective in its operations and as applying exclusively to Chinese merchants who both came into the
United States for the first time since November 3, 1893, and,
having carried on business here, afterwards left the country and
seek to return. 21, 99.
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5. Merchants already here when the statute took effect may leave the
country and return as if the act of November 3, 1893, had not
been passed. 21.
6. Since May 6, 1882, neither State nor Federal courts had jurisdiction
to admit Chinese to citizenship. 37,581.
7. The convention of March 17, 1894, between the United States and
China, repea,l s only the act of October 1, 1888. 68.
8. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to require the production
of a certificate in such form as he may prescribe, as evidence of the
right of certain Chinese subjects to enter the United States. lb.
9. The Secretary of the Treasury has authorit,y to issue regulations
requiring Chinese laborers residing in the United States, and
who may depart therefrom for temporary sojourn abroad, to
return to this country only at the ports from which they depart.
lb.

10. A certificate of naturalization issued by the circuit court at Montreal, Canada, and a passport issued by the governor-general of
Canada can not be accepted in lieu of the certificate required by
the act of July 6, 1884, in order to entitle such person claiming the
right as a merchant to enter and travel in the United States. 123.
11. Chinese subjects resident of t,he British Colony of Hongkong desiring admittance to the United States under the provisions of the
treaty of 1894 with China, must produce the necessary certificate,
signed by the register-general of that colony. 347.
12. In the convention with China of 1894, the use of the words "port"
and ''land" do not limit the right to return to such Chinese as
travel by sea. 357.
13. lt is necessary for Chinese laborers to leave this country at a port
which is within the jurisdiction of a Chinese consul, and should
return to it at a port of entry where there is a collector; but as
they have the right to go and return by land, these places need
not be seaports. lb.
14. Under Article II of that convention, the officer to whom the evidence of sickness or disability are to be reported, in order to
enable Chinese laborers to return to the United States, is the
Chinese consul at the place he left the United States. 357.
15. The policy of the Government being against the admission of Chinese laborers, treaty provisions making exceptions should not
"be extended by construction to cases not falling within the
plain scope of the language used. 424.
16. The intent of Article II of the treaty with China was that each
Chinaman should, before leaving the United States, receive
from the collector a certificate of his right to return, in order to
entitle him to do so. lb.
17. The Trea ury Department can not directthe aclrnission ofChinesc
laborers who fail to obtain before t,heir <leparture from this
country the certificate required by the treaty with China,
although they complied with all the requirements affect.ing Chinese lahornR wl10 leave the nited, 'tates, except the procuring
of certificateH of their rigb t to return. I b.
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18. The departing Chinese laborers comply with the conditions necessary to demand a certificate, if they file the required papers
with the collector of customs of the district from which they
depart. Ib.
19. Certificates issued to residents of China by a Chinese consular
officer and presented as evidence of the right of such persons to
enter this country, conformably to section 6 of the act of July
5, 1884, are not entitled to be treated as made by the Chinese
Government within the meaning of said act. 481.
20. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to limit the number of Chinese to be admitted to the United States as participants in the Tennessee Exposition. 517.
21. In case of an extension of one year allowed under certain conditions to Chinese laborers to return to the United States by the
treaty with China, the date of the original certificate and the
day of the return: must control. 575.
22. In case of such extension neither the collector nor the Secretary
of the Treasury has discretion to inquire into causes of further
delay or grant additional extensions. Ib.
23. Certain Chinese persons of alleged American birth who entered
the United States were deported to Canada, but subsequently
returned to the United States: Held, The collector of customs
has the right to enforce his exclusion by again returning them
to Canada. 614.
24. A Chinese laborer leaving the United Etates is furnished with the
necessary certificate entitling him to return within one year,
but before the expiration of such period he avails himself of the
privilege of an extension of one year allowed by the treaty of
1894, on the ground of sickness or other cause of disability
beyond his control. He started to return in sufficient time to
reach the United States by the ordinary course of travel, but
was delayed in quarantine by the Canadian authorities, so that
he in fact did not reach the United States until three days after
the expiration of bis second year: Held, That the return to the
United States must be within the additional year which the
treaty has made the sole provision for delay. 575.
25. The certificate of a United States Commissioner states that a
Chinaman charged with unlawfully coming within the United
States, after a full hearing, was adjudged to have the lawful
right to remain in the United States, and was accordingly discharged, it appearing that he is a citizen of the United States:
Held, That certificates of this character should :µot be accepted
as sufficient evidence of the right of the holders to enter this
country. 581.
26. Whether or not children born in this country of subjects of the
Chinese Empire are to be recognized as citizens of the United
States: Quaere. Ib.
CHINESE MERCHANTS.
See CHINESE, 1, 4, 5, 10.
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CIRCULATING NOTES.
See TAXATION, 3-6 .
. CITIZENSHIP.
Since May 6, 1882, neither State nor Federal courts have jurisdiction to admit Chinese to citizenship. 37, 581.
See CHINESE, 26; VESSELS, 4.
CIVIL SERVICE.
1. Thequestionofwhetheror notM was ·aresident of Alabama at the
time of his appointment under the civil-service rules consid ered: Held, 'That he was not a bona fide resident of such State
on the date named. 33.
2. The Attorney~General is not at liberty to comply with a request
for a further consideration and opinion upon the residence of
M, a civil-service employee, as it would involve consideration and
decision upon conflicting evidence. 58.
3. The phrase "no person appointed to a place" as used in the civilservice rules substituted by the President November 2, 1894,
affects persons holding the positions at the time as well as those
thereafter appointed. 91.
4. Certain removals of superintendents and clerks in the Baltimore
post-office and the appointment of their successors held to be
legal. 140.
5. The act of March 2, 1895, does not make the offices of all clerks in
the offices of the Comptroller and Auditor of the Treasury the
subject of competitive examination. 187.
6. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make temporary
appointments, without certification from the Civil Service Commission, of draftsmen and skilled service, under the act of
March 2, 1895. 261.
7. An irregularity in the certification of the name of an eligible for
appointment under the civil service is cured by the probational
and absolute appointment of such a person. 289.
8. The certificate of eligibles delivered to the appointing officer by
the subordinates of the Civil Service Commission is a complete
authority to such officer to make any selection he may desire
therefrom, and is a complete protection to the appointee. 335.
9. Section 4415 Revised Statutes, so far as it prescribes the method
by which vacancies on the board of inspectors of hulls and
steam vessels shall be filled, is repealed by the civil-service
act. 393.
10. Tho board designated by this section to fill such vacancies can
not act as a board of examiners Uil(ler the civil-service act, unless
its members are duly selected and appointed as such. Ib.
11. Rule III of the civil service includes in the departmental service
all employees of whatever designation, however, or for whatever purpose employed, whether compenHated by a fixed salary
or otherwise, who are serving in or on detail from the several
Executive Departments, commissions, and offices in the District
of Columbia. 407.
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12. The confidential agents employed in the free-delivery division of
the Post-Office Department, and designated as secret agents, were
not classified under Rule III, by the civil-service •rules promulgated May 6, 1896. Ib.
13. This rule covers only those who are to be regarded as appointed
for service in the departments at the seat of Government,
whether for the time being actually employed there or detailed
for service elsewhere, as distinguished from those appointed for
service in the States or Territories. Ib.
14. Paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty not being classified by the
Executive Order of May 6, 1896, while those performing similar
services in offices on shore were, there is no authority for transferring one of the former to a similar position in the Navy
Department. 503.
15. The Executive Order of May, 1896, including within the classified
service a person .not under the civil service at the time of his
appointment, bestowed upon such appointee all the rights and
benefits of persons of like class or grade under the civil service,
making him eligible for transfer, and retained him in the service
absolutely and not subject to the period of probation. 534.
16. An employee of the Government who receives money to pay certain
secret postal agents and, at the direction of one of said agents,
deducts therefrom a portion thereof and pays it to the representative of a political campaign fund, is not guilty of either
receiving or being concerned in receiving a contribution for
political purposes within the meaning of the act of .January
16, 1883. 298.
17. The intention of the above act was not to forbid voluntary contributions for political purposes by persons in the employ of
the Government, but to protect them from solicitation and
coercion with respect to such contributions. Ib.
CLAIMS.
1. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States,
which includes judgments on recognizances, is vested by law
in the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to all claims save
those arising under the postal laws. 494.
2. The question of the legality of payment of a claim for pay presented to the Secretary of the Treasury is one exclusively for
the Comptroller, whose decision thereon is by the statute made
final as to all executive officers. 530.
3. The claim of Samuel C. Reid, jr., considered and directions given
for stating account with owners, etc., of the U. S. brig of war
General Armstrong under the acts of May 1, 1882, and March 2,
1895: Held, That the Secretary of State has no authority to
apply any part of the unexpended balance of the fund in reimbursing Samuel C. Reid, jr., or anyone else for the expenses and
charges incurred in securing the appropriation. 154.
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4. Upon reconsideration it is held that the unexpended balance of
the appropriation made to satisfy the claims growing out of the
destruction of the brig General Armstrong should be nsecl to
reimburse S. C. Reid, jr., to the extent that the vouchers ou file
in the State Department show that he has made expenditures
or disbursements on this account. 523.
See ASSIGNMENTS.
CLERKS.
See GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
CLOQUI'l' RIVER.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 2, 3.
CLOUD UPON THE TITLE.
A contract of option for the sale of certain lands to the officers of
the Shiloh Battlefield Association, which purports to waive
homestead and dower rights, although the wives of the vendors
are not parties to the agreement, also purporting to have been
admitted of recorcl, when in fact it was never acknowledged or
attested, etc ., does not constitute a cloud upon the title. 302.
COASTING TRADE.
See VESSELS, 9.
COLLECTORS OF CUS'fOMS.
1. Collectors of customs are subordinates of the Secretary of the
Treasury, and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, providing
that the collector or Secretary of the Treasury, if dissatisfied,
may apply for a review of the decisions of the Board of General
Appraisers, does not mean that the collector may appeal against
the decision or wishes of the Secretary. 203.
2. They have no authority to interfere or direct the United States
storekeeper to interfere in a controversy between the importers
and the warehousemen with reference to the delivery of goods.
232.
COLLISIO SAT SEA.
See NAVIGATION RULES.
COLORADO.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3-6.
COLUMBIA 1 TITUTION FOR THE DEAF AND DUMB.
1. Advertisements for proposals in accordance with the provisions
of section 3709, ReYised Statutes, are not required for supplies
or services for t he Columbia Institution for the Deaf and
Dumb. 349.
2. The 'olumhia Institntion for the Deaf and Dumb is not a bureau,
office, or other subdivision of the Department of the Interior,
although Gov rnmPnt contributions toward its support is lmsine s within the jurisdiction of that Department. Ib.
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COMMON CARRIERS.
It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to require
of common carriers transporting merchandise in bond, under
the immediate transportation act, to file a hond agreeing to
accept and transport within a definite fixed period of time all
merchandise offered under the act. 369.
COMPROMISE.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized by section 3469,
Revised Statutes, to remit or release any portion of a judgment
indebtedness on consideration of h ardship to certain individuals. The authority to compromise relates to claims of doubtful
recovery or enforcement. 50.
2. The Secretary of tho Treasury has no authority to remit or release
judgments in favor of the Government from which there is no
appeal and which are clearly recoverable. 264.
3. The distinction between the compromising of a doubtful case and
the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability is that the
former is strictly a fiscal one, while the latter is in the nature
of a pardoning power. Ib.
4. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States,
which includes judgments on recognizances, is vested by law in
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect t o all claims Sa"fe
those arising under the postal laws. 494.
5. An assessment made by the Treasury Department of 10 per cent,
under the provisions of section 20 of the act of February 8,
1875, upon the circulating notes of Canadian banks which had
come into the United States and been received and paid by
banks in Calais, Me., is one which may be compromised. 557.
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY.
1. The question whether or not the Secret::i,ry of the Treasury is
authorized by the appropriation act for th o fiscal year 1896 to
purchase newspapers and other articles for use outside of Washington, in view of sections 192 and 3683, Revised Statutes,
belongs to a class of questions which should be submitted to
the Comptroller of the Treasury, except in matters of great
importance, as nnder the act of July 31, 1894, bis opinion is a
complete protection. 178.
2. The act of July 31, 1894, makes it obligatory upon the Comptroller of the Treasury to make a decision upon any question
involving a payment to be made by or nuder the b ead of any
department, and it contemplates the construction by him of
statutes. 181.
3. The Comptroller is an agent of the Government in the broad
sense of the term, but is more properly callecl an officer, and
was not intended to be included within the meaning of the
word "agent" in section 3469, Revised Statutes. 361.
4. The question as to the right to refund certain duties claimed to
have been collected through mistake of law should be asked of
the Comptroll(lr of the Treasury. 188.
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COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY-Continued.
5. An opinion which could have been asked of the Comptroller of
the Treasury is notwithstanding given by the Attorney-General,
it appearing that the question is one of importance, and the
Comptroller joins in requesting it. 224, 181, 402.
6. The Attorney-General will not pass upon the question to wha,t
appropriation a certain expenditure should be charged, as it is
one which should more properly be submitted to the Comptroller
of the Treasury. 405, 221.
7. On questions of disbursement of money or payment of claims,
which are by law reltlgated to the Comptroller, the AttorneyGeneral should not render an opinion. 530.
8. The question of the legality of payment of a claim for pay presented to the Secretary of the Treasury is one exclusively for
the Comptroller, whose decision thereon is by the statute made
final as to all executive officers. 530.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 5.
CONDEMNATION.
See EMINENT DOMAIN.
CONGRESSMEN.
,. 1. During the term of R. as United States Senator, Congress
increased the salary of the minister to Mexico. On February
23, 1895, the President nominated R. to such office, and he was
confirmed the same day, but did not take the oath of office
until March 4, 1895, when his term expired. His commission
was delivered to him the following day: H~ld, That the nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate constituted the appointment within the inhibition of the Constitution
relative to the appointment of members of Congress to an office
the emoluments whereof have been increased during the term
for which he was- elected. 211.
2. The acceptance of any office under the United States by a member
of either House of Congress operates as a vacation of his seat,
as he is disabled by the Constitution from holding any civil
office under authority of the United States while a member of
either House. Ib.
3. Members of Congress whose seats are contested, until a decision
is made unseating them, are considered in all respects endowed
with the same rights, powers, and privileges as other members. 342.
See NAVAL ACADEMY, 1--4.
CO

J

PIRACY.
Interference with the carriage of the mail on railroads in the
usual and ordinary way is a criminal offense, and the combination of offenders may be prosecuted under section 5440, Revised
tatute . 8.
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CONSULAR OFFICERS.
1. Consular officers of th e United States Mn not extend expired
inspection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is
there any authority of law for sending local inspectors out of
the country to make inspection. 52.
2. The United States consul in intervening by mutual consent of the
parties in a controversy between the officers and crew of the
unregistered yacht Barraconta, acted merely as an arbitrator
and not as consul. 201.
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 26-29.
CONTESTED ELECTIONS.
See CONGRESSMEN, 3.
CONTRACTS.
1. It is not competent for the Secret,ary of the Navy under the contract for the construction of the battle ship Indiana to pay to
the contractors certain reserved payments prior to her preliminary or conditional acceptance, but a supplemental contract
may be entered into, modifying the terms and provisions of the
existing contracts. 12.
2. A penalty imposed under a contract for delay in completing a
work which has been :finished according to the contract without damage to the Government, may be remitted by the Secretary of War and the sum withheld paid to the contractor. 27.
3. A contract for the improvement of the Hudson River may be
legally modified so as to provide for the acquirement by the
United States through process of condemnation of the necessary lands for use as dumping grounds to be maintained by the
contractors. 78.
4. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power, by virtue of his gen~ral authority, to change contracts entered into by the United
States with responsible parties secured by responsible sureties,
in the inierest of private parties thereto, without considerations
inuring to the United States. 115.
5. The provision in a contract providing for the forfeiture of $20 p er
day for each day's delay in completing certain work at West
Point Military Academy, is to be regarded as a penalty, and in
case of delay it is lawful to assess against the contractor the
actual damages sustained instead of the penalty. 139.
6. Modifications of contracts to meet contingencies may be made
upon consent of the contracting parties, without rescinding
and abrogating the entire contract. 207.
7. The modification of a contract which does not prejudice the interests of the Government or violate any statutory provision, is
not such a new contract as must be preceded by an advertisement for proposals from bidders. Ib.
8. Executive officers are expressly prohibited from making contracts
to extend beyond one year an~ for which no appropriation by
Congress has been made. 207, 304.
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9. N notified the Secretary of War that it elects to carry on the work .
of dredging in the Mobile Harbor under its contract if the
appropriation is exhausted without waiting for the appropriation by Congress to pay for it, and asks the Secretary of War to
supervise the same. Held, That he is without authority to continue the employment of the contractors, and that the work
which they propose to do does not come within their contract,
and that he can not supervise it. 244.
10. A contract not for the completion of any specific work, as the
erection of a building, the construction of a road, or rendering
a channel adequate for the passage of vessels of a certain draft,
is at an end after the appropriation becomes exhausted. Work
done thereafter would not come within such contract. If further appropriations are made there mu.st be a new contract for
their expenditure. Ib.
11. The Secretary of War is not required by the act of March 3, 1896,
providing that contracts may be entered into by him for the
completion of improvements named, to make such contracts,
but he may decline to do so in all cases where he is convinced
the public interest would not be subserved by making them.
420.
12. Contracts for the purchase of seals by the United States used to

secure packages while being transported in bond, must be
awarded upon advertisement. 304.
13. The period at which persons reach their majority and become sui
j'/1,ris with .respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge
this power of the General Government. 327.
14. Under section 5 of the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896,
which limits the amount that the Secretary of War can obligate the Government for in any fiscal year to $400,000, the contractor may perform in one year the work which the contract
allows him three years, and although he may earn a larger sum
than this amount, he may not receive full payment therefor
under three years. 379.
15. Where the total amonnt authorized to b e expended is less than
$400,000, contractors may be allowed to eatn the amounts authorized to be expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress
for such work . Ib.
16. The contract with the Pnuematic Gun Carriage and Power Company for the construction of a uisappearing gun carriage under
the act of August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment
of a premium, and does not bind the Government beyond the
amount appropriated: 457.
17. The 1 tting of this contract for the full amount appropriated
exhausted the power of the , 'ecr ctary of the Navy under the
act, and there is no authority for making a supplemental contract binding the Government to further expenditures in the
way of premiums. 4.95,
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18. What one party to a contract may have personally understood a
provision to mean at the time the contract was made can not
avail. What both parties understood controls, and that is to
be ascertained from the language of the contract itself. 585,
19. Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor the
railway to be built upon trestlework followin g tbe line of the
jetty must be at the expense of the Government, whether it is
the case of original construction or extension. 607.
See ADVERTISEMENTS; APPROPRIATIONS; Bms; CLOUD UPON
TITLE; ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 1, 5 j PATENTS, 4 i RIVERS AND
HARBORS.
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 16, 17.
COPYRIGHTS.
1. Section 3 of the act of March 3, 1891, designed to protect domestic
authors against foreign infringements of their copyrights,
applies as well to books copyrighted before as those copyrighted
after the passage of the act. 159.
2. The exceptions in the case of persons purchasing for use and not
for sale, who import, subject to the duty thereon, not more than
two copies of such book at any one time, is not limited in its
application to the "authorized editions" of such book. lb.
3. The importation of foreign-made chromos which have not been
copyrighted, but which are copies of a foreign copyrighted
painting, is not prohibited by the act of March 3, 1891, amending section 4956, Revised Statutes. 416.
4. A foreigner simulating a trade-mark of a domestic manufacturer
can not obtain the right to send fraudulently marked goods
into the country merely by recording his fraudulent mark under
section 6 of the act of August 27, 1894, before the domestic manufacturer has taken the steps necessary to protect himself. 260.
COUNSEL.
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1.
COUNTERFEITING.
1. 'rhe Attorney-General will not give an official opinion upon the
question whether certain plates and cuts used for making
sketches and pictures of foreign postage stamps come within
the terms of the act of May 16, 1884; and the act of February
10, 1891 ( except section 4); prohibiting counterfeiting, because
they relate only to criminal proceedings. 133.
2. Tho counterfeiting of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes
within the meaning of the phrase "obligation or other securities * * * of any foreign government," in section 4 of the
act of February 10, 1891. 136.
COURT-MARTIAL.
See PENITENTIARIES, l.
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COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. The expression, "any judge of any court of the United States''
may be retired under section 714, Revised Statutes, was intended
to have the widest application, and applies to the chief justice
as well as the judges of the Court of Claims. 449.
2. The expression, "after having held his commission as such at least
ten years," in the foregoing section, does not mean that the
commission under which the judge serves at the time of his
retirement must have been in force at least ten years. It was
being in commission and not holding a particular ·commission
· that Congress meant to make a condition. lb.
GUBAN INSURRECTION.
1. The Cuban insurrection can not be brought within the rules of
internationai law with respect to belligerence and neutral rights
and duties. 267.
2. The sale and shipment or carriage of arms ancl munitions of war
to Cuba does not become a violation of international law merely
because they are destined to a port which is recognized by the
Spanish Govel'nment as open to commerce, nor because they are
to be or are landed by stealth. Ib,
3. The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of war by persons in the United States to persons in Cuba is not a violation
of international law, however strong a supposition there may
be tha-t they are to be used in an insurrection against the
Spanish Government. Individuals in the United States have
the right to sell such articles and ship them to _whomever may
choose to buy. lb.
·
4. Neither our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge
and therefore can not be bound to take notice who-are and who
are not loyal subjects of Spain, so long as their actions are con.fined to her own territory. lb.
5. If persons supplying or carrying arms and munitions from a place
in the United States are in any wise parties to a design that
force shall be employed against the Spanish authorities, or that
either in the United States or elsewhere, before final delivery of
such arms and munitions, men with hostile purposes toward the
Spanish Government shall also be taken on board and transported in furtherance of such purposes, the enterprise is not
commercial but military, and is in violation of international
law and of our own statutes. lb.
See INrERNA.TIONAL LA.w, 1-8.
CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKER.
1. The term" custom-house broker," as used in the tariff act of 1894,
section 23, includes persons who deal in drawback matterH
exclusively, as well as those who combine all branches of
custom-house work: 255.
2. When the li ense of such a broker has been revoked, he can not
th reafter deal directly with the customs officials: except when
acting for himself as principal. lb.
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CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKER-Continued.
3. The authority to collect drawback may be delegated by a manufacturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law,
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed
broker unless he obtains himself a license. Ib.
CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
IN GENERAL-

1. Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by

a collector of customs although protected by patents. 72.
2. "Sea stores," in tariff legislation, are the stores contained in
incoming vessels which are necessary for use for the purpose
of the voyage; articles brought into port aboard ship to be
consumed aboard or carried off again on the outward voyage,
or if put ashore at all, landed only for the convenience of the
ship itself. 92.
3. The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in different
parts of the customs legislation. In sectious 2766 and 3111,
Revised Statutes, it covers any tangible personal property. In
sections 2795 and 3113 it means property imported into the country, whether for sale or not. In the act of March 3, 1875, it has
a narrower meaning, but still includes personal property not
imported for the use or enjoyment of the importer himself. lb.
4. The export tax imposed by a foreign government is not to be con. sidered as one of the" costs, charges, and expenses'' referred to
in section 19·of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890.
108.

5. The decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury on all questions as
to the construction or meaning of any part of the revenue laws
are made conclusive upon all customs officers by section 2652,
Revised Statutes. 203.
6. Collectors of customs are subordinates of the Secretary of the
Treasury, and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, providing
that the collector or Secretary of the Treasury, if dissatisfied,
may apply for a review of the decisions of the Board of Gen~
eral Appraisers, does not mean that the collector may appeal
against the decision or wishes of the Secretary. Ib.
7. The importation of foreign-made chromos, which have not been
copyrighted, but which are copies of a foreign copyrighted
painting, is not prohibited by the act of March 3, 1891, amending section 4956, Revised Statutes. 416.
ABANDONMENT-

8. Goods not damaged may be abandoned to the United States under
section 23 of the act of June 10, 1890, and the importer thereof
relieved from the payment of duty. 326.
9. It is not· the intent of Congress that the United States should in
any case exact as duties an amount greater than the value of
the property imported. Ib.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
ABANDONMENT-Continued.

10. In an application for an abandonment under section 23 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, the Board of General
Appraisers had jurisdiction to review the collector's decision,
which review is :final for all purposes, since the importers did
not appeal. 402.
BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS-

11. The General Appraisers appointed under the provisions of the act
of June 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department. 85.
12. In case of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,
it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to investigate
the matter for the advice of the President. lb.
13. A protest filed by an importer under the customs administrative
act of 1890 was overruled by the Board of General Appraisers
on September 26, 1892. The decision was in part made inadvertently, some of the evidence being overlooked, which was
first called to their attention on July 6, 1894, with the request
that the decision be reviewed. Held, that it was the importer's
duty to watch for the decision of the board, and that after the
lapse of time stated it was without further jurisdiction in the
premises. 144.
14. The Board of General Appraisers has jurisdiction under section 14
of the act of June 10, 1890, to decide whether cartage charges as
made by a collector of customs are proper. 262.
See 10, 79.
BONDED WAREHOUSES-

15. Goods imported and warehoused for nearly three years, then withdrawn and exported to Canada, and :finally reshipped to the
United States by a different merchant, the transaction not appearing to be merely colorable for the purpose of evading the
tariff laws, may be entered for warehousing as an original importation within !lection 2971, Revised Statutes. 23.
16. The provisions of the South Carolina dispensary law of 1893 are
ineffective and inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a
United States bonded warehouse under the control of a collector
of internal revenue. 73.
17. Distilled liquors in a bonued warehouse are exempt from the operations of the process of a State court. lb.
18. Goods imported and entered for warehouse prior to the act of
August 28, 1894, and not withdrawn for consumption within
three years from the date of the original importation, are unaffected by the new rate of duties. 116.
19. Goods deposited 1Jefore that act in store as unclaimed merchandise
unders ction 2965, Revised Statutes, maybe withdrawn for consumption upon payment of the new rates of duties at any time
within three years from the da.te of their original importation,
so long as they remain unsold. If sold, however, the dutv is to
be deducted from the proceeds of sale, as are those of 1890. lb.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
BONDED WARE HOUSES-Continued.

20. Whether goods exported for the mere purpose of extending the
three years' warehousing period provided by the statutes, and
immediately reimported, can be regarded on the second arrival as
an original importation under the customs laws. Qna:re. 129.
21. The collector of customs has no authority to interfere or direct
the United States storekeeper to interfere in a controversy between the importers and the warehousemen with reference to
the delivery of goolls. 232.
22. The Government has no further concern with imported goods
which have been deposited iu a private bonded warehouse, the
duty having been paid and a withdrawal permit issued, and
the right to deliver or withhold rests with the warehouseman
alone. lb.
2:-J. Under the act of August 27, 1894, dutiable goods purchased by the
United States from an importer while in bond remain dutiable,
and the duty must be paid before delivery. 243.
24. The by-products: such ns rice meal and broken rice resulting from
the cleansing of irnported rice in importers' bonded warehouses,
intended for exportation, may be withdrawn for consumption
instead of exporting. 474.
25. The act of March 2, 1874, relative to bonded warehouses for the
storage of imported rice is still in force. lb.
See 71, 89.
DEC LARAT IONS TO INVOICES-

26. 'rhe person making the declaration to au invoice of goods intended
for shipment under the customs-administrative act of June 10,
1890, is not required to be actually present before a consular
officer of the United States in order to authorize such officer to
certify such invoice. 571.
27. All that is necessary is that he shall be satisfied that the person
making the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to
be; that he is a credible person, and that the statements made
under such oath are true. lb.
28. Where the consular officer has doubts as to the identity of the
person making the declaration, or as to his credibility or tho
truthfulness of the statements set forth in the declaration, he
has the right to require the declarant to come personally before
him. lb.
.
29 . The question as to where and in what manner oaths to the declarations indorsed on invoices shall be taken, is more~ matter of
regulation or instruction for the government of the consular officer than of construction of a statute. . lb.
DISCRIMINAT ING DUTIES-

30. Paragraph 608 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, imposing a discriminating duty on salt imported from a country which imposes
a duty on salt exported from the United States, does not violate
the "most favored nation clause" in the treaty of May 1, 1828,
with Prussia. 80.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
D ISCRI MI NATI NG DUTIES-Continued.

31. Whether or not such di!!criminating duty applies to a country
which imposes a duty on salt exported f'roin tl).e United States,
but lays a countervailing excise tax on domestic salt. Qumre,
lb.
32. As .to whether a discriminating duty should be imposed under the
act of 1894 upon salt imported from Germany, which country
imposes a duty in the nature of an internal excise tax on salt
exported from the United States. Qumre. 377.
33. Diamonds imported into the United States from Canada, not in the
usual course of strictly retail trade, which were the productions
of a foreign country not contiguous to the United States, are
subject to the discriminating duty of 10 per cent under section
22 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897. 591.
34. In determining the liability to this discriminating duty, it is not
necessary to ascertain the mode of conveyance used in the transportation into the United States from Canada, lb.
35. Certain goods came from Japan via Vancouver, British Columbia,
and thence per railroad through Canada to Chicago, in cars
sealed at Vancouver by a United States consular officer: Held,
not to be imbject to a discriminating duty, as section 4228,
Revised Statutes, is not repealed by section 22 of the Dingley
.tariff act. 597.
36. The purpose of this section was to secure to United States vessels
the transportation of goods by sea by discriminating against
transportation in other vessels to the United States, and also to
prevent evasion to a contiguous country. Ib.
37. To hold that there should be a discrimination by different duties
upon importations, direct or indirect, under section 22 of the
above act would be to put a new purpose in the law and destroy
its unity. This is not compelled by its language or any mischief
intended to be remedied. Ib.
38. Section 22 of this act and section 4228, Revised Statutes, as
amended, are not coextensive in scope, therefore are complements of each other. lb.
39. Section 4228, Revised Statutes, is in effect made a proviso to section
22 of the Dingley tariff act by the act of July 24, 1897, and as
such, is not r epugnant to section 22. Ib.
40. The operation of section 22 commenced with its passage and continues until it is suspended according to section 4228, l{evised
Statutes, and again takes effect if the l'eciprocal exemptions of
foreign nations be withdrawn. Ib.
DRAWBACKS-

41. The que tion of drawbacks upon exhibits of foreign governments
at th World's Fair is governed by the act of April 25, 1890, aml
not by section 3025, Revised , tatutes. 36.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
DRAW BACKS-Continued.

42. A drawback is allowable on oil cake made from imported linseed
under the tarfff act of Angust 28, 1894. 109.
43. The proviso to paragraph 25 of the McKinley tariff act allows a
drawback only in cases where the article manufactured or produced can be so separated into its component materials that the
relative proportions of each material may be ascertained without reference to past books of account. 110.
44. This section is intended to apply only to cases where the article
is made up of two or more different materials. Ib.
45. A drawback is claimed under section 25 of the McKinley tariff
act on certain lead ore used in smelting operations, the lead
in the ore which is used being about 90 per cent of foreign
origin ancl 10 per cent domestic: Held, that no portion of the
lead entered for drawback could be regarded as incidental to
any other portion thereof or to the whole, nor is the proportion
of the domestic lead in the total product small enough to be
disregarded. 110.
46. Drawback of duties can not be allowed by reason of the existence
of product of foreign ore in the lead of which the manufactured
artfole is composed. 229.
47. Camel's hair noils, resulting from the separation of imported
camei's hair into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback
under section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manufactured article. 159.
48. Imported articles of domestic origin are to be regarded as '' imported materials," within the meaning of section 22 of the act
of August 28, 1894, and are entitled to a drawback where their
prior importation was not merely colorable. 501.
49. The exportation of alcohol with the intention of its reimportation
for the purpose of taking advantage of the drawback privilege&
is to be regarded as colorable only, and the alcohol is to bs
forfeited, the person engaged in the transaction punished, and
no drawback is recoverable. Ib.
50. Where the exportation of alcohol is genuine and with the intent
to dispose of it abroad, so that upon its arrival there it is to be
regarded as absorbed in the general mass of foreign commodities,
the subsequent importation is proper. Ib.
51. The authority to collect drawback may be delegated by a manufacturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law,
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed
broker unless he obtains himself a license. 255;
52. ''Drawback moneys" are duties-repayment to the importer or the
person to whom he has transferred bis right:;., of a part of the
duties which have been paid by him upon receiving his goods.
Ib.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
DUTIES-

53. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe reasonable
rules, and such as are necessary to secure the collection of the
duties on imports and to protect the United States from irregular or fraudulent proceedings. 571.
54. A vessel containing a cargo of sugar for the United States was
wrecked in the journey; she was subsequently returned with the
goods to the port of departure, repaired, and the goods reloaded
on the same vessel: Held, that the goods should not be appraised
under section 2928, Revised Statutes1 as merchandise taken from
a wreck. 121.
55. Under the act of August 28, 1894, dutiable goods purchased by the
United States from an importer while in bond remain dutiable
and the duty must be paid before delivery. 243.
56. The importation of certain bird of paradise feathers, being composed of natural feathers which are neither dressed, colored,
nor manufactured, is not included within paragraph 328 of the
tariff act of August 28, 1894. 541.
57. Books imported for the purpose of sale are dutiable under the act
of August 28, 1894. 301.
58. The phrase "manufactnres of wool" in paragraph 297 of the act
of 1894 does not include articles of which wool is a component
material but of which it is not the material of chief value. 66.
59. The phrase "manufactures of wooP 1 has been given a restrictive
meaning in prior tariff acts. There is a presumption, in the
absence of anything to the contrary, that Congress intended it
still to have the same significa.nce. Ib.
60. The headings of the schedules in the tariff act have little significance, they· being intendeu. only for general suggestions as to
the character of the articles within the schedules. Ib.
61. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively to be resolved
in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act mentions
or describes the same article in two different places, when the
higher rate governs. Ib.
62. Persons crossing into Canada for no other purpose than to purchase
clothing there, and immediately returning, are not entitled to
introduce the same free of duty as "personal effects" under the
tariff act of 1890. 3.
63. The duty on the by-products, such as broken rice and rice meal,
withdrawn for consumption from importers' bonded warehouses
should be assessed upon the proportion of unclean rice represented by such by-products. 474.
61. The by-products 1 such as rice meal and broken rice, resulting
from the cleansing of imported rice in importers' bonded warehouses intended for exportation may be withdrawn for consumption instead of exportation. Ib.
6:-. The word "wool," as used in paragraph 297 of the tariff act of
1 91, r fers to hair of the sheep only, and the new duties upon
arti les made of the hair of other animals went immediately
into ·ff ct upon the passag1J of the act. 66.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
DU TI ES-Continued.

66. "Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of the

alpaca and of the angora goat, but never is used to include all
goat's hair, nor yet camel's hair, cow hair or horse hair.
Throughout schedule K of the above act it is used so as to
include even hair of the kinds first mentioned. Ib.
PENAL DUTIES-

67. A consignee representing two different principals made an entry

covering two invoices of goods imported by the same vessel
upon each of which there was a penal duty. The invoice is_to
be treated as the ur:.it and not the entry. 283.
68. The statutes forbid the Secretary of the Treasury from making a
customs regulation permitting collectors of customs to receive
as special deposits penal duties, to be returned to the importers
in case of a remission of the duties. 345.
69. All moneys paid_ to coilectors of customs for unascertained duties,
must be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United
States. Ib.
70. When goods are entered or withdrawn for consumption, all duties
then charged against them, including penal duties, must be
paid before they are released from Government custody. 418.
See 80-89.
REFUNDS-

71. Upon an application to withdraw free of duty under the merchant

shipping act certain warehoused coal imported under the tariff
act of 1890, the shipper being refused, paid without protest in
order to get possession thereof, certain liquidated duties that
had been erroneously assessed : Held, that the Secretary of
the Treasury had the authority to refund the amount so collected. 92.
7'2. The act of March 3, 1875, was intended only to apply to cases where
the duties are improperly assessed and therefore improperly
collected. Ib.
73. The power to refund duties collected by mistake, in the absence
of a proper protest, is limited to the following : (1) when the
duties provisionally paid are reduced upon the final liquidation;
(2) for mere clerical error; (3) for mutual mistake of fact. 224,
251.
74. Prior to the customs administrative act, duties collected by mis-

take of law, could not be returned after one year from the time
of entry in the absence of a protest by the importer under section 2931, Revised Statutes. 251.
75. There is no statutory authority for the Secretary of the 'rreasury
to refund penal duties which have been paid into the treasury
on the ground that they were incurred without willful 11egligence or an intention of fraud on the part oft.he importer. 320.
76. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make a refund of
duties where there was an error due to a mutual mistake of
fact. 454.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
REFU NOS-Continued.

77. A mistake on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury in estimating the equivalent of the Spanish pound or libra, in the
absence of due protest by the importers, is not sufficient to
warrant a refund of the excess of duties paid under such erroneous estimate. Ib.
RELIQUIDATION OF DUTIES-

78. Section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, did not in any way limit
the power of the collector of customs to reliquidate duties in the
interest of the Government within one year after entry. 334.
79. The duty on an importation of mohair goods after August 28, 1894,
being erroneously assessed, an appeal was taken to the Board of
General Appraisers, and upon notice by the appraiser that a mistake of fact had been made, the collector requested a return of the
papers for reconsideration, but .t he board declined to comply:
Held, that section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, is still in force
and that the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to order a
reliquidation of the assessment of duties in the interest of the
importers and to direct the return of the papers to the collector. 152.
REMISSION OF PENALTIES-

80. In case of a fraudulent undervaluation by one partner of a firm,
although it was his purpose to cheat his own firm, as well as
the United States, the Secretary of the 'l'reasury is without
authority to remit the consequent penalty. 90.
81. Section 17 of the antimoiety act supersedes section 5292, Revised
Statutes, as to all cases arising under the customs laws except
those of vessels and merchandise seized or subject to seizure
and of less value than $1,000. 101.
82. Penal duties may be remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury
under the provisions of section 5293, Revised Statutes, where
they do not exceed $1,000. 283.
83. And without recounie to a proceeding before a district judge. l 01.
84. The limit of $1,000 referred to in section 5293, Revised Statutes, and
section 20 of the antimoiety act refer to the amount of the penalty to be remitted and not to the value of the merchandise. lb.
85. The Secretary of the Treasury may return the findings to the
United States commissioner iu proceedings for the remission of
penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further bearing
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289.
86. But he has no authorit,y to prosecute a further inquiry into the
facts after the commissioner has r eported his findings under
section 18 of said act. 549.
7. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to remit a fine or penalty
under section 5294, Revised Statutes, as amended, but he can
not remit a forfeiture. 291.
Ther is no statutory authority for the 'ecretary of the Treasury
t o refund penal duties which have been paid into the Treasury
on the ground that they wrrr inrnrr<'d without willful 11egligenc or an intention of francl ou the part of th e importer. 320.
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CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS-Continued.
REMISSION OF PENAL Tl ES-Continued.

89. ·where payment of the penal duties imposed under section 7 of the
act of June 10, 1890, is required as a condition precedent to the
delivery of the goods, the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit such penalties is unavailing in many cases, but not
in the case of warehoused goods, nor where the penalties are
first assessed upon final liquidation after the delivery of the
goods to the importer. 418.
DAMAGES.
The appropriation in the act of March 2, 1895, for raising the
height of the dam at Great Falls and for damages on account of
the consequent flooding of land and other injuries was intended
to cover all damages that might result from raising the dam :d½
feet higher than bad been conternpldited under the act of July
JG, 1882. 223.
See EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, 1; SEAL FISHERIES, 2.
DAMS.
See RIO GRAN DE RIVER, 1, 2; NAVI GABLE WATERS, 2, 3, 12, 13.
DATE.
The date is no part of the substance of a sealed instrument and
not necessary to be inserted. The real date is the time of its
delivery, which may always be proved. 469.
DEAF AND DUMB INSTITUTION.
See COLUMBIA INSTITUTION l!'OR

THE

DEAF AND DUMB.

DECLARATIONS TO INVOICES.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGUL•.TIONS, 26- 29.
DEFINI1'IONS.
See WORDS AND PHRASES.
DELIVERY TO IMPORTERS .
See CUSTOMS LAws AND REGULATIONS, 2 l, 22.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.
1. All appointments and removals of messengers and laborers in the
Department of Agriculture must be made by the Secretary or
Acting Secretary. 355.
See ABSENCE, 5; Brns, 6-8; CATTLE; MEA'l' INSPECTION; SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE; SEEDS.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
1. The Secretary of the Navy is not authorized to employ special
counsel in foreign countries to institute suits in behalf of the
United States for the purposes of recovering damages caused to
war vessels of the Unfted States, but should refer the matter to
the Department of Justice for attention. 195.
2. The Department of Justice is charged with the duty of determining when the United S-'.iates shall sue, for what it shall sue, and
that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases. 195.
See ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
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DEPARTMENTAL CLERKS.
See ABSENCE; APPOINTMENTS, &c.,

2, 3;

CIVIL SERVICE; GoVERN:-

MENT EMPLOYEES.

DEPARTMENTAL CONSTRUCTION.
1. ,vhen an act of Congress has for a considerable period received a
uniform departmental construction, which was known to Congress, and a subsequent act in pari materia is enacted without
change of language, there is a presumption of considerable
force that the new language is intended to receive the same
construction as the old. 338.
2. If there be any ambiguity in a statute, the uniform departmental
practice for a number of years should be regarded as having
settled the law. 412,349.
3. This is especially so where the language was not modified when
incorporated in the Revised Statutes. 349.
4. Departmental practice which has not been uniform, although of
long standing, forms no guide to the construction of the law.
363.
5. A uniform departmental practice, continuing for a quarter of a
century, ought to be conclusive in case of an ambiguous statute.
408.
6. The weight to be given departmental practice is greatly increased
when Congress, in reenacting the law, fails to indicate in anJ'
way its disapproval of the settled construction, to which it is
thus regarded as giving an implied approval. lb.
7. Departmental practice clearly defeating the obvious purpose of a
statute which is not ambiguous, should not govern in its interpretation. lb.
DEPORTATION.
See CHINESE, 3, 23.
DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS.
See NAVY, 7.
DIPLOMAS.
See WORLD'S

COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION,

2, 3, 5.

DISBURSING OFFICER.
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1.
DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE.
See MILITIA, 1.
DISCRIMI A.TI G D TIES.
ee CUSTOMS LAW AND
DIS CRIMIN A. TIO
ee QUARANTINE,
DI PE

ETC.,

ARY LAW OF

REGULATIONS,

30-40.

3.

O TH CAR LI A.

, 'ee INTER AL REYE GE, 1, 2.
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DISTILLED LIQUORS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 16, 17.
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
United States district attorneys are not required or authorized to
make the examination into the sufficiency of the sureties on
official bonds required by section 5 of the act of March 2, 1895.
154.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. Certain questions arising in the settlement of an award made
under a joint resolution of Congress, approved July 10, 1888, to
arbitrate and settle certain questions at issue between the District of Columbia and Samuel Strong considered. 87.
2. The unauthorized stretching of wires across tho Iowa Reservation
in the District of Columbia is governed by section 1818, Revised
Statutes, and should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Interior. 224.
3. The laying of conduits or erection of overhead wires for electric
lighting purposes in any park or reservation for the purpose of
illumination is prohibited by the act of March 3, 1897. 545.
4. The board created by the act of September 27, 1890, establishing
the Rock Creek Park, has no power to authorize the construction of a reservoir for the use of the District of Columbia within
the limits of such park. 566.
5. It is not necessary under existing law for the Secretary of the
Treasury to advertise in six newspapers, published in the District of Columbia, for proposals for the interior finish of the
post-office building in the city of Washington. 595.
6. The selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements
of this character in the District of Columbia is in the discretion of the head of the Department. Ib.
DRAUGHTSMEN.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 6.
DRAWBACKS.
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 41-52.
DUTIES.
See CUSTOMS LAws AND REGULATIONS.
EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
See LABORERS AND MECHANICS.
ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRAN'f STATION.
1. The express stipulation in certain contracts with reference to
rentals at Ellis Island that they may be annulled by the Secretary of the Treasury for • cause implies some facts or state of
facts inducing or justifying an abrogation of the contract for
the benefit of the United States. 115.
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ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION-Continued.
2. The Secretary of the Treasury may grant a license, revocable at
his will, to erect and maintain a building on Ellis Island, an
immigrant station, for the purpose of an exhibition ball and
condncting a land and labor bureau. 473.
3. He has power under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893, to
grant exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island Immigrant Station, after public competition, under such limitations
and conditiont:i as he may prescribe. 476.
4. He has no authority to lease an:y part of Ellis Island Ib.
5. In a contract for ferry service between Ellis Islanu Immigrant
Station and the Barge Office, New York, to continue for three
years and thereafter from year to year until terminated by
notice from either party, given sixty days before the end of the
original period or any one year thereafter, and in which it was
also covenanted that the contract might be annulled and terminated at any time by the Secretary of the Treasury for good
and sufficient cause: Held, that the burning of the buildings
on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant station from that
place, and the discontinuance of the ferry service supplied a
good aud sufficient cause for the termination of the contract to
the Secretary of the Treasury. 585.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. Under the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894, and the act of
April 24, 1888, the Secretary of War has full authority to condemn the land necessary for the construction of a boat railway
provided for in the former act. 221.
2. If a change in the location of an existing railroad is a necessity
in the building of an authorized boat rail way, the acquisition
by the Secretary of War of the necessary land to make such
a change is merely an incident to the enterprise intrusted
to him. 221.
3. The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to acquire
and bold· real estate wherever and whenever needed fur the use
of the Government in the execution of any of its powers. 455.
4. Such property may be acquired by any of the means by ·w hich
natural or artificial persons may acquire property, subject in
certain cases to the local laws of the State. lb.
5. A contract for the improvement of the Hudson River may be
lega1ly modified so as to provide for the acquirement by the
United States through process of condemnation of the necessary
lands for use as dumping grounds to be maintained by the cont ractors. 78.
E GRAVI "G AND PRI TING.
See BUREAU 01!' ENGRA.YING
E TRY ~~ GOOD ' .
See Cu TOM LA.WS

A.ND PRIN'l'ING.

A.ND REGULATION ,

67.
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EVIDENCE.
The Secretal'y of the Treasury may rnturn the findings to the
United States commissioner in proceedings for the r emission
of penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further hearing
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289.
EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES.
See ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION,

3.

EXECUTIVE.
The Executive has no right tQ interfere or control the action of the
judiciary in proceedings against persous charged with being
concerned in hostile expeditions against friendly nations. 267.
See APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS,

1.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS.
1. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the
Government to restrain the manufacture or use of an article
alleged to be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will
a claim for damages lie against the Government for such
use. 96.
2. It is unlawful for an executive department to make a contract
for supplies for a longer term than one year from the time the
contract was made. 304.
3. The sole responsibility of every appointment in an executive
department rests upon the head of that department, except
where otherwise specially provided by statute. 355.
4. The power of appointment and removal in an executive department
being discretionary in character, they can not be delegated. lb.
5. The statutory designation of 2 o'clock p. m. for the opening of all
proposals in each Department means only that such proposals
shall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m., thus securing t.o both
the Government and the bidders the ad vantage of the prescribed moment prior to which no bids can be opened. 546.
See Brns, 1-8; MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1, 2; PRINTING, ETC.
EXTRADITION.
1. In an application by Mexico to a United States commissioner
for the extradition of a fugitive under the treaty with that
country, the commissioner shouid decline to proceed with the
inquiry until a translation of the papers containing the charges
are produced before him; but in such a case he should so advise
that Government and make a liberal allowance of time for the
production of such translation before returning the papers.
428.
2. While such treaty does not in terms provide for such translation,
yet the proceedings thereunder must accord with the rules aud
forms of the tribunals of that jurisdiction to which r ecourse is
had; and inasmuch as the commissioner is the sole j1tdge of the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence upon which extradition
is sought, it follows that such evidence must be presented in a
language that is intelligible to him. Ib.
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FISHING VESSELS.
See VESSELS, 5.
FLOOD TIDE.
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 2, 3.
FLOYD COUNTY, GEORGIA, BONDS.
The proposed issue of interest-bearing bonds by the county commissioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with
the banking laws of the United States. 70.
FORFEITURES.
See PENALTIES, 2, 3.
FRAUD.
·A fraud committed by one member of a partnership in a transaction which he is conducting on behalf of the firm is regarded
as a fraud of the firm, whether successful or unsuccessful, and
although it was the purpose of the partner to cheat his own
firm as well as the United States. 90.
FUNDS IN DISPUTE.
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, ETC., 1, 2.
FURLOUGHS.
See SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, 1.
FUR SEALS.
See SEAL FISHERIES.
GALVESTON HARBOR.
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 8, 9.
" GENERAL ARMS'fRONG," BRIG.
See CLAIMS, 3, 4.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
1. Government employees are not entitled to witness fees when subpamaed to testify in behalf of the United States, but are entitled to their expenses. When subpamaed by a private party,
they may demand and accept witness fees. 263.
2. Absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of military duties is not to be charged to the thirty days' leave allowed
them for rest and recreation. 353.
See ABSENCE; CIVIL SERVICE; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; PUBLIC OFFICERS; STATE DEPARTMENT, 1.
GRE T F LLS OF THE POTOMAC.
ee DAMAGES.
GRE T LAKE.
The rea.t Lake are high seas within the meaning of the act of
Augu t 19, 1 90. 106.
RULE , 2.
ee TA. VIGATI
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GUADALCPE HIDALGO.
See TREATIES, 6-9.
HYDRAULIC MINING.
See CALII<'ORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION, 1, 2, 3.
IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION ACT.
It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to require
of common carriers transporting merchandise ih bond, under
the immediate transportation act, to file a bon<L agreeing t o
accept and transport, within a definite fixed period of time, all
merchandise offered under the act. 369.
IMMIGRANT STATION.
See ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION.
IMMIGRANTS.
Certain steamship companies dispute the validity of the regulations of the Treasury Department, holding them liable for t he
maintenance and transportation to the seaboard, under the act
of March 3, 1891, of certain alien immigrants who had reach ed
the interior of the country: Held, that the enforcement of the
regulation is the duty of the Department of Justice, and t he
opinion the Attorney-General can not be required thereon. 6.

of

IMPORTED MATERIALS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS and REGULATIONS, 42-48.
INCOME-TAX LAW.
See TAXATION, 8, 9.
JNDIAN DEPREDATION CLAIMS.
1. Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the
benefit o:i: the Osage Indians within the meaning of section 12
of the act of July 15, 1870, and can not be authorized by t he
President under its terms. 131.
2. The same considerations apply in the case of the Ute Indi ans
under the act of June 15, 1880. Ib.
3. The President h, not charged with any power or duty of approval
or disproval respecting the payments of Indian . depredation
judgments from annuities and property of Indians or from
appropriations on their account, but all authority and discretion in the premises are vested in the Secretary of the Interior.
Ib.
INDIAN TERRITORY.
See ARMY, 1.
INDIANS.
1. The word "subjects" is used in treaties and international awards
chiefly because the inhabitants of monarchies are called subjects instead of citizens, yet in the act of April 61 1894, it wa,s
intended to embrace Indians. 466,
·
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INDIANS-Continued.
2. Indians are not commonly understood to be embraced by the laws
of Congress, yet they may ue and often are, and whether they
are or not is a question of intent. lb.
See SEAL FISHERIES, 12.
INFORMERS.
The Secretary of the Na.vy has implied authority to contract with
persops for their compensation in furnishing information of
frauds practiced upon the Government in the supply of equipment which was not according to contract. 1.
INJUNCTIONS.
See PROCEDURE, 1, 2.
INSPECTION.
See MEAT INSPECTION.
INSPECTION CERTIFICATES.
Consular officers of the United States can not extend expired inspection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is there
any authority of law for sending local inspectors out of the
country to make inspection. 52.
INSPECTORS OF HULLS AND STEAM BOILERS.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 9.
INTERN AL REVENUE.
1. The provisions of the South Carolina dispensary law of 1893 is
ineffective and inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a
United States bonded warehouse under the control of a collector •
of internal revenue. 73.
2. Distilled liquors in a bonded warehouse are exempt from the operations of the process of a State court. Ib.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. Arms and munitfons of war, and in some cases the ship carrying
them, are subject to· seizure by the government within whose
jurisdiction they come if its domestic laws or regulations are
violated, but international law imposes no duty upon the United
States with respect to such transactions. 267.
2. Internationallaw takes no account of a mereinsnrrection, confined
within the limits of a country, which has not been protractecl
or successful enough to secure for those engaged in it recognition as beligerents by their own government or by foreign governments. lb.
3. The obligation of preventing hostile expeditions against a friendly
nation is one of diligence a1Hl not a guaranty against such expeditions; and what constitutes diligence depends upon the circircumstance in each case. lb.
4. Th Ex cutive has no right to interfere or control the action of
the ,judiciary in proceedings against 1)ersons cha,rged with being
concerned in hostile expeditious against friendly nations. lb.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-Continued.
5. The neutrality laws of the United States, so called because their
main purpose is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the
United States while occupying a position of neut,rality toward
belligerents, were also intended to prevent offenses against
friendly powers, whether they should or should not be engaged
in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. lb.
6. The failure of the United States to pass neutrality laws would not
diminish its international obligations, nor would the passing
thereof increase such obligations. lb.
7. The revenue and police regulations of a country have never .been
recognized by international law as coming within the rules
regulating the conduct of other nations. lb.
8. The duty of the United States, when a state of war is declared or
recognized by another country, is of its own motion to use diligence to discover and to prevent within its borders the formation or departure of any military expedition intended to carry
on or take part in such war. lb.
9. The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute
sovereignty of every nation as against all others within its own
territory. 274.
See Cu~AN INSURRECTION.
IOWA RESERVATION.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2.
IRRIGATION.
See RIO GRANDE RIVER; TREATIES, 8, 9.
JUDGES, RETIREMENT.
See COURT OF CLAIMS, 1, 2.
JUDGMENTS.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized by section 3469,
Revised Statutes, to remit or release any portion of a judgment
indebtedness on consideration of hardship to certain individuals. The authority to compromis~ relates to claims of
doubtful recovery or enforcement. 50.
2. He has no authority to remit or release judgments in favor of the
Government from which there is no appeal and which are
clearly recoverable. 264.
3. One final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be
pleaded in bar in all others upon the same cause of action. 447.
JURISDICTION.
See ACTIONS, 9.
LABORERS.
See CHINESE.
''LABORERS AND MECHANICS."
Certain foremen of mechanics at the Fort Leavenworth militarv
prison are not "laborers and mechanics" within the eight-hoU:-r
law of August 1, 1892. 32.
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LACHES.
See ACTIONS, 2.
LANDS AND LAND PATENTS.
1. Patents to Mexican laml grants in Cal'ifornia under the a ct of
March 3, 1851, were conclusive only a s between the United
Sta,tes and the patentees, and did not affect the interests of
third persons. 13.
2. The surveys confirmed by such patents do not precl ude a l egal
investigation and decision by the proper tribunals between
conflicting claimants. lb.
· See ACTIONS, 1-3; PUBLIC LANDS; REAL ESTATE.
LAWS OF THE LAND.
A" municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws
of the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a
soldier violating such an ordinance and ~scaping to a military
reservation should be surrendered to the civil authorities for
trial upon demand. 88.
LEASE.
1. There can not strictly be a lease of a use.
See ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 4.

476.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE.
See ABSENCE.
LEGAL ADVICE.
The Commissioner of Patents should submit to the law officers
assigned to the Department of the Interior questions arising in
the administration of his ·department upon which l egal a dvice
is desired. 174.
·
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1, 2.
LIBEL.
Any publication in an official circular of the ground upon which
an officer or employee of the Government has been suspended
or discharged from the public service will not support a cause
of action for libel against the officer making such publication,
provided it is made in good faith, without malice, in the p erformance of an official duty, and with the design only of promoting the public interests. 320.
LICENSES.
1. Licenses are not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal fishing
in other waters than those covered by the award of the Paris
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239.
2. Wh n th license of a custom-house broker has b een revoked, h e
can no t thereafter deal directly with the customs officials,
ex ·ep when acting for himself as principal. 255.
3. The ecr et ary of the Treasury m ay grant a license, r evocable at
his w ill, to erect and maintain a building on Ellis Island, a n
immi •rant t ation, £ r th purpose of an exhibition ball and
ndu ·t ing a l and and l abor b ur au. 473.
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LICENSES-Continued.
4. He has no power to leas_e for any length of time Government
property withC1ut express authority of law, though he may
license the use thereof. 476.
5. A revocable license without limitation of time given by the Secretary of War for the erection of a Roman Catholic chapel on
a military reservation at West Point transcends the statute.
537.
LIENS.
1. A mechanic's lien will not lie against property of the United
States. 18, 78.
2. Assuming that the title to the land on which the dry dock at Port
Royal is built and the exclusive jurisdiction over it are in the
United States, the mechanics' lien laws of South Carolina do not
operate thereon and claims under such laws may be ignored in
the settlement with contractors. 18.
3. On the grounds of -p ublic policy, the mechanics' lien Jaws do not
generally, in the absence of expressed provisions, apply to public buildings erected by States for public use. lb.
4. The owner or consignee of a vessel arriving from a foreign port
is entitled to a lien for freight on the merchandise imported on
such vessel for the purpose of exportation. 38.
5. The Treasury Depal'tment may legally accept the revenue cutter
Calumet subject to a creditor's lien, and after satisfying the
lien proceed against the contractor's bondsmen to recover payment made in excess of the contract price. 70.
LIFE-SA.VING CORPS.
See LIFE-SAVING MEDALS, 5.
l .IFE-SA.VING MEDALS.
1. Section 12 of the act of June 18, 1878, does not authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to bestow life-saving medals for signal
service made in saving persons from drowning in small inland
streams, r,onds, and pools. 65.
2. The waters contemplated by such section are either the high seas
or what 1night be described as waters of the United States. lb.
3. Section 12 of the act of June 18, 1878, with reference to the awarding by the Secretary of the Treasury of life-saving medals of
the second class upon persons for bravery in "succoring the
shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning," refers only to
those cases wher~ the rescued were suffering from the perils of
the sea either by actual shipwreck or from being upon or connected with any vessel in distress. 124.
4. It applies only to those who are in danger of drnwning in any of
the waters of the United States in the vicinity of a life-saving
station, life- boat station, or house of refuge. Ib.
5. The intent of such statute was to provide for the bestowal of such
medals of honor upon the regular or volunteer members, whether
permanent or temporary, of the life-saving corps. Ib.
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LOTTERIES.
1. The plan of business of a certain company considered and declared
to be in the nature of a lottery within the meaning of sections
3894 and 4001, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, and the use of the mails by it forbidden. 4.
2. The advertisements in Le Petit Journal, a French publication,
considered and held to fall within the prohibited class defined
iu section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, as unmailahle. 171.
3. The acts of Congress authorizing the Postmaster-General to withhold mail matter from persons and concerns engaged in conducting a lottery or gift enterprise, etc., are constitutional, and empower him to deny mail facilities to all such. 313.
4. The name "lottery" covers any dl:ltermination of gain or loss by
the issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion.
It is none the less a lottery because it is fairly conducted 0r because such conduct is amply secured. Ib.
MAILS.
1. Interference with the carriage of the mail on railroads in the usual
and ordinary way is a criminal offense, and the combination
of offenders may be prosecuted under section 5440, Revised
Statutes. 8.
2. The extension of the free-delivery service of the Detroit post-office
so as to permit the delivery of mail to vessels in Canadian
¥Taters is not legally authorized. 173.
3. Public interests require that the Government should have a monopoly of the business of carrying the mail. 394.
4. The Monthly Bulletin containing advertisements of private firms
or corporations, published by the Bureau .of American Republics, is entitled to transmission through the mails free of postage,
under the act of February 20, 1897. 514.
See LoTTERrns, 1, 2, 3; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 1-7.
MAKAR INDIANS.
See SEAL FISHERIES, 12.
MARINE CORPS.
See AccoUNTs, 2; PENSIONS, 1, 2.
MARINE-HOSPITAL FUNDS.
Sick and disabled officers and seamen of the Revenue-Cutter
Service are entitled to the benefit of ihe Marine-Hospital funds
provicled for sick and disabled seamen. 340, 365.
MEAT I SPECTIO .
1. A criminal prosecution will not lie for falsely representing in a
label placed on canned meat that the meat contained in the can
has lrnen inspected in accordance with the act of March 3, 1891.
12 .
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MEAT INSPEC'rION-Continued.
2. It is the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture, under the act of
March 2, 18~5, to make regulations toprevent the transportation
of condemned carcasses of cattle, sheep, etc., inspected in accordance with the provisions of this act. 167.
3. The act of March 3, 1891, imposes a penalty for transporting the
carcasses or the food p-roducts thereof, declared to be unsound
or diseased, but the law does not require that they should be
rendered unfit for human food. Ib.
4. The Department of Agriculture is not required to effect the prevention of the consumption of diseased meat as human food
within the State of its origin and without its having been carried out and brought back into such State. Ib.
5. It can not compel the destruction of pork, although a:f(ected with
trichinoo, nor can it license its use under limitationM and restrictions. 167.
6. Section 2 of the act of March 2, 1895, with reference to the inspection of cattle the meat of which is intended for exportation,
relates alone to live cattle and the meat of cattle, and any
reasonable regulation affecting these and these alone is authorized by the statute. 229.
7. An act of Congress providing for the inspection of beef intended
for exportation, and that no clearance shall be given to any vessel having on board for exportation uninspected beef, does not
authorize tbe making of a regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring that meat other than beef products shall be so
marked as to show the species of animal from which it was produced, cl~ssifying all unmarked packages of meat as uninspected
beef and refusing clearance to vessels having on board such
unmarked packages. 229. ·
See CATTLE, 1, 2.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
A mechanic's lien can not be acquired upon property of the United
States. 78.
See Lnrns.
MEDALS.
See LIFE-SAVING MEDALS; W ORLD's COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, 2-7.
MERCHANDISE.
See wORDS AND PHRASES.
MERCHANT MARINE.
See VESSELS.
MEXICAN LAND GRANTS.
See LANDS, ETC., 1, 2.
MEXICO.
See CONGRESSMEN, 1; TREATIES, 6-9.
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MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT.
1. In selecting the granite for t,he Memorial Hall at vVest Point the
safest plan is to designate certain fixed standar<ls, each l>id being
upon the separate kinds with the right added to the boarcl to
make selection. 240.
2. A revocable license without limitation of time given by the Secretary of War for the erection of a Roman Catholic chapel on
the military reservation at West Point transcends the s_tatute.
537.
MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
See NATIONAL GUARD.
MILITARY RESERVATIONS.
1. A revocable license without limitation of time given b y the Secretary of War for the erection of a Roma,n Catholic chapel on
the military reservation at vVest Point transcends the statute.
537.
2. An explicit authority is necessary for even a transient occupation
of a military reservation for other than its special purpose. Ib.
3. Permanence of right of occupation is forbidden by the act of July
28, 1892, and consequently an occupation which contemplates
permanency or duration longer than five years is forbidden. lb.
4. The Secretary of War has no power to accept for the Government
a donation of a building erected upon a military reservation,
where the acceptance is accompanied by a limitation for its
use in perpetuity by the Roman Catholics. lb.
5. The Secretary of War has no authority to grant permission for the
erection of a bethel, reading room, and library within the army
reservation on Ship Island. 565.
MILITIA.
The J!.,ifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in
the military service of the United States in such sense as to
entitle Capt. Frederick Huidekoper to a certificate of discharge
from the United States. 130.
See NATIONAL GUARD.
MINORS.
1. The consent of parents and guardians to enlistments in the Navy
of minors over 18 years of age is not necessary to make the
enlistment valid. 327.
2. The period at which persons reaeh their majority and becorne sui
juris with respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge
this power of the General Government . lb.
3. The United States have a right to prescribe the rules and conditions under which voluntary or compulsory services are to be
rendered by citizens. lb.
4. If a statute permits a man to bind himself by enlistment during
his minority, there is no reason why he can not bind himself
for a further period. lb.
5. The phra e "other persons" in section 1416, Revi!,ed Statutes,
includes all persona over 18 years, whether of age or not. Ib.
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MISTAKE.
1. If a bid for the construction of public works has been accepted,
. it can not be withdrawn by the contractor 1)ecause he made a
clerical error in preparing his estimates, as the mistake. was not
mutual, but was due to negligence. 186.
2. A soldier should not be held accountable for money paid him in
excess of the amount to which he w2.s entitled where such payment was made through a mistake of law on the part of the
executive officers of the Government. 323.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 71-77.
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS.
See CoNTRACTS, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7.
MONEY IN DISPUTE.
1. A disbursing officer of the United States holding a Treasury draft
payable to certain contractors can not with propriety or safety
be directed to turn it over to a receiver appointed by a State
court in an action between contesting claimants. 75.
2. Funds in the hands of the Secretary of War may be retained by
him pending a controversy between the parties claiming them
until a final adjudication of the whole matter by the tribunal
to which the parties may last resort. 447.
"MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE."
See TREATIES, 1-3.
NATIONAL GUARD.
Certain arma furnished the Washington Light Infantry of Charleston, S. C., are held by the State of South Carolina for the use
of the whole body of the militia of the State in snch manner
and in accordance with such rules and regulations as the
authorities of the State may prescribe. 54.
See ABSENCE, LEAVES OF, 3, 4.
NATURALIZATION.
See CITIZENSHIP.
NAVAL ACADEMY.
1. The act of March 2, 1895, authorizing Representatives or Delegates
in Congress to recommend a candidate for appointment as a cadet
at the Naval Academy of the United States limits this right to
members of the then existing Fifty-third Congress. 164.
2. In order for such a recommendation to be valid, it should have been
made before 12 o'clock noon of March 4, 1895; consequently three
recommendations made on that day, but received at the Navy
Department after such hour, are ineffective. Ib.
3. The Secretary of the Navy has no right to call for a new recommendation for appointment of a cadet at Annapolis, even though
he had not acted upon the recommendation until after the Congressman who made it was unseated, ·unless it ue under sectiol!.
1516J Revised Statutes, where the candidate failed to pass. 342•

666

DIGEST OF OPINIONS.

' NAVAL ACADEMY-Continued.
4:. The nomination of a ca,det for appointment at the Naval Academy
by a Congressman who was subsequently unseated b y contest
. of election is good, and the candidate can not lawfully be
deprived of his place if he passes his examination. Ib.
NAVAL OFinCERS.
See NAVY, 1-6, 9-11.
NAVAL REGULATIONS.
See NAVY,2-4.
NAVAL SUPPLIES.
See ADVERTISEMENTS, 5, 9; Brn·s, 1, 2.
NAVIGABLE DEPTH.
"Navigable depth" is a depth sufficiently wide to be navigated
by vessels either moved by sails or steam and to permit them to
pass each other. 29.
NAVIGABLE WA'l'ERS.
1. Where a State has grantecl authority to construct a bridge over a
navigable river and the location and plan has been approved
by the Secretary of War, the question whether the purchasers
of such right are authorized to proceed is one which does not
concern the Government. 293.
2. The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the
United States, and the Secretary of War had exclusive authority to permit their obstruction by dams, but can not revoke his
permit when large sums of money have been expended on the
faith thereof. 41.
3. The act of September 19, 1890, as amended, intended that the
navigable ·waters of the United States should thereafter be
under the exclusive control of the United States; and that for
the future their navigability should be interfered with by
bridges, dams, or other obstructions only by express permission
of the United States granted by the Secretary of War. Ib.
4. It is the duty of the Secretary of War to act upon a petition to
have designated the portion of a river within which refuse matter may be discharged, in accordance with the provisions of the
act of August 18, 1894, chapter 299, sect.ion 6, although the navigability of the river will not be affected. 305.
5. In making such designation he should be governed only by considerations affecting the navigation of the river or which may
affect its future navigation. 305.
6. The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme, and
grows out of the power to regulate commerce. 430.
7. Congress may declare what is an obstruction and remove it. Ib.
8. When Congress chooses to act, it is not concluded, by anything
that the States or that individuals by its authority have done,
from as urning entire control of the matter and abating any
erection that may have been made and preventing any others
from heiu<r made, except in conformity with such regulations
as it may impo. e. Ib.
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NAVIGABLE WATERS-Continued.
9. The provision in the river and harbor act of September 19, 1890,
that whenever the Secretary of War shall determine that any
bridge constructed over "any of the navigable waterways of
the United States is an unreasonable obstruction to the free
navigation of such waters," he shall give notice to have such
obstruction removed or remedied, is not an unconstitutional
delegation of the legislative functions . 430.
10. Where a bridge was erected by authority of a State before Congress assumed actual jurisdiction over the river for tho purposes of navigation, and it was declared an obstruction to
navigation by the Secretary of War under the above act, such
obstrnction can be abated without compensation by the United
States for the expenses incurred. lb.
11. The control and supervision of the navigable waters of the United
States is placed in the Secretary of War. 518.
12. The remedy of the United States in case of the erection of a dam
without authority across the Rio Grande River is by injunction
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890. 518.
13. The Secretary of the Interior has no power, under the provisions
of the act of March 3, 1891, to authorize the damming of the Rio
Grande River for irrigation purposes. 518.
14. The Secretary of War is authorized, under the act of July 13,
189'.&, to permit the construction of a canal connecting Port
Arthur, Tex., with Sabine Pass, a navigable water improved at
the expense of the Government, for a canal is such a work as
is provided for iu section 7 of said act.
15. Although the Attorney-General can not determine without considering questions of fact whether or not a bar in Flushing
Creek formed opposite the month of a sewer and offering an
obstruction to navigation is .such a case as comes within the
exception provided in section 6 of the act of August 17, 1894,
the Secretary of War is not precluded from taking such action
inviting the attention of the town authorities of Flushing to
the matter as may be advisable. 594.
See CALIFO_RNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION, 1.
NAVIGATION RULES.
1. Rules 6 and 7 of section 4223, Revised Statutes, relating to river
steamers navigating waters flowing into the Gulf of Mexico and
their tributaries, and to coasting steam vessels, etc., navigating
the bays, lakes, or other inland waters, are repealed by the act
of August 19, 1890. 106.
2. The act of August 19, 1890, adopting the regulations for preventing collisions at sea are applicable to all waters navigable. for
seagoing vessels and connected either with the ocean or with
the Great Lakes, and also applicable to every kind of steam
vessel. 106.
3. The Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels have power
to make regulations not inconsistent therewith. 106.
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4. The provision of section 4234, Revised Statutes, requiring sailing
vessels to show a lighted forch on the approach of any steam
vessel <luring the night time was not repealed by section 3 of
the act of February 19, 1895. 227.
5. Sections 12 and 13 of the act of March 3, 1897, relating to the
navigation laws, which amends section 4233, Revised Statutes,
are special rules duly.made by local authority according to the
provisions of article 30 of the act of 1890. 513.
6. Those portions of the international regulations for preventing
collisions at sea prescriLed by the act of August 19, 1890, which
did not interfere with the operations of the special rules duly
made by the local authorities according to the provisions of
article 30 as construed by the act of 1895 are rules for the
guidance of American vessels on the high seas as well as on all
waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels. 513.
NAVY.
1. The status of members of the staff corps of the Navy are governed
by sections 1485, 1486, and 1487, Revised Statutes. 46.
2. Article 21 of the Naval Regulations is within the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy by section 1547, Revised
Statutes. lb.
3. There is no inconsistency between sections 1483 and 1484, Revised
Statutes, in their operation upon the question of the precedence
of engineer officers of the Navy. Ib.
4. The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the approval of the President, for the government of the Navy have the force of the statute law when not
inconsistent therewith. lb.
5. The rule of the Febiger Board for ascertaining the date of precedence of officers on the active list of the Navy is in conflict with
the act of August 5, 1882. lb.
3. B. entered the Navy September 20, 1854; on February 8, 1868, he
was dismissed from the service; on March l, 1871, pursuant to a
joint resolution of Congress, he was reappointed; on September
20, 1894, at his request, he was placed upon the retired list under
the provisions of section 1443, Revised Statutes: Held, that as
he had not been forty years in actual service of the United
States, the retiring order was without effect, and he should be
restored to the active list of the Navy. 103.
7. Paymasters of the Navy may receive from enlisted men or petty
officers, for deposit under the act of February 9, 1889, accumulated savings to any amount, providing they represent the earnings of such a person as an enlisted man or petty officer in the
United, tates avy. 498.
8. The consent of parents and guardians to enlistments in the Navy
of minors over eighteen years of age is not necessary to make
the enlistment valid. 327.
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NAVY-Continued.
9. The person to be employed under the act of February 19, 1897, to
supervise the c·ompletion of the tables of planets may be designated either by the order of the Secretary of the Navy or of the
head of the Bureau, which order need only designate the person
selected as a competent mathematician and the compensation
he is to receive. 507.
10. There is no obj ection to the employment of a retired officer to
supervise the completion of this work. Ib.
11. As adequate power resides in the Secretary of the Navy to cause
the arrest of an officer for mal-appropriation of public funds, .
notwithstanding the fact that he has been arrested by the civil
authorities for the same offense, and discharged on bail, it is
improper to cause his arrest by the civil officers in order to his
trial for a naval court-martial. 504.
12. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of
July 26, 1894, is not limited in its application to premiums
earned prior to January 1, 1894. 84.
See ACCOUNTS, 2, 3; CONTRACTS, 1; MINORS, 1-5; PENSIONS, 1, 2;
PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
NEUTRALITY LAWS.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW.
NORTH AMERICAN COMMERCIAL COMPANY.
The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require the
North American Commercial Company to furnish security to the
amount of its indebtedness for the years 1894 and 1895 in addition to the $50,000 of bonds already made pursuant to section
1963, Revised Statutes. 177.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO.,
See PUBLIC LANDS, 7-9.
OATHS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 26-29.
OFFICE.
1. The President can appoint to office only those who are eligible
under the Constitution. His appointment of one not eligible is
a nullity. 211.
·
2. A statute making an appropriation for certain employment, providing no permanency to the term or contemplating none of the
usual formalities in the selection of an employee for such service, as the taking of an oath or receiving a commission, does not
create an office. 507.
See CONGRESSMEN, 1, 2.
OFFICERS.
_S ee ARMY OFJ.<'ICERS; NAVY, 1-6, 9-11.
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OFFICIAL BONDS.
See BONDS, 3.
OPTION.
See CLOUD UPON THE TITLE.
OS.A.GE INDIANS.
Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the
benefit of the Osage Indians within the meaning of section 12
of the act of July .15, 1870, and can not be authorized by the
President under its terms. 131.
OVERHEAD WIRES.
See DISTRIC! OF COLUMBIA, 2.
P .A.CIFIC RAILROAD COMP.A.NIES.
See CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
PAPERS.
See POST-OFFICE.DEPARTMENT, 1.
PARDON .
.As in some of the States a person convicted of an offense which
the laws of the United States call a misdemeanor loses his right
to vote, sit as juror, etc., if the action of the President on an
application for pardon depends simply on the question of necessity for pardon, such necessity exists, unless the applicant is to
be prevented from freely changing his residence under penalty
of losing his rights of citizenship thereby. 242.
P .ARKS .A.ND RESERV.A.TIONS.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3, 4.
P .A.RTNERSHIP.
See FRAUD.
PASSPORT:
See CHINESE, 10.
PATENT OFFICE.
1 . .A rule promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, limiting appeals in
patent cases to six months from ·the time when in a condition
for appeal, is not in contravention of the law. 122.
2. .A rule or regulation made by the Commissioner of Patents and
adopted and approve<l by the Secretary of the Interior, under
s ction 483 Revised Statutes, is a regulation prescribed by the
bead of a Department, and as such,. when not incon istent with
law, bas the force of law and is taken judicial notice of by the
courts. lb.
3. The Commissioner of Patents shoul<l submit to the law officers
a signed to the Department of the Interior questions arising in
the a lmioi ·tration of his D partment upon which legal advice
i d ired. 174.
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PA'rENTS.
1. Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by
a collector of customs, although protected by patents. 72.
2. A preliminary injunction may be granted to restrain the manufacture or use of a patented invention prior to the :final determination of the case. 96.
3. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the
Government to restrain the manufacture or use of an article
alleged fo be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will a
claim for damages lie against the Government for such use. Ib.
4. Where loss and injury may result to the Government from the
appropriation by its contractors of a patented invention or
other property of third persons, a bond of indemnity should be
required as a part of a contract. Ib.
PAYMASTERS'. CLERKS.
See C1v1L SERVICE, 14.
PAYMENT .THROUGH MISTAKE.
See MISTAKE, 2.
PENALTIES.
1. A penalty imposed under a contract for delay in completing a
work which has been :finished according to the contract without
damage to the Government, may be r emitted by the Secretary
of War and the sum withheld paid to the contractor. 27.
2. The provision in a contract providing for the forfeiture of $20 per
day for each day's delay in completing certain work at West
Point Military Academy is to be regarded as a penalty, and in
case of delay it is lawful to asRess against the contractor the
actual damages sustained instead of the penalty. 139.
3. The distinction between the compromising of a doubtful case and
the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability is that the
former is strictly a fiscal one, while .t he latter is in the nature
of a pardoning power. 264.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 80-89.
PEN ALTY ENVELOPES.
See MAILS, 4.
PENITENTIARIES.
Prisoners sentenced by a military court-martial to confinement in
a United States penitentiary shoulcl be conducted thereto L>y the
proper officer of the vVar Department, and not be turned over
to a United States marshal for delivery. 204.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3-6, 10.
PENSIONS.
1. The provision of section 4724, Revised Statutes, forbidding persons in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps from drawing both a
pension as an invalid and the pay of his rank in the service, is
not applicable to retired officers. 408. Reversed, 453.
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2. The pension acts of August 29, 1890, and March 3, 1891, providing
that thereafter no officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps on
the retired list should draw or receive pension under any law,
should not have a retrospective effect and forbid the allowance
of pension to ~uch person up to and jncluding the last quarterly
payment falling due prior to the :first-mentioned date. 408.
''PERILS OF THE SEA."
See wORDS AND PHRASES.
"PERSONAL EPFECTS."
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 62.
PNEUMATIC GUN CARRIAGE AND POWER COMPANY.
See PREMIUMS, 1, 2, 3.
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FUND.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 16, 17.
PORT ROYAL DRY DOCK.
See LIENS, 2.
POSSESSION OF FUNDS.
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1, 2.
POSTAGE STAMPS.
The counterfeiting of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes
within the meaning of the phrase "obligation or other securities * * * o any foreign Government" in section 4 of the
act of Pebruary 10, 1891. 136.
POSTAL SERVICE.
1. The proviso to the act of January 12, 1895, constitutes no substantial limitation upon the power to print and supply "special
request envelopes," under section 3915, Revised Statutes. 119.
2. The extension of the free-delivery service of tbe Detroit postoffice so as to permit the delivery of mail to vessels fo Canadian
waters, is not legally authorized. 173.
•
See AccouNTs, 1; CIVIL SERVICE, 4, 12, 16; LOTTERIES; MAILS;
RAILROAD COMPANIES, 1-6.
PO T-OFFICE DEPARTMENT.
The disposition of useless papers which have accumulated in the
office of the Auditor for the Post-Office Department should be in
accordance with the act of February 16, 1889. 151.
PRACTICE.
0 ACTION i J UDGMENTS i PR CE DURE.
PRE~UU I .
1. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of
July 26 1894 is n t limited in its application to premiums
earned prior to January 1, 1 94. 84.
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PREMIUMS-Continued.
2. The contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company for the construction of a djsappearing gun carriage under
the act of August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment
of a preminm, and does not bind the Government beyond the
amount appropriated. 457.
3. And there is no authority for him to make a supplemental contract binding the Government to further expenditures in the
way of premiums. 495.
PRESIDENT.
1. 'fhe President can appoint to office only those who are eligible
. under the Constitution. His appo_intmen~ of one not eligible
is a nullity. 211.
2. He has no power to remit forfei ture of a judgment on a recognizance elsewhere than in the Distr:i.ct of ColuTLbia. 494.
See CONGRESSMEN, 1; PARDON.
PRINTING AND BINDING.
1. The Public Printer should print and distribute in slip form 760
copies of private bills, postal conventions, etc., under section
56 of the public printing and binding act of 1895. 405.
2. Under that section the State Department shouhl receive 500 copies
of the private laws, conventions, etc., printed in slip form. Ib.
3. The t1llotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the
different departments is not actually passed upon by the
accounting offi cers of the Treasury and · is not within thejr
jurisdiction. 42B.
.
4. The order of the Secretary of State upon the Public Printer, under
section 90 of the public printing and binding act of January 12,
1895, for a number of copies of certain Congressional documents,
not exceeding the number of bureaus in his Department, should
be furnished without being charged to the allotment of his Department. 423.
5. The word "order" in the clause in section 80 of this act, providing "that no order for p11blic printing shall be acted upon after
the expiration of one year, unless the entire copy and illustrations shall be furnir:ihed within that period," was not intended
to include a joint resolution of Congress for· the printing of a
"history of international arbitrations," digest, etc. 427.
6. Under section 90 of th e act of J anuary 12, 1895, the head of an
executive department has no right to r equest the Public Printer
to furnish a greater number of copies of publicatjons, other than
bills and resolutions, than the number of bureaus in the department and divisions in the office of the head thereof. 370.
7. The head of an executive department may make a requisition on
the Public Printer for any number of publications, where the
cost of printing is to be charged against such department, and
the Pubhc Printer has no authority to pass upon the character
of the publications. Id.
See ADVERTISEMENTS, 3, 4.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
See LIBEL.
PROCEDURE.
1. A preliminary injunction may b e granted to restrain the manufacture or use of a patented invention prior to the final determination of the case. 96.
2. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the
Government to r estrain the manufacture or use of an article
alleged to be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will a
claim for damages lie against the Government for such use. lb.
See ACTIONS.
PROCESS.
Distilled liquors in a bonded warehouse are exempt from the operations of the process. of a State court. 73.
PROPOSALS.
See Brns.
PROTESTS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 13, 73, 74, 77.
PRUSSIA.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 30, 31, 32.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
On the grounds of public policy the mechanic's lien l aws do not
generally, in the absence of express provisions, apply to public
buildings erected by States for public use. 18.
See PUBLIC wORKS.
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.
See PUBLIC WORKS; RIVERS AND HARBORS.
PUBLIC LANDS.
1. Lands of the United States within the limits of a State are not
subject to her laws, except there be in the act of her legislature,
under which jurisdiction was ceded to the United States, a reservation of concurrent jurisdiction to the State. 18.
2. Lands reserved from the public domain for the use of the Navy
Department can only be restored to the public domain by Congres ional action. 120.
3. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, granting certain sections of unappropriated public lands within the State of Colorado to the State for penitentiary purposes, that S3,id l ands are
to be selectccl and located by direction of the legislature of
saicl tate and with the approval of the Pi-esident of the United
States, on or before a specifiecl clay, are not directory, as Congre. .· had no rio-ht to give directions to the legislature of a
tat , hut are rather in the nature of conditions precedent and
can nly b given effect as conditions, and a failure by the
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PUBLIC LANDS-Continued.
designated authorities to select and locate lands within the
time named renders the grant inoperative, and after the expiration of said time the President is not authorized to approve a
selection and location of said lands. 462.
,1. An act r eqniring a State to make a selection of lands within a
specified period after its a<lmission into the Union can not be
construed as directions to those whom CongreRs bad no right to
direct, as they can only be given effect as conditions precedent,
,vhich, if not complied with, prevent the grant from being
effectual. Ib.
5. The President is not authorized to approve a selection of public
lands for penitentiary purposes by the State of Colorado under
section 9 of the act of March 3, 1875. lb.
6. Failure by the designated authorities of a State to Relect and
locate lands within the time named by an act providing for such
selection renders the grant inoperative. Ib.
7. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, a Wisconsin corporation,
having purchased, under a foreclosure sale, the mortgages of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the Secretary of the
Interior should act upon the application of the former for patents to land, npon the same considerations which wonld govern
in case there had been no foreclosure and the a,pplications were
all made by the latter company. 486.
8. The consideration for the grant of pnblic lands to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, under the act of July 2, 1864, being
the construction and maintenance of a railroad telegraph line,
and such obligation having been fully p erformed by it, the right
to have the lands patented was perfect in said company. lb.
9. Congress, by consenting to the issuing of bonds secured by mortgage on the railway and telegraph lines of the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, necessarily consented to their transfer to
the purchaser in case of foreclosure, whether a natural or artic
ficial person, and if the latter, no matter bow or by what
authority created, would take the property subject to all the
continuing rights of the Federal Government just as the original company held it. Ib.
10. The States of South Dakota and Montana having received grants
for the erection of penitentiaries, the enabling act under which
the two Dakotas, Montana, and Washington ,vere admitted into
the Union provided that North Dakota and Washington should
have like grants for the same purpose. ·washington already
has a penitentiary. Held, that further legislation is required.
352.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.
When power is given to public officers to be exercised for the
public interest the language used, though permissive iu form,
is in fact mandatory. 167.
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PUBLIC PRINTER.
See PRINTING AND BINDING.
PUBLIC PROPERTY.
1. Public property can be subject to claims against it only when it
is in the possession of the courts, by act of the Government,
seeking to have hs rights established. 18.
2. The Secreta,ry of the Treasur~, ha,s no power to lease for a term of
years, or for any length of time, the property of the Government placed in his charge, wHhout express authority of law
therefor. 476.
See PUBLIC WORKS.
PUBLIC WORKS.
1. A mechanic's lien can not be acquired upon property of the United
States. 78.
2. In a contract for public works, although tbe representations of an
officer of the Government have been relied up·on, they must be
regarded as wholly personal antl of no effect as ~1gainst the
United States. lb.
3. No authority exists in the Secretary of the Navy to incur obligations for the completion of a dry dock where the appropriation
has become exhausted, although it would result in a great saving
to the Government. 288.
See Brns, 4-5; CONTRACTS; Punuc PROPERTY; RIVERS AND
HARBORS.
QUARANTINE AND QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.
1. The Secretary of Agriculture may lawfully provide food for quarantined cattle where they are in danger of loss, but in such case
h e should hold them until such expenses are repaid, and in case of
default sell them. 193.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture may provide and enforce regulations
requiring the food and attendance to be furnished quarantined
cattle by the owner, under the act of August 30, 1890. lb.
3. In quarantine regulations against yellow fever promulgated by
the Secretary of the Treasury an exemption from disinfection,
etc., of vessels bound to ports in the United States north of the
southern boundary of Maryland does not constitute a discrimination within the meaning of the act of February 15, 1893, providing t hat Tegu1ations shall operate uniformly and in no manner
discriminate against any port or p1ace. 446.
4. The authority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and
slaughter imported sheep affected with scab, under the act of
August 30, 1890, is doubtful. 460.
5. Tb act of August 30, 1890, provides a summary method of appraisal
and payment in the case of the slaughter of animals exposed to
infection, but no payruent is provided where they are imported
in violation of the act. The evident intent of the act was that
1•xposed animals imported in violation thereof were to be slanght r cl incli criminately, without regard to the question of the
1 gality of the importation. 460.
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QUARANTINE AND QUARANTINE REGULATIONS-Continued.
6. A Chin~se laborer fnrnishecl with the necessary certificate, etc.,
arrived in tbe United States two clays after the period :fixed by
the treaty, being delayed in quarantine by the Canadian authorities; Held, That be could not enter the United States, as his
return should have been within the period which the treaty bas
made the sole provision for delay. 575.
7. Quarantine is not actus Dei, but an ordinary incident of travel, to
be contemplated by one undergoing a voyage. 575.
RAILROAD COMPANIES.
1. Railroad companies are prohibited from carrying, outside of the
mails, first-class mail matter not in Government stamped envelopes, for companies, corporations, or private individuals operating car lines, transportation lines, hotels, restaurants, or any
other class of business that may either be connected or not connected with the railroad company. 394-.
2. Any railroad company or any officer or employee thereof, carrying
letters which are neither written by that company nor addressed
to it, is liable to the penalties imposed by the law. lb.
3. A railroad company can not carry letters from one of its connecting lines to another, although they may relate to through business over the lines of all. lb.
4. A r ailroad company has the right to carry letters about its own
business, written and sent by its officers and agents, without
being in Government stamped envelopes. They may be letters
to others of its officers and agents, to those of connecting lines,
or to anyone else, so long as no other carrier intervenes. lb.
· 5. Letters of a railroad company addressed to officers or agents of a
connecting line on company business, and delivered to an agent
of the latter at the point of connection, may be carried by the
latter to any point on its line. lb.
6. The term "private hands" as used in section 3992, Revised Statutes, with reference to the conveyance or t ransmission of mail
matter, was evidently intended to cover all except common carriers on post routes. Neither the latter nor their employees,
while engaged in this business can be considered as "private
hands." lb.
7. Railroad companies can not set up a common right against the
conditions which tlie law incorporates in their contracts with
the Government. lb.
8. The act of July 29, 1892, does not authorize the Secretary of War
to approve the survey of the Great Falls Electric Railway Company over th e lands of the Washington Aqueduct, where the
inner rail of said railway is less than the distance specified in
said act. 394.
REAL ESTATE.
1. The United States had authority to take possession of and use
real estate during the period of the war for war purposes, but
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they did not have authority or power, by any summary proceeding, to divest the title of the owner, nor the power ~o retain
possession beyond th e period during which the occasion for the
taking continued. 382.
·2. A proceeding to ouster the Government from such possession, while
not maintainable strictly against the United States, ma.y be
maintained against the individuals in possession of the premises.
Tb.
3. The United States having taken possession and still retainin g the
same, such possession can not be surrendered by the offi cers of
the Government without authority from the Secretary of War.
Ib.
4. If the United States have abandoned such real estate and the
lawful owner has entered and taken possession, his possession
is lawful and can not be disturbed. Ib.
5. In order to acquire title to land upon which Fort Taylor is located,
which was taken possession of by the United States authorities
during the war, the proper course is to apply to Congress for its
condemnation or purchase. Ib.
6. If the United States is in possession of land taken during the war
for war purposes, anu is forcibly ejected or ousted , even by the
lawful owner, such possession is unlawful and should be restored
to the United States. lb.
7. The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to
acquire and hold real estate wherever and whenever needed for
the use of the Government in the execution of any of its powers.
455.
8. Such property may be acquired by any of the means b y which

natural or artificial person s may aeqnire property, subject in
certain cases to the local laws of the State. Ib.
9. The Secretary of the Treasury, without further authority than the
act of March 3, 1891, may accept a voluntary grant of l and from
the city of Saginaw, Mich., to be used for the purposes of a
public building. Ib.
10. No legislation by Congress is needed to enable the United States
to take and hold lands rnceived through voluntary gift, devise,
or grant. Ib.
RECOG IZA TC ES.
1. The I resident has no power to remit forfeiture of a judgment on
a recognizance elsewhere than in the District of Columbia . 494.
2. Th power to compromise claims in favo1· of the United States,
which in lud s judgments on recognizances, is vested in th e
, 'ecretary of the Treasury. Ib.
REF
TOM ' LAW

REGI,'TRY FOR

AND REGULATIONS,
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71- 77.

-B ILT VE,' ELS.

''e A.MEHI A~ REGISTHY, 1-5.
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REID CLAIM.
See CLAIMS, 3, 4.
RELIQUIDATION OF DUTIES.
See CusTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 78, 79.
REMISSION OF PENALTIES AND RECOGNIZANCES.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, ETC., 80-89; RECOGNIZANCES, 1, 2.
REMOVALS.
See APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS, 3; NAVAL ACADEMY, 4-.
REPRESENTATIONS.
In a contract for public works, although the representations of
an officer of the Government have been relied upon, they must
be regarded as wholly personal and of no effect as against the
United States. 78.
REPRESENT A'l'IVES.
See CONGRESSMEN.
RESIDENCE.
See CIYIL SERVICE, 1.
RETIRED OFFICERS.
See ARMY OFFICERS, 2-5, 7; NAVY, 6, 10.
RETIREMENT OF JUDGES.
See COURT Ol!' CLAIMS, 1, 2.
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
1. Officers of the Revenue-Cutter Service placed upon "permanent
waiting or<ler" under the act of March 2; 1895, are withdrawn
from the line of promotion1 but may be restored to their former
rank when their disability ceases. 286.
2. There is no legal limitation to the number of officers who may be
placed upon permanent waiting orders. Ib.
3. Sick seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the
benefit of the Ma.rine Hospital funds provided for sick and disabled seamen. 340, 365.
4. The provision in the act of June 4, 1897, that certain chief engineers of the Revenue-Cutter Service" shall be eligible for appointment to the office of captain of engineers in said service, with
the pay and emoluments of such captain," creates the office of
"captain of engineers," with pay the same as that of n, captain
of the Revenu.e -Cutter Service. 551.
See LIENS, 5.
REVENUE LAWS.
Sections 3985 and 3993, Revised Statutes, are revenue laws, and
aro not to be strictly constrne<l, though they impose r,enalties.
394.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS; TAXATION.
10892-VOL 21. P'.l' 3 - -18
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REVISED STATUTES.
In case of doubt as to the construction of a revised statute,
reference may always be had to the original act. 190.
RIO GRANDE RIVER.
1. The remedy of the United States in case of the erection of a dam
without ·authority across the Rio Grande River is by injun ction
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890. 518.
2. The Secretary of the Interior has no po:wl:'r, under the provisions
of the act of March 3, 1891, to authorize the tlamming of the
Rio Grande River for irrigation purposes. lb.
See TREATIES, 6-9.
RIVERS AND HARBORS . .
1. The contract for tbe construction of a ship canal between the
South Pass of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico, by James
B. Eads and his associates construed, and former opinions relative to width and characteristics of channel required to be maintained concurred in. 29.
2. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of War justice, either
to the Government or to the contractor on the works at the
South Pass jetties of the Mississippi River, so requires, he has
tho right to determine the actual height of average :flood tide
as a datum for measurements. 308.
3. 'l'he period to be covered by observations for the purpose of fixing
the proper average flood tide of a river depends on science, not
on law; but it should be sufficiently long to include every
phase of the situation as it is affected by the various causes
which operate upon it. lb.
4. The act of June 3, 1896, providing for the improYement of the
Chicago River "as far as may be permitted by the existing
docks and wharves" confines the improvement·s within the
existing docks and wharves. 471.
5. The river and harbor act of 1896 provided for a deep-water harbor
of commerce and of refuge at either San Pedro Harbor or Port
Los Angeles ancl the appointment of a board to select the place
and determine the plans of improven:i:ent. 587.
6. The decision of the board as to location of the harbor is final. lb.
7. The report of the board considered and the c0nclusion reached
that the project reported by them is a breakwater and that it
fulfills the provision of the law and will make within its me11ning a harbor for commerce and refuge . lb.
8. Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor the
rail way to be built upon trestle work following the line of the
jetty must be at tho expense of the Government, whether it is
the cas of original construction or extension. 607.
9. The Government mu t bear the expense of maintaining the railway npou the ori 0 ·inal work aud upon tho extension after the
suspension of operations npon the.'i<', respectively. lb.
, ee APPROPIUATIO ·s, 5, 6 8-15; NAVIGABLE W .A.TERS.
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ROCK CREEK PARK, D. C.
See DISTRICT Ol!' COLUMBIA, 4.
SAN PEDRO HARBOR.
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 5-7.
SAVINGS.
See NAVY, 7.
SEAL FISHERIES.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require the North
American Commercial Company to furnish security to the amount
of its indebtedness for the years 1894 and 1895 in addition to
the $50,000 of bonds already made pursuant to section 1963, Revised Statutes. 177.
2. The British Government present a claim for damages on account
of the seizure by American cruisers in the North Pacific Ocean
and Bering Sea of the British sealing schooners Wanderer and
Favorite for violation of the laws for the preservation of fur
seals, having on board prohibited and unsealed firear_m s,
together with large numbers of seal skins. The schooners were
delivered to a British naval officer with a written statement of
the facts upon which the seizures bad been made, but which
did not specifically assert that seals had been taken contrary
to law, which officers, without in anywise invoking the action
of the courts, released them, having reached the conclusion,
after investigation and upon legal advice, that no case could
ue made out against them: Held, there is no liability for damages. 234.
3. There is nothing in the British statutes or orders and instructions
issued for their execution which requires any formal charge by
officers making seizure of a vessel. An indorsement of the
grounds upon which it was seized on the certificate of the vessel
· is required in order to enable the vessel to proceed to port for
trial. Ib.
·
4. The mode provided by the Bering Sea Award act for dealing with
vessels seized is to subject them to l egal proceedings in the
British courts. Delivery to the naval authorities of the country to which the vessel belongs, in place of delivery to its judicial authorities, was merely for convenience and not for the
purpose of dispensing with legal proceedings or having a trial
by such nava,l authorities instead. lb.
5. The naval officer to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized
under the provisions of this act has no power to review or
investigate the seizure. Ib.
6. While the acts of both countries are directed only against cases
of unlawful seal fishing, they are not limited to the seizure of
vessels actually caught in the act, for in all other cases the
action must depend upon the evidence and indications. Ib.
7. ·where reasonable grounds for the seizure of a vessel are shown,
there is no liability, altho ugh the court has discharged the vessel. lb.
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SEAL FI ITERIES-Contilmed.
If a, liability exists for unlawful seizures, it is governed by the
well- ettled principles of law ommon to both countries relative t.o such liabiliti s. lb.
9. Licenses a,re not requiretl for vessels engaged in fur-seal fishing
in other waters tba,n those cov-ered by the award of the Paris
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239.
10. A rngulation of the Secretary of the Treasury preRcribing that
only a certain race or class of peopl e shall have the pridlege of
1dlling sea otter within n, certain area would be a violn.tion of
section 1915, Revised Sfotutes, a,s being a grant of a special
privilege. 333.
11. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized under section 1956,
Revised Statutes, as amended, to instruct captains of the furseal patrol fleet to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to
have hunted sea otter within the Territory of Alaska and the
waters thereof and to a11 the dominion of the United States in
the waters of Bering Sea. 346.
12. The Makah Indians arc prohibited as other persons from killing
seals in the Pacific Ocean, including the Bering Sea, by the act
of March 6, 1894, aud the only right they can claim is that of
sealing in the particular manner and places permitted in explicit
terms l)y section 6 of the act to coast Indians generally. 466.
See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 15.
SEA OTTER.
See SEAL FISHERIES, 10.
SEAMEN.
The amount expended by a, United States consular officer in providing shipwrecked seamen with food, clothing, and passage to
a port in the United States should not be deducted from the
wages of such seamen. 25, 34.
See NAVY, 7; REVENl'E-CUTTER SERVICE, 3; VESSELS, 4, 7, 9.
SEA STORES.
See w ORDS

AND

PHRASES.

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE.
The Secretary of Agriculture can make general regulations under
which subordinates in charge of particular localities can furlough, without pay, assistant microscopists, the same to take
effect at once. 318.
See QUARANTINE ETC., 1, 2; MEAT INSPECTION, 2, 7; SEEDS, 1, 2, 4.
,'ECRETARY OF STATE.
It is competent for the Secretary of State to -prohibit the publication in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American Republics
of advertisements of private firms or corporations. 514.

, 'E 'RETARY l!"' THE I TERIOR.
The e ·r tary of the Interior has no power under the provisions
of th a.ct of 1farc11 3 1 91, to authorize tbe damming of the
l i (;r:mll Hiv r for irri~ation pnrpos s.
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SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
See APPROPRIATIONS, 4; Brns, 1-3; 90NTRACTS, 1; INFORMERS;
NAVAL ACADEMY, 3; NAVY.
SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to make distribution of the diplomas and medals directly to the exhibitors of the
World's Columbian Exposition. 216.
2. '.('he Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make temporary
appointments, without certification from the Civil Service
Commission, of draftsmen and skilled service, under the act of
of March 2, 1895. 261.
·
3. The Secretary of the Treasury is not required under the act of
July 31, 1894, to report to Congress the balances due on postal
accounts for the past :fiscal year. 296.
4. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States
which includes judgments on recognizances is vested by law in
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to all claims save
those arising under the postal laws. 494.
See CHINESE, 3, 8, 9, 20, 22; COMPROMISE; CUSTOMS LAWS, ETC.,
5, 6, 53, 68, 71-73, 75-77, 79, 80, 82-89 i ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 1-5;
JUDGMENTS, 1, 2 j SEAL FISHERIES, 1, 10, 11.
SECRETARY OF WAR.
1. A penalt,y imposed under a contract for delay in completing a
work which has been finished according to the contract without damage to the Government, may be remitted by the Secretary of ,var and the sum withheld paid to the· contractor. 27.
2. The Secretary of War is charged with the custody, care, and protection of the Washington Monument. 215.
3. If a change in the location of an existing railroad is a necessity in
the building of an authorized boat railway, the acquisition by
the Secretary of War of the necessary land to make such a
change, is merely an incident to the enterprise entrusted to
him. 221.
4.. Under the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894, and the act of
April 24, 1888, the Secretary of War has full authority to condemn the land necessary for the construction of a boat railway
provided for in the former act. Ib.
5. It is within the authority of the Secretary of War to waive informalities in the submission of bids and the written guaranty
accompanying the same for the performance of public works,
and in specific cases to waive formal defects both in the bids and
bonds. 469.
6. The control and supervision of the navigable waters of the United
States is placed in the Secretary of War. 518.
Sec MILITARY RESERVATIONS, 4, 5; NAVIGABLE vVATERS, 3, 4, 5,
9-11, 14; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 8.

684

DIGEST OF OPINIONS.

SEEDS.
1. The seeds purchasab~e under the act of March 2, 1895, by the
Secretary of Agriculture for distribution are limited to those
described in section 527, Revised Statutes. 162.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to make the purchase
of such seeds, conformable to section 3709, Revised Statutes,
reserving the right to reject any and all bids. lb.
3. The act making appropriations for the purchase of seeds for the
Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year 1895 does not
authorize the purchase of any others than those described in
section 527, Revised Statutes. 55.
4. Under·the joint resolution (S. R. 43) the Secretary of Agriculture
is required_to distribute valuable seeds for the year 1896 in
accordance with the custom of preceding years. If such custom
has varied from year to year, he is free to exercise his discretion,
which is merely one of choice and not a discretion to do or leave
undone. 321.
5. The appropriation which was made for the purchase of seeds for
the Department of .Agriculture under the provisions of section
527, Revised Statutes, for the year 1896, is available for purchases which may be made under joint resolution (S. R. 43). lb.
6. The act of April 25, 1896, making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the ii.seal year ending .June 30, 1897,
authorizes the expenditure of $130,000 for seed already put up
in packages and labeled ready for distribution. 372.
SENATORS.
See CONGRESSMEN.
SHIP'S PAPERS.
See VESSELS, 5.
SMUGGLED GOODS.
Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by
a collector of customs, although protected by patents. 72.
SOUTH CAROLINA DISPENSARY LAWS.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, 2.
SOUTH PASS CHANNEL, MISSISSIPPI RIVER.
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 1, 2.
SPAIN.
See C

RAN

INSURRECTION.

STATE BA K CIRCULATION.
See TAXATION, 6.
TATE DEPART 1ENT.
Tl.Je chi f ·lerk, C'hiefs of hureaus, and translators of the State
partment are derk within the meaning of section 169,
l vi ed , tatnteH, and are to he appointed by the 8ecretary of

tat!'. 363.
' "PRffTI •c;

ANJ> BIN»IN ·,

1 2, 4, 5.
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STATES.
As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain
bonds issued by certain States and owned by the United States
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1, 3-6, 10.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See ACTIONS, 2.
STATU'rORY CONSTRUC TION.
1. If a term has no technical meaning, it must be regarded as used in
the ordinary sense. 179.
2. If a usage is no~ definite, uniform, and general, it is entitled to no
weight. 179. ·
3. If a special meaning has been attached to certain words in a prior
tariff act, there is a presumption of some force that Congress
intended that they should have the same signification when
used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject-mat,ter.
541.
4. One of the surest methods of interpreting a provision in a tariff
law is by its past history. Ib.
·
5. The headings of the schedules in the tariff act have little significance, they being intended only for general suggestions as to the
character of the articles within the schedules. 66.
6. As an aid to the construction of a statute, it is proper to consider
the original form of the bill and the changes made by amendment. Ib.
7. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively to be resolved
in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act-mentions
or describes the same article in two different places, when the
higher rate governs. lb.
8. Too great weight should not be placed upon exceptions and provisos in the construction of the main provisions of a statute,
since they may have been inserted out of an excess of caution.
255.
9. Words should not have a retrospective operation unless they are
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature can
not be otherwise satisfied. 408.
10. The ordinary meaning of language must be presumed to have
been intended unless it would manifestly defeat the object of
the provisions. 420.
·
11. While the word "may" is sometimes construed as imposing a
duty rather than conferring a discretion, especially where the
power conferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public
or that of private persons, yet this rule of construction is by no
means invariable. Its application depends on the context of
the statute and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it
was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary
power or to impose an imperative duty. Ib.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-Continued.
12. A statute should receive a reasonable construction and one in
consonance with its manifest object and intent. 546.
13. In the construction of a doubtful passage of a st.atute resort
should be hacl to the immediate context and the l egislation in
pari rnateria.. 124.
14. Where language is ambiguous the probable intent of the legislature should be songht as a guide to the construction. 4Hi.
15. In case of doubt as to the construction of a revised statute: r eference may always be had to the original act. 190.
16. A clear omission from a statute can not bo supplied upon any
considerations of supposed oversight, inconsistency, or hardship. 291,416.
17. Savings and exceptions are often introduced in a, statute from
excessive caution. It wonkl sometimes porvert the intentions
of an author of a writing if every other thing of the same
general tenor as that excepted should be regarded as embraced
in the general words. 597.
18. "\¥here two acts are passed on tho same day the· order of their
passage is not important if they can he reconciled. Ib.
19. Two acts under legislative consideration at the same time should
be construed as contemporaneous acts in arriving at the intent
of the legislature. lb.
20. In construing an act it is proper to consider facts which must
have been known to Congress, and to assume that it legislated
having them in view. Ib.
21. Repeals by implication are not favored and a.re held to have taken
place only when the provisions of the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable and could not have been intended to be operative at the same time. 55, 181.
22. The inconsistency and antagonism between the two must be such
that they can not stand together. 119, 203, 227.
23. Irreconcilable conflict is necessary for an implied repeal of a
statute, and the presumption is stronger against implied repeals
where provisions supposed to conflict are in the same act or
were passed at nearly the same time. Ib.
24. An act of Congress should not be treated as a nullity if it can by
any reasonable construction be made operative. 372.
25. The object of a later act being expressly to a.mend an earlier act,
a feature of the former act which was omitted from the later
act was necessarily repealed. 253.
26. The portions of an amended section of a sta,tute which are merely
copied ,vithout changes are not to be considered as repealed
and again enacted, l ut to have been the law all along; and the
new partH or the changed portions are not to be taken to have
been the law at any time pi:ior to the pas age of the amended
act. 159.
27. In mea uring the legislative intent as to the scope to b given to
a sta ute in its operation upon previous statutes not specifically
referr cl to, a onsideration of the effect upon the public welfare
mu t n e sarily be tak n in view. 181.
0
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-Continued.
28. In case of inconsistenCJ' between a treaty and a subsequent statute
the latter controls. 80.
_29. A treaty, the provisions of which are self-executing, modi.fies the
requirment of a prior statute with which it is in conflict. 347.
30. The ordinary presumption of a statnte is that it l ays down a rule
of conduct for the future, but makes no change in rights already
acquired or conditions already established. 21.
31. When power is given to pnblic officers to be exercised. for the public interest, the language nsed, thongh permissive in form,
i8 in fact mandatory. 167.
32. Language whose ordinary meaning is permissive only is sometimes held to be mand~tory when other parts of the la,w make
plain that it was intended to require and not merely authoriz_e.
391.
33. The appropriation of specific funds "to be immediately available"
ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them for the purpose
named in the act. 420.
See DEPARTMENTAL CONSTRt:CTION, 1-7.
ST. LOUIS AND CLOQUET RIVERS.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 2, 3.
STRONG AWARD.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, l.
SUBPCENA OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.
See WITNESS FEES, 1.
SUPPLIES.
It is unlawful for an Executive Department to make a contra.ct for
supplies for a longer term than one year from the time the
· contract was made. 304.
See ADVERTISEMENTS, 1-9; Brns.
TARIFP ACTS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3-7.
TAXATION.
1. A tax imposed upon a schooner, under section 4219, Revised Statutes, on account of having employed on board as an officer one
not a citizen of the United States should uot be remitted,
although such person h'a d declared bis intention of becoming a
citizen, and for three years subsequent thereto continuously
served on board American merchant vessels, but bad failed to
actually perfect his citizenship. 412.
2. The passengers on whom a capitation tax is imposed by the act of
August 3, 1882,, and August 18, 1894-, are those who make the
United States their place of destination and not those who
merelr touch at our ports en route to some other country. 543.
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TAXATION-Continued.
3. An assessment made by the Treasury Department of 10 per·cent,
under the provisions of section 20 of the act of February 8, 1875,
upon the circulating notes of Cauadian bauks which had come
into the Unit,ed States and been received and paid by banks in
Calais, Me., is one which may be compromised. 557.
4. Banks of the United Sta,tes are liable for this tax on such circulating notes which have come across the line and been received
by United States banks and paid ont a,s current funds. lb.
5. The 'intent anu. meaniug of section 20 of this a,ct was to apply the
tax to the amount of the circulating notes issued by any of
the ·persons or corporations named in the statute, and used by
the banks and other persons therein named. lb.
6. An order on a State bank which can not be used in the community
as money without danger of total loss to whoever may take it
is not such a note as is embraced within sections 19 and 20 of
the act of February 8, 1875, upou which a tax may be imposed.
336.
7. The opinion of the Attorney-General of May 15, 1889, does not
conflict with the collection of the special tax on retail liquor
dealers in the Indian country and Alaska under section 3244,
Revised Statutes. 25.
8. Under the income-tax law mileage and commutation of quarters
paid officers of the United States Army are to be considered as
parts of the income of such officer, an<l are to be added to their
other income in making up the total income. 112.
9. When the amount paid such officer has reached iu the aggregate
for the calendar year $4,000, the paymaster should deduct from
the first payment in excess of such amount the tax on the entire
amount of such excess of salary payable to such officer for said
year. lb.
TENNESSEE EXPOSITION
See CHINESE, 20.
TRADE-MARK.

See COPYRIGIITS, 4..
TRANSPORTATION OF ENLISTED MEN.
See ACCOUNTS, 2, 3.
TREASURY DEPARTME T.
1. The general appraisers appointed uncler the provisions of the act
of June 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department. 85
2. Tho allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the dii
ferent departments is not actually passe(l upon by the accounting offic rs of the Treasury, and is not within their jurisdiction.
0
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'ee .Au 'EL'CE, 1, 2;
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of a prior statu te with whi hit ii:; ju conflict. 347.
Article 7 f the tr aty of .February 2, 1848, k nown as the Treaty
of foa<lalup Hidalgo, i st ill in force so far as it affects the
Rio Grande. 274.
~
Article 7 is limited in terms to t h at p ortion of the Rio Grande
lying b elow the southern boundary of New Mexico, and applies
only to such works as either p arty might construct on its own
side. Ib.
The only right the treaty professed to create or protect with
respect to the Rio Grande w as that of navigation. Claims for ·
injuries to agriculture alone in consequen ce of the scarcity of
water resulting from irrigation ditches wholly within the
Unite·d States at places far above the h ead of navigation, find
no support in the treaty. Ib.
The taking of water for irrigating purposes from the Rio Grande,
above the point where it ceases to be entirely within the United
States and becomes the boundary between this country and
Mexico, is not prohibited by said treaty. Ib.
See CHINESE; EXTRADITION, 1.

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury may return the :findings to th e
United States commissioner in proceedings for t he remission of
penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further hearing
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289.
2. But he has no authority to prosecute· a further inquiry into the
facts after a United · States commissioner has reported his findings under section 18 of said act. 549.
See CHINESE, 25 i EXTRAf>ITION, 1.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS.
See DISTRICT ATTORNEYS,
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UNMAILABLE MATTER.
See LOTTERIES.
USELESS PAPERS.
See POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, 1.
UTE INDIANS.
Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the
benefit of the Ute Indians within the meaning of the act of
June 15, 1880, and can not be authorized by the President under
its terms. 131.
VESSELS.
1. 'l'he owner or consignee of a vessel arriving from a, foreign port is
entitled to a lien for freight on the merchandise imported on
such vessel ·for the purpose of exportation. 38.
2. Consular officers of the United States can not extend expired inspection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is there
any authority of law for sending local inspector's out of the
•country to make inspection. 52.
3. American steam vessels while engaged in commerce beyond the
jurisdiction of the United States, are not subject to the regulalations provided by Title 52, Revised Statutes. lb.
4. The act of June 26, 1884, making provision for a class of persons
who might be officers of United States vessels, although aliens,
not being in cqn:fl.ict or inconsistent with the act of April 17,
1874, both statutes must be regarded as in force. 166.
5. The master of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered, are not
required by sections 4309 and 4310, Revised Statutes, to deposit
their ship's papers with the United States consul when they arrive at a foreigD port where there is such a consular officer. 190.
6. Licenses are not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal :fishing
in other waters than those covered by the award of the Paris
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239.
7. Section 4598, Revised Statutes, with reference to the absenting of
seamen from vessels without leave from the proper officer,
where he has signed a contract before a shipping commissioner
to perform a voyage, and the apprehension of such deserters,
does not apply to a vessel engaged in the coast wise trade of the
United States, unless, in compliance with section 4520, such a
seaman contracts formally with a vessel of 50 tons burden or
upwards. 483.
8. The purpose of section 22 of the Dingley tariff act was to secure
to nited States vessels the transportation of goods by sea by
discriminating against transportation in other vessels to the
United States, and also to prevent evasion to a contiguous
country. 597.
9. e tion 4609, Revised Statutes-, with reference to the demanding
or receiving of remuneration by- anyone from any seamen or
persons seeking employment as such, does not extend to vessels
ngaged in the coasting trade generally. 284.
e :\IERI 'A.~T REGI TRY; A.VIGATION LAws; SEAL F1snE1uEs;
TA.XATIO · ,
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VOLUNTEER SERVICE.
See ARMY OFFICERS, 8.
WAR.
See REAL ESTATE, 1.
WAREHOUSES.
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 15-25.
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT.
See RAILROAD COMPANIESJ 8.
WASHINGTON MONUMENT.
The Secretary of War is charged with the custody, care, and protection of the Washington Monument. 215.
WASHINGTON, STATE OF.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 10.
WEATHER BUREAU.
A vacancy in the office of the Chief of the Weather Bureau can
only be filled by appointment of the President or by detailing
the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, in accordance with the
act of October 1, 1890. 189.
WEST POINT.
See MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT.
WITNESS FEES.
Government employees are not entitled to witness fees when subpamaed to testify in behalf of the United States, but are entitled
to their expenses. When subpoonaed by a private party they
may demand and accept witness fees. 263.
WORDS AND PHRASES.
Words should not have a retrospective operation unless they are
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature can
not be otherwise satisfied. 408.
AGENT-

The Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury are agents of the
Government in the broad sense of the term, but are more properly called officers, and were not intended to be included within
the meaning of the word " agent" in section 3469, Revised
Statutes. 361.
·
The "agent" referred to in that section is one who has special
charge of a claim for the purposes of collection or enforcement,
in the same way that the district or special attorney bas,
though he need not possess their professional character. Ib.
BROKER-

This word has no definite legal signification. 255.
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WORDS AND PHRASES-Continued.
COST-

The word "cost" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, is to be construed liberally; and if the actual cost of the repairs is three
times the actual purchase price of the wreck, then she is
entitled to registry. 143.
CUSTOMHOUSE BROKER-

As used in the tariff act of 1894, section 23, the term includes
persons who deal in drawback l'.llatters exclusively, as well as
those who combine all branches of customhouse work. 255.
DRAWBACK MONEYS-

" Drawback moneys" are duties; repayment to the importer or
the person to whom he has transferred his rights of a part of
the duties which have been paid by him upon receiving his
goods. 255.
EMPLOY-

In section 169, Revised Statutes, this word is regarded as the
equivalent of " appoint." 355, 363.
LOTTERY--

The name "lottery" · covers any determination of gain or loss by
the issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion.
It is none the less a lottery because it is fairly conducted or
because such conduct is ampl~ secured. 313.
MAY-

While the word ''may'' is sometimes construed as imposing a duty
rather than conferring a discretion, especially where the power
conferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public or that
of private persons, yet this rule of construction is by no means
· invariable. Its application depends on the context of the
statute and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it was
the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power
or to impose an imperative duty. 420.
MAY BE-

The various provisions in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896,
that contracts "may be" entered into by the Secretary of War
for the completion of certain improvements, to be paid for out
of future appropriations, are not mandatory but discretionary,
and he may decline to make contracts in all cases where he is
convinced that the public interests will not be subserved by
making them. 420.
MERCHANDISE-

The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in different
parts of the customs legislation. In sections 2766 and 3111,
Revised Statutes, it covers any tangible personal property. In
sections 2795 and 3113 it means property imported into the
country whether for sale or not. In the act of 1875 it has a
narrower meaning, but still includes p ersonal property not
import •d for tho use or enjoyment of the importer himself. 92.
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MERCHANT-

A Chinese person is not a "merchant" within the meaning of
section 2 of the act of March 3, 1893, unless he condµcts his
business either in his own name or in a firru name of which his
own is a part. 5.
MISCELLANEOUS-

The word "miscellaneous" in tbe act of April 21, 1894, refers to
that class of commodities which must be purchased on a considerable scale and used alike by many or all of the various
departments and Government establishments in the city of
Washington. 59.
MODIFICATION-

To change slightly, as in the form or in the external qualities of
a thing, or to change somewhat the form or qualities of. 207.
MORTAR STEEL-

The term ''mortar steel" properly includes any steel of such
quality as is considered by experts to be adapted for use in the
construction of mortars. 179.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-

A "municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws
of the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a
soldier violating such an ordinance and escaping to a military
reservation should be surrendered to the civ~l authorities for
trial upon demand. 88.
NAVIGABLE DEPTH-

A depth sufficiently wide to be navigated by vessels either moved
by sails or steam and to permit them to pass each other. 29.
~NEUTRALITY LAWS-

The nljutrality laws of the United States, so called because their
main purpose is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the
United States while occupying a position of neutrality toward
belligerents. They were also intended to prevent offences
against friendly powers, whether they should or should not be
engaged in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. 267.
NO PERSON APPOINTED TO A PLACE-

The phr.ase "no person appointed to a place," as used in the civ~lservice rules substituted by the President ~ovember 2, 1894,
affects persons holding the positions at the time as well as those
thereafter appointed. 91.
ORDER-

The word" order" in the clause in the public printing and binding act of January 12, 1895, section 80, providing "that no
order for public printing shall be acted upon after the expiration of one year, unless the entire copy and illustrations shall
be furnished within that period, was not intended to include a
joint r.esolution of Congress for the printing of a "history of
in~eruatioual arbitrations," digest, etc. 427.
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PERILS OF THE SEA-

By "perils of the sea" is meant all loses which occur from maritune adventure . 124.
PERMANENT DISABILITY-

.A. permanent disability i one that appears to be chronic or of
indefinite future duration. 2 6.
PERMANENTLY INCAPACITATED-

Within the meaning of the act of March 2, 1895, an officer i s
permanently incapacitated when his disability appears to b e
chronic or of indefinite duration. 286.
PORT-

The word "port" does not always mean a seaport when used in
connection with our customs officers, and the word '' land" is
not necessarily limited to disembarkation from a ship. 357.
PRIVATE HANDS-

The term "private hands" as used in section 3992, Revised Statutes, with reference to the conveyance or transmission of mail
matter, was evidently intended to cover all except common
carriers on post routes. Neither the latter nor their employees
while engaged in this business can be considered as "private
hands." 394.
SEA STORES-

" Sea stores," in tariff legislation, are the stores contained in
incoming vessels which are necessary for their use for the purpose of the voyage; articles brought into port aboard ship tu
be consumed aboard or carried off again on: the outward voyage, or if put ashore at all, landed only .f or the convenience of
the ship itself. 92.
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE-

.A. "special privilege" is one which is not open to all persona
alike who comply with terms and conditions fairly within the
power of all. The limitation of a right to people of a specified
race or class is necessarily a "special privilege." 333.
STATIONERY-

The word "stationery" has no special legal definition, but is
ordinarily defined as the "articles usually sold by stationers;
the various materials employed in writing, such as paper, pens,
pencils, and ink." 59.
SUBJECTS-

The word" subjects" is used in treaties and intern.ational awards
chiefly because the inhabitants of mona1·chies are called subjects instead of citizens; yet in the act of April 6, 1894, it was
intended to embrace Indians. 466.
SUCH-

Ordinarily the word "such" refers to the next immediate antecedent, hnt not n ·er f!arily.
ever when the purpose of the
s ction would thereby be impaired. 551.
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TO BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE-

The appropriation of specific fonds u to be immediately available" ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them for the
purposes named in the act. 420.
WOOL.

The word "wool," as used in paragraph 297 of the ta.riff act of
1894, refers to hair of the sheep only, and the new~uties upon
articles made of the hair of other animals went immediate:iy
into effect upon the passage of the act. 66.
"Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of the
alpa.ca and of the angora goat, but never is used to include all
goats' hair, nor yet camels' hair, cow hair, or horsehair.
Throughout Schedule K of the above act it is used so as to
include even hair of the kinds first mentioned. Ib.
The phrase "manufactures of wool" in the above paragraph does
not include articles of which wool is a component material, but
of which it is not the material of chief value. Ib.
WRECK.

The word "wreck" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, must be
taken in a very comprehensive sense as applicable to a vessel
which is disabled or rendere_d unfit for navigation, whether this
state of the vessel has been caused by the winds or the waves,
by stranding, fire, explosion of boilers, or by any other casualty. 198.
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION.
1. The question of drawbacks upon exhibits of foreign governments
at the World's Fair is governed by the act of April 25, 1890, and
not by section 3025, Revised Statutes. 36.
2. The Secretary of the 'rreasury has no authority to make distribution of the diplomas a~.d medals directly to the exhibitors of
the World's Columbian Exposition. 216.
3. The receipt and distribution by an authorized committee or subordinate body of the medals and diplomas awarded by the
World's Columbian Commission are purely ministerial acts,
involving no discretion. They could consequently be delegated
by the commission, and, as they were so delegated, delivery can
be made either to its executive committee or to the board of
reference and control. 1 b•.
4. So much of section 3 of the act of August 5, 1892, as provides for
the duplication of medals at the mints of the United States in
gold or silver or brass was repealed by the act of March 3, 1893.
253.
5. After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas
awarded them, the Treasury Department has not any authority
to say what use shall or shall not be made of them, or to restrict
the making or using of facsimiJes of them by exhibitors to whom
they have been awarded, beyond wlJat is prescribed by the
express provision of the statutes already referred to. 330.
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6. The law authorizing the Secretary of th e Treasury to furnish
electrotypes and photographs of the m.edals of aw ard t o exhibitors to whom medals have been awarded, and to newspapers
a111l periodicals for publication, carries with it the auth ority, to
those to whom such electrotypes and photographs m ay be furnished, to have prints made therefrom without furth er or more
specific authority. lb. ·
7. The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the right to insert
the name of the exhibitor in the blank space which will b o used
for that purpose on the medal. Ib.
"WRECK."
See WORDS
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YELLOW 1<.,EVER.
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